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with a new introduction.
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More than 10 years have gone since the Swedish Social Insurance Agency published
a series of booklets entitled Perspectives on Mortality Forecasting. Five volumes
appeared in print, on different topics that all are relevant for anyone faced with the
task of computing a forecast of mortality in future years. Each volume contained the
papers presented in a series of workshops organized by the Stockholm Committee on
Mortality Forecasting during the years 2002–2007. The current volume contains
reprints of the contributions to the five booklets. Each part of this book corresponds
to one original booklet. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research for the publication of this book and
from the Swedish Social Insurance Agency for organizing the Committee’s
workshops.
The field of mortality forecasting is in continuous change. The purpose of the
current volume is to track this development by showing the reader what the main
issues were some 10–15 years ago, together with an update. Therefore, the book
starts with an introductory chapter, which summarizes recent new insights on the
following topics:
– The need for accurate mortality forecasting today for systems for pension, health
care, and elderly care
– Determinants and dynamics of life expectancy
– Causes of death and lifestyle factors, such as smoking and obesity
– Cohort and period perspectives
– Compression of mortality
– Joint forecasting of mortality in similar populations
– From scenarios to stochastic modelling
– The way conditions in early life affect mortality in later life
– The increasing gap in life expectancy with respect to position in the income
distribution
vii
Some of the material in the introductory chapter relates to only one of the five
parts, while other items in the list above cut across themes. The last item brings up a
new topic of mortality forecasting, which was not dealt with in any of the workshops.
Lund, Sweden Tommy Bengtsson
Oslo, Norway Nico Keilman
viii Preface
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Tommy Bengtsson, Nico Keilman, Juha M. Alho, Kaare Christensen,
Edward Palmer, and James W. Vaupel
Part I Current Practice
2 Life Expectancy Is Taking Center Place in Modern National
Pension Schemes – A New Challenge for the Art of Projecting
Mortality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Edward Palmer
3 Experiences from Forecasting Mortality in Finland . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Juha M. Alho
4 Mortality Projections in Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Helge Brunborg
5 Mortality Assumptions for Sweden. The 2000–2050 Population
Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Hans Lundström
6 Forecasting Life Expectancy: The SCOPE Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 73
James W. Vaupel
7 Mortality Forecasts. Comments on How to Improve Existing
Models – An Epidemiologist’s Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Kaare Christensen
8 The Need for Looking Far Back in Time When Predicting Future
Mortality Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Tommy Bengtsson
ix
Part II Probabilistic Models
9 Erroneous Population Forecasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Nico Keilman
10 Remarks on the Use of Probabilities in Demography
and Forecasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Juha M. Alho
11 An Expert Knowledge Approach to Stochastic Mortality
Forecasting in the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Maarten Alders and Joop de Beer
12 Stochastic Forecasts of Mortality, Population and Pension
Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Shripad Tuljapurkar
Part III The Linear Rise in Life Expectancy: History and Prospects
13 The Linear Rise in the Number of Our Days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Jim Oeppen and James W. Vaupel
14 Mortality Forecasts and Linear Life Expectancy Trends . . . . . . . . . 167
Ronald Lee
15 Forecasting Life Expectancy: A Statistical Look at Model Choice
and Use of Auxiliary Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Juha M. Alho
16 Life Expectancy Convergence Among Nations Since 1820:
Separating the Effects of Technology and Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Jim Oeppen
17 Linear Increase in Life Expectancy: Past and Present . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Tommy Bengtsson
Part IV Causes of Death
18 How Useful Are the Causes of Death When Extrapolating
Mortality Trends. An Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Graziella Caselli, Jacques Vallin, and Marco Marsili
19 Forecasting Life Expectancy and Mortality in Sweden – Some
Comments on Methodological Problems and Potential
Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
Måns Rosén
20 How Analysis of Mortality by Cause of Death Is Currently
Influencing UK Forecasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
Richard Willets
x Contents
Part V Cohort Factors: How Conditions in Early Life Influence
Mortality Later in Life
21 A Life Course Perspective to the Modern Secular Mortality
Decline and Socioeconomic Differences in Morbidity and
Mortality in Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Martin Lindström and George Davey Smith
22 Early Life Events and Later Life Health: Twin and Famine
Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
Kaare Christensen
23 The Month of Birth: Evidence for Declining but Persistent
Cohort Effects in Lifespan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Gabriele Doblhammer
24 Early-Life Conditions and Old-Age Mortality in a Comparative
Perspective: Nineteenth Century Sweden and Belgium . . . . . . . . . . 335




Tommy Bengtsson, Nico Keilman, Juha M. Alho, Kaare Christensen,
Edward Palmer, and James W. Vaupel
1.1 The Need for Accurate Mortality Forecasts Is Greater
Than Ever Before
Globally, the twenty-first century will witness rapid population ageing. Already in
2050, one out of five persons in the world, and one out of three in Europe, is
expected to be 60 or over (UN 2015). Moreover, we have entered into a new stage
of population ageing in terms of its causes, which have altered its consequences. In
the first stage, lasting until the middle of the twentieth century in developed
countries, population ageing was entirely due to the decline in fertility, with Sweden
being commonly used as an example (Coale 1957; Bengtsson and Scott 2010; Lee
and Zhou 2017). During this stage, the increase in life expectancy was primarily
driven by declines in infant and child mortality. It worked in the opposite direction to
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the fertility decline, making the population younger since it added more years before,
than after retirement (Coale 1957; Lee 1994). In the second stage of population
ageing, which is the current situation, population ageing is primarily driven by the
increase in life expectancy, which is now due to declining old-age mortality. As a
result, more years are added after retirement than in working ages (Lee 1994). Could
immigration or an upswing in fertility stop population ageing? The short answer is
most likely not. The effect of migration on population aging is generally regarded as
minor (Murphy 2017), and since population ageing is a global phenomenon, it will
be of no general help anyway. A rapid increase in fertility is improbable and, in any
case, an increase would take some 25 years before adding to the labor force. Instead,
attention has been focused on how to adapt our social systems to the increasing
number of elderly per worker – more so since the increase in the elderly-per-worker
ratio came in parallel with a rise in per capita costs for the institutional care, home
care, and general health care for the elderly.
The increase in per capita costs for the elderly is most clearly visible in the United
States and Japan, but also in a selection of European countries, among them Sweden
(Lee and Mason 2011; Qi 2016). Attempts to adapt social care, health care, and
pension systems to this new reality, among other things by increasing the minimum
pension age and even indexing them to life expectancy, are not sufficient. Accurate
life expectancy projections for planning the supply of health care and other services
to the elderly forms of care become then crucial. This said, the public pension system
is still a main driver of costs in a large number of countries, which is why we need to
learn how to design national pension systems that adapt to the ageing process.
Specifically, the re-design of public pension systems has increasingly been directed
to creating public life-cycle savings-transfer schemes that are financially sustainable.
An example of a financially stable pension scheme that by design is demograph-
ically robust is the Non-financial Defined Contribution (NDC) public pension
scheme, introduced in a number of European countries since the mid-1990s (Latvia,
Italy, Poland, Norway, and Sweden). What’s more, the demographic stability fea-
tures of such NDC systems are being emulated by other countries, where Germany is
a prime example. This is not the end of the story, however. In fact, it is more where
the story of this publication begins. What has happened is that life expectancy these
days is an important parameter in calculating newly granted pensions, not only in
public NDC schemes, but also increasingly in occupational and or employer-based
financially defined contribution schemes. Indeed, more and more countries are
converting from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes (e.g. Australia,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States).
What all systems for public and private pension, health care, and elderly care have
in common is that accurate life expectancy and mortality projections are important
for both planning and managing expenditures. This is why the topic of the endeavor
presented in this publication is how to project future mortality accurately. Ideally,
projected values should be very close to outcomes observed later. The problems
arises when there is a systematic tendency to over- or underestimate the remaining
number of years a group of persons of a certain age may be expected to be alive.
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In practice, during recent decades, demographers, actuaries, economists, and
other social scientists have done just this. They have systematically underestimated
improvements in future life expectancy for people 60 and older. This means that
current pension schemes are under-financed. Similarly, to calculate future costs for
social and health care systems, accurate mortality forecasts are equally important.
The demographic models used in projecting mortality are usually based on
statistical modelling of historical data. The question is, is it possible to bring the
results of mortality modelling closer to the ideal, and if so, what do demographers
need to do to achieve this result? This reasoning provided the motivation for forming
the Stockholm Committee on Mortality Forecasting in 2000, and the question is still
a high priority, which is an important message of this publication. Here, we attempt
to identify what we have learned since this collaboration began, and discuss what
remains to be done. Doing so, we go beyond the five themes addressed in our
previous publications. We discuss whether information on socioeconomic status can
be used to improve mortality forecasting – in particular the fact that persons with low
socio-economic status (income, education, occupation) tend to be worse off in terms
of life expectancy than those with higher status.
1.2 Determinants and Dynamics of Life Expectancy –
Pensions Are Upping the Ante for the Challenge Facing
the Art of Projecting Mortality
In 2003, the first chapter of the first volume of the Stockholm Committee on
Mortality Forecasting was titled “Life Expectancy Is Taking Center Place in Modern
National Pension Schemes – A New Challenge for the Art of Projecting Mortality”
(see Chap. 2 in the current volume). Now, 15 years later, we are beginning to get a
clear perspective of the challenge of life expectancy dynamics, and its repercussions
for public policy in general and for pensions in particular. Since 2003, we have
become much more aware of the importance of understanding both the determinants
and dynamics of life expectancy. Below we will argue that accurate projections of
life expectancy are more necessary than before. Pension scheme design is nowadays
increasingly proactive rather than reactive. Life expectancy now has the leading role
in the design of pension schemes – in setting the minimum age at which benefits can
be claimed and how they are calculated.
As we moved into the twenty-first century, the “philosophy” for projecting life
expectancy employed by many official statistical agencies, embraced a general belief
that improvements in mortality could not continue into the twenty-first century at the
same rate as they did in the preceding half century. This belief is exemplified in the
approach adopted in the three country-practice contributions in the first volume of
Perspectives on Mortality Forecasting – Finland (Chap. 3 by Alho), Norway
(Chap. 4 by Brunborg), and Sweden (Chap. 5 by Lundström).
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In projecting life expectancy in the 1990s, Statistics Finland adjusted future
age-specific mortality rates so that the implied increase in life expectancy gradually
slowed down until the line reached a certain target value. Norway employed a
similar procedure, i.e. a trend extrapolation of past rate(s) of change in mortality
with a gradual decrease in the rate of change towards an “end target”. In Sweden, the
extrapolation included a downward adjustment of the historical rate of change, for
the period 2000–2050 as time passed, first by 25 percent and then by 50 percent.
For many, the eye-opening event of the time was Oeppen and Vaupel’s article
“Broken Limits to Life Expectancy”, published in Science. In this article, they
concluded that there is no evidence that the upward linear trend in best-performance
life expectancy is coming to an end:
Continuing belief in imminent limits (to improvements in mortality) is distorting public and
private decision-making.[. . .] If life expectancy were close to a maximum, then the increase
in the record expectation of life should be slowing. It is not. For 160 years, best-performance
life expectancy has steadily increased by a quarter of a year per year, an extraordinary
constancy of human achievement (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002).
In Chap. 13 of the present volume, Oeppen and Vaupel write: “If the trend of the past
160 years continues for the next half century, (best performance) life expectancy in
2050 will reach a record of 97.5.” At the time, the message of these two papers
conflicted with the cautious note “Overly optimistic forecasts of life expectancy have
already influenced important areas of public policy” (Olshansky et al. 2001).
Waldron (2005), commissioned by the USA Office of the Government Actuary,
examined the life expectancy projections underlying the US’s official projections for
Social Security, and even projection models employed in several European countries.
She concluded that, regardless of the choice of procedure, including use of the “state of
the art” Lee-Carter model, ex-post evaluations show that the models systematically
underestimate expected lifespans, frequently owing to the widespread use of “expert
opinion”. Keilman and Pham (2004) evaluated official mortality projections in 14
European countries, published after World War II, against actual outcomes. They
showed slow increases in projected life expectancies. On average, the under-prediction
of life expectancy amounted to 1.0–1.3 years of life for projections 10 years ahead, and
3.2–3.4 years of life 20 years ahead (see Chap. 9 by Keilman).
Mortality rates of the older population have declined faster and faster since at least
the 1960s. At a joint World Bank – Swedish conference held in Stockholm in
December 2009 on NDC pension schemes, a paper examined patterns of mortality
decline in the Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, and
four other countries – Japan, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States
(Alho et al. 2013). At that time, Japan (# 3) and Sweden (# 10) were in the top
10 group of performers and Portugal (# 51) and the US (# 47) at the bounds of the top
quartile, with the remaining countries in-between these four. The examination covered
birth cohorts in these eight countries beginning earliest in 1908 and ending in 2007.
The clearest pictures are those for Japan and Sweden. In war-free Sweden, age
groups 65–74 and 75–84 show an unmistakable acceleration in the rate of decline in
mortality around 1945–1950, when death rates started to decline faster than before
4 T. Bengtsson et al.
1945. This new trend is still visible in 2014. The same process is observable for Japan,
but it is much stronger and shorter in duration. It begins in the mid-1950s and
continues up to 1990, but even as it decreases in strength, the rate of acceleration in
these age groups is still on a par with all the other countries but the US. The latter
country goes between phases of accelerating and decelerating increases in the rate of
change in mortality. Most noteworthy is that in Japan, from around 1990, acceleration
in the decline in mortality also came to the age group 85–99 and is still going on.
The success of procedures or lack of it, for projecting life expectancy is reflected
directly in the fairness and financial sustainability of national pension schemes. To
begin with, more and more life expectancy is entering directly into determination of
individual benefits in national pension schemes. This means that non-biased cohort
life expectancy projections over a succession of birth cohorts are essential for
fulfilling the social criterion of fairness of individual outcomes within and between
generations, and the fiscal criterion of maintaining financial balance. Both require
that the procedure employed to project life expectancy does not lead to systemati-
cally biased estimates of life expectancy – i.e. systematic under or overestimation of
the life expectancy of the pension insurance pool’s birth cohorts. The other side of
the same coin is that systematic underestimation of life expectancy creates financial
deficits that have to be financed by younger generations, which goes against the
notion of intergenerational fairness.
The challenge is to design statistical models that capture the dynamics of the rate
of decline in mortality. It has been demonstrated that, with data for 2400 individual
birth cohorts for the period 1907–2014 for eight countries,1 both classical period
models and the Lee-Carter model systematically underestimate life expectancy, and
that the scale of the errors is increasing (Palmer et al. 2018). As an alternative, a new
model for projecting cohort life expectancy from the changing relationship between
period and cohort mortalities has been used (Palmer et al. 2018). Applying the new
model to the entire sample, the most important finding is that it delivers systemat-
ically unbiased projections for the individual cohort observations for the eight
countries separately, and in the aggregate. Other promising alternative models are
also being developed that are not systematically biased and that have improved
accuracy (Bergeron-Boucher et al. 2017; Pascariu et al. 2018).
1.3 Cause of Death Forecasts
Is it useful to include causes of death (CoD) in mortality forecasting models? Willett
(Chap. 20) lists some of the problems. First, interactions between different causes are
difficult to model. Second, CoD reporting is unreliable at older ages where most
deaths occur. Third, there is the danger of misclassification of deaths by cause (e.g.,
1Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United
States.
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primary or secondary cause) particularly for the very oldest. Fourth, there are
important major causes that change over time with medical advances. Finally,
cause classification methods change over time and may distort observed trends
(Tuljapurkar and Boe 1998; Booth 2006). Wilmoth (2005) showed that when trends
are extrapolated linearly, cause-specific mortality forecasts result in lower future
values for life expectancy than do all-cause forecasts, because the CoD that declines
most slowly is the one that dominates in the end. Caselli, Vallin, and Marsili
(Chap. 18) illustrate this point empirically for England and Wales. Alho (1991)
found that using CoD did not improve the accuracy of his mortality forecasts for the
US. A major review of mortality forecasting methods for the UK population
concluded that such forecasts should not be carried out by cause of death (GAD
2001). However, cause-elimination projections may be useful as reference scenarios;
see Rosén (Chap. 19) for an application to Swedish data.
Some causes of death are related to life style factors, such as smoking, obesity,
exercise etc. Examples are lung cancer, cardiovascular diseases, and problems with
the respiratory system. Chetty et al. (2016) analyzed the correlates in local variation
in life expectancy in the United States. They showed that life expectancy was
negatively correlated with rates of smoking and obesity and positively correlated
with exercise rates among individuals in the bottom income quartile. Janssen, De
Beer, and their colleagues have done innovative work and developed mortality
projection models that explicitly account for smoking-related mortality (Janssen
et al. 2013; Stoeldraijer et al. 2013; Janssen and de Beer 2016). They separated
smoking-related mortality from non-smoking-related mortality, estimated age- and
sex-specific mortality rates for both types of mortality, parameterized the age
schedules, and extrapolated the parameters of these schedules. The model contains
separate parameters for the delay of mortality and for the compression of the age at
death distribution; hence the name CoDE-model. To include smoking-related mor-
tality of men and women may potentially result in more accurate mortality pro-
jections, because the onset and the level of the smoking epidemics (and subsequent
fall in prevalence) differ between the sexes. Smoking behavior explains a large part
of the divergence in life expectancies between the sexes after World War II, and their
convergence in recent decades.2
1.4 Period and Cohort Perspectives
Virtually all life expectancies discussed in this volume are computed from period life
tables. A period life expectancy may be interpreted as the expected life length of a
newborn child if all age-specific period mortality rates would remain constant over
2See, for instance, Lindahl-Jacobsen et al. (2016) for the case of Denmark, and Janssen and Van
Poppel (2015) for The Netherlands. See also Sect. 1.5 on joint forecasting of mortality in similar
populations in this Chapter.
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time. It relates to the behavior of many different birth cohorts during just one
calendar year. However, this is a hypothetical situation, and real people do not live
in this way. They are members of only one birth cohort, and they live their lives
during many years.
Survival in real birth cohorts is different from survival in the hypothetical
situation of constant period mortality rates, for various reasons (Borgan and Keilman
2016). First, in times of falling mortality, the life expectancy of a certain birth cohort
is comparable to that based on age-specific mortality rates for a particular year many
decades later. This is what demographers call a “tempo effect”. Second, there are
cohort effects. Mortality decreased regularly for subsequent cohorts, but some
cohorts may display a typical pattern. An example is the case of Denmark, discussed
earlier, where women born in the interwar period adopted unhealthy life styles.
Because of their high mortality, Danish female period life expectancy stagnated
in the 1970s and 1980s (Lindahl-Jacobsen et al. 2016). Then, Danish female period
life expectancy started to rise again as this cohort died out. Third, there is mortality
selection. The frail members of a birth cohort tend to die earlier than members that
are more robust. That leaves a selected population at the higher ages. When
longevity improves, more of the frail cohort members will live longer. Thus for a
country where the living conditions improved early (examples are Norway and
Sweden) the elderly population in our days may contain more frail persons than it
does in countries where the living conditions improved later (for example, in Italy).
On the other hand, factors that enabled more members of a cohort to survive may
have also led to improved health for the members of the cohort that were not at high
risk of death.
Because of these complications, cohort life expectancy may increase faster than
what period life tables suggest. For instance, “best practice” cohort life expectancies
for women born between 1870 and 1920 increased by 0.43 years of age per calendar
year (Shkolnikov et al. 2011) – almost twice as fast as the improvement in best
practice period life expectancy for women since 1840 (0.24 years of age per calendar
year). Here, best practice life expectancy may refer to the maximum life expectancy
observed among national populations in a given year or for a given birth cohort (see
also Oeppen and Vaupel in Chap. 13). Wilmoth (2005) shows empirical evidence for
Sweden for the period 1751–2002 and birth cohorts 1751–1911. Goldstein and
Wachter (2006) use official estimates and projections of female life expectancy
from Sweden and the United States. In addition, they derive analytical expressions
for gaps and lags between the two types of life expectancies. The life expectancy lag
is the number of years it takes for a period life expectancy to reach the current level
of the cohort life expectancy. The gap is the difference between the life expectancy
for a cohort born in a particular year, and the period life expectancy for that year.
Goldstein and Wachter (2006) find that period life expectancies are approximately
equal to cohort life expectancies for cohorts born about 40–50 years earlier. They
note also that the lag lengthens as mortality improves. The life expectancy gap has
risen and then fallen over time. Canudas-Romo and Schoen (2005) analyze the Siler
model of age-specific mortality combined with constant rates of mortality decline,
and find qualitatively similar effects for the lag. Gaps were about one-ninth to
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one-tenth of the lags. Missov and Lenart (2011) assume a Gompertz model for
age-specific mortality and the same yearly improvement in mortality at all ages.
Under these conditions, the temporal change in period life expectancy is approxi-
mately proportional to but less than the change in cohort life expectancy. If period
life expectancy improves by 2 years of age per decade, cohort life expectancy would
improve by 2.5 years per decade, or by 25 per cent more. Wilmoth (2005) assumes
that distributions of deaths by age change over time in accordance with a linear shift
model. Under this model, he also finds that cohort life expectancies increase faster
than period life expectancies. Like Missov and Lennart, he establishes a simple
linear relationship between period and cohort life expectancies.
Another consequence of the distorted view that period life tables give in times of
changing mortality is the compression around the mean or the modal age of the age-
at-death distribution. Ouellette and Bourbeau (2011) show an on-going process of
mortality compression in Canada, France, Japan, and the United States. Keilman
et al. (2018) find the same for Norway. Deaths tend to be progressively concentrated
near the mean or the modal age at death. The findings for these five countries are
based on period data. Observed and projected cohort patterns for the age at death
distribution (AADD) for Norway suggest that compression in cohorts born
1900–1950, measured as a decrease in the standard deviation of the AADD beyond
30 years, is twice as fast compared to compression in period AADDs during the
years 1900–2060. Canudas-Romo (2008) studies the period standard deviation from
the modal age at death, assuming the Siler mortality change model as in Canudas-
Romo and Schoen (2005) and a Gompertz mortality change model. The period
standard deviation is constant under the Gompertz model, but falls regularly under
the Siler model. Ediev (2013) discusses the theoretical link between period and
cohort compression measures. He concludes that compression in periods may very
well go together with decompression in cohorts. Tuljapurkar and Edwards (2011)
show that the variance in the age at death is inversely related to the Gompertz slope
of log mortality.
Given the problems inherent to a period approach, it will not come as a surprise
that methods that project cohort life expectancies perform rather well. Zhao de
Gosson de Varennes et al. (2016) demonstrate that compared to the classical
Lee-Carter method for extrapolating age-specific mortality rates period-wise,
projecting cohort life expectancy based on its rate of change in mortality works
well in eight countries with long data series. See also Sect. 1.2 on determinants and
dynamics of life expectancy in this chapter.
1.5 Joint Forecasting of Mortality in Similar Populations
Since the early days of cohort-component forecasting, official forecasters have been
keen to assure forecast users of the external validity of their results. For example, the
forecast of a given country should not markedly deviate from the developments in
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countries with similar culture, economics, or social life. Secondly, male and female
mortalities should not diverge in an unreasonable manner.
During the past two decades, extrapolation methods have regained prominence in
mortality forecasting, primarily because assessments of earlier judgmental forecasts
have been shown to grossly underestimate future life expectancy. However, separate
extrapolations of the mortality of genders, or of countries, will eventually lead to
divergence. Happily, the time series tools used in extrapolation offer multiple ways
of constraining forecasts to behave in a coherent manner. A rather large literature has
evolved that links varying forms of substantive reasoning regarding trends in
smoking, obesity etc. (Staetsky 2009; King and Soneji 2011) to extrapolation.
Notable statistical contributions include Li (2013), Kleinow (2015), and Raftery
et al. (2014).
However, the empirical evidence regarding the convergence of male and female
mortality, or across countries, is equivocal. Thorslund et al. (2013) provide evidence
of convergence between male and female life expectancy at 65, since the 1990s, in,
for instance, several Northern European countries. However, an analysis of 23
European countries in Alho (2016) shows that both the creation of the male-female
difference occurred differently in different countries and considerable differences in
trends continue to exist to this date. Notably, European countries that have suffered
large war casualties, and the former socialist States, have histories that differ from
those observed in northern Europe, and show little evidence of convergence.
1.6 From Scenarios to Stochastic Modelling
The scenario-based approach as a way to express forecast uncertainty has been
criticized from a statistical point of view (Alho and Spencer 1985; Lee 1998).
Obviously, uncertainty is not quantified as no probability is attached to the high-
low interval. A second drawback is that one assumes perfect correlation over time:
when mortality is low one year, it is also low in all other years. In reality, mortality
shows random fluctuations. Third, the scenario-based approach is inconsistent when
variant assumptions for mortality are combined with variant assumptions for fertility
(or migration). With three variants for each of the two components, nine different
combinations for population results can be made. However, a variant pair that is
extreme for one variable is not necessarily extreme for another variable.
Since the future is inherently uncertain, one should compute a forecast by
stochastic methods. However, official forecasters of mortality have been slow to
adopt such methods. A notable exception is the implementation of a stochastic
approach by the U.N. (Raftery et al. 2012). This work builds on ideas similar to
those of Girosi and King (2008). In both works, data from similar countries is used in
joint forecasting, a feature that is particularly important for countries with poor data.
Raftery et al. (2012) adopted a Bayesian approach to population forecasting. This
view is particularly useful when one combines expert opinions with empirical data.
The application of the Bayesian approach in demography, “Bayesian demography”,
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started to gain popularity about 10 years ago.3 The Bayesian approach to demo-
graphic forecasting is a welcome development in addition to frequentist methods that
have been used more widely. For instance, see Alho and Spencer (2005, p. 235) for
stochastic modelling of future mortality for 18 European countries in the framework
of the Uncertain Population of Europe (UPE) Project.
In contrast to population forecasting by statistical agencies, in actuarial science
stochastic modelling has become, during the past decade, the standard. The difficulty
in using safety margins and other scenarios in the pricing of annuities and other
mortality related insurance products has proven to be difficult, to the point that liquid
markets for such products are few. Notable examples of stochastic modelling are the
formulations by Hahn and Christiansen (2016) and van Berkum et al. (2017), who
both develop full probability models for age-specific mortality of one or more
populations, and compute the posterior distributions of the relevant risk measures
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques.
Macroeconomics is another field where the inadequacy of the scenario-based
assessment of forecast uncertainty is becoming evident. Generational accounting and
the sustainability of pension systems can now be analyzed in stochastic demographic
settings (Alho et al. 2008). Recent analyses (Lassila et al. 2014) allow for adaptive
responses to stochastic shocks. Extensions of stochastic demographic modelling to
migration (Bijak 2011) and household composition (Keilman 2017) are now
available.
1.7 How Conditions in Early Life Affect Mortality
in Later Life
The idea that childhood conditions are important for health in later life, which can be
traced far back in time, came into focus in the 1920–1930s, when demographers and
epidemiologists became aware of a long-term decline in mortality (Derrick 1927;
Kermack et al. 1934; Bengtsson and Mineau 2009). They found that as each birth
cohort got healthier, and infant mortality declined, health improved in the remaining
part of their lives as well. The focus was on infant mortality, regardless of the
determinants of infant mortality, as a predictor of mortality throughout the life
course. The role of fetal development, which also can be traced far back in time,
came into focus much later, in the 1970s (Forsdahl 1977; Barker and Osmond 1986).
It has since then dominated the research, in both medical and social sciences.
Adverse conditions in early life influence cardiovascular diseases, respiratory and
allergic diseases, diabetes, hypertension and obesity, breast and testicular cancers,
neuropsychiatric and some other disorders later in life (Kuh and Ben-Shlomo 2004).
Three specific diseases, respiratory tuberculosis, hemorrhagic stroke, and bronchitis,
which have accounted for two thirds of the total decline in mortality in ages
3See Bijak and Bryant (2016) for a review and Alho and Spencer (1985), for early discussions.
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15–64 years from the mid-nineteenth century to the first decade of the twentieth
century, reflect demonstrable responses from conditions in infancy and childhood
(see Chap. 21 by Lindström and Davey Smith). The question is then, if children early
in life, during fetal stage or in first years of life are “programmed” for a certain health
status, can this information be used to improve mortality forecasting?
Birth weight has become a common indicator of fetal development, both in
medical and economic research. Low birth weight is associated with high blood
pressure later in life. Despite the effects not being large (Huxley et al. 2002),4 this
measure is still correlated with increased risks of heart disease (Barker 1994) and
diabetes (Hales et al. 1991). Many diseases have since then been added to the list of
outcomes associated with low birth weight, including schizophrenia (Brown and
Derkits 2010). Recently, high birth weight, somewhat counterintuitively, has been
associated with increased incidences of breast and prostate cancer (Risnes et al.
2011). Thus, the relationship between birth weight and diseases later in life appears
to be U-shaped.
Low birth weight has also been shown to be linked to educational and labor
market outcomes (Currie and Moretti 2007; Johnson and Schoeni 2011; Royer
2009). Children with low birth weight perform worse in school, and earn less, than
children with normal birth weight do (Currie and Hyson 1999; Case et al. 2005).
However, some studies have only found small effects of birth weight. A study of
Norway using register data, for example, found that a 10% lower birth weight, a
sizable difference from the norm is associated with only 1.2% lower IQ for males,
0.3% shorter height, and 0.9% less earnings (Black et al. 2007).
Birth weight does not change much in the long term, only during extreme
situations, such as during wars and famines, if at all (Abolins 1962). For example,
since 1860 in Norway, adult height, weight and lifespan have increased substan-
tially, and still the average birth weight has only varied within a range of 200 g
(Rosenberg 1988). Since the overall effects on both health and earnings are small,
the birth-weight measure is unlikely to be an important indicator predicting mortality
trends.
Instead, recent research has shown that infections due to certain bacteria, viruses,
and parasites during pregnancy lead to health problems later in life (Adams Waldorf
and McAdams 2013). Children exposed to the 1918 pandemic during the fetal stage,
for example, show elevated risks for cancers and coronary heart disease at older ages
(Mazumder et al. 2010; Myrskylä et al. 2013). Furthermore, children are vulnerable
to maternal and environmental factors not only during the fetal stage but also in the
first years of life. In fact, the development of cells and organs are gradually slowing
down and completed only when the individual is about 20 years of age. Taking the
lungs as an example, they not only keep growing in size after birth, but new alveolar
sacs develop for several years, with this structures being also very sensitive to
infections (Broman 1923).
4See also Chap. 22 by Christiansen.
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Streptococcal infections in early childhood are associated with rheumatic heart
disease in later life (Cunningham 2012), whereas respiratory infections have been
suggested to impair lung function (Bengtsson and Lindström 2003).5 Recent
research, studying effects of exposure to specific diseases, like whooping cough,
in first years of life on mortality over the full life course shows that scarring over-
powers selection at ages around 25 years, where after the net negative health effects
increase with age (Quaranta 2014). Moreover, infections in early life are associated
with cancer and diabetes at older ages (Finch and Crimmins 2004). They may also
cause inflammation in atherosclerosis, which is a risk factor for a variety of diseases
including cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and some forms of cancer later in life
(Libby et al. 2002; Finch 2010).
Getting back to the question of whether information on conditions early in life can
be used to improve mortality forecasting, we conclude that information on birth
weights cannot be relied upon to predict life spans. Instead, infections in the first year
of life, manifested in infant mortality, seems far more promising, as emphasized by
the development of research in the last decade. However, since infant mortality has
declined to very low levels during the twentieth century, this predictor is likely to
lose importance over time, at least for developed countries. The same is likely the
case for information on season of birth, which is another predictor of life expec-
tancy.6 Instead, early life factors at the family level, which in the past were not
associated with mortality, are likely to become more and more important (Bengtsson
and Van Poppel 2011). Whether they can be used for mortality forecasting, is,
however doubtful, since the effect is not strong enough to have any practical
importance for the projections themselves. Alternatively, it seems more promising
to use information on life-style factors such as obesity or smoking, which have
become increasingly relevant predictors for health and mortality (Janssen et al. 2013;
Neovius et al. 2010).
1.8 The Increasing Gap in Life Expectancy with Respect
to Position in the Income Distribution
In this section, we discuss some issues that were not addressed in any of the five
booklets. Recently, socioeconomic differences in length of life have received a lot of
attention, in particular the fact that persons with low socio-economic status (income,
education, occupation) tend to be worse off in terms of adult mortality than those
with higher status. The gradient is stronger among men than among women, and has
grown stronger in the recent past (Elo 2009; Mackenbach et al. 1997; Marmot et al.
1991; Torssander and Erikson 2010; Cutler et al. 2012; de Gelder et al. 2017; Chetty
et al. 2016). While some argue that the socioeconomic differences in adult mortality
5See also Chap. 24 by Bengtsson and Alter.
6See Chap. 23 by Doblhammer.
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have always existed, others are skeptical. Most of this research is based on cross-
sectional data for cities. Studies based on longitudinal data for Sweden, the Nether-
lands, and Canada find barely any social differences in adult mortality in the past
(Bengtsson and Dribe 2011; Bengtsson and Van Poppel 2011).
What characterizes individuals in the lower income deciles is that their relative
income status remains largely unchanged throughout their working lives and follows
them into retirement. Consequently, and not surprisingly, the result is a low pension
in retirement, since all pensions are related one way or another to individual working
life incomes. In addition, many studies for Western European and Anglo-Saxon
countries show population differences in life expectancy with respect to other
socioeconomic characteristics than income, such as education and occupation
(National Academies of Sciences 2015; Chetty et al. 2016). This research has also
shown that income gaps we see at retirement, originate already at younger ages,
sometimes even earlier than age 40. What’s more, it is likely that differences in life
expectancy by income group are partially at least indirectly related to level of
education and choice of occupation, as the empirical evidence reveals that persons
with low education and low-skilled occupations have lower life expectancy than
highly educated persons with occupations requiring high intellectual skills.
What these studies make clear is that the gap in life expectancy by income has
several important characteristics. The first is that seen over a longer period of time, life
expectancy in some populations is largely stagnant in the low deciles. Persons with
higher income and those who live in more economically dynamic local cultures are
experiencing growth in life expectancy. Geography, i.e., the social environment of
peoples’ home communities, also turns out to be important. For example, in NewYork
City, Chetty et al. (2016) find that the life expectancy of low-income individuals is
5 years more than in Detroit, which is attributed to differences in “social” infrastruc-
ture. They also find that the strongest determinant of life expectancy differentials
across income deciles is the prevalence of unhealthy life-style factors (smoking,
drinking, exercise, dietary, etc.) among persons in the lowest deciles.7 One has to
bear in mind, however, that causality runs both ways: not only from low income
(through bad health) to low life expectancy, but also the other way around.
What are the ramifications in the present context? The average total working-life
income of women is generally less than that of men, which means that women are
likely to be overrepresented as low-income individuals in all income deciles. The
reasons are well-known: this is in part due to an uneven division of child care and
care of elderly relatives, in part due to lower earnings for equal work and lower
wages in female dominated occupations (such as the care sector and sales personnel),
partly due to individual decisions to work part time even as children become older. It
7On the other hand, they found that access to health care services was not a significant factor,
indicating that provision is generally sufficient on a regional level in the United States. They also
report that, as a group, first generation immigrants have a longer life expectancy than persons born
in the United States.
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comes as no surprise then that the gender difference in the scale of pensions at
retirement is generally a reflection of women’s working careers.
Despite their lower income, however, the life expectancy of women exceeds that
of men. This gender gap in life expectancy leaves its imprint on the redistribution of
income within a pension insurance pool. As a group, since women live several years
longer than men, money is ultimately transferred from men to women. This has
generally been viewed as an acceptable transfer of resources, partially compensating
within the insurance pool for women’s lower share of the income of male-female
partners prior to retirement.
The general picture emerging from the empirical literature is nevertheless that the
poor are increasingly transferring income to the rich in the universal unisex old-age
insurance pool, if we focus singularly on how annuities are created. And, as a
consequence, the literature is beginning to produce proposals of how to even out
the distributional outcomes within the insurance pool, in the context of a public
pension scheme.
There are two proposals – in addition to maintaining the status quo in insurance
pool distribution. One is a technical tax-transfer solution that can be designed to
redistribute money within the annuity pension pool (Holzmann et al. in preparation).
Alternatively, information on the socio-economic determinants of life expectancy
can be used to create separate insurance pools. For instance, a simple procedure is to
stratify new retirees into separate, say, birth-cohort decile-based insurance pools by
income, as measured by Defined Contributions (DC) account balances at the com-
mencement of retirement.
However, stratifying by income is already what is happening as the default in the
overall DC format in countries that have NDC and/or FDC public pension schemes.
In addition, status quo is that persons with the lowest working-life income in all
countries already receive some form of guarantee or social pension, often means-
tested – financed by general tax revenues. This may nevertheless be a first-best
solution, provided the amount transferred through the guarantee contributes suffi-
cient income for the least well-off 20–30 percent of the pensioners’ population.
What’s more, in a broader perspective, the amount of money on pension account
balances is by far not the only component of overall personal resources, which
include capital income (also with a high-income profile) and other sources that one
would normally take into account in granting a means-tested income transfer for
retired persons. Therefore, in practice the status quo approach might not be so bad
after all. In addition to this, the economists will remind us to bring into the discussion
individuals’ supply of labor, and its determinants, which explains individual lifetime
earnings – and ultimately the magnitude of pensions granted – through individual
preferences for work and leisure.
Let us return now to the discussion from a previous section – that of the
development of mortality and forecasting life expectancy. The point of departure
was the ongoing increase in life expectancy of the older population and developing
projection models that produce unbiased cohort-based forecasts over time. Of
course, the emerging empirical evidence regarding socio-economic heterogeneity
in life expectancy has implications for projections, even only if implicitly.
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To begin with, we are gaining a better understanding of the underlying mecha-
nisms. The knowledge emanating from the empirical research (Chetty et al. 2016),
together with the many “bits and pieces” from other studies, suggests that there
remains considerable potential for further dramatic improvements in life expectancy.
This would occur through improved community social-infrastructure and public
health policy directed towards creating awareness of individuals’ “self-destructive”
life styles. If this is the direction in which we are moving, the result will be that a
larger share of birth cohorts will reach the pension age and beyond, a share that will
enjoy healthier years in old age. This would create then even more decades of
considerable improvements in life expectancy, adding to the effect of continued
advancements in medical technology.
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Tommy Bengtsson and Nico Keilman
This part focuses on current practices of mortality forecasting in Sweden, Norway,
and Finland with some reflections on what can be done to improve them. The first
paper, written by Edward Palmer, introduces the question of why we are interested in
improving mortality projections. To ease the stress of population ageing on public
pension systems, several countries have changed from defined benefit to defined
contribution systems, including Sweden. For these countries, life expectancy pro-
jections are used to calculate individual pensions. To get financially robust systems,
that also are fair across generations, it is very important to calculate life expectancy
accurately, since it determines the size of the pensions.
Juha M. Alho, Helge Brunborg, and Hans Lundström discuss current projection
models in Finland, Norway and Sweden, respectively. Although the methods used
consider cohort trends, and projections are updated regularly, they underestimate the
progress of life expectancy, as has been the case for forecasts by national agencies in
other countries. This means that current contribution based pension systems are too
generous since the benefits are based on an underestimation of remaining life
expectancy. It also means that the pension systems are under-financed, which creates
a burden on future generations.
James Vaupel presents the SCOPE approach to forecasting life expectancy. It is a
kind of scenario method, with scenarios structured conditionally, and with the
possibility of stochastic scenarios. Kaare Christensen discusses how to improve
existing models from the perspective of an epidemiologist, focussing on cohort
approaches. If we know the “risk profile” of the current cohorts compared to the
previous cohorts, then our forecasts may improve. Self-rated health, as well as
T. Bengtsson
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N. Keilman
Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
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physical and cognitive abilities, are possible indicators of remaining life expectancy,
which may provide an opportunity to improve forecasting. Finally, Tommy
Bengtsson stresses the role of historical experience in getting forecasting right. He
argues that since the cause of the great mortality decline is clearly multi-factorial,
and the importance of the various factors changes over time, both period and cohort
factors must be taken into account when forecasting mortality. The use of demo-
graphic cohort information in the 1990s was a considerable advancement. The
question now is whether we are ready to take a great step forward by using
multivariate causal models that combine information at the individual and societal
levels.
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Chapter 2
Life Expectancy Is Taking Center Place
in Modern National Pension Schemes – A




Mortality scenarios are a standard tool in projecting costs of defined benefits
(DB) pay-as-you-go pension systems. Government actuaries and statisticians have
used mortality projections to estimate the costs of national pay-as-you go defined
benefit pension systems since their conception, although the development of com-
puter technology in the 1970s and 1980s was a prerequisite for more sophisticated
analysis. With the maturation of computer technology, the possibilities to model and
examine various assumptions are nowadays more-or-less unbounded. We have
become used to official publications from, for example, the Office of the Govern-
ment Actuary in the US or, in Sweden, the National Social Insurance Board, that
provide a picture of future contributions and payments given various demographic
and economic scenarios. These reports provide a picture of the financial develop-
ment of national pension systems.
Financial projections illuminating the financial status of pension systems are
indisputably important, not the least because pay-as-you-go systems transfer con-
siderable resources from workers to pensioners. As life expectancy increases, and
assuming current retirement patterns, 25–30% of the total population in the OECD
will be pensioners within the coming three decades. There is now considerable
debate in countries all around the world about how to cope with the aging popula-
tion. The World Bank’s publication Averting the Old Age Crisis (1994) constituted a
milestone in the debate. The World Bank recommended that its client countries
adopt multi-pillar schemes, with a funded “second pillar” playing an important role.
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The Swedish pension reform, first published as a proposal in Swedish in 1992, and
then legislated by parliament as a framework law in early 1994, introduced the notional
defined contribution scheme to the international political arena. Since the mid-1990s,
there has been a large-scale conversion of national pension schemes from defined
benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) – both notional defined contribution (NDC)
and financial defined contribution (FDC). As countries convert to DC schemes, life
expectancy projections are used to calculate individual pensions in national systems.
The purpose of this paper is to summarize the dramatic change that has occurred
in the design of national pension schemes in the past 10 years and to discuss the need
for accurate mortality projections in this context.
2.2 Basic Pension Economics – The Role of Mortality
The financial costs of a pay-as-you-go pension system are determined by a few key
parameters. In the aggregate these are the size of an average benefit relative to the
average wage, the number of workers and the number of pensioners. The ratio of the
latter two is the system dependency ratio. The system dependency ratio can also be
computed as the number of years people work related to the number of years they are
retired with a benefit. These are two sides of the same coin. The policy parameters of
a country are the size of a pension and the level of the contribution rate. The
demographic and economic determinants of pensions are largely exogenous to
policy, although these can respond to system design.
These ideas follow from the two fundamental equations of pension economics,
which provide the point of departure for an overview of the links between mortality
and pay-as-you-go pension systems. Where bars denote averages, and p and w depict
pensions and wages, these equations are:





or for the average participant in the scheme see e:g: Palmer 1999ð Þ






The first equation tells us that pension costs, measured in terms of the contribu-
tion rate on wages, is determined by the average benefit times the number of
recipients, and the contribution base, expressed in the first equation as the product
of the average wage and the number of contributors. If pension payments grow faster
than contributions, the contribution rate needed to finance them increases, and vice
versa. The second equation expresses the same relationship for the average scheme
participant in terms of years worked and years of retirement. It tells us that more
years of retirement in relation to years of work will result in higher pension costs.
Mortality affects both the numerator and the denominator of the first equation.
Declining mortality among working age persons increases the size of the working
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age population and the (potential) labor force. Decreasing mortality of persons above
the pension age increases the population of retirees. In other words, the age distri-
bution of mortality improvements matters.
In terms of the second equation, increasing mortality from the age of retirement
implies that people will have to work more years – at the same wage – to receive a
benefit of a given level and with a fixed contribution rate. Conversely, if the pay-as-
you-go system is designed so that a benefit is defined, for example, in terms of the
number of covered years of work and contributions required to qualify for a benefit
of a fixed amount, then declining mortality, i.e. more years in retirement, increases
the contribution rate that the younger generation of workers has to pay in order to
sustain the fixed level benefit over more years.
This is a static picture, however. Assume now that the labor force grows at the
rate λ and productivity at the rate g, and that the average wage grows at the rate of
growth of productivity. Then the first equation tells us a number of things. First, if
benefits are inflation-indexed, which is a common form of indexation for pay-as-
you-go systems, then positive values of productivity and labor force growth will
counteract negative effects on costs of increasing longevity after retirement. During
the past two decades some countries have taken advantage of this mechanism to
reduce costs, by replacing wage indexation of benefits with price indexation.1
The first equation also tells us that a country can afford wage indexation as long
as the labor force grows faster than the number of pensioners. With wage indexation,
the real-valued (inflation adjusted) pension grows with the rate of increase in
productivity, and productivity growth is shared between workers and pensioners.2
Many countries have seen this as a desirable redistributional aspect of a pay-as-you-
go pension system. Whether or not this level of ambition can be attained depends on
the connection between the construction of the pension system and the demography
behind changes in the work force and the number of pensioners.
Assume now net migration of zero and a birth rate that reproduces the population.
Maintaining a fixed ratio between the average pension and the average wage through
wage indexation of benefits over time requires that the positive effect on the work
force of declining mortality surpass the increase in pension payments resulting from
decreased mortality among the retired population.
Of course, the effect on the working population of decreasing mortality will have
to be associated with sufficiently healthy years of life to make a difference.
1The UK did this in the early 1980s. This has also been one of the mechanisms used by transition
country governments during the 1990s to cut back on burdensome pension costs – where the
immediate problem was a dependency ratio around 1.5 workers per pensioner, due to very generous
pension ages inherited from the old communist regimes.
2Denoting the rate of inflation by p, the nominal wage rate grows at (1 + p) (1 + g), as does the
nominalwage base. For a fixed ratio of pensioners to contributors (the first equation) it is possible to
index benefits with this factor, and maintain a constant contribution rate, since the numerator
increases at the same rate as the denominator.
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In addition, the economy must be able to employ the extra labor created in this way.3
Employability is usually viewed as a short-run problem, however, as the growth of
the working age population and labor supply are usually regarded as the long-run
determinants of a country’s economic growth, together with the rate of growth of
productivity.
The second equation provides technical insight into how a pay-as-you-go system
can be designed to adjust to changes in the life expectancy of pensioners. Given that
people continue to work with the average wage, increasing life expectancy after
retirement can be dealt with by increasing the minimum benefit age at the rate of
change in the life expectancy of retirees. This also requires that people work and
contribute during the additional time prior to a retirement age4 that is sufficient to
maintain a fixed ratio of years of retirement to years of work. Alternatively, the
pay-as-you-go scheme can be constructed as a notional defined contribution scheme
as discussed below.
2.3 NDC and FDC Schemes – And Life Expectancy
A notional defined contribution – NDC – scheme is the pay-as-you-go equivalent of
the financial defined contribution – FDC – scheme. The difference is in the rate of
return, which in the NDC scheme is based on economic growth, whereas it is a
financial rate of return in the FDC scheme. In the neo-classical Golden Rule, these
are equivalent in the long run. However, many current writers make the claim that
FDC schemes should always be expected to yield a higher return (e.g., Feldstein and
Samwick 1997, 1998). This claim is based on the observation that the financial rate
of return has surpassed the rate of economic growth over the past half century in the
US. Data for Sweden (e.g., Frennberg and Hansson 1992) yield a similar result, at
least up to the fall of the stock market in 2001–2002.
How does an NDC scheme work in practice? In the NDC public scheme, just as in
any public or privately managed FDC scheme, wage earners pay contributions based
on a fixed contribution rate. The value of these are accredited their accounts – this is
the defined-contribution feature of the system. Contributions are paid on earnings as
long as people work, and if people combine work with a pension then they continue
to pay contributions on earned income and increase their pension capital accord-
ingly. The previous year’s account value is indexed annually with a nominal per
3In addition, the years added to the older population need to be (relatively) healthy years in order not
to create other social costs, for example, increasing costs for health and home care of the elderly. In
a broader model of the social “costs” of caring for the elderly, e.g., health and home care, could be
added to the numerator of the first equation by adding the cost per capita.
4In a DB scheme where the right to a full benefit is based on a certain number of years, e.g., 40, it
might be necessary to increase this number to assure that the period of working and contributing
also become longer as the minimum pension age is increased.
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capita wage index in Sweden,5 where the system was conceived in 1992–1994. The
wage sum is used for indexation in Latvia and GDP in Italy, both of which were
legislated in 1995.
The NDC annuity is calculated by dividing the value on the account at the chosen
age of retirement with a factor based on unisex life expectancy at the age of
retirement. In addition to this, in Sweden a real rate of return of 1.6% and in Italy
1.5% is calculated into the annuity. This form of front-loading is an alternative to
possible wage indexation (from a lower initial level) over the lifetime. Annuities are
also indexed to annual changes in prices in both countries. Annual indexation in the
Swedish scheme also includes an adjustment for digressions of actual real growth
from 1.6%, and if estimated system liabilities exceed assets a balancing adjustment
to bring the system back into financial equilibrium. This keeps the aggregate
contribution rate in line with the individual contribution rate of 16%.6
Góra and Palmer (2002) have recently made the claim that the main difference
between NDC and FDC is in the nature of the “fund,” which in the NDC case can be
seen as a fund of bonds bearing the rate of return of the wage sum (tax base) in the
economy, where it is a needless exercise to sell the bonds on the market fund, since
this simply creates transaction costs. These authors also note that both NDC and
FDC funds are illiquid until retirement, and that from retirement both are paid out as
yearly annuities. Both FDC and NDC have the advantage that they eliminate
negative externalities by creating a direct link between contributions and benefits.
On the other hand, an FDC scheme is associated with the positive externality of
creating financial funds. If these are placed in non-government debt instruments they
contribute to financing private investment and – if they do not offset private saving –
provide additional financing for economic growth. The major difference between
NDC and FDC is, thus, that NDC does not create this opportunity. On the other
hand, an FDC scheme that invests solely in government bonds can be viewed as a
cost-inefficient NDC scheme, since the transaction costs of marketing the debt do not
create offsetting revenues.
Proponents of NDC claim that it represents a paradigm shift in social security
thinking (e.g., Palmer 2000). By creating a direct link between contributions and the
annuity and by basing the size of the annuity on life expectancy at retirement, NDC
5In principle, a system must follow the development of contributions, i.e. the wage sum on which
contributions are based, in order to maintain financial equilibrium. This means that if the per capita
wage is used to index notional capital and benefits, then the system must be equipped with a brake
that keeps it in financial equilibrium when labor force growth (λ) is negative. In the Swedish system
a financial balance is kept that relates estimated system assets to liabilities. Ceteris paribus, if
liabilities exceed assets because labor force growth is negative, both benefits and notional capital
will be indexed downwards to bring the system back into equilibrium (See Palmer 2000, 2002;
Settergren 2001).
6In principle, the Italian system should achieve a long-term equilibrium around the weighted
contribution rates of the employed and self-employed if contributions and accrual factors are
brought more in line. In practice, the absence of a mechanism to offset chronic divergence from
the imputed return of 1.5% may lead to financial difficulties. Palmer (1999) examines the stability
conditions of the NDC PAYGO system, as does Valdés-Prieto (2001).
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systems reduce the impact on system costs of individual behavioral choice and of
unexpected changes in longevity. In comparison, in the DB framework the burden of
the risk is unclear. It may fall on future generations of workers or on present workers
before they retire.
NDC pension schemes are subject to the same “political risks” as DB pay-as-you-
go – “political” management of public funds causing low rates of return, special
interest lobbying, etc. For example, in Italy, the rate credited into the notional
account is actually higher than the payroll tax earmarked for pensions, while in
Poland it is lower, which is synonomous to taxing accounts. The NDC provides a
framework for monitoring the costs of these interventions, as Fox and Palmer (1999)
have argued in discussing the Latvian NDC scheme.
An NDC scheme with demographic reserves and indexation of notional capital
and benefits that follows the growth of the contribution base, and with an annuity
based on life expectancy projections that on average do not deviate from the
outcome for birth cohorts, yields approximate long-run financial stability (Palmer
1999). If as in Sweden indexation follows the per capita wage rate and life expec-
tancy is based on current outcomes – rather than a cohort projection – then there is a
built in risk that the assets of the system will fall below the liabilities. Financial
balance is secured in Sweden through a balance mechanism, based on current
estimates of system assets and liabilities.
Briefly, the Swedish balance mechanism works as follows. If assets, measured as
the estimated future stream of revenues from contributions and the current value of
the system’s buffer fund(s), are less than liabilities, i.e., claims on future payments of
pensions of pensioners and the notional account values of workers, the balance index
falls below unity. In this case, both notional account values and benefits are adjusted
to bring the system back into balance.
The Swedish NDC scheme was started with a large buffer fund inherited from the
old system – these funds will help to cover the demographic pressure associated with
the large birth cohorts of the 1940s. Various scenarios using relatively extreme
demographic and economic assumptions show that it is likely that if the balance
index has to be used in the future, the negative effect on future benefits during the
whole retirement period of a pensioner is not likely to be more than 10 per cent in
total, given some of the worse scenarios (Settergren et al. 2000).
Most importantly for the present topic, both FDC and NDC schemes work more
efficiently with good expectancy projections. Poor projections give rise to a need for
adjustment, and in general, do not provide the information needed by scheme
participants to plan their “economic lives” given information about the development
of their own cohort’s life expectancy and the expected value of their own stream of
pension benefits.
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2.4 It’s More Important Than Ever to Project Life
Expectancy Accurately
Public NDC and FDC schemes have been introduced in a number of countries since
the mid-1990s.7 In addition, also since 1995, public FDC schemes have been
introduced in a large number of Latin American countries, and have become popular
in especially the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe.8 These countries
join, then, some of the forerunners of funded schemes, among them, Chile, Australia,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. The newer countries in the
league differ from many of the forerunners, however, in their explicit DC construc-
tion. For example, the mandated employer schemes in Australia and the “opting out”
schemes in the UK have been largely financial defined benefit (FDB) schemes,
although there is a recent tendency for these also to convert to FDC. The difference
between an FDB and an FDC scheme is small, however, since financial solidarity
requires that life expectancy projections be on target in both.
In principle, there are two approaches that can be applied in estimating the life
expectancy factor to be used in the calculation of annuities for NDC, and FDC,
schemes. One is to base the projection on the current period tables – perhaps with
some form of smoothed moving average. This is the approach applied by Sweden.9
The major alternative is to produce a cohort projection.
This is the approach applied by Latvia. The Swedish projection is revised yearly
with new information on mortality, as is the Latvian projection.
The revision process differs in Latvia, however. Latvia bases changes in the
projection of life expectancy on a professional judgment,10 with a demographic
analysis as the point of departure. In the revision process, it is asked whether new
information provides sufficient evidence to revise the existing long-term projec-
tion.11 One could view this approach as a sort of error-correction mechanism. In
principle, the methods available for projecting life expectancy for FDC schemes
7In addition to Sweden, Italy, Latvia and Poland, which have already been mentioned, versions of
NDC schemes have been introduced in Kyrgyzstan, and in Russia.
8See Fox and Palmer (2001) for a discussion of the driving forces behind this movement.
9Although the life expectancy factor is continuously updated in Sweden, since people continue to
live longer after receiving their pension, the procedure used to calculate it will underestimate the
actual outcome. This is counterbalanced either through other, positive factors contributing to the
financial balance, or through triggering the balance index (see above).
10The judgment is the product of a white paper written by a leading demographer and a discussion
in an official committee of demographers and actuaries set up for this purpose. This is discussed in
Krumins et al. (2001).
11The procedure was initiated in 1999, and in the first 3 years thereafter, no revision of the long-term
projection had been made.
2 Life Expectancy Is Taking Center Place in Modern National Pension. . . 29
are exactly those available for NDC. In the FDC context an effort is made to project
a life expectancy factor that is expected to give long-run system solvency.12
In sum, as countries convert to DC schemes, life expectancy projections are used
to calculate individual pensions in national systems. The question is whether the
state of the art in projecting mortality can meet new demand created by large public
schemes that are turning towards annuities based on life expectancy.
2.5 Final Comments
With conversion to public NDC and FDC schemes in Sweden,13 as well as else-
where, individuals have been given greater responsibility to plan their own working
careers and saving with respect to a desired level of resources during retirement. In
the DC framework resources during retirement are linked to contributions during the
whole working career, and the level of a benefit is also determined by life expectancy
at the age chosen for retirement. In this framework, knowledge about the develop-
ment of cohort life expectancy becomes an important informational input into the
economic plans of individuals.
One of the goals of policy makers is to loosen up the idea of “a” pension age at
which everyone is expected to exit the labor force, that is the concept of the
“statutory” or “mandatory” pension age that implanted itself so deeply in the
minds of employees, unions and employers since the 1960s. The focus is to shift
from the “right” to leave the labor force at age, for example 60, with a defined
lifelong benefit, to the “right” to work as an older worker – but in a work environ-
ment that is friendly to older workers.
The transition from national DB to DC schemes presupposes a future where
people can freely choose between work and retirement – combining a partial or full
benefit with partial or full retirement. It also presupposes that individuals invest
enough in their human capital (personal health, education and training) to be able to
remain in the labor force longer. Today the de facto age of exit from the labor force
for men and women together is below 60 in the OECD countries. There is evidence
that this has been influenced by national benefit schemes (Gruber and Wise 1999).
12In FDC schemes there is a trade off between the rate of return and life expectancy in the sense that
inaccuracies in the projection of the life expectancy factor can be counterbalanced by a better rate of
financial return on funded capital. In the Swedish NDC construction, since positive labor force gains
are undistributed, i.e. indexation is with (1 + g)(1 + p), these together with good returns on the buffer
fund(s) can counterbalance the clear inaccuracy in the projection of life expectancy at retirement
resulting from not attempting to account for some additional increase in life expectancy of cohorts
after retirement.
13Note that Sweden, as other countries that have introduced NDC and FDC schemes, has a
minimum guarantee, which has not been discussed in the present context.
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Countries are now aiming to raise this age. National DC (NDC or FDC) schemes are
a tool that can help promote this goal, and this is an important reason why countries
are introducing them.14
To conclude, in order to plan for retirement in a DC environment, individuals
need good information about their cohort’s life expectancy. Work career and saving
plans will then be formulated in accordance with this information, thereby deter-
mining lifetime resources and their distribution over the life cycle.
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Experiences from Forecasting Mortality
in Finland
Juha M. Alho
3.1 Modeen and Törnqvist
The first official cohort-component projection of the population of Finland was
prepared by Gunnar Modeen (1934a), an actuary with the Central Statistical Office
of Finland at the time. Modeen’s work had elements of genuine forecasting in that he
commented on past trends in fertility, mortality, and migration, and discussed their
possible long-term implications (Modeen 1934b). On the other hand, the work was
rather schematic in nature. In particular, age-specific mortality was assumed not to
change during the projection period, although Modeen was aware of its declining
trend since the late nineteenth century (Modeen 1934a, 38). Unable to pinpoint the
future rate of decline exactly, Modeen rejected any alternative assumption as
speculative (cf., Modeen and Fougstedt 1938).
Analyses of mortality trends in presumably more advanced countries were used
as leading indicators in the United States by Whelpton et al. (1947), for example. In
Finland, Leo Törnqvist (1949) proposed similar methods. In particular, he used
Swedish mortality as a target towards which he assumed Finnish mortality to
converge. Both series were first transformed via a logistic type transformation.
Then, the curves were aligned, and the Finnish curve was prolonged in accordance
with the Swedish development.
A problem with Modeen’s projection was that it soon became outdated. Fertility
started to increase at the time the projection was published, and mortality continued
to decline. Modeen’s calculations suggested that the Finnish population would never
exceed four million, but this mark had already been crossed by 1950. Törnqvist’s
collected works (Viren et al. 1981) do not mention the error of past forecasts as a
motivation for his own early work. Nevertheless, the future statistics professor, a
J. M. Alho (*)
University of Joensuu, Joensuu, Finland
e-mail: juha.alho@helsinki.fi
© The Author(s) 2019
T. Bengtsson, N. Keilman (eds.), Old and New Perspectives on Mortality
Forecasting, Demographic Research Monographs,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05075-7_3
33
specialist in time-series analysis (among other fields, cf. Nordberg 1999), was well
aware that forecasts cannot be made without error. He appears to have been the first
to formulate the problem of uncertainty in population forecasting in probabilistic
terms in Törnqvist (1949). Later, Törnqvist also conducted what must be one of the
earliest assessments of the empirical accuracy of Finnish forecasts (including his
own!) in Törnqvist (1967).
In this note, we will outline current developments in Finnish mortality forecast-
ing. In Sect. 3.2, we describe the methods used by official forecasters. These derive
mainly from the tradition of early cohort-component forecasters (cf. DeGans 1999).
In Sect. 3.3, we discuss how uncertainty can be taken into account using probabi-
listic models and present-day computing facilities. We conclude in Sect. 3.4 by
commenting on some applications for which mortality forecasts are particularly
relevant.
3.2 Official Forecasts1
The arithmetic underlying cohort-component forecasts was understood a hundred
years ago (DeGans 1999). Since the method relies on detailed assumptions
concerning future age-specific rates, the real key to forecast accuracy lies with
those assumptions. One would think that major improvements would have occurred
during the past century, judging from the way the assumptions are formulated. Yet,
the methods were essentially perfected by Whelpton back in the 1940s.
The two producers of official population forecasts in Finland are Statistics
Finland and the Social Insurance Institution of Finland (or KELA, an abbreviation
of the Finnish name). Since the forecasters of the two institutions cooperate on an
informal basis, the forecasts have many similarities.
Both institutions produce forecasts approximately every 3 years. More frequent
updates are made if unexpected developments occur. Both disaggregate the popula-
tion by sex and single years of age (0, 1, 2, . . ., 99, 100+). Currently both organi-
zations forecast until 2050.
KELA produces a national forecast only, whereas Statistics Finland forecasts the
population of every one of the 448 municipalities of Finland. In the case of mortality,
the country is divided into three relatively homogeneous areas: Northern and Eastern
Finland, which have a high level of mortality (due in particular to cardio-vascular
diseases among males); the Swedish-speaking coastal areas, with low mortality; the
rest of the country, with intermediate mortality. The reason for the low mortality
among the Swedish speakers has not been established, but both socio-economic and
lifestyle factors apparently play a part (Koskinen and Martelin 1995).
1The author would like to thank Mr. Matti Saari, Statistics Finland, and Mr. Markku Ryynänen,
KELA, for information on the practice of forecasting. Any misunderstandings are the sole respon-
sibility of the author.
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Neither organization uses cause-specific mortality data in the preparation of their
assumptions. This is contrast with the U.S. Office of the Actuary, for example (e.g.,
Wade 1987). However, we have argued elsewhere that cause-specific information
cannot be expected to increase forecast accuracy unless one of two conditions are
met: either leading indicators can be identified in the preparation of forecasts, or
structural changes can be anticipated based on other available information (as in the
case of AIDS, for example) (Alho 1991).
Both organizations use trend extrapolation as a basis for their mortality forecast.
Starting from a target value for life expectancy at birth, e0, Statistics Finland adjusts
future age-specific mortality rates so that the implied increase in life expectancy
gradually slows down until the target of e0 is reached. Age-dependent proportional
adjustment is used to modify the jump-off rates. In KELA the starting point is a
classification of individual ages into aggregates with similar mortality levels.
Regression analysis is used in the log-scale to estimate rates of decline that gradually
decelerate. The assumption, made by both organizations, that the rate of decline
eventually falls off, is far from self-evident. In fact, we have used U.S. data to show
that such an assumption has historically made the U.S. mortality forecasts worse
than simpler trend extrapolations (Alho 1990).
Neither organization formulates their targets on a cohort basis although both
occasionally examine cohort trends to see whether there are any irregularities. A
current example of such an irregularity was reported by KELA: the female cohorts
born in the 1950s appear to have higher mortality than cohorts born earlier,
during WWII.
The methods of trend extrapolation used by the organizations blend judgment and
empirical analysis. Neither organization has experimented with the method proposed
by Lee and Carter (1992). Its performance in regard to ages 65+ in Finland, was
investigated in a University of Joensuu pro gradu thesis by Eklund (1995), who
found that a one-dimensional singular-value decomposition produced a good fit to
the data. Because of random variation, however, the resulting forecast was not
always an increasing function of age.
In addition to the trend forecast, KELA produces another mortality variant in
which it is assumed (as Modeen did) that mortality will remain at the jump-off level.
Statistics Finland limits itself to a single variant even though high and low variants
have previously been used in national forecasts.
3.3 Predictive Distribution of Mortality
A major contribution by Törnqvist (1949) was that he was apparently the first to
maintain that since the future values of a vital rate cannot be totally known, they
must be treated as random variables. The actual future values are then “samples”
from their distributions. In modern terminology, the uncertainty of the future value is
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expressed in terms of a predictive distribution that represents both our best guess and
its uncertainty. The distribution is conditioned on all information available at the
jump-off time of the forecast (e.g., Gelman et al. 1995, 9).
Törnqvist’s contribution may have been ahead of its time. In particular, correct
formal treatment of the predictive distribution would have been difficult before the
availability of high-speed computing. In recent years, the potential usefulness of a
probabilistic approach to uncertainty has been noted on several occasions.2 At the
University of Joensuu, we have written a computer program, PEP (Program for Error
Propagation), which is capable of simulation samples from a wide range of predic-
tive distributions.
The main concept of PEP is that it allows us to describe the uncertainty connected
with a forecast at the time it is being made. All sources of uncertainty – age-specific
fertility and age and sex-specific mortality and migration – are taken into account
and propagated throughout to derive the predictive distribution of the population. In
this sense, PEP is merely a stochastic version of the cohort-component bookkeeping
system. The usefulness of the results depends on the assumptions underlying the
calculations. The user of PEP must specify a point forecast for each of the vital rates
for all future years, just as in ordinary cohort-component forecasting. An additional
step is required in the form of specifying the uncertainty surrounding the forecast.
Suppose R(j,t) is the mortality rate for age j ¼ 0, 1, . . ., ω in a future year t ¼ 1,
2, . . ., T. PEP assumes that
R j; tð Þ ¼ exp r̂ j; tð Þ þ X j; tð Þð Þ,
where r̂(j, t) is the point forecast of the log-rate, and X(j,t) is a random error with a
mean of E[X(j,t)] ¼ 0. The random error can always be written in the form
X j; tð Þ ¼ ε 1; tð Þ þ    þ ε j; tð Þ:
In PEP, the error increments ε(j,t) are assumed to be of the form
ε j; tð Þ ¼ S j; tð Þ η j þ δ j; tð Þ
 
,
where the S(j,t)’s are known scale factors that can be chosen to match any sequence
of error variances Var(X(j,t)) that increases with t. Fixing j, we can think of the terms
ηj as representing errors in forecasted trends. In the case of mortality, the trend
corresponds to the rate of decline, for example. Since the terms δ(j,t) are independent
for any fixed j, they represent unpredictable random variation. The relative roles of
the two types of uncertainties derive from the assumption ηj~N(0, κj), and δ(j, t)~N
2Review of Land (1986); “Special Section on Statistical Analysis of Errors in Population Forecast-
ing and Its Implications on Policy,” Journal of Official Statistics, September 1997; “Frontiers of
Population Forecasting,” Population and Development Review, 1998 Supplement; review of
U.N. forecasts by the National Research Council (2000).
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(0, 1  κj), where 0  κj  1. The terms ηj are assumed to be independent of the
terms δ(j,t). Finally, the terms ηj can either have a constant correlation across j, or an
AR(1) type correlation. The same is true for the δ(j,t)’s, when t is fixed. This scaled
model for error was introduced in Alho and Spencer (1997).
In Alho (1998) we provide details of the application of PEP to the population of
Finland for 1999–2050. The point forecasts for each vital rate were as specified by
Statistics Finland. We now present some details on the treatment of uncertainty in the
mortality forecast.
Age-specific mortality data in 5-year age-groups 0–4, 5–9, . . ., 75–79, and 80+
were available for the years 1900–1994. After a preliminary analysis, the data were
aggregated into the broader age groups 0–4, 5–34, 35–59, 60–79, and 80+ by adding
the age-specific rates together. This increased the stability of the trends. The analysis
was carried out in terms of the logarithm of the sum (cf. Alho 1998, Figures 5a–e,
pp. 19–21). The unusual values produced by the civil war in 1918 and WWII in
1939–1944 were smoothed using values from the previous year. For each of the five
broad age groups, we produced baseline forecasts as follows:
• Starting from year y ¼ 1915, we used the data for the previous 15 years (y, y –
1, . . ., y – 15) to calculate a trend forecast for all future years until 1994.
• A linear trend was estimated from the first and the last observation of the 15-year
data period.
• In case the linear trend was positive, it was replaced by a constant value (i.e.,
slope ¼ 0).
For each y¼ 1915, 1916, we calculated the empirical forecast error for lead times
t ¼ 1, 2, . . ., 50. For each lead time t, we could then estimate the standard deviation
of the error around zero (i.e., assuming that the forecasts are unbiased). This would
give us estimates of Var(X(j,t)) directly, from which the scales S(j,t) could be
deduced. However, it turned out that especially for younger ages the estimates
were somewhat erratic because of the large random (Poisson-type) variation in the
counts. Therefore, final estimates were produced by averaging the estimates from the
six time series corresponding to the three broad age groups of 35–59, 60–79, and 80
+ for males and females. The resulting estimate of the standard deviation of the
relative error starts from approximately 0.06 at t¼ 1 and increases in a linear fashion
to about 0.6 at t ¼ 50. Otherwise expressed, the relative error one might expect for a
single age group increases from 6% to roughly 60% in 50 years (cf., Alho 1998,
Fig. 6, p. 22). These estimates were used for all ages.
The results were checked by fitting an ARIMA(1,1,0) model to the data series,
and similar results were obtained (Alho 1998, Fig. 6, p. 22).
The parameter κ was estimated by the least-squares method. The single value
κ ¼ 0.149 was applied for all ages.
An AR(1) process was used to model the autocorrelation of the error terms ηj and
δ(j,t) across age j. Otherwise expressed, the correlation was assumed to be ρji  jj for
any two single years of age i and j, where the empirical estimate ρ ¼ .945 was used
for ηj’s and ρ ¼ .977 was used for δ(j,t)’s. Finally, a parameter for contemporaneous
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crosscorrelation between the error of male mortality and the female mortality was
estimated as .795.
The details are fairly complex. One way to assess the reasonableness of the
procedures is to consider their implications for life expectancy. Figure 3.1 has a
predictive distribution for male life expectancy at birth, and Fig. 3.2 has a plot for
female life expectancy. The median of the predictive distribution is 82.0 for males
and 85.6 for females in 2050. A 50% prediction interval (or interval between the first
and third quartile) is [79.0, 84.4] for males and [83.9, 87.5] for females. An 80%
prediction interval for males is [76.5, 86.5] and [82.3, 89.0] for females. The
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Fig. 3.2 Predictive distribution of female life expectancy in Finland in 1998–2050
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Two concerns can be raised concerning the intervals. First, the long-term point
forecasts are based on an eventual slowdown of the decline in mortality; this may
make the Finnish forecast too conservative, as it did in the U.S. earlier. However, we
may note that the life expectancy implied by the current Swedish forecasts for males
is 82.6 and for females 86.5 years in 2050. In the intermediate variant of the
Norwegian forecast, the corresponding ages assumed are 80.0 and 84.5 years. We
see that despite the assumption of a slow-down in the mortality decline in Finland,
the Finnish forecast is the most optimistic of the three in terms of improvement, since
the current life expectancy in Finland is the lowest. Even though the Finnish point
forecast may be too low at the end of the forecast period, from this perspective the
Finnish forecast appears less conservative.
Second, in view of the vast potential for new medical advances, one could argue
that the range of uncertainty expressed by the widths of the intervals might be overly
narrow. Two arguments seem relevant here. For the U.S. (both sexes combined), Lee
and Carter (1992, p. 660, Fig. 3.1) calculated model-based 95% intervals for life
expectancy 50 years ahead. The width of these intervals was approximately
8.4 years. In a normal model, the corresponding width for an 80% interval would
be approximately 5.5 years. Thus, our intervals are clearly wider. In a discussion of
the paper by Lee and Carter, we noted that by including all sources of variation, the
Lee and Carter intervals would have been approximately one half wider (Alho
1992). This would have resulted in estimates close to ours. (One could also argue
that in a large country with heterogeneous sub-populations there might be some
offsetting variation, resulting in a national average more stable than in a small
homogeneous country. While conceivable, this possibility does not seem to be an
adequate reason for inflating the Finnish intervals, since it does not show up in the
Finnish time series).
A related criticism suggests that future advances in medical knowledge may be so
unprecedented that intervals based on past outcomes are too narrow. However, in
1915, at the start of our observation period, both life expectancy for both males and
females was substantially lower – 43.2 and 49.2 years (Kannisto and Nieminen
1996); the improvements by the end of the twentieth century were 27.5 and
29.5 years, respectively. Our estimates reflect the variation in this turbulent period
of major improvement. The future can be even more volatile, but the advantage of
our intervals is that they correspond to actual past variation, rather than to a
subjective assessment. Of course, a subjective assessment may be used as a basis
for other calculations that would complement our own.
3.4 Applications
Now that we have the analytical capability to produce predictive distributions for
future vital rates and future population, it is of some interest to consider how they
might be applied. There are two aspects to this.
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First, it is critical that we understand how the predictive distribution can be
understood. As noted, e.g., in Alho (1998), predictive distributions can be based
on (1) formal statistical models, (2) errors of past forecasts can be used to estimate
the error of future forecasts, (3) errors of baseline forecasts can be used to estimate
future error, and (4) error specification can be purely subjective. Of course, any
mixture of the four is also a possibility. The results we have shown rely primarily on
(3), although they have elements of (1) and (4), as well. The aim was to provide an
empirical assessment of the difficulty of forecasting (or “forecastability”) of the vital
processes for different times. As such, the results for mortality correspond to the
uncertainty in mortality forecasting during the twentieth century. One can reason-
ably question whether forecasting is now easier, or more difficult, than in the past,
but at least we now have a quantitative empirical assessment of how things were
before.
Second, the predictive distribution can be used to address numerous social-policy
issues that depend on future population and its age structure. For example, in Alho
et al. (2001) we review an example in which output from PEP was used in
combination with the Finnish overlapping-generations model to devise alternative
pension-funding rules, and another example in which output from PEP was used to
assess the stability of the current rules for state aid to municipalities. In a University
of Joensuu pro gradu thesis, Polvinen (2001) used PEP to form a predictive
distribution of the so-called generational accounts. All these questions are of funda-
mental concern for the long-term planning of the social-support systems in Finland.
In no case has the effect of uncertain population age-distribution previously been
recognized. Other applications have been presented by Lee and Tuljapurkar (1998)
for the Social Security system of the United States, for example. Further research
opportunities are discussed in Auerbach and Lee (2001).
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Chapter 4
Mortality Projections in Norway
Helge Brunborg
4.1 A Brief Description of the Norwegian Population
Projection Model
The official population projections for Norway are produced and published by
Statistics Norway. As in Finland, though not in Denmark and Sweden, the national
statistical agency makes regional projections as well. The smallest geographical
units projected are the 435 municipalities (kommuner), which range in size from
about 250 (Utsira) to about ½ million (Oslo) people.
Using the projection model BEFREG, the population by age and sex is projected
1 year at a time by the cohort-component method. The method employs a migrant pool
approach formigration between the 90 economic regions of Norway (NUTS), with 1–19
municipalities in each region. The regional projection results are subsequently broken
down into results for individualmunicipalities according to the size and historical growth
rate of broad population age groups in each municipality. Thus, the cohort component
method is generally not applied at the municipal level. The national population figures
are found by aggregating the regional projections, i.e. the bottom-up principle.
The model has been virtually unchanged during the last 15–20 years; see Rideng
et al. (1985) for a general description and Hetland (1998) for a technical description
of the computer system.
After this paper was written, a new set of population projections for Norway for the period
2002–2050 was published in December 2002, see http://www.ssb.no/folkfram/. One
important change compared to the 1999–2050 projections is that the assumed life expectancies
up to 2050 are considerably higher than previously. The method for projecting the age-specific
death probabilities is the same as that for the 1999–2050 projections.
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In the most recent projections, for the period 1999–2050 and with the registered
population as of 1 January 1999 as the initial population, we assumed three variants
for each of the following demographic components: fertility, mortality, net immi-
gration and the degree of centralisation for internal migration (plus a variant with
zero migration). This would yield 144 different population projections; however,
only a few of these combinations have been computed and published. The
populations of municipalities were projected until 2020, those of the counties were
projected until 2050 (but published only for the years up to 2030), and the population
for the entire country was computed until 2050.
All data for the projections come from registers through the population-statistics
system BESYS, which is used to build up a structure of aggregate data for population,
births, deaths, domestic and international migration, where the smallest unit is
age*sex*municipality.
As mentioned above, BEFREG projects the population only by age, sex and
region. Previously, Statistics Norway has also made national projections by age, sex
and marital status (Brunborg et al. 1981; Kravdal 1986) and by age, sex and
household status (Keilman and Brunborg 1995). The last two of these publications
used mortality rates by formal marital status, whereas the first did not. Moreover, the
stochastic microsimulation model MOSART projects a sample (from 1% to 10%) of
Norway’s population by age, sex, marital status, household status, educational
activity and level, labour-market earnings and public-pension status/benefits (includ-
ing disability and old-age). In this model the mortality probabilities have been
estimated from 1993 data with sex, age, marital status, educational attainment and
disability status as covariates (Fredriksen 1998). MOSART has a complicated data
structure that is infrequently updated.
4.2 A Short History of Mortality Projections in Norway
Since 1969, thirteen sets of regional and national projections have been prepared and
published, usually every 3 years.1 In the first projections the mortality rates were
kept constant for the entire projection period and set equal to the most recently
observed rates, usually for a period ranging from two to five calendar years for
national rates and 10-year periods or more for regional rates and time trends. The use
of observations for several years is done to reduce random variations due to
Norway’s small population (about four million).
Gradually the projections of the age- and sex-specific mortality rates have become
more sophisticated2:
1See Texmon (1992) for a survey of Norwegian population projections for the period 1969–1990.
2For more detail, see the publication for each set of projections, with text in both Norwegian and
English, the most recent being Statistics Norway (2002).
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• In the projections of 1977 and 1979, the observed rates were reduced by 2% and
3%, respectively, and kept constant for the entire projection period (until 2010).
• Regional mortality rates (specific for each of the 19 counties) were introduced in
the projections of 1979. This affects overall mortality if, for example, net migra-
tion flows go primarily from high to low-mortality areas.
• A declining trend in future mortality rates was assumed for the first time in the
1982 projection, when all rates were reduced by 1% per year for the first 10 years
but kept constant for the rest of the projection period.
• The Brass logit life-table model was used for the projections of 1987 (but not
later).
• A model with time- and age-specific death rates was used for the period
1990–2050 (but not later); see Statistics Norway (1991) and Goméz de Leon
and Texmon (1992).
• Alternative mortality projections were introduced in the 1993 projections, when
sets of rates yielding low, medium and high life expectancies were assumed
(Statistics Norway 1994).
• Target life expectancies for the final projection year were also introduced in the
1993 projections (Statistics Norway 1994).
• Age- and sex-specific reductions in future death rates were used in the 1999–2050
projections.
Most of these changes were made because it was discovered that mortality had
been persistently overestimated. It is perhaps surprising that it took so long to realise
this, since Norway had experienced an almost uninterrupted mortality decline since
the 1820s (though with some stagnation for men in the 1950s). The decline has been
particularly rapid since the 1960s – see Fig. 4.1.
4.3 Current Methodology of Mortality Projections
In this section, we will describe the methodology and thinking behind the current
mortality projections, focusing on a number of separate issues that need to be
considered.
4.3.1 Target Life Expectancies
The assumed target life expectancies at birth for the final projection year, 2050, vary
from 77 to 83 years for men and from 81.5 to 87.5 years for women (i.e. the same as
for the previous projections, those of 1996) – see Fig. 4.1. There is no theory or
profound thinking behind these assumptions, which have been based on the devel-
opment in Norway and elsewhere:
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• The assumed future increase of e0–7.5 years for males and 6.3 years for women –
in the most optimistic alternative from 1998 to 2050 is of the same magnitude as
the actual increase during the previous 50-year period from about 1950 to 1998
(5.5 and 7.7 years, respectively).
• In the medium UN series, it is assumed that e0 for Norway will increase to
80.5 years for men and 86.4 years for women in 2040–2050 (United Nations
1999), i.e. well within our range. The long-term UN projections to 2150 assume
that e0 will increase to 85.2 for men and 91.3 for women in Europe and to 87.1
and 92.5 in North America; these constitute the upper limits of the projections.
• The most recent Swedish projections assume life expectancies for 2050 that are
slightly lower than in our high alternative, 82.6 for men and 86.5 for women
(Statistics Sweden 2000).
We conclude that our assumptions about target life expectancies in 2050 are not
extreme and perhaps even slightly conservative. In our next projections, we will
consider assuming a wider range of life expectancies. It would be useful to base this
range on probabilistic considerations, for example, the work done by Juha Alho and
Nico Keilman – see e.g., Keilman et al. 2001.
4.3.2 Difference in Target e0 for Males and Females
We have assumed a continued gradual decline in the difference between female and
male life expectancies, to 4½ years in 2050. This is consistent with historical trends,





























































Fig. 4.1 Life expectancy at birth for women and men. Registered 1825–1998 and projected
1999–2050: Low, medium and high assumptions of life expectancy
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the 1980s, declining later to 5.7 years in 1998. This decrease, which has been
observed in most European countries, is usually explained as due to a narrowing
of the gender differences in life style. A similar assumption has been made in
Sweden, where the differential is reduced to 3.9 years for 2050.
The most specific manifestation, as well as the principal reason, for this tendency
is probably the change in smoking behaviour. The proportion of daily smokers
among men 16–76 in Norway has decreased from about 1=2 in 1973 to 1=3 in 2000,
while it has remained constant at 1=3 for women. In 2000, smoking had become
more common for the first time among women than among men (32% vs. 31%) – see
Fig. 4.2.
4.3.3 Life Expectancies in the First Projection Year
If we had assumed a smooth development of e0 from the most recent observations to
the target, there would have been practically no difference between the alternatives
for the first years of the projection. We would like, however, to have a reasonably
wide range of e0 to cover the possibility of random year-to-year fluctuations in
mortality. For this purpose, we chose, as described in Sect. 5.5, a parameter that
yields a change in e0 for the first projection year (i.e. from 1998 to 1999) that is
similar to the largest observed annual change in e0 during the period 1965–1998. In
other words, we chose the largest annual decrease for the low alternative – about
0.4 years for men 0.2 years for women – and the largest annual increase for the high
alternative – about 0.6 years for each sex (see Table 4.1). In 1996 a similar approach
was taken to widen the mortality range in the first projection year, but then the
standard deviation of the difference between observed and projected life expectan-
cies was subtracted (or added) to yield the low (or high) values for the first projection
year. Actual and assumed life expectancies for the first projection years are shown in
Figs. 4.3 and 4.4. It can be seen that the observed values are close to the medium
variant in both rounds of projections, with a slightly faster improvement for men
than for women.
4.3.4 Path of e0 from the Initial Until the Target Year
In Sect. 5.5, we describe the method used to project the mortality rates in the
1999–2050 population projections for Norway. The e0 trajectory is found by inter-
polating between the life expectancies assumed for the initial and target years. This is
done by assuming a dampening of the annual age- and sex specific rates of change in
death rates. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show e0 for males and females for each of the three
mortality alternatives in the two most recently completed projections, i.e. for
1996–2050 and 1999–2050.
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We notice that the 1999 projections generally assume a more linear development
of e0 than the 1996 projections, except for the low alternative. The main reason is
that we did not impose the restriction of no mortality change in the target year, as
discussed below. It is, however, not yet possible to determine whether the 1999 paths
are more realistic than the 1996 paths – only time will tell!
4.3.5 Slope of e0 in the Target Year
In the previous round of projections, for 1996–2050, it was assumed that life






































Fig. 4.2 Proportion of daily smokers among men and women 16–74 Years of Age, 1973–2000.
(Source: http://www.ssb.no/emner/03/01/roy/)
Table 4.1 Change factors and target life expectancies, population projections 1999–2050a
Life expectancy
variant
First projection year (1999)
Subsequent projection years










L (low) 3.315 75.1 0.927 77.0
M (medium) 0.741 75.5 0.982 80.0
H (high) 3.026 76.1 1.005 83.0
Females
L (low) 1.417 81.0 0.791 81.5
M (medium) 0.212 81.2 0.978 84.5
H (high) 4.195 81.7 1.006 87.5
aThe observed life expectancy at birth in 1998 was 75.5 years for males and 81.2 years for females
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in such a distant future. In the most recent projections, however, we have not been
concerned about the slope of e0 in the target year. This is due partly to the high
uncertainty, but also to the likelihood – in our opinion – that mortality will continue
to decline, even after 2050.
4.3.6 Alternative Mortality Assumptions
As mentioned in the introduction, Statistics Norway did not begin to introduce
alternative mortality assumptions before 1993. Although future fertility (and migra-
tion) may seem more uncertain than future mortality, there are a number of uncer-
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Fig. 4.4 Life expectancy at birth for women, registered 1994–2000 and projected to 2001
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technological breakthroughs in the diagnosis and treatment of diseases, new epi-
demics and other diseases, pollution and other environmental problems, increasingly
unhealthy life styles, etc.
Thus, it seems wise to base population projections on several mortality alterna-
tives. The alternatives should cover a realistic future range of variation. If the range
is too small, there are in reality no alternatives; if it is too large, the projections may
cease to be interesting. Ideally, the range should be based on a probability
distribution.
The number of alternatives is another choice that needs to be considered. The
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Fig. 4.6 Life expectancy at birth for females, registered 1970–1999 and projected to 2050
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complicated to present and use the population projections. Thus, three seems to be a
sensible number. In the last three rounds of projections, we have assumed one low,
one medium and one high alternative for life expectancy. Note that “low”, “medium”
and “high” do not refer to mortality levels as such but to life expectancies, for
consistency with the assumptions about other demographic components; for exam-
ple, “low” implies low population growth.
4.3.7 Age Groups
The current version of BEFREG has 100 age groups, 0,1,2,. . .,98 and 99+. We are
considering including more single-year age groups, at least age 99, in the next
version of the model for two reasons: First, there is an increasing number of (and
interest in) centenarians. Second, the lack of a decline in mortality for the oldest of
the old, as described in Sect. 4.4, may necessitate a more differentiated approach for
this particular group.
4.3.8 Cohort Mortality
Cohort mortality is not directly considered in our mortality assumptions. However,
we have calculated the implications of our assumptions for cohort mortality – see
Fig. 4.7.3 We may note that projected cohort mortality approaches projected period
mortality; this tendency may be expected in view of the assumptions made. We also
see that the difference between cohort and period mortality is particularly high for
the 1960s–1980s.
4.4 Age-Specific Trends in Mortality Rates
The future age pattern of mortality has been given little attention in previous
Norwegian population projections. The reason may be that the past mortality decline
was implicitly assumed to be about the same for all ages and perhaps also that the age
pattern of mortality was not considered to matter so much for the population
projections – the only important factor being the level of mortality as measured by
life expectancy at birth.
It is clear, however, that the mortality decline has varied greatly by age and sex. It
is well known that historically the decline was largest for infants and children. To
3The life expectancy for cohorts born in 1950 and later and having members still living in 2050 has
been estimated from extrapolated death probabilities. For example, q(101, c1950) ¼ q(101, c1949).
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learn more about recent trends, we have studied the development of age-and
sex-specific mortality rates for the past 30–40 years.
Let q(x,t,s) be the probability of death at age x, time t and sex s. The annual
relative rate of change during the period from t1 to t2 is
ř x; sð Þ ¼ ln q x; s; t2ð Þ=q x; s; t1ð Þð Þ= t2  t1ð Þ: ð4:1Þ
We estimated the rate of change for x ¼ 0,1,. . .99; t1 ¼ 1965–1968, t2 ¼ 1998;
and s ¼ male, female.4 As these rates of change exhibit a rather ragged appearance
we applied a smoothing procedure. The rate of change r(x,s) is graduated using a
21-term weighted moving average, with coefficients from Hoem (1995). The
smoothed rates of change for males and females are shown in Fig. 4.8.
As expected, the decline has been the most rapid for children, but it has also been
very impressive for adolescents and for men and women between 40 and 80. On the
other hand, it has been nearly zero for persons over 90. There is even a tendency of
increasing mortality for the oldest individuals, especially men over age 95, see
Figs. 4.9 and 4.10. Thus, mortality rates for the oldest in Norway may have stagnated
or started to increase in recent years. This is contrary to the trends in most other
countries, but similar to those in the Netherlands (Nusselder and Mackenbach 2000).
There are also indications of stagnating old-age mortality trends in Denmark,
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Fig. 4.7 Life expectancy at birth for periods and cohorts, registered and projected
4We experimented with different periods, finding similar patterns, and chose the oldest single-year
age-specific death rates that were available to us when we performed this analysis, i.e. for 1965.
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4.5 Projections of Age-Specific Mortality Rates
In the most recent projections, we assume that the age-specific mortality declines are
consistent with the patterns shown in Fig. 4.8 and as estimated in (1). To project the
mortality probabilities q(x, t, s) by age x, time t and sex s, we multiply them by a
factor depending on the rates of change ̌r (x, t, s) estimated for the period 1965–1998,
as shown in Fig. 4.8. These rates of change are also changed, however, 1 year at the
time, through multiplication by the parameters αs or βs for each age.
1 Per cent
0








Fig. 4.8 Annual change in age-specific death probabilities, 1965–1998. Per cent. Men and women
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Fig. 4.9 Expected remaining years of life for elderly men at selected ages
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Thus, for the first projection year, 1999, we find
q x; s; 1999ð Þ ¼ q x; s; 1997:5ð Þ∗ 1þ r x; s; tð Þð Þ,where ð4:2Þ
q x; s; 1997:5ð Þ ¼ q x; s; 1997ð Þ þ q x; s; 1998ð Þð Þ=2 ð4:3Þ
and 1997.5 denotes the average of 1997 and 1998. For 1999 the change factors are
r x; s; 1999ð Þ ¼ ř x; sð Þ∗αs: ð4:4Þ
For the subsequent years we compute
q x; s; tð Þ ¼ q x; s; t 1ð Þ∗ 1þ r x; s; tð Þð Þ for t ¼ 2000, . . . , 2050,where ð4:5Þ
r x; s; tð Þ ¼ ř x; sð Þ∗βs for t ¼ 2000 and ð4:6Þ
r x; s; tð Þ ¼ r x; s; t 1ð Þ∗βs for t ¼ 2001, . . . , 2050: ð4:7Þ
Equation (4.7) determines the path of e0 from the most recently observed values
of qx (the mean of 1997 and 1998) to the assumed target values for 2050 (see
Table 4.1). The estimates of parameters αs and βs employed here imply a dampening
of the annual rates of change of the age- and specific death probabilities, see
Table 4.1. The parameters are determined in the following way, for each sex and
mortality alternative (low, medium and high):
• The parameter for the first projection year, αs, is chosen on the following
assumptions about the change in life expectancy from 1998 to the first projection
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Fig. 4.10 Expected remaining years of life for elderly women at selected ages
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– It is set equal to the largest decline in e0 observed during 1965–1998 in
alternative L
– It is set equal to zero in alternative M
– It is set equal to the largest increase in e0 observed during 1965–1998 in
alternative H
• The parameter for the rest of the projection years, βs, is chosen such that the
resulting life expectancy in 2050 is equal to our target life expectancy for that year
– see Table 4.1. This is done through iteration. (The procedure is made easy by
using an Excel spreadsheet function that lets the user set the target whereby the
program estimates the value that yields the desired value of the target).
4.6 Projection Results
The two most recent sets of population projections for Norway, i.e. those for
1996–2050 and 1999–2050, are very similar with regard to most of the assumptions.
The fertility and migration assumptions are almost the same, and the target life
expectancies in 2050 are identical although the trajectories are slightly different. As
mentioned above, the greatest difference is that we have assumed a different
age-pattern of mortality change for the projection period. This difference, and in
particular the slower mortality decline for the oldest, result in significantly lower
numbers of old people than in the previous projections (Fig. 4.11).5 The results are
very similar for the low alternatives, where only a very small mortality decline has
been assumed. However, the high alternative of the 1999 projections yields about the
same number of people 90+ as the medium alternative of the 1996 projections. For
2050, for example, the projected population 90+ varies from 50,000 to 150,000 in
the previous projection to 50,000–100,000 in the most recent projections.
We conclude that the specification of the age-structure of mortality decline has
significant effects on the projected number of old people. Thus, the analysis of
mortality trends for the oldest members of the population is important for population
projections.
5The three different projections from 1999 shown here differ only with regard to the mortality
assumptions. The 1996-projections are also different with regard to fertility and migration, how-
ever, but for the age groups and period considered here, the effects of these differences are marginal.
Fertility differences for 1996–2050 will obviously not affect the number of persons 90+ for this
period. The youngest age in 1996 of persons to enter age group 90+ in the projection period
1996–2050 is 36 years. Since persons aged over 35 accounted for only 12% of net immigration in
1996–1999, differences in net immigration can only have marginal effects on the number of persons
90+ projected for the period 1996–2050.
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Chapter 5
Mortality Assumptions for Sweden.
The 2000–2050 Population Projection
Hans Lundström
5.1 Mortality Projection in Sweden
A new population projection for Sweden is prepared every third year with minor
updates in between. Statistics Sweden is responsible for the projections.
Ideally, mortality projections should be made in a process-oriented manner. In
practice, however, they are mainly based on trend extrapolations of period mortality
rates for the last 50 years. The critical component in the assumptions concerns the
ages of 50 and above. The problem is to handle both short-term and long-term
developments, especially when there is a trend shift like the one today with a
temporary slow-down in the mortality decline for middle-aged women. Does this
change mark a new trend or not? Most users are mainly interested in the short-term
development, i.e. in the next year or the next 5 years. Others have a time horizon of
50 years or longer. There are three alternative assumptions: no change in mortality,
mortality decline according to the main alternative, and a more pronounced mortality
decline.
The assumption of the future mortality decline is based not only on the observed
trend but adjusted for other information such as smoking behavior.
For the coming projection we plan to base the analysis more on cohort mortality.
Mortality in Sweden has fallen ever since the mid-nineteenth century. In the
beginning, the change was mainly due to a reduced risk of dying of infectious
diseases and deficiency diseases. The factors underlying the greater chances of
To a large extent, this is a translation from Swedish of Chapter 3.3 in the publication Sveriges
framtida befolkning. Befolkningsframskrivning för åren 2000–2050. Demografiska rapporter
2000:1 SCB. (Sweden’s future population. Population forecast for the years 2000–2050.
Demographic reports 2000:1, Statistics Sweden). ISBN 91-618-1068-1.
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survival were economic, social and sanitary improvements, and, not least, medical
advances such as the introduction of vaccines and antibiotics.
More recent developments – say, since 1950 – have brought a continued decline
in mortality. Changes in the last few decades have largely concerned chronic
illnesses, including cardiovascular diseases and cancer, which are the major causes
of death. The reasons for the changes in what are sometimes called the diseases of
wealthy societies are a transition to a healthier lifestyle and improved medical care,
leading to a considerable increase in survival at advanced ages. The decline in
mortality at ages above 65 began considerably earlier for women than for men.
5.2 Sharply Lower Mortality in 1950–1999
In the second half of the twentieth century, mortality fell sharply. The risk of death
has been reduced by more than half among men below the age of 50 and women
below the age of 80. The drop in infant mortality has been particularly dramatic. In
1950, 21 of 1000 children born died before their first birthday. In 1999, just three per
thousand live-born children died in their first year.
Among adult men, however, the risk of death changed relatively little in the
period 1950–1975. For part of this period, there was even an observable increase in
mortality, largely among middle-aged men. Since 1975, however, male mortality has
declined substantially, by an average of about 2% per year among men between
young middle age and the age of about 80, (see Fig. 5.1).
Among women, we see a decline in mortality throughout the post-1950 period.
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Fig. 5.1 Annual reduction of risk of death at different ages for two periods, 1950–1999. Men
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85, the reduction of mortality has been somewhat lower. However, over the last
10 years the rate of mortality reduction among uppermiddle-aged women has slowed
slightly, (see Fig. 5.2).
We may add that in recent years severe influenza epidemics have occurred more
frequently. This has had a serious effect on many elderly people. The long-term rise
in women’s annual average life expectancy has therefore slowed temporarily after
each influenza epidemic. One reason why women’s average life expectancy is
affected most is that a larger proportion of elderly women than men reach
advanced ages.
5.3 Reasons for the Decline in Mortality in 1980–1999
Assumptions about future mortality trends are based on changes in mortality over the
past two decades. During this period, the decline in male mortality has strongly
resembled the decline in female mortality. In spite of this close correspondence,
around 1980 the situation differed for men and women aged over 50 – and these are
critical ages in the assumptions used in the forecast.1
The rising mortality observable for men until the end of the 1970s was caused by
an increase in deaths due to cardiovascular diseases and cancer. Changes in lifestyles
helped to break this trend in the 1980s, when mortality began to fall. The proportion
of people smoking every day has declined since the end of the 1970s, a tendency
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Fig. 5.2 Annual reduction of risk of death at different ages for two periods, 1950–1999. Women
1Except in the very long term, assumptions on relative changes in younger age groups have a
limited impact on the numerical strength of the population, since mortality is so low at these ages.
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fatty food and increased exercise have probably been other important factors behind
the decline in cardiovascular diseases. Alcohol consumption has also fallen during
this period.
The evident rise in mortality for men until the end of the 1970s was not
observable among women. However, a slight tendency towards higher mortality
due to ischemic diseases has been discernible, along with a relatively sharp rise in
mortality from lung cancer. Nevertheless, total mortality fell, though at a lower rate.
The reasons for the reduction in female mortality over the last 20 years have
probably been about the same as those affecting male mortality, but with one
major exception: the proportion of smokers has continued to increase gradually at
more advanced ages. This is due to a generational change involving smokers. The
proportion of women who have smoked at some time increases in each successive
generation over the age of about 30, (see Fig. 5.3). In spite of this, mortality from
cardiovascular diseases has diminished, whereas mortality due to lung cancer, which
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Fig. 5.3 Proportion of daily smokers by sex, 1981–1997. (Moving averages (3 year). Source:
living conditions survey. (ULF, Statistics Sweden))
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The medical treatment of cardiovascular diseases in particular has improved, and
this has had a significant impact on the decline in the risk of death. A simple
indicator of the changes is that mortality due to cardiovascular diseases (heart
attacks) has fallen considerably more rapidly than the risk of falling ill (incidence).
5.4 Higher Average Life Expectancy in 1950–1999
Mortality trends since 1950 have resulted in an increase in the average life expec-
tancy of men from 69 to 77 years, an average increase of 0.16 years per calendar
year. For women average life expectancy went up from 72 to 82 years, an average
increase of 0.20 years per calendar year.
Table 5.1 below shows changes in life expectancy between different periods in
the second half of the twentieth century. Table 5.1 also reveals the positive impact on
average life expectancy (at birth) of the improvements in mortality at different ages.
The gains for men in recent years consist mainly of mortality improvements among
Table 5.1 Change in average
life expectancy at birth
between different periods
(in years) Sex period
Change (in years)
Total
of which in age group
0–19 20–64 65–
Men
1951–55 to 1956–60 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.1
1956–60 to 1961–65 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0
1961–65 to 1966–70 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1
1966–70 to 1971–75 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
1971–75 to 1976–80 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.1
1976–80 to 1981–85 1.1 0.2 0.5 0.4
1981–85 to 1986–90 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.4
1986–90 to 1991–95 1.2 0.2 0.6 0.5
1991–95 to 1998a 1.3 0.1 0.6 0.5
Women
1951–55 to 1956–60 1.2 0.3 0.6 0.4
1956–60 to 1961–65 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.5
1961–65 to 1966–70 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.5
1966–70 to 1971–75 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.7
1971–75 to 1976–80 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.5
1976–80 to 1981–85 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.6
1981–85 to 1986–90 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.5
1986–90 to 1991–95 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.5
1991–95 to 1998a 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.6
Total change and distribution by different age intervals
a1998 is the last point in time (the distance from the middle year of
the previous period is 5 years here, as in the other cases)
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young and middle-aged men, but improvements among the elderly have also made a
major contribution. For women, the trend among the elderly accounts for most of the
increase in average life expectancy over the same period.
5.5 Future Mortality
As stated above, improved living conditions in a range of areas are significant factors
underlying the decline in mortality in recent decades. Given present trends, there is
reason to hope for continued improvements in living conditions and lifestyles. We
know that fewer and fewer young people are taking up smoking and increasing
numbers are exercising regularly in their spare time, factors that are important to
health and life expectancy. It is worth noting that even if no major improvements
were to occur in future, the long-term (longitudinal) impact on mortality at a given
age would be similar to that observed to date (perhaps for several decades). In certain
cohorts, people could enjoy a favourable life expectancy throughout their entire
lives, assuming the levels attained in the 1980s and 1990s are sustained (for factors
like consumption, exercise, and men’s smoking habits).
Nevertheless, there are lifestyle factors that give rise to concern. Even if smoking
is now becoming less common among young people, there is a considerable
difference between the smoking habits of elderly and middle-aged women, (see
Fig. 5.3). At present, relatively few elderly women are smokers or former smokers.
The number will increase during the forecast period, as those who are middle-aged
grow old, and this may put a brake on the decline in mortality. As a result, we have
assumed that the long-term decline in mortality will be less marked for women than
for men. The increasing proportion of people who are overweight, greater stress in
professional life, and a possible rise in alcohol consumption in the future are some
examples of trends that could slow the decline in mortality. Better information on
health matters and improvements in workplace organisation, in the broad sense of
this term, may moderate such effects.
Medical progress has had a positive impact on mortality trends. In all probability,
the positive trend observed until now in the medical area will continue, and these
medical advances may help to improve quality of life and increase life expectancy.
The possible impact of potential breakthroughs in genetic engineering and biotech-
nology surpasses our present comprehension. However, as serious illnesses become
more curable, a higher proportion of elderly people will have previously had such
illnesses. Despite successful treatment at the time, this factor may have a negative
impact on mortality among the very oldest.
Thus, numerous trends may potentially have a – positive or negative – impact on
mortality. However, it is hardly possible to quantify the effect of these factors with
any precision. We should bear in mind that until now, mortality has changed slowly.
Accordingly, we assume that in the immediate future, mortality will continue to
follow the trend prevailing up to this point. In the longer term, we assume that the
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reduction in the risk of death will continue throughout the forecast period2 but will
be slowed somewhat by the negative risk factors indicated above. It is far from clear
when this slowdown in the reduction of mortality will set in and how significant it
will be. Our assumptions have been guided in part by the growing uncertainty of
assessments as the time elapsed increases. Here we have assumed a reduced decline
in mortality for women from 2010 onwards and for men from 2015 onwards. The
difference between men and women is due in part to our assumption that longitudi-
nal effects will cease to be felt sooner among women than among men, since the
decline in mortality started earlier among women than among men. We also put a
brake on the decline towards the end of the forecast period. The reason is that the
overall picture of causes of death may change by then. We should bear in mind that
most of the extrapolated reduction in mortality is connected with cardiovascular
diseases. In 30–40 years time, this cause-of-death category may well be considerably
reduced, even at relatively advanced ages. The other causes of death, which are
declining more slowly, will thus acquire greater significance in relative terms and
will then automatically entail a slower decline in total mortality.
5.6 Assumptions Used in the Forecast for the Immediate
Future
We have based our assumptions regarding mortality in the immediate future on
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Fig. 5.4 Risks of death in 2000 by age and sex. Per million
2It may be noted that this assumption is very far-reaching in statistical terms, since in effect we are
extrapolating 50 years forward in time from a 20 year trend (at least for men).
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We assume that risk of death will subsequently be reduced according to the
pattern shown in the figures below. Among men, we assume that the risk of death
will decline by 1.5% per year at ages below 45, at a somewhat faster rate between
50 and 75, and at a gradually declining rate at more advanced ages. These reductions
in the risk of death largely correspond to the trend observable in the 1990s among
middle-aged and older men. We assume that this reduction in risk of death will
continue unchanged until 2015.
For women, the risk of death has diminished over time in about the same way as
for men. For the period until 2010, we have assumed an annual reduction in the risk
of death of 1.5% up to the age of 80, in accordance with the trends observed in the
1990s.
It should be noted that the change in the rate of reduction in mortality at different
dates proceeds in stages (linear progressive reduction). The transition to a new rate of
reduction occurs over a 4-year period (for men in 2015–2018 and for women in
2010–2013).
5.7 Assumptions Used in the Forecast for the Longer Term
Among men, we assume that the annual rate of reduction during the period
2018–2039 will be 75% of its original level. After this, the rate of reduction will
gradually decline over a 4-year period until it reaches 50% of the original level (due
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Among women, we assume that the risk of death will be reduced at a slightly
slower pace beginning in 2010. We set the rate of reduction at 75% of its original
level over the period 2013–2034 and at half its original level in 2038–2050,
(see Fig. 5.6).
Behind these assumptions, there is substantial uncertainty regarding the speed at
which the chances of survival are capable of changing over so long a period of
extrapolation. However, the future may bring both a more rapid slow-down in the
decline in mortality and new medical advances resulting in sharply lower risks of
death.
5.8 Mortality Trends over the Period 1950–2050
Figure 5.7 summarizes mortality trends between 1950 and 2050. A logarithmic scale
has been used, thus making it possible to compare the mortality trends for different
ages. The fact that the curves have the same slope shows that the percentage change
in the risk of death has been the same.
5.9 Higher Average Life Expectancy
According to our estimates, average life expectancy for men will rise from 77.1 in
2000 to 82.6 in 2050, while the corresponding figures for women are 82.1 and 86.5.
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Fig. 5.7 Mortality trends by age 1950–1999 and assumed mortality 2000–2050. Men and women.
Per 1 million
Table 5.2 Average life
expectancy at birth and at age
65, 1951–2050
Year
At birth At age 65
Men Women Men Women
1951–60 70.9 74.1 13.9 15.0
1961–70 71.7 76.1 13.9 16.1
1971–80 72.3 78.1 14.1 17.5
1981–90 74.0 79.9 14.9 18.7
1991–95 75.6 81.0 15.7 19.4
2000 77.1 82.1 16.5 20.1
2010 78.7 83.4 17.6 21.1
2020 80.0 84.4 18.4 21.8
2030 81.0 85.2 19.1 22.5
2040 82.0 86.0 19.8 23.0
2050 82.6 86.5 20.3 23.5
expectancy over the coming 50-year period than we have observed over the past
50 years. We estimate that average life expectancy at 65 will rise by 3.8 years for
men and 3.4 years for women over the next 50 years.
5.10 Assumptions Regarding Mortality Trends in Some
Countries
For the sake of comparison with assumptions regarding future mortality trends in
other countries, we have provided average life expectancies according to population
forecasts for a number of countries in Europe and for the USA and Japan, (see
Tables 5.3 and 5.4).
There is wide variation between the different countries. In France and Belgium, it
is assumed that average life expectancy for men will increase by nearly 8 years over
Table 5.3 Average life expectancy for men, 2000–2050
Country Average life expectancy at birth, in years
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Sweden 77.1 78.7 80.0 81.0 82.0 82.6
France 74.6 76.4 78.0 79.5 80.9 82.2
Belgium 74.4 75.7 77.1 78.7 80.3 82.1
Austria 75.1 76.9 78.5 80.0 81.0 82.0
Switzerland 76.1 77.5 78.8 79.8 80.6 81.3
Finland 73.8 75.6 77.3 78.7 80.0 81.2
USA 74.2 75.5 76.8 78.3 79.8 81.2
Netherlands 75.3 76.6 77.8 78.8 79.5 80.0
Norway 75.8 77.3 78.5 79.4 79.8 80.0
Japan 77.4 78.1 78.6 79 79.2 79.4
UK 75.1 76.6 77.6 78.2 78.7 78.9
Italy 75.9 77.1 78.3 78.3 78.3 78.3
Denmark 73.4 73.5 73.5 73.5 73.5 73.5
Ireland 73.7 75.2 76.4
Spain 74.1 75.3 76.0
Germany 73.7 74.8 75.7 76.7 76.9
Iceland 77.3 77.5 77.5 77.5
Forecasts in different countries
Source: USA, US Bureau of Census; Japan, Ministry of Health and Welfare; Sweden, Forecast
2000–2050. Other countries: Eurostat, June 2000
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the next 50 years, while in Japan it is expected to rise by just 2 years. In Sweden, the
predicted increase is 5.5 years.
For women, too, there is a considerable range in assumed future mortality.
France, Belgium and the USA are predicting that average life expectancy will go
up by 7 years, whereas Japan and the Netherlands are anticipating a gain of barely
more than 2 years. In Sweden, the rise is expected to be 4.4 years.
5.11 Alternative Assumptions
The purpose of alternative assumptions is to attempt to capture some of the uncer-
tainty in the principal assumption that we have already presented.
Under an alternative assumption with lower mortality, the declining trend in
mortality decline during the 1990s will continue uninterrupted throughout the
Table 5.4 Average life expectancy for women, 2000–2050
Country Average life expectancy at birth, in years
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
France 83.0 84.8 86.5 87.9 89.2 90.4
Belgium 81.1 82.3 83.6 85.0 86.5 88.1
Austria 81.3 82.8 84.2 85.5 86.2 87.0
Switzerland 83.0 84.4 85.6 86.0 86.4 86.9
USA 79.9 81.4 82.9 84.2 85.4 86.6
Sweden 82.1 83.4 84.4 85.3 86.0 86.5
Japan 84.1 85.1 85.6 86.0 86.3 86.5
Finland 80.9 82.0 83.1 84.0 84.8 85.5
Italy 82.3 83.5 84.7 84.7 84.7 84.7
Norway 81.5 82.7 83.5 84.1 84.4 84.5
UK 80.1 81.5 82.6 83.2 83.6 83.8
Netherlands 80.6 81.1 81.6 82.2 82.7 83.0
Denmark 78.5 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6
Spain 81.9 83.0 83.7
Iceland 81.9 82.1 82.1 82.1
Ireland 79.4 81.0 82.4
Germany 80.1 81.1 81.9 82.6 82.9
Forecasts in different countries
Source: USA, US Bureau of Census; Japan, Ministry of Health and Welfare; Sweden, Forecast
2000–2050. Other countries: Eurostat, June 2000
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forecast period until 2050. We assume continuous improvements in lifestyle
throughout the period. Moreover, further improvement in medical care and treatment
is required (over and above the improvement in the principal assumption), particu-
larly with regard to diseases other than cardiovascular diseases.
In an alternative with higher mortality, we assume no changes in mortality at all in
future. Positive and negative lifestyle factors offset each other. This alternative
provides a base level for the impact on the population of assumptions regarding
mortality; i.e., it functions as a form of sensitivity analysis.
In the first alternative, life expectancy rises from 77.1 in 2000 to 86.1 in 2050 for
men and from 82.1 to 89.0 for women. In the second alternative, the figures remain at
their initial level throughout the period.
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Chapter 6
Forecasting Life Expectancy: The SCOPE
Approach
James W. Vaupel
This note outlines a method for forecasting life expectancy. The method is based on
the idea of structured conditional probabilistic estimation; it “scopes” out the range
of possibilities the future may hold. I first described this SCOPE method at a
workshop organized by Juha Alho several years ago in Finland.1 It is a kind of
scenario method – with probabilities attached to scenarios, with scenarios structured
conditionally, and with the possibility of stochastic scenarios. It is a simple method,
and it is by no means original; many other people have used a similar approach in
various settings. This method might be helpful to those who want to forecast life
expectancy. This note summarizes my presentation.
To be concrete, suppose the goal is to forecast female life expectancy at birth in
Sweden in 2050. In the year 2000, the expected life span for Swedish women was
just over 82 years. What will it be in the middle of the twenty-first century?
A central point of uncertainty is whether the kind of progress and development in
Sweden that has marked the past couple of centuries will continue until 2050.
Perhaps the future will be characterized by poverty, misery, and a shorter life
expectancy. Coming decades could bring nuclear war, massive biochemical terror-
ism, epidemics more deadly than the AIDS epidemic, catastrophic environmental
change, lasting economic depression, or some other disaster or combination of
disasters that might cause female life expectancy in Sweden to plummet far below
its current level of more than 82 years, perhaps even down to zero. These possibil-
ities are indicated in the figure below. My “guesstimate,” given my current knowl-
edge and the limited amount of time I have spent researching and thinking about this
J. W. Vaupel (*)
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question, is that there is a 15% chance that life expectancy will decline in the future.
If it does, then my best guess is that the mean value – of the range of possible life
expectancies in 2050 – is 70 years, which is close to the current value of female life
expectancy in the world as a whole. Discussions among a group of experts and
systematic consideration of various scenarios would undoubtedly produce values








Suppose calamity is averted, with probability 0.85. Then the next major uncer-
tainty would seem to be whether life expectancy is approaching a looming limit. This
limit does not have to be an ultimate cap that will hold forever. It simply has to be
some ceiling that Swedes will not be able to exceed by 2050. Perhaps there really is
some biological limit to life expectancy of 85 or so. Current evidence suggests that
this is unlikely, but it might be true. More plausibly, perhaps it will be impossible to
make much progress in reducing death rates at very old ages. To achieve such
reductions, new kinds of biomedical breakthroughs will be required, and these
breakthroughs may not be forthcoming, at least over the next half century. Further-
more, there may be practical impediments to further reductions in mortality. For
instance, taxpayers may not be willing (or able) to pay for the required interventions
if there are too few workers to support increasing numbers of retired people. For
illustrative purposes, suppose the probability of some such scenario is 20% and that,
conditional on this, life expectancy in 2050 will be 85 for Swedish females. Of
course, it might not be precisely 85, but suppose that 85 is the average value of the
fairly narrow range of possibilities permitted by this line of thinking. Again, debate
and systematic calculation would lead to values other than 20% and 85 years, but
these values provide a suggestive example.
The final possibility, in my simple probability tree, is that the future will be
roughly the same or perhaps even better than the past. The uncertainty here might be
structured as follows:
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• One possibility is that the pace of age-specific mortality improvement over the
next half century will be similar to the pace of improvement over the last 50 or
100 years. This is the general idea underlying the Lee-Carter-Tuljapurkar time-
series method of forecasting life expectancy and Juha Alho has also done research
along this line.2 I am not sure what the latest results are if this approach is applied
to Swedish females, but to be specific, suppose the mean value of predicted life
expectancies in 2050 is 92.5.
• A second possibility is that the pace of life-expectancy increase over the next half
century will be similar to the rate of increase over past decades. Jim Oeppen and I
studied the rise in the expectation of life over the last 200 years. We discovered
that “best-practice” life expectancy, i.e., female life expectancy in the country that
held the record, had risen linearly by 3 months per year from 1840 to 2000. Over
this entire period, Sweden has been either at or near the top. Currently, the life
expectancy of Japanese women is almost 85 years, whereas that of Swedish
females is a bit more than 82 years. Thus, the current gap is between two and a
half and three years. If the trend of the past 160 years continues for the next half
century, then life expectancy in 2050 will reach a record 97.5. If time-series
methods are applied to the data, then there will be some small band of uncertainty
around this value; the band will be narrow because the trend over the past
160 years has been remarkably linear. I have not applied time-series methods to
the data, however, and I am not sure exactly how wide the range of uncertainty
will be. In any case, a greater source of uncertainty will involve the gap between
Swedish and record life expectancy in 2050. In the figure below, I assume that the
mean value of this gap is 3 years, yielding a life-expectancy estimate of 94.5.
• Finally, the third possibility is that mortality improvements will accelerate in the
future. Biology and biomedicine may be on the verge of unprecedented break-
throughs in knowledge about specific diseases and about the aging process itself –
many knowledgeable scientists are of this opinion. Specifically, instead of
increasing by 2.5 years per decade, life expectancy may increase by 3, then
4, and then 5 years per decade over the next three decades and perhaps by 6, 8,
or even 10 years per decade in the 2030s and 2040s. Since the sum of
3 + 4 + 5 + 7 + 9 is 28, female life expectancy in Sweden in 2050 may be
110 years rather than the current 82 years or so. In the figure below, I suggest a
range from 100 to 120 years if mortality improvements accelerate, with a mean
value of 110. This is really just a guess, and some informed discussion and
structured debate might yield quite a different picture. For illustrative purposes,
however, a value of 110 may not be inappropriate.
What is the chance that the future will be like the past in terms of age-specific
mortality change, that the future will be like the past in terms of life expectancy
2See Lee and Carter (1992: 659); Tuljapurkar et al. (2000); Alho (1998).
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change, or that the future will bring an accelerated rate of increase in life expectancy?
The trend in best-practice life expectancy is so regular that I assigned a probability of
40% to a continuation of this trend, and I gave each of the other two possibilities a
30% chance. Folding the tree back, these values lead to a mean life expectancy of
98.5 if the future is like the past or even better. If there is no disaster, then the mean is
95.84. All factors considered, the mean is 92.0. (The calculations just happened to
produce a value close to this nice round number).
The future is enveloped in uncertainty, and there is a wide probability distribution
around this value of 92.0, stretching from 0 to 120 in the tree below. This predictive
distribution could be estimated. Some components of uncertainty could be assessed
by expert judgement. Other components, as noted above, could be estimated by
time-series methods. A structured conditional probability tree, of the kind shown
below, could be used to organize the forecasting problem. And that is the concept
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Chapter 7
Mortality Forecasts. Comments on How
to Improve Existing Models – An
Epidemiologist’s Perspective
Kaare Christensen
From an epidemiologist’s perspective, one way to improve mortality forecasts is to
gain insight into the causes and predictors of mortality. If we know the “risk profile”
of the current cohorts compared to the previous cohorts, then our forecasts may
improve.
If we also include genetics in our perspective, the initial task will be to quantify
the contribution of genes and environment to lifespan. Therefore, the first question
will be, “Are the lifespans of relatives correlated?” and if so, “Is the correlation due
to a shared environment or to shared genes?” It is important to pose these questions
initially because the answers determine whether it is worthwhile to seek the causes
and predictors of mortality in the environment as well as in the genetic make-up.
7.1 Are the Lifespans of Relatives Correlated?
Traditional family studies suggest a correlation in lifespan within families. However,
studies have generally found only small correlations in lifespan between parents and
offspring (0.01–0.15) (Pearl 1931; Cohen 1964; Wyshak 1978), whereas correla-
tions between siblings tend to be higher (0.15–0.35) (Cohen 1964; Wyshak 1978).
Heritability estimates based on regression analysis were in the range of 0.10–0.33 for
parents-offspring and 0.33–0.41 for siblings, constantly over a period of 300 years
(Meyer 1991), but these estimates include both genetic factors and shared environ-
mental factors. Some family studies have found a stronger maternal than paternal
effect (Abbott et al. 1974), but not all (Wyshak 1978). The lower correlation found
for parents and offspring than for siblings, suggests that genetic non-additivity
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(genetic effects due to gene interaction which are not passed from one generation to
the next) is present. However, it may also reflect a higher degree of shared environ-
ment among siblings than among parents and offspring; the latter constitute two
generations living under very different conditions.
7.2 The Relative Effects of Genetic and Environmental
Factors on Lifespan
Twin studies are designed to separate the effects of additive and non-additive genetic
factors, as well as shared and non-shared environmental factors. However, most of
the early twin studies had methodological problems due to left-truncation of the
cohorts included, selection bias, lack of zygosity diagnosis, or heavy right-
censoring. Carmelli and Andersen (1981) included a sample of 2242 Mormon
pairs of twins born 1800–1899 in which both twins had died, a criterion met by
60% of the original sample. Wyshak (1978) followed 972 Mormon twin-pairs
(possibly included in the study of Carmelli and Andersen) until death. Unfortu-
nately, since both studies lacked zygosity diagnosis, heritability estimates could not
be provided. However, similarity in length of life was found. The similarity was
more pronounced for twins of the same sex (including both MZ and DZ twins) than
for twins of the opposite sex (always DZ twins), suggesting genetic influences on
lifespan. Jarvik et al. (1960) followed a sample of 853 pairs of twins for 12 years; the
sample included only pairs with at least one twin surviving to age 60. At the end of
the follow-up period, both twins had died in only 35% of the pairs. The mean intra-
pair difference in lifespan was found to be higher for DZ than in MZ twins,
suggesting genetic influences on lifespan. Hrubec and Neel (1981) followed a
sample of 31,848 male twin veterans born 1917–27 for 30 years to ages 51–61.
Around 10% were deceased at the time of analysis. To avoid censoring problems,
longevity was analyzed as a categorical variable (dead/alive). In this study, the
heritability of “liability” to die was estimated to be 0.5.
The first non-censored and population-based twin study that could provide an
estimate of the magnitude of genetic influences on lifespan was conducted by
McGue et al. (1993). It covered 600 Danish pairs of twins born 1870–1880. Using
path analysis, a heritability of 0.22 was found, with genetic influences being mainly
non-additive. Later this study was expanded by Herskind et al. (1996) to include
more than 2800 twin-pairs with known zygosity born 1870–1900. These cohorts
were followed from age 15 to death. The study confirmed that approximately a
quarter of the variation in lifespan in this population could be attributed to
non-additive genetic factors, while the remaining three-quarters were due to
non-shared environmental factors.
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Ljungquist et al. (1998) studied the 1886–1900 Swedish cohorts of twins and
concluded that around a third at most of the variance in longevity is attributable to
genetic factors.
Hence, it seems to be a rather consistent finding in the Nordic countries that
approximately 25% of the variation in lifespan is caused by genetic differences. It is
interesting that animal studies have revealed similar estimates for a number of
species not living in the wild (Curtsinger et al. 1995; Finch and Tanzi 1997).
Hence, the conclusion from these studies is that it is worthwhile to seek the causes
and predictors of mortality in the environment as well as in the genetic make-up.
However, the results from family studies with low correlations between family
members suggest an absence of common genes with a substantial impact on lifespan.
7.3 Prediction of Mortality
From a forecast perspective, which focuses on reduction of mortality (rather than on
sudden increases in mortality due to new diseases, war, etc.), there is little interest in
estimating survival at younger ages, when the room for improvement is very limited.
What is important for future mortality trajectories is mortality among elderly people
(Vaupel et al. 1998).
A number of risk factors seem to lose their importance with age, probably because
of heterogeneity and selection, e.g., smoking, obesity, diseases and SES (socio-
economic status). However, this does not mean that the survival rate of the elderly,
including the very oldest, cannot be raised. In the latter category, the fraction dying
every year is high (for example, 1/4 – 1/3 among nonagenarians), and there is both
practical and theoretical evidence that intervention can have substantial positive
effects on both quality of life and survival.
In relation to forecasting, it is important to note that certain predictors remain
valid even at the highest ages, e.g., self-rated health as well as physical and cognitive
abilities (Nybo et al. 2001). This may provide an opportunity to improve forecasting
if for example the physical abilities of new cohorts of elderly persons are assessed
and compared to previous cohorts; i.e. “Are the new cohorts of the elderly healthier
than the previous cohorts (and therefore expected to live longer)?” The first reports
of this kind have been published based on US studies (Manton and Gu 2001; Manton
et al. 1997). They indicate that the new cohorts of elderly are increasingly healthy.
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7.4 Conclusion
The cohort differences in physical abilities among the elderly and the correlation
between physical abilities and mortality may be the basis for improving the fore-
casting of mortality.
References
Abbott, M. H., Abbey, H., Bolling, D. R., & Murphy, E. A. (1974). The familial component in
longevity. A study of offspring of nonagenarians II. Preliminary analysis of the completed
study. Johns Hopkins Medical Journal, 134(1), 1–16.
Carmelli, D., & Andersen, S. (1981). A longevity study of twins in the mormon genealogy.
Progress in Clinical and Biological Research, 69(Pt C), 187–200.
Cohen, B. H. (1964). family pattern of mortality and life-span. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 39,
130–181.
Curtsinger, J. W., Fukui, H. H., Khazaeli, A. A., Kirscher, A., Pletcher, S. D., Promislow, D. E., &
Tatar, M. (1995). Genetic variation and aging. Annual Review of Genetics, 29, 553–575.
Finch, C. E., & Tanzi, R. E. (1997). Genetics of aging. Science, 278(5337), 407–411.
Herskind, A. M., Harvald, B., Holm, N. V., McGue, M., Sorensen, T. I., & Vaupel, J. W. (1996).
The Heritability of human longevity: A population-based study of 2872 Danish Twin Pairs Born
1870–1900. Human Genetics, 97(3), 319–323.
Hrubec, Z., & Neel, J. V. (1981). Familial factors in early deaths: Twins followed 30 years to ages
51–61 in 1978. Human Genetics, 59(1), 39–46.
Jarvik, L., Falek, A., Kallmann, F. J., & Lorge, I. (1960). Survival trends in a senescent twin
population. American Journal of Human Genetics, 12, 170–179.
Ljungquist, B., Berg, S., Lanke, J., McClearn, G. E., & Pedersen, N. L. (1998). The Effect of
genetic factors for longevity: A comparison of identical and fraternal twins in the Swedish twin
registry. The Journals of Gerontology. A Biological Science and Medical Science, 53(6), M441–
M446.
Manton, K. G., & Gu, X. (2001). Changes in the prevalence of chronic disability in the United
States black and nonblack population above age 65 from 1982 to 1999. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the U S A, 98(11), 6354–6359.
Manton, K. G., Corder, L., & Stallard, E. (1997). Chronic disability trends in elderly United States
populations: 1982–1994. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the U S A, 94(6),
2593–2598.
McGue, M., Harvald, B., Holm, N., & Vaupel, J. W. (1993). Longevity is moderately heritable in a
sample of Danish Twins Born 1870–1880. Journal of Gerontology, 48(6), B237–B244.
Meyer, P. J. (1991). Inheritance of longevity evinces no secular trend among members of six New
England families born 1650–1874. American Journal of Human Biology: The Official Journal
of the Human Biology Council, 3, 49–58.
Nybo, H., Andersen, K., Christensen, K., Gaist, D., Jeune, B., McGue, M., Petersen, H. C., &
Vaupel, J. W. (2001). Predictors of mortality among 2,249 nonagenarians the Danish 1905-
Cohort Survey. Manuscript.
Pearl, R. (1931). Studies on human longevity IV. The inheritance of longevity. Human Biology, 3,
245–269.
82 K. Christensen
Vaupel, J. W., Carey, J. R., Christensen, K., Curtsinger, J. W., Holm, N. V., Iachine, I. A., Johnson,
T. E., Kannisto, V., Khazaeli, A. A., Liedo, P., Longo, V. D., Manton, K. G., Yashin, A. I., &
Zeng, Y. (1998). Biodemographic trajectories of longevity. Science, 280(5365), 855–860.
Wyshak, G. (1978). Fertility and longevity in twins, sibs, and parents of twins. Social Biology, 25
(4), 315–330.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
7 Mortality Forecasts. Comments on How to Improve Existing Models – An. . . 83
Chapter 8
The Need for Looking Far Back in Time
When Predicting Future Mortality Trends
Tommy Bengtsson
There are three reasons why we must look far back in time when predicting future
mortality trends. Firstly, the mortality decline that we can observe today has its roots
in improvements achieved long ago in living standards and diet, public health
institutions, medicine, and other areas relevant to the physical well-being of the
population. Speaking in general terms, living conditions improve from one period to
the next. Such improvements are called period factors, since they relate to living
conditions for the entire population during one specific period.
Secondly, the health and remaining life span for people living today is determined
not only by contemporary period factors but also by living conditions earlier in life.
Since even conditions in the foetal stage have an influence on longevity, improve-
ments during early childhood could have an effect on mortality trends today. These
are called cohort factors, since they relate to the conditions for a certain cohort, often
birth cohort, while previous cohorts are unaffected. Since the oldest people living
today were born a hundred or more years ago, we have to consider cohort factors far
back in time in predicting future mortality.
Thirdly, predicting future mortality trends also requires a multivariate point of
departure. No single factor, but a variety of factors, determines health and remaining
life span, and we do not know a priori which one is the most important. Thus,
predicting future mortality trends calls for a long-term multivariate, causal approach,
in which both period and cohort factors are taken into account. This kind of holistic
view has not always been in favour. Early in the twentieth century, cohort factors
were considered most important, while multivariate period factors became more
popular later on, followed in turn by a preference for single-period factors as the
main determinant of the great mortality decline since the mid-eighteenth century.
Now we are once again discussing cohort factors.
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Thus, there has been a shift over time in our explanations for the mortality decline
(Bengtsson 1998). Below I shall develop the reasons why I think we need to take a
multivariate, period, and cohort approach. I will start with an overview of the great
mortality decline, commencing several hundred years ago, and then move on to
discuss how the explanations for the historical decline have changed over time.
Over the past 300 years, human physiology has undergone profound changes.
These were made possible by numerous advances whereby humans have gained an
unprecedented degree of control over their environment. The changes include
increases in body size by over 50%, in length of life by over 100%, and in time
lived in retirement by several hundred per cent, with obvious implications for
expenditures on pensions and health care. The extension of the human life span
has been gradual, starting a long time ago with what now is called the great mortality
decline.
The timing of the great mortality decline was strikingly similar in the countries of
Western and Northern Europe despite differences in economic structure and devel-
opment. It started in the mid-eighteenth century, levelled off for a couple of decades
in the mid-nineteenth century, and then continued. Over this period, life expectancy
at birth rose from some 35 years to more than 70 years. The development in North
America was similar.
Few scholars today will argue that the great mortality decline was due solely or
primarily to a single factor. Economic growth, for example, was probably not a
major determinant before or during the initial stages of the great mortality decline,
and its effect may be far less than expected during later stages of the decline. Instead,
the causes are multi-factorial and vary from the start to the end of the decline.
In countries for which long historical series of age-specific mortality rates
(England, France, and some others, including the Nordic countries) are available,
we know that the increase in life expectancy began with a fall in the rates of infant
and child mortality. This was mainly due to a reduction in deaths from smallpox,
which was a very common childhood disease in the eighteenth century.
While infant mortality continued to decline in Sweden throughout the nineteenth
century, it levelled off in England and remained stable until the end of the nineteenth
century, when it again dropped rapidly, as was the case in all other Western
countries. Childhood mortality in both countries actually increased in the
mid-nineteenth century before commencing a persistent decline. This exemplifies
two patterns of the historical decline in infant and childhood mortality: a northern
pattern with declines essentially throughout the nineteenth century, and a western
one with a levelling off during the nineteenth century and a further decline after the
1880s (Perrenoud 1984).
Adult and old-age mortality started to decline gradually at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, possibly earlier for England. The decrease was generally sharper
in the later years of the nineteenth century and even more so after the First World
War, as was the case with mortality at all other ages. The decline slowed for adults
and the elderly around 1950 but accelerated again in the 1970s.
With the great mortality decline followed a change in the leading causes of death,
from pestilence, to receding pandemics, and then to man-made diseases (Omran
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1971). In his theory of epidemiological transition, Omran identified three different
development patterns: the classical or western pattern, described above, the accel-
erated pattern, and the delayed pattern. They are distinguished by differences in
timing and speed. The decline that took 200 years in the West started 150–200 years
later in the Third World but then took less than 50 years to complete. In many
countries, the great mortality decline has not yet occurred, and the gains from low
mortality are still to be reaped.
The great mortality decline can be viewed in light of two approaches, one based
on period factors, the other on cohort factors. Most studies focus largely on period
factors. In addition, factors based almost entirely on human actions should be
distinguished from those beyond deliberate human control. One widely accepted
multi-factorial explanation (United Nations 1953) is based on period factors that
depend upon human activity: these include public health reforms, advances in
medical knowledge, improved personal hygiene, and rising income and standards
of living. This explanation is highly similar to the demographic-transition theory
(Davis 1945; Notestein 1953; Bengtsson and Ohlsson 1994).
On a broader front, McKeown (1976) questioned the multi-factorial explanation
of the great mortality decline. He argued that a single factor – better nutrition – could
almost entirely explain the great mortality decline. His criticism was based on a
study of cause-specific mortality in England and Wales from 1838 to 1947, where he
observed that two-thirds of the mortality decline was due to a reduction in infectious
diseases. In later work, he also analysed mortality rates and economic development
for other countries and further back in time, though not in such detail as for England
and Wales.
McKeown argued that medical advances had little influence on mortality trends
before the breakthrough of sulphonamides and antibiotics in the 1930s and 1940s.
Previously, the only curable disease had been diphtheria. Very few deaths, however,
were due to diphtheria, and its incidence was already receding when the antitoxin
came into use around 1900. For periods before 1838, McKeown held that inocula-
tion and vaccination for smallpox had little or no impact on the general mortality
decline. Vaccination started in England at the end of the eighteenth century, but it did
not become widespread until after 1840, when it was made available at public
expense. The history of vaccination in the Nordic countries is similar. There,
smallpox mortality was declining even before vaccination started in the first years
of the nineteenth century and well before it became common in the 1820s. However,
not all scholars agree on this interpretation. Easterlin (1999) downplays the role of
economic development and better diet, contending that advancement in medical
knowledge is the principal reason for the mortality decline from the mid-nineteenth
century onwards.
The improvement of personal hygiene may have had some effect on mortality in
England and Wales after about 1880, when the incidence of intestinal infections
declined, probably because of substantial improvements in water supply and sewage
control at that time. Prior to 1870, the decrease in intestinal infections accounted for
only a small part of the general decline in mortality, and according to McKeown,
neither better personal hygiene nor measures to improve public health had any
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significant impact on the overall decline before 1870. Other public-health measures,
such as the breast-feeding campaigns in Sweden in the 1830s and thereafter, were
not discussed by McKeown. Fridlizus (1984) has argued that while these campaigns
might well have had an impact on infant mortality in Sweden, they began much later
than the decline in mortality. In fact, childhood mortality went up somewhat at the
time of the first breast-feeding campaigns.
In 1957, Helleiner argued that the population of Western Europe must have
increased from the mid-eleventh century to the late thirteenth century and from the
mid-fifteenth century to the end of the sixteenth century (Helleiner 1957). The
population increase observed in the eighteenth century was therefore unique only
in that the mortality decline started from a higher level and went on longer than
before. Helleiner and other scholars have contended that these changes in mortality
were spontaneous (natural), and in 1973 the UN added natural factors as a fifth
determinant of the great mortality decline (United Nations 1973). Later, others like
Fridlizus (1984), Perrenoud (1984) and Schofield (1984) asserted that a change in
the virulence of pathogens initiated the great mortality decline. Their basic assump-
tion was that the virulence of pathogens changes spontaneously over time. Virulence
in a pathogenic organism is generally understood as its ability to overcome host
defences. At this point, it is important to note that some pathogens develop more
quickly in a malnourished host, whereas others do not depend on a weakening of the
host to produce very high mortality.
McKeown’s main argument on this subject, though not proved, is that the initial
development of mortality in the late eighteenth century was an integral part of the
great mortality decline. Since the decline continued for the next two centuries, it
cannot be due to a spontaneous reduction in the virulence of pathogens; thus,
according to McKeown, the only explanation left is better nutrition. Improved
nutrition would explain not only the decline in infectious diseases from the
mid-nineteenth century onwards, but also the initial decline. This reasoning is part
of McKeown’s attempt to find one single explanation for the entire mortality decline.
Fogel (1994) criticized McKeown’s reasoning for considering only nutritional
intake, or diet, while ignoring the needs of the body to maintain itself and build up
cells. Thus, McKeown only took into account gross nutrition, rather than net
nutrition; the latter must be more closely related to health and mortality. I will
come back to this issue shortly.
Cohort explanations for the mortality decline refer to factors that initially affect
only certain young age groups but may have a long-lasting impact on these groups.
Such factors would consist mainly of improvements in childhood conditions, or even
conditions during the foetal stage, that have lasting effects on health and on the life
span. Net nutrition is seen as the principal determinant of cellular development,
which is most rapid during the foetal stage and gradually diminishes until the body is
fully developed around the age of 20. Net nutrition is what is left for the development
of cells after the nutritional requirements of other life-sustaining functions and work
have been met. Thus, low net nutrition could be due either to low nutritional intake
or to additional, disease-related needs of the body for nutrition. Moreover, many
diseases not only claim nutrients but also make it more difficult for the body to
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absorb nutrients in general, as is the case with infectious diseases. If cells and organs
consequently fail to develop properly, a child’s growth and development may be
inhibited, and the child may be less healthy in general. Thus, we can differentiate
between two basic types of cohort explanations for the mortality decline, namely
(i) increased nutritional intake during the foetal stage and/or early years of life, and
(ii) decreased needs for nutrition during the foetal stage or early years of life owing to
less disease in the mother or the child.
The importance of early childhood conditions for later life has probably been well
known since time immemorial. It is often assumed that each generation shows the
same relative mortality from childhood to old age. Kermack, McKendrick and
McKinley adopted this assumption in 1934 when scholars were starting to become
aware of the great mortality decline (Kermack et al. 1934). Strangely enough, cohort
factors were out of fashion when the UN in 1953 and 1973 made its synthesis of the
causes of the great mortality decline. Over the last couple of decades, both
medical and historical research on this matter has expanded rapidly (for an overview,
see Elo and Preston 1992).
In this connection, the work by Barker (1994 and elsewhere) has been of major
importance. He has summarised the medical evidence showing the importance of
foetal and neonatal nutrition for adult health. In historical research, Fogel (1996) is
probably the leading advocate of these ideas. In addition, Preston and van de Walle
(1978) for urban France, and Fridlizius (1989) for Sweden, emphasised the impor-
tance of cohort factors for the mortality decline. Bengtsson and Lindström found that
exposure to disease from airborne infections has a strong effect on mortality among
the elderly (Bengtsson and Lindström 2000, 2001).
Steckel (1983) and Fogel (1996 and previous work) use final body height as a
measure of net nutrition and health during childhood. Individuals who have had
well-nourished and healthy mothers, and thus have been well nourished themselves
during the foetal stage, have a lower risk of death during infancy. If they are well
nourished and healthy, their cells and organs develop better, they grow taller, and
they live longer. Since health is determined by net nutrition and not gross nutrition,
there is no direct link between gross nutrition and height attained. Improvements in
health and height may be due either to better nutrition (better diet) or to more limited
claims on nutrition from disease. Thus, a decline in the prevalence of smallpox, for
example, has a positive effect on height and extends the life span, everything else
being equal. The problem is to evaluate how much of the improvement in health is
due to diet and how much is due to less disease. Calculating diets for pre-modern
populations is a difficult task (Fogel 1996), and it is even harder to calculate disease-
related claims on nutrition. Still, historical records show similarities between trends
in height and gross consumption of nutrition (Fogel 1994, 1996), indicating that
trend in disease-related claims has been of minor importance. If that is the case, then
McKeown’s focus on gross nutrition may be justified.
Whether due to a low or badly composed nutritional intake, or to greater claims
on nutrition from diseases, undernourishment may stunt growth in height or weight
and lead to illness, disease and mortality later in life more than in the immediate
future. The immediate relationship, or period link, between the economy and
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mortality, therefore, is much weaker than Malthus believed, according to Fogel. The
rather tenuous short-term relationship often found between prices and deaths for
many European countries, as shown by Lee (1981, 1993), Galloway (1988) and
others, supports this interpretation (Fogel 1994). Thus, cohort factors matter more to
the mortality decline than period factors, according to Fogel.
To summarise, few scholars today will argue that any single factor is the primary
determinant of the great mortality decline. Of course, it is no coincidence that the
vast growth in resources resulting from the transformation of our economies in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was concurrent with the great mortality decline
and with the fertility transition as well. In a millennial perspective, these events took
place at about the same time. This is not to say, however, that there is a close
relationship between the economy and the great mortality decline. On the contrary,
economic growth has probably not been a major determinant, either before the great
mortality decline or in its initial stages, and its impact may have been far less than
expected during later stages of the decline. Instead, the causes are multi-factorial and
vary from the start to the end of the decline.
Initially, the decline may well have been partly due to pure luck, for example
spontaneously less aggressive smallpox pathogens as part of an old demographic
pattern rather than the result of a modernisation process. Later development and
compulsory use of vaccine surely prevented the re-emergence of the more aggressive
virus. Improvements in nourishment and in the care of mothers and children had
long-lasting effects on life span. Advancements in water supply and sanitation as
well as better housing contributed to the decline from the second part of the
nineteenth century onwards. Medical progress in the twentieth century prolonged
life. The fact that health is determined by net nutrition – intake of nutrition minus
claims on nutrition – and that claims are partly disease-related, makes it difficult to
evaluate the determinants of the mortality decline. The influence of conditions in
childhood – including temporary ones – on mortality at older ages adds further
complexity. The impact of each individual factor is therefore very difficult to
measure; to do so would require a long series of high-quality data. Several variables,
such as the virulence of pathogens and the claims on nutrients due to disease can at
best be estimated indirectly, if at all. The analyses based on highly aggregated
longitudinal data have identified the problems and directed us toward the solutions.
It is more doubtful, however, whether solutions will be found at that level of
analysis. Perhaps the use of longitudinal micro data will serve as valuable comple-
ment, as it has in other areas.
In my opinion, the development of theories about the great mortality decline
can be summarised in Fig. 8.1, which also could give us some guidance for the
future.
Thus, the cause of the great mortality decline is clearly multi-factorial, and the
importance of the various factors changes over time. Both period and cohort factors
must be taken into account in analysing the decline. A longterm perspective is
essential in predicting future mortality trends. Combining longitudinal information
for individuals with information at the societal level is likely to provide important
information about mortality determinants in the past and may be useful for predicting
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future trends as well. Previously, both population and mortality projections were
based largely on periodic information about demographic trends. The use of demo-
graphic cohort information in the 1990s was a considerable advancement. The
question now is whether we are ready to take a great step forward by using
multivariate causal models that combine information at the individual and societal
levels.
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The chapters in this part focus on probabilistic (also labelled as stochastic) forecasts,
in other words forecasts in which uncertainty has been quantified. Given a history of
sizable forecasting errors, the first paper, by Nico Keilman, addresses the question of
why demographic forecasts are uncertain. He summarizes main patterns in ex-post
observed errors in historical population forecasts, and discusses probabilistic fore-
casts. Illustrations come from a probabilistic forecast for the population of Norway.
In the second paper, Juha Alho outlines the statistical background of uncertain
events and forecasts of these. The purpose of his remarks is to review some
probability models, and to show how people with different backgrounds may
interpret probabilities differently. The basic cause of the difficulties, and disagree-
ments, is that there are several layers of probabilities to be considered. Consequently,
it is essential to be explicit about the details of the model.
In the third paper, Maarten Alders and Joop de Beer examine the approach taken
by Statistics Netherlands in their stochastic forecast of mortality. They discuss the
use of expert knowledge for the specification of the uncertainty of future mortality.
They also describe the methodology underlying the Dutch stochastic population
forecasts.
Finally, in the fourth paper, Shripad Tuljapurkar presents a model for mortality
analysis and forecasting that has proven to be feasible for probabilistic forecasts. He
gives illustrations of US and Swedish mortality, and discusses also possible impli-
cations of uncertain mortality for future pension expenditures.
N. Keilman






World population in the year 2000 was 6.09 billion, according to recent estimates by
the United Nations (UN 2005). This number is almost 410 million lower than the
year 2000-estimate that the UN expected in 1973. The UN has computed forecasts
for the population of the world since the 1950s. Figure 9.1 shows that the calcula-
tions made in the 1980s were much closer to the current estimate than those
published around 1990. Subsequent forecasts for the world population in 2000
show an irregular pattern: apparently, in 1973 and around 1990 it was rather difficult
to predict world population size and much less so in the mid-1980s.
At first sight, the relative differences in Fig. 9.1 appear small. The highest forecast
came out in 1973. That forecast numbered 6.49 billion, only 6% higher than the
current estimate of 6.09 billion. However, the difference is much larger in terms of
population growth. The 1973 forecast covered the period 1965–2000. During those
35 years, a growth in world population by 3.20 billion was foreseen. According to
the current estimate, the growth was 16% lower: only 2.7 billion persons.
An important reason for lower population growth is that the world’s birth rates
fell stronger than previously thought. Thirty years ago, the UN expected a drop in
total fertility by 1.4 children between the periods 1965–1970 and 1995–2000: from
4.7 to 3.3 children per woman on average. Recent estimates indicate that fertility
initially was higher than previously thought, and that it fell steeper than expected in
that 30-year period, from 4.9 to 2.8.
Accuracy statistics of the type given here are important indicators when judging
the quality of population forecasts. Other aspects, such as the information content
(for instance, does the forecast predict only total population, or also age groups?) and
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the usefulness for policy purposes (for instance, does the predicted trend imply
immediate policy measures?) are relevant as well. Nevertheless, the degree to
which the forecast reflects real trends is a key factor in assessing its quality, in
particular when the forecast is used for planning purposes. For example, imagine a
forecast, for which the odds are one against two that it will cover actual trends. This
forecast should be handled much more cautiously than one that can be expected to be
in error only one out of five times.
The purpose of this chapter is to give a broad review of the notions of population
forecast errors and forecast accuracy. Why are population forecasts inaccurate? How
large are the errors involved, when we analyse historical forecasts of fertility,
mortality, and the age structure? Moreover, how can we compute expected errors
in recent forecasts? We shall see that probabilistic population forecasts are necessary
to assess the expected accuracy of a forecast, and that such probabilistic forecasts
quantify expected accuracy and expected forecast errors much better than traditional
deterministic forecasts do. The chapter concludes with some challenges in the field
of probabilistic population forecasting.
The focus in this chapter is on population forecasts at the national level, com-
puted by means of the cohort component method. I have largely restricted myself to
national forecasts, because most of the empirical literature on forecast errors and
forecast accuracy deals with forecasts at that level. Notable exceptions, to be
discussed below, are analyses for major world regions by Lutz et al. (1996, 2001),
and for all countries in the world by the US National Research Council (NRC 2000).
The empirical accuracy of subnational population forecasts has been evaluated since
the 1950s (Smith et al. 2001), but the expected accuracy of such forecasts is largely
uncharted terrain, cf. the concluding section. I focus on the cohort component
method of population forecasting, because this method is the standard approach
for population forecasting at the national level (Keilman and Cruijsen 1992). Most of
the empirical evidence stems from industrialized countries, although findings for
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Fig. 9.1 Zooming in on the year 2000 world – population at the end of the twentieth century
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Various terms are in use to express accuracy, and lack thereof. I shall use
inaccuracy and uncertainty as equivalent notions. When a forecast is accurate, its
errors are small. Forecast errors are a means of quantifying forecast accuracy and
forecast uncertainty. Empirical errors may be computed based on a historical
forecast, when its results are compared with actual population data observed some
years after the forecast was computed. For a recent forecast, this is not possible. In
that case, one may compute expected errors, by means of a statistical model.
9.2 Why Population Forecasts Are Inaccurate
Population forecasts are inaccurate because our understanding of demographic
behaviour is imperfect. Keyfitz (1982) assessed various established and rudimentary
demographic theories: demographic transition, effects of development, Caldwell’s
theory concerning education and fertility, urbanization, income distribution, Mal-
thus’ writings on population, human capital, the Easterlin effect, opportunity costs,
prosperity and fertility, and childbearing intentions. He tried to discover whether
these theories had improved demographic forecasting, but his conclusion was
negative. Although many of the theories are extensively tested, they have limited
predictive validity in space and time, are strongly conditional, or cannot be applied
without the difficult prediction of non-demographic factors. Keyfitz’ conclusion
agrees with Ernest Nagel’s opinion from 1961, that “. . . (un)like the laws of physics
and chemistry, generalizations in the social sciences . . . have at best only a severely
restricted scope, limited to social phenomena occurring during a relatively brief
historical epoch with special institutional settings.” Similarly, Raymond Boudon
(1986) concluded that general social science theories do not exist – they are all
partial and local, and Louis Henry (1987) supports that view for the case of
demography. Applied to demographic forecasting, this view implies that uncertainty
is inherent, and not merely the result of our ignorance. Individuals make
unpredictable choices regarding partnership and childbearing, health behaviour,
and migration. Note that the views expressed by Nagel and Boudon are radically
different from Laplace’s view on chance and uncertainty: “Imagine . . . an intelli-
gence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated . . . To it
nothing would be uncertain, and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes. “
(Laplace 1812–1829). This view suggests that our ignorance is temporary, and good
research into human behaviour will increase our understanding and help formulating
accurate forecasts.
Whichever view is correct, demographic behaviour is not well explained as of
today. When explanation is problematic, forecasting is even more difficult. There-
fore, in addition to whatever fragmentary insight demographers obtain from
behavioural sciences, they rely heavily on current real trends in vital processes,
and they extrapolate those trends into the future. Hence, they face a problem when
the indicators show unexpected changes in level or slope. It will not be clear whether
these are caused by random fluctuations, or whether there is a structural change in the
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underlying trends. A trend shift that is perceived as random will first lead to large
forecast errors. This effect is known in forecasting literature as assumption drag
(Ascher 1978). Later, when the new trend is acknowledged, it will be included in the
forecast updates and the errors will diminish. On the other hand, random fluctuations
that are perceived as a trend shift will cause forecast errors, which will have a
fluctuating effect on subsequent forecasts.
9.3 Empirical Evidence from Historical Forecasts
There is a large literature, in which historical population forecasts are evaluated
against observed statistics (Preston 1974; Calot and Chesnais 1978; Inoue and Yu
1979; Keyfitz 1981; Stoto 1983; Pflaumer 1988; Keilman 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001;
Keilman and Pham 2004; National Research Council 2000). These studies have
shown, among others, that forecast accuracy is better for short than for long forecast
durations, and that it is better for large than for small populations. They also learned
us that forecasts of the old and the young tend to be less accurate than those of
intermediate age groups, and that there are considerable differences in accuracy
between regions and components. Finally, poor data quality tends to go together
with poor forecast performance. This relationship is stronger for mortality than for
fertility, and stronger for short-term than for long-term forecasts. Selected examples
of these general findings will be given below.
9.3.1 Forecasts Are More Accurate for Short Than for Long
Forecast Durations
Duration dependence of forecast accuracy is explained by the fact that the more
years a forecast covers, the greater is the chance that unforeseen developments will
produce unexpected changes in fertility, mortality, or migration.
The US National Research Council (NRC) evaluated the accuracy of nine total
population size forecasts for countries of the world. Four of these were published by
the United Nations (between 1973 and 1994), four by the World Bank (between
1972 and 1990), and one by the US Census Bureau (1987). The absolute percentage
error, that is the forecast error irrespective of sign, increased from 5% on average for
5-year ahead forecasts, to 9% 15 years ahead, and to 14% 25 years ahead (NRC
2000). The average was computed over all countries and all forecasts. Developed
countries had errors that were lower, and increased slower by forecast duration: from
2 (5 years ahead) to 4–5 (25 years ahead) %. A striking feature of these errors is that,
even at duration zero, i.e., in the forecast’s base year, the errors are not negligible.
Hence, forecasts start off with an incorrect base line population. For countries in
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Africa and the Middle East this base line error was highest: 5%. Base line errors
reflect poor data quality: when the forecasts were made, demographers worked with
the best data that were available, but in retrospect, those data were revised.
Total fertility showed average errors from 0.4 children per woman after 5 years, to
0.6 and 0.8 children per woman after 15 and 25 years, with higher than average
errors for European countries. In an evaluation of ten TFRforecasts made by the UN
since 1965, I found that for Europe as a whole, TFR errors were lower, and increased
slower: from 0.2 children per woman after 5 years, to 0.5 after 15 years (Keilman
2001). An analysis of the errors observed in TFR forecasts in 14 European countries
made since the 1960s shows that TFR-predictions have been wrong by 0.3 children
per woman for forecasts 15 years ahead, and 0.4 children per woman 25 years ahead
(Keilman and Pham 2004). Life expectancy was wrong by 2.3 (5 years ahead), 3.5
(15 years ahead) and 4.3 (25 years ahead) years on average in the NRC evaluation. In
14 European countries, life expectancy forecasts tended to be too low by 1.0–1.3 and
3.2–3.4 years at forecast horizons of 10 and 20 years ahead, respectively.
9.3.2 Forecasts Are More Accurate for Large Than for Small
Populations
A size effect in empirical errors at the sub national level was established already
50 years ago (White 1954), and reconfirmed repeatedly (see Smith et al. 2001 for an
overview). Schéele (1981) found that the absolute error in small area forecasts within
the Stockholm area was approximately proportional to the square root of population
size, i.e., a power of 0.5 (see also Bandel Bäckman and Schéele 1995). Later,
Tayman et al. (1998) confirmed such a power law for small area forecasts in San
Diego County, California, when they found that the mean absolute percentage
forecast error was proportional to population size raised to the power 0.4.
At the international level, the NRC analysis referred to earlier showed that the
absolute percentage error in forecasts of total population size was 5.5% on average,
the average being taken over all countries and all nine forecast rounds. However, for
countries with less than one million inhabitants, the average was 3 percentage points
higher; for countries with a population of at least one million, the error was 0.7
percentage points lower (controlling, among others, for forecast length, year fore-
casted, forecast round, and whether or not the country had had a recent census; see
NRC 2000, Appendix Table B7).
There are three reasons for the size effect in forecast accuracy. First, at the
international scale, forecasters tend to pay less attention to the smallest countries,
and take special care with the largest ones (NRC 2000). Second, both at the
international and the local scale, small countries and areas are stronger affected by
random fluctuations than large ones. In fact, many errors at the lower regional level
cancel after aggregation. This explains irregular patterns and randomness in
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historical series of vital statistics at the lower level, leading to unexpected real
developments after the forecast was produced. Third, for small areas the impact of
migration on total population is strong compared to fertility and mortality, while, at
the same time, migration is the least predictable of the three components.
9.3.3 Forecasts of the Old and the Young Tend to Be Less
Accurate Than Those of Intermediate Age Groups
In medium sized and large countries and regions, international migration has much
less effect on the age structure than fertility or mortality. Therefore, a typical age
pattern is often observed for accuracy. For many developed countries, a plot of
relative forecast errors against age reveals large and positive errors (i.e., too high
forecasts) for young age groups, and large negative errors (too low forecasts) for the
elderly. Errors for intermediate age groups are small. This age effect in forecast
accuracy has been established for Europe, Northern America, and Latin America,
and for countries such as Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and the
United Kingdom (Keilman 1997, 1998). The fall in birth rates in the 1970s came
fully unexpected for many demographers, which led to too high forecasts for young
age groups. At the same time, mortality forecasts were often too pessimistic, in
particular for women – hence the forecasts predicted too few elderly. The relative
errors for the oldest old are often of the same order of magnitude as those for the
youngest age groups: plus or minus 15% or more for forecasts 15 years into the
future.
9.3.4 Accuracy Differs Between Components and Regions
In an analysis of the accuracy of 16 sets of population projections that the UN
published between 1951 and 1998, I found considerable variation among ten large
countries and seven major regions (Keilman 2001). Problems are largest in
pre-transition countries, in particular in Asia. The quality of UN data for total fertility
and the life expectancy has been problematic in the past for China, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh. The poor data quality for these countries went together with large errors
in projected total fertility and life expectancy. For Africa as a whole, data on total
population and age structure have been revised substantially in the past, and this is a
likely reason for the poor performance of the projections in that region. Nigeria, the
only African country in my analysis, underwent major revisions in its data in
connection with the Census of 1991. In turn, historical estimates of fertility and
mortality indicators had to be adjusted, and this explains large projection errors in the
age structure, in total fertility and in the life expectancy for this country. The
problematic data situation for the former USSR is well known, in particular that
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for mortality data. The result was that, on average, life expectancy projections were
too high by 2.9 years, which in turn caused large errors in projected age structures for
the elderly. For Europe and Northern America, data quality is generally good. Yet, as
noted in Sect. 9.3.3, the two regions have large errors in long-range projections of
their age structures, caused by unforeseen trend shifts in fertility and mortality in the
1960s and 1970s.
The analysis of the statistical distribution of observed forecast errors for 14
European countries showed that a normal distribution fitted well for errors in life
expectancies (Keilman and Pham 2004): TFR-errors, on the other hand, were
exponentially distributed. This indicates that the probability for extremely large
error values was greater for the TFR than for the life expectancy. Extreme errors
for net migration are even more likely.
9.4 The Expected Accuracy of Current Forecasts
Forecast users should be informed about the expected accuracy of the numbers they
work with. It focuses their attention on alternative population futures that may have
different implications, and it requires them to decide what forecast horizon to take
seriously. Just because a forecast covers 100 years does not mean that one should
necessarily use that long a forecast (NRC 2000). In that sense, empirical errors
observed in a series of historical forecasts for a certain country can give strong
indications of the accuracy of the nation’s current forecast. However, these historical
errors are just one realization of a statistical process, which applied to the past.
Expected errors for the current forecast can only be assessed when the population
forecast is couched in probabilistic form.
A probabilistic population forecast of the cohort component type requires the
joint statistical distribution of all of its input parameters. Because there are hundreds
of input parameters, one simplifies the probabilistic model in two ways. First, one
focuses on just a few key parameters (for instance, total fertility, life expectancy, net
immigration).1 Second, one ignores certain correlations, for instance those between
components, and sometimes also those in the age patterns of fertility, mortality, or
migration.2
1A cohort component forecast that has 1-year age groups requires 35 fertility rates, 200 death rates,
and some 140 parameters for net migration for each forecast year. With age groups and time
intervals equal to 50 years, a forecast for a period of 50 years, say, still requires that one specify the
joint statistical distribution of (7 + 40 + 28)  10 ¼ 750 parameters.
2For Western countries, there is little or no reason to assume correlation between the components of
fertility, mortality, and migration. Nor is there any empirical evidence of such correlation (Lee and
Tuljapurkar 1994; Keilman 1997). In developing countries, disasters and catastrophes may have an
impact both on mortality, fertility, and migration, and a correlation between the three components
cannot be excluded. There may also be a positive correlation between the levels of immigration and
childbearing in Western countries with extremely high immigration from developing countries.
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In probabilistic forecasts, an important type of correlation is that across time
(serial correlation). Levels of fertility and mortality change only slowly over time.
Thus, when fertility or mortality is high one year, a high level the next year is also
likely, but not 100% certain. This implies a strong, but not perfect serial correlation
for these two components. International migration is much more volatile, but
economic, legal, political, and social conditions stretching over several years affect
migration flows to a certain extent, and some degree of serial correlation should be
expected. In the probabilistic forecasts for the United States (Lee and Tuljapurkar
1994), Finland (Alho 1998), the Netherlands (De Beer and Alders 1999), and
Norway (Keilman et al. 2001, 2002) these correlation patterns were estimated
based on time series models. For Austria (Hanika et al. 1997) and for large world
regions (Lutz and Scherbov 1998a, b) perfect autocorrelation was assumed for the
summary parameters (total fertility, life expectancy, and net migration). This
assumption underestimates uncertainty (Lee 1999). In recent work for world regions,
Lutz, Sanderson, and Scherbov relaxed the assumption of perfect autocorrelation
(Lutz et al. 2001).
Three main methods are in use for computing probabilistic forecasts of the
summary indicators: time series extrapolation, expert judgement, and extrapolation
of historical forecast errors (Lee 1999; NRC 2000). The three approaches are
complementary, and elements of all three are often combined. Time series methods
and expert judgement result in the distribution of the parameter in question around its
expected value. In contrast, an extrapolation of empirical errors gives the distribution
centred around zero (assuming an expected error equal to zero), and the expected
value of the population variable is taken from a deterministic forecast computed in
the traditional manner.
Time series methods are based on the assumption that historical values of the
variable of interest have been generated by means of a statistical model, which also
holds for the future. A widely used method is that of Autoregressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA)-models. These time series models were developed for
short horizons. When applied to long-run population forecasting, the point forecast
and the prediction intervals may become unrealistic (Sanderson 1995). Judgmental
methods (see below) can be applied to correct or constrain such unreasonable
predictions (Lee 1993; Tuljapurkar 1996).
Expert judgement can be used when expected values and corresponding predic-
tion intervals are hard to obtain by formal methods. In demographic forecasting, the
method has been pioneered by Lutz and colleagues (Lutz et al. 1996; Hanika et al.
1997; Lutz and Scherbov 1998a, b). A group of experts is asked to indicate the
probability that a summary parameter, such as the TFR, falls within a certain
pre-specified range for some target year, for instance the range determined by the
high and the low variant of an independently prepared population forecast. The
subjective probability distributions obtained this way from a number of experts are
combined in order to reduce individual bias. A major weakness of this approach, at
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least based upon the experiences from other disciplines, is that experts often are too
confident, i.e., that they tend to attach a too high probability to a given interval
(Armstrong 1985). A second problem is that an expert would have problems with
sensibly guessing whether a certain interval corresponds to probability bounds with
90% coverage versus 95% or 99% (Lee 1999).
Extrapolation of empirical errors requires observed errors from historical fore-
casts. Formal or informal methods may be used to predict the errors for the current
forecast. Keyfitz (1981) and Stoto (1983) were among the first to use this approach in
demographic forecasting. They assessed the accuracy of historical forecasts for
population growth rates. The Panel on Population Projections of the US National
Research Council (NRC 2000) elaborated further on this idea and developed a
statistical model for the uncertainty around total population in UN-forecasts for all
countries of the world. Others have investigated and modelled the accuracy of
predicted TFR, life expectancy, immigration levels, and age structures (Keilman
1997; De Beer 1997). There are two important problems. First, time series of
historical errors are usually rather short, as forecasts prepared in the 1960s or earlier
generally were poorly documented. Second, extrapolation is often difficult because
errors may have diminished over successive forecast rounds as a result of better
forecasting methods.
Irrespective of the method that is used to determine the prediction intervals for all
future fertility, mortality and migration parameters, the next step is to apply these to
the base population in order to compute prediction intervals for future population
size and age pyramids. This can be done in two ways: analytically, and by means of
simulation.
The analytical approach is based on a stochastic cohort component model, in
which the statistical distributions for the fertility, mortality, and migration parame-
ters are transformed into statistical distributions for the size of the population and its
age-sex structure. Alho and Spencer (1985) and Cohen (1986) employ such an
analytical approach, but they need strong assumptions. Lee and Tuljapurkar
(1994) give approximate expressions for the second moments of the distributions.
The simulation approach avoids the simplifying assumptions and the approxi-
mations of the analytical approach. The idea is to compute several hundreds or
thousands of forecast variants (“sample paths”) based on input parameter values for
fertility, mortality, and migration that are randomly drawn from their respective
distributions, and store the results in a database. Early contributions based on the
idea of simulation are those by Keyfitz (1985), Pflaumer (1986, 1988), and
Kuijsten (1988).
In order to illustrate that probabilistic forecasts are useful when uncertainty has to
be quantified, I shall give an example for the population of Norway. I shall compare
the results from a probabilistic forecast with those from a traditional deterministic
one, prepared by Statistics Norway.
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9.5 Probabilistic Forecasts: An Alternative to Forecast
Variants
Technical details of the methods used to construct the probabilistic forecast are
presented elsewhere (Keilman et al. 2001, 2002). Here I shall give a brief summary.
ARIMA time series models were estimated for observed annual values of the
TFR, the life expectancy for men and women, and total immigration and immigra-
tion in Norway since the 1950s. Based on these ARIMA models, repeated stochastic
simulation starting in 1996 yielded 5,000 sample paths for each of these summary
parameters to the year 2050. The predictive distributions for the TFR and the life
expectancy at birth were checked against corresponding empirical distributions
based on historical forecasts published by Statistics Norway in the period
1969–1996. The predicted TFR, life expectancy, and gross migration flows were
broken down into age specific rates and numbers by applying various model
schedules: a Gamma model for age specific fertility, a Heligman-Pollard model for
mortality, and a RogersCastro model for migration. Next, the results of the 5000 runs
of the cohort component model for the period up to 2050 were assembled in a data
base containing the future population of Norway broken down by 1-year age group,
sex, forecast year (1997–2050), and forecast run. For each variable of interest, for
example the total population in 2030, or the old age dependency ratio (OADR) in
2050, one can construct a histogram based on 5000 simulated values, and read off
prediction intervals with any chosen coverage probability.
The results showed odds equal to four against one (80% chance) that Norway’s
population, now 4.5 million, will number between 4.3 and 5.4 million in the year
2025, and 3.7–6.4 million in 2050. Uncertainty was largest for the youngest and the
oldest age groups, because fertility and mortality are hard to predict. As a result,
prediction intervals in 2030 for the population younger than 20 years of age were so
wide, that the forecast was not very informative. International migration showed
large prediction intervals around expected levels, but its impact on the age structure
was modest. In 2050, uncertainty had cumulated so strongly, that intervals were very
large for virtually all age groups, in particular when the intervals are judged in a
relative sense (compared to the median forecast).
Figure 9.2 shows the high and the low bound of the various prediction intervals
for the old age dependency ratio, defined as the population 67 and over relative to
that aged 20–66.3 The prediction intervals are those with 95%, 80%, and 67%
coverage. The median of the predictive distributions is also plotted. The intervals
widen rapidly, reflecting that uncertainty increases with time. We see that ageing is
certain in Norway, at least until 2040. In that year, the odds are two against one (67%
interval) that the OADR will be between 0.33 and 0.43, i.e., at least 10 points higher
than today’s value of 0.23. The probability of a ratio in 2040 that is lower than
today’s is close to zero.
3The legal retirement age in Norway is 67.
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How do these probabilistic forecast results compare with those obtained by a
traditional deterministic forecast? Statistics Norway’s most recent population fore-
cast contains variants for high population growth and low population growth, among
others (Statistics Norway 2005). The high population growth forecast results from
combining a high fertility assumption with a high life expectancy assumption (i.e.,
low mortality) and a high net immigration assumption. Likewise, the low growth
variant combines low fertility with low life expectancy and low immigration. The
forecast predicts a population aged 67 and over in 2050 between 1,095,000 (low
growth) and 1,406,000 (high growth). However, the corresponding OADR-values
are 0.409 for low population growth, and 0.392 for high population growth. There-
fore, while there is a considerable gap between the absolute numbers of elderly in the
two variants, the relative numbers, as a proportion of the population aged 20–66, are
almost indistinguishable. The interval for the absolute number thus reflects uncer-
tainty in some sense, but the OADR-interval for the same variant pair suggests
almost no uncertainty. On the other hand, the probabilistic forecast results in Fig. 9.2
show a two-thirds OADR-prediction interval in 2050 that stretches from 0.31 to
0.44.4
This example illustrates that it is problematic to use forecast variants from
traditional deterministic forecast methods to express forecast uncertainty. First,
uncertainty is not quantified. Second, the use of high and low variants is inconsistent
from a statistical point of view (Lee 1999, Alho 1998). In the high variant, fertility is
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Fig. 9.2 Old age dependency ratio, Norway
4The median OADR-value of the stochastic forecast in 2050 (0.37) is lower than the medium value
of Statistics Norway’s forecast for that year (0.395). Life expectancy in 2050 rises to 86 years in
Statistics Norway’s forecast, but only to 82.3 years in the median of the stochastic forecast. The
latter forecast was prepared 4 years earlier than Statistics Norway’s forecast.
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low in one year, it is 100% certain that it will be low in the following years, too.
Things are even worse when two or more mortality variants are formulated, in
addition to the fertility variants, so that high/low growth variants result from
combining high fertility with high life expectancy/low fertility with low life expec-
tancy. In that case, any year in which fertility is high, life expectancy is high as well.
In other words, one assumes perfect correlation between fertility and mortality, in
addition to perfect serial correlation for each of the two components. Assumptions of
this kind are unrealistic, and, moreover, they cause inconsistencies: two variants that
are extreme for one variable need not be extreme for another variable.
As a further illustration of the use of stochastic population forecasts when
analyzing pension systems, let me consider the possibility of a flexible retirement
age. When workers postpone retirement, they contribute longer to the pension fund,
and the years they benefit from it become shorter (other factors remaining the same).
Therefore I analyse the following question: which retirement age is necessary in
Norway in the future in order to achieve a constant OADR (see also Sect. 12.4 of the
chapter by Tuljapurkar in this volume for a similar analysis for the United States)? I
will investigate two cases. First I assume a constant OADR equal to 0.24, which is
the highest value observed in the past (around 1990, see Fig. 9.2). Second, I assume
an OADR equal to 0.18. This is the value in 1967, the year when the Norwegian
pension system in its current form was introduced. Since the future age structure is
uncertain, the retirement age necessary to obtain a constant OADR becomes a
stochastic variable. Table 9.1 gives the results.
The table shows that the retirement age in Norway must increase strongly from its
current value of 67 years, if the OADR were to remain constant at 0.24. The median
of 71.9 years in 2050 indicates that the rise is almost 5 years. Yet the uncertainty is
large here. In four out of five cases would the retirement age in 2050 be between
69 and 75 years. In the short run the situation is completely different. The age
structure of the population of Norway is such that the retirement age can decrease to
2010, and yet the ratio of elderly to the population in labour force ages could remain
constant. This finding is almost completely certain. Even the upper bound of the 95%
interval (65.5) is much lower than today’s retirement age.
If one would require an OADR as low as the one in 1967, the median age at
retirement has to increase to no less than 75.1 years in 2050. A higher retirement age
Table 9.1 Prediction intervals for retirement age, Norway
Median 67% interval 80% interval 95% interval
OADR ¼ 0.24
2010 64.8 64.5–65.2 64.4–65.3 64.1–65.5
2030 69.2 68.2–70.3 67.9–70.6 67.2–71.3
2050 71.9 69.4–74.4 68.7–75.1 67.0–76.8
OADR ¼ 0.18
2010 67.6 67.2–68.1 67.1–68.2 66.8–68.5
2030 72.0 71.0–73.0 70.7–73.3 70.1–74.0
2050 75.1 72.8–77.2 72.2–77.9 70.7–79.4
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is necessary even in the short run: the median in 2010 is 67.6 years, and the lower
bound to the 80% prediction interval indicates that the probability that we may can
an increase is about 10% or lower, given the assumptions made.
9.6 Challenges in Probabilistic Population Forecasting
A probabilistic forecast extrapolates observed variability in demographic data to the
future. For a proper assessment of the variability, one needs long series with annual
data of good quality. The minimum is about 50 years, but a longer series is
preferable. At the same time, one would ideally have a long series of historical
forecasts, and estimate empirical distributions of observed forecast errors based on
the old forecasts. There are very few countries that have so good data. Therefore, a
major challenge in probabilistic forecasting is to prepare such forecasts for countries
with poorer data. Two research directions seem promising. First, when time series
analysis cannot be used to compute predictive distributions, one has to rely strongly
on expert opinion. Lutz et al. (1996, 2001) have indicated how this can be done in
practice. An important task here is a systematic elicitation of the experts’ opinions, in
order to avoid too narrow prediction intervals. Second, in case the data from
historical forecasts are lacking, one could replace actual forecasts by naïve or
baseline forecasts (Keyfitz 1981; Alho 1998). Historical forecasts often assumed
constant (or nearly constant) levels or growth rates for summary indicators such as
the TFR, the life expectancy, or the level of immigration. Thus we can study how
accurate past fertility forecasts would have been if they had assumed that the base
value had persisted. Similarly, we can compute mortality errors based on an assump-
tion of a linear increase in life expectancy. Such naïve error estimates would be
expected to lead to conservative, that is, too large variability estimates, in some cases
only slightly so but in others substantially.
Most applications of probabilistic forecasting so far focus on one country. Very
few have a regional or an international perspective. One important exception is the
work by Lutz et al. (1996, 2001), who used a probabilistic cohort component
approach for 13 regions of the world.5 For fertility and mortality, they combined
the three methods mentioned in Sect. 9.4 to obtain predictive distributions for
summary indicators. An important challenge was the probabilistic modelling of
interregional migration, because migration data show large volatility in the trends,
are unreliable, not consistent between countries, or often simply lacking. In their
1996 study, Lutz and colleagues assumed a matrix of constant annual interregional
migration flows, with the 90% prediction bounds corresponding to certain high and
5Probabilistic forecasts of total population size for all countries of the world have been prepared by
the Panel on Population Projections (NRC 2000), but these forecasts do not give age detail.
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low migration gains in each region. In the recent study, net migration into the regions
was modelled as a stochastic vector with a certain autocorrelation structure. A
second challenge was the treatment of interregional correlations for fertility, mor-
tality, and migration. Due to the paucity of the necessary data, these correlations are
difficult to estimate. Therefore, the authors combined qualitative considerations with
sensitivity analysis, and investigated alternative regional correlation levels.
Because of these data problems, the development of a sound method for proba-
bilistic multiregional cohort component forecasting is an important research chal-
lenge. For sub-national forecasts, the problems are probably easier to overcome than
for international forecasts, because the data situation is better in the former case, at
least in a number of developed countries. The way ahead would thus be to collect
better migration data, and to invest efforts in estimating cross-regional correlation
patterns for fertility, mortality, and migration. An alternative strategy could be to
start from a probabilistic cohort component forecast for the larger region, and to
compute such forecasts at the lower regional level (by age and sex) by means of an
appropriate multivariate distribution with expected values corresponding to the
regional shares from an independently prepared deterministic forecast.
Not only regional forecasts, but also other types of population forecasts should be
couched in probabilistic terms, such as labour market forecasts, educational fore-
casts, and household forecasts, to name a few. Very few of such probabilistic
forecasts have been prepared. Lee and Tuljapurkar (2001) have investigated the
expected accuracy of old age security funds forecasts in the United States. A major
topic of research here is to analyse the relative contribution to uncertainty of
demographic factors (fertility, mortality, migration) and non-demographic factors
(labour market participation, educational attainment, residential choices).
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Chapter 10
Remarks on the Use of Probabilities
in Demography and Forecasting
Juha M. Alho
10.1 Introduction
The concept of “probability” is used as a step in life table construction to get the
expected number of survivors in a cohort. However, in traditional texts on demo-
graphic methods (e.g., Shryock and Siegel 1976), variance in the number of survi-
vors plays no role. Similarly, concepts of estimation, estimation error, and bias are
routinely used, but standard error and sampling distribution are not (except in
connection with sample surveys). Although statistically satisfactory accounts of
the life table theory have existed for a long time (e.g., Chiang 1968; Hoem 1970),
a reason for neglecting population level random variability, and statistical estimation
error, has been that the populations being studied are so large that random error must
be so small as not to matter, in practice.
In contrast, when statistical methods started to become used in population
forecasting in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, some of the resulting prediction intervals
have been criticized as being implausibly wide. This view has not often been
expressed in print, but Smith (2001, pp. 70–71) provides an example. Others,
especially sociologically minded critics have gone further and argued that due to
the nature of social phenomena, the application of probability concepts in general, is
inappropriate. On the other hand, demographers coming with an economics back-
ground have tended to find probabilistic thinking more palatable.
The purpose of the following remarks is to review some probability models, and
show how the apparent contradiction arises. We will see that the basic principles
have been known for decades. The basic cause of the difficulties – and disagreements
– is that there are several layers of probabilities that can be considered. Conse-
quently, it is essential to be explicit about the details of the model.
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10.2 Binomial and Poisson Models
As emphasized by good introductory texts on statistics (e.g., Freedman et al. 1978,
p. 497), the concept of probability can only be made precise in the context of a
mathematical model. To understand why one often might ignore other aspects of
random variables besides expectation, let us construct a model for the survival of a
cohort of size n for 1 year. For each individual i ¼ 1,. . .,n, define an indicator
variable such that Xi ¼ 1, if i dies during the year, and Xi ¼ 0 otherwise. The total
number of deaths is then X ¼ X1 + . . . + Xn. We assume that the Xi’s are random
variables (i.e., their values are determined by a chance experiment). Suppose we
make an assumption concerning their expectation
E Xi½  ¼ q,i ¼ 1, . . . , n, ð10:1Þ
and assume that
X1, . . . , Xn are independent: ð10:2Þ
It follows that X has a binomial distribution, X ~ Bin(n, q). As is well known, we
have the expectation E[X] ¼ nq, and variance Var(X) ¼ n(qq2). Therefore, the
coefficient of variation is C ¼ ((1q)/nq)½.
Now, in industrialized countries the probability of death is about 1% and popu-
lation size can be in the millions, so relative variation can, indeed, be small. For
example, if q ¼ 0.01 and n ¼ 1000,000, we have that C ¼ 0.01. Or, the relative
random variability induced by the model defined in (10.1) and (10.2) is about 1%.
Equivalent calculations have already been presented by Pollard (1968), for example.
One might object to the conclusion that relative variability is negligible on the
grounds that (10.1) does not hold: surely people of different ages (and of different
sex, socio-economic status etc.) have different probabilities of death. Therefore,
suppose that
E Xi½  ¼ qi, withq ¼ q1 þ    þ qnð Þ=n: ð10:3Þ
In this case








q2i  n2q2: ð10:5Þ
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Therefore, we have that the variance (10.4) is actually less than the binomial
variance. The naive argument based on population heterogeneity simply does
not hold.
Before proceeding further, let us note that, apart from substantive factors, hetero-
geneity of the type (10.3) is imposed on demographic data, because vital events are
typically classified by age, so individuals contribute different times to the “rectan-
gles” of the Lexis diagram. This is one reason why the basic data are typically
collected in terms of rates, and a Poisson assumption is invoked. There is some
comfort in the fact that if the assumptions (10.2) and (10.3) are complemented by the
following assumptions: suppose the qi’s depend on n and as n !1, (i) nq ¼ λ > 0,
and (ii) max{q1, . . ., qn} ! 0, then the distribution of X converges to Po(λ) (Feller
1968, p. 282). The Poisson model is of interest, because under that model E[X] ¼ λ
as before, but Var(X) ¼ λ > n(qq2). In other words, the Poisson model has a larger
variability than the corresponding binomial models. Quantitatively the difference is
small, however, since now C ¼ λ–1/2. If n ¼ 1000,000 and q ¼ 0.01, then
λ ¼ 10,000, and C ¼ 0.01, for example. Or, the relative variability is the same as
that under the homogeneous binomial model, to the degree of accuracy used.
The usual demographic application of the Poisson model proceeds from the
further identification λ ¼ μK, where K is the person years lived in the population,
and μ is the force of mortality. The validity of this model is not self-evident, since
unlike n, K is also random. At least when λ is of a smaller order of magnitude than K,
the approximation appears to be good, however (Breslow and Day 1987,
pp. 132–133). As is well-known, the maximum likelihood estimator of the force of
mortality is μ̂ ¼ X/K with the estimated standard error of X1/2/K. Extensions to
log-linear models that allow for the incorporation of explanatory variables follow
similarly.
Since the Poisson distribution has the variance maximizing property, and it
provides a model for both the independent trials and occurrence/exposure rates,
we will below restrict the discussion primarily to the Poisson case.
10.3 Random Rates
Since (10.1) is not the cause of the low level of variability in the number of deaths,
we need to look more closely at (10.2). A simple (but unrealistic) example showing
that there are many opportunities here is the following. Suppose we make a single
random experiment with probability of success¼ q, and probability of failure¼ 1q.
If the experiment succeeds, define Xi ¼ 1 for all i. Otherwise define Xi ¼ 0 for all
i. In this case we have, for example, that X ¼ nX1, so E[X] ¼ nq as before, but Var
(X) ¼ n2(q–q2), and C ¼ ((1q)/q)1/2 independently of n. For q ¼ 0.01 we have
C ¼ 9.95, for example, indicating a huge (nearly 1000%) level of variability.
More realistically, we may think that dependence across individuals arises
because they may all be influenced by common factors to some extent, at least.
For example, there may be year to year variation in mortality around a mean that is
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due to irregular trends in economics, epidemics, weather etc. If the interest would
center on a given year, the model might still be X ~ Po(μK), but if several years are
considered jointly, then the year-to-year variation due to such factors would have to
be considered. In this case, we would entertain a hierarchical model of the type
X  Po μKð ÞwithE μ½  ¼ μ0, Var μð Þ ¼ σ2: ð10:6Þ
In other words, the rate μ itself is being considered random, with a mean μ0 that
reflects the average level of mortality over the (relatively short) period of interest,
and variance σ2 that describes the year to year variation.
In this case we have that
Var Xð Þ ¼ E Var Xjμð Þ½  þ Var E Xjμ½ ð Þ
¼ μ0Kþ σ2K2: ð10:7Þ
It follows that Var( μ̂ ) ¼ σ2 + μ0/K. This result is of fundamental interest in
demography, because if K is large, then the dominant part of the error is due to the
annual variability. If the interest centers (as in the production of official population
statistics) on a given year, with no regard to other years, we would be left with the
pure Poisson variance μ0/K, which is often small. An exception is the oldest-old
mortality, where Poisson variation is always an issue, because for ages high enough
K will always be small and μ0 large.
However, when the interest centers on the time trends of mortality, and eventually
on forecasting its future values, then the year to year variation σ2 must be considered.
Under model (10.6) this is independent of population size K. This is a realistic first
approximation, but we note that model (10.6) does not take into account the
possibility that a population might consist of relatively independent subpopulations.
In that case, populations having many such subpopulations would have a smaller
variance than a population with no independent subpopulations.
10.4 Handling of Trends
Consider now two counts. Or assume that for i ¼ 1, 2, we have that
Xi  Po μiKið ÞwithE μi½  ¼ μ0i, Var μið Þ ¼ σi2, Corr μ1; μ2ð Þ ¼ ρ: ð10:8Þ
Repeating the argument leading to (10.7) for covariances yields the result
Corr X1;X2ð Þ ¼ ρ= 1þ μ01=σ1K1ð Þ 1þ μ02=σ2K2ð Þf g½: ð10:9Þ
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Or, the effect of Poisson variability is to decrease the correlation between the
observed rates. We note that if the Ki’s are large, the attenuation is small. However,
for the oldest old the Ki’s are eventually small, and the μ0i’s large, so attenuation is
expected.
In concentrating on Poisson variability that is primarily of interest in the assess-
ment of the accuracy of vital registration, demographers have viewed annual vari-
ation as something to be explained. Annual changes in mortality and fertility are
analyzed by decomposing the population into ever finer subgroups in an effort to try
to find out, which are the groups most responsible for the observed change. Often
partial explanations can be found in this manner, but they rarely provide a basis for
anticipating future changes (Keyfitz 1982). To be of value in forecasting, an expla-
nation must have certain robustness against idiosyncratic conditions, and persistence
over time. This leads to considering changes around a trend as random.
One cause for why some demographers find statistical analyses of demographic
time-series irritating seems to lie here: what a demographer views as a phenomenon
of considerable analytical interest, may seem to a statistician as a mere random
phenomenon, sufficiently described once σ2 is known. [This tension has counterparts
in many parts of science. Linguists, for example, differ in whether they study the fine
details of specific dialects, or whether they try to see general patterns underlying
many languages.]
In forecasting, the situation is more complex than outlined so far. In mortality
forecasting one would typically be interested taking account of the nearly universal
decline in mortality, by making further assumptions about time trends. For example,
suppose the count at time t is of the form Xt ~ Po(μtKt), such that
log μtð Þ ¼ αþ βtþ ξt,whereE ξt½  ¼ 0, Cov ξt; ξsð Þ ¼ σ2min t; sf g: ð10:10Þ
If the ξt’s have normal distributions, under (10.10) we would have that E
[μt] ¼ exp (α+βt+σ2t/2)  μ0t (This model is closely related to the so-called
Lee-Carter model.)
One reason that makes (10.10) more complicated than (10.8), is that μ0t involves
parameters to be estimated, so standard errors become an issue. Especially, if Var(β̂)
is large, this source of error may have a considerable effect for large t, because it
induces a quadratic term into the variance of error, whereas the effect of the random
walk via σ2 is only linear.
The way Var( β̂ ) is usually estimated from past data assumes that the model
specified in (10.10) is correct. Therefore, probabilistic analyses based on (10.10) are
conditional on the chosen model. What these probabilities do not formally cover is
the uncertainty in model choice itself (Chatfield 1996).
One should pay attention to model choice because it is typically based on
iteration, in which lack of fit is balanced against parametric parsimony (cf., Box
and Jenkins 1976). One would expect error estimates calculated after a selection
process to be too small, because of potential overfitting. Yet, a curious empirical fact
seems to be that statistical time-series models identified and estimated in this
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manner, for example demographic time-series, often produce prediction intervals
that are rather wide, and even implausibly wide in the sense that in a matter of
decades they may include values that are thought to be biologically implausible.
A possible explanation is that the standard time-series models belong to simple
classes of models (e.g., (10.10) can be seen as belonging to models with polynomial
trends with once integrated, or I (10.1), errors) and the identification procedures used
are tilted in favor of simple models within those classes. This shows that although
judgment is certainly exercised in model choice, it can be exercised in a relatively
open manner that tends to produce models that are too simple rather than too
complex. When such models are estimated from the data, part of the lack of fit is
due to modeling error. Therefore, the estimated models can actually incorporate
some aspects of modeling error.
Modeling error can sometimes be handled probabilistically by considering alter-
native models within a larger class of models, and by weighting the results according
to the credibility of the alternatives (e.g., Draper 1995). Alho and Spencer (1985)
discuss some minimax type alternatives in a demographic context. A simpler
approach is to use models that are not optimized to provide the best possible fit
obtainable. In that case the residual error may capture some of the modeling error,
as well.
10.5 On Judgment and Subjectivity in Statistical Modeling
“One cannot be slightly pregnant”. In analogy, it is sometimes inferred from this
dictum that if judgment is exercised in some part of a forecasting exercise, then all
probabilistic aspects of the forecast are necessarily judgmental in nature. In addition,
since judgment always involves subjective elements, then the probabilities are also
purely subjective. I believe these analogies are misleading in that they fail to
appreciate the many layers of probabilities one must consider.
First, the assumption of binomial or Poisson type randomness is the basis of
grouped mortality analyses, and as such implicitly shared by essentially all demog-
raphers. It takes some talent to see how such randomness could be viewed as
subjective.
Second, although models of random rates are not currently used in descriptive
demography, they are implicit in all analyses of trends in mortality. Such analyses
use smooth models for trends, and deviations from trends are viewed as random. The
validity of alternative models can be tested against empirical data and subjective
preferences have relatively little role.
On the other hand, models used in forecasting are different in that they are
thought to hold in the future, as well as in the past. Yet, they can only be tested
against the past. However, even here, there are different grades. In short term
forecasting (say, 1–5 years ahead), we have plenty of empirical data on the
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performance of the competing models in forecasting. Hence, there is an empirical
and fairly formal basis for the choice of models. In medium term forecasting (say,
10–20 years ahead), empirical data are much more scant, and alternative data sets
produce conflicting results of forecast performance. Judgment becomes an important
ingredient in forecasting. In long-term forecasting (say, 30+ years ahead), the
probabilities calculated based on any statistical model begin to be dominated by
the possibility of modeling error and beliefs concerning new factors whose influence
has not manifested itself in the past data. Judgment, and subjective elements that
cannot be empirically checked, get an important role. Note that the binomial/Poisson
variability, and the annual variability of the rates, still exist, but they have become
dominated by other uncertainties.
In short, instead of viewing probabilities in forecasting as a black and white
subjective/objective dichotomy suggested by the “pregnancy dictum”, we have a
gradation of shades of gray.
10.6 On the Interpretation of Probabilities
A remaining issue is how one might interpret the probabilities of various types.
Philosophically, the problem has been much studied (e.g., Kyburg 1970). It is well-
known that the so-called frequency interpretation of probabilities is not a logically
sound basis for defining the concept of probability. (For example, laws of large
numbers presume the existence of the concept of probability for their statement and
proof.) However, it does provide a useful interpretation that serves as a basis of the
empirical validation of statistical models we have discussed from binomial/Poisson
variation to short and even medium term forecasting. For long term forecasting it is
less useful, since we are not interested in what might happen if the history were to be
repeated probabilistically again and again. We only experience one sample path.
It is equally well-known that there is a logically coherent theory of subjective
probabilities that underlies much of the Bayesian approach to statistics. This theory
is rather more subtle than is often appreciated. As discussed by Savage (1954), for
example, the theory is prescriptive in the sense that a completely rational actor would
behave according to its rules. Since mere mortals are rarely, if ever, completely
rational, the representation of actual beliefs in terms of subjective probabilities is a
non-trivial task.
For example, actual humans rarely contemplate all possible events that might
logically occur. If a person is asked about three events, he might first say that A is
three times as likely as B, and B is five times as likely as C; but later say that A is ten
times as likely as C. Of course, when confronted with the intransitivity of the
answers, he could correct them in any number of ways, but it is not clear that the
likelihood of any given event would, after adjustment, be more trustworthy than
before.
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Actual humans are also much less precise as “computing machines” than the
idealized rational actors. Suppose, for example, that a person P says that his
uncertainty about the life expectancy in Sweden in the year 2050 can be represented
by a normal distribution N(100, 82). One can then imagine the following dialogue
with a questioner Q:
Q: So you think the probability that life expectancy exceeds 110 years is over
10%?
P: I don’t know if I think that. If you say so.
Q: Why can’t you say for sure?
P: Because I can’t recall the 0.9 quantile of the standard normal distribution
right now.
(Upon learning that it is 1.2816, and calculating 100 + 1.2816*8 ¼ 110.25 P then
agrees.)
Both difficulties suggest that any “subjective” probability statements need to be
understood in an idealized sense. To be taken seriously, a person can hardly claim
that he or she “feels” that some probabilities apply. Instead, careful argumentation is
needed, if one were to want to persuade others to share the same probabilistic
characterization (Why a mean of 100 years? Why a standard deviation of 8 years?
Why a normal distributional form?).
10.7 Eliciting Expert Views on Uncertainty
Particular problems in the elicitation of probabilistic statements from “experts” are
caused by the very fact that an expert is a person who should know how things are.
First, representing one’s uncertainty truthfully may be tantamount to saying that
one does not really know, if what he or she is saying is accurate. A client paying
consulting fees may then deduce that the person is not really an expert! Thus, there is
an incentive for the expert to downplay his or her uncertainty.
Second, experts typically share a common information basis, so presenting views
that run counter to what other experts say, may label the expert as an eccentric,
whose views cannot be trusted. This leads to expert flocking: an expert does not want
to present a view that is far from what his or her colleagues say. An example (pointed
out by Nico Keilman) is Henshels (1982, p. 71) assessment of the U.S. population
forecasts of the 1930s and 1940s. The forecasts came too high because according to
Henshel the experts talked too much to each other. Therefore, a consideration of the
range of expert opinions may not give a reasonable estimate of the uncertainty of
expert judgment.
Economic forecasting provides continuing evidence of both phenomena. First,
one only has to think of stock market analysts making erroneous predictions with
great confidence on prime time TV, week after week. Second, one can think of think-
tanks making forecasts of the GDP. Often (as in the case of Finland in 2001), all tend
to err on the same side.
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Of course, an expert can also learn to exaggerate uncertainty, should it become
professionally acceptable. However, although exaggeration is less serious than the
underestimation of uncertainty, it is not harmless either, since it may discredit more
reasonable views.
A third, and much more practical problem in the elicitation of probabilities from
experts stems from the issues discussed in Sect. 10.7. It is difficult, even for a trained
person, to express one’s views with the mathematical precision that is needed. One
approach that is commonly used is to translate probabilities into betting language.
(These concepts are commonly used in the Anglo-Saxon world, but less so in the
Nordic countries, for example.) If a player thinks that the probability is at least p that
a certain event A happens, then it would be rational to accept a p: (1p) bet that A
happens. (I.e., if A does not happen, the player must pay p, but if it does happen, he
or she will receive 1p. If the player thinks the true probability of A occurring is
ρ  p, then the expected outcome of the game is ρ(1–p) – (1–ρ)p ¼ ρ – p  0.)
This approach has two problems, when applied in the elicitation of probabilities
from experts. First, it is sometimes difficult to convince the experts to take the notion
of a gamble seriously when they know that the “game” does not really take place.
Even if the experts are given actual money with which to gamble, the amount may
have an effect on the outcome. The second problem, in its standard form, the
gambling argument assumes that the players are risk neutral. This may only be
approximately true if the sums involved are small. If the sums are large, people tend
to be more risk adverse (Arrow 1971). Moreover, experimental evidence suggests
(e.g., Kahneman et al. 1982) that people frequently violate the principle of maxi-
mizing expected utility.
The betting approach has been used in Finland to elicit expert views on migration
(Alho 1998). In an effort to anchor the elicitation on something empirical, a
preliminary time series model was estimated, and the experts were asked about the
probability content of the model based prediction intervals for future migration.
Experts had previously emphasized the essential unpredictability of migration, but
seeing the intervals they felt that future migration is not as uncertain as indicated.
The intervals were then narrowed down using the betting argument. In this case the
use of an empirical bench mark may have lead to a higher level of uncertainty than
would otherwise have been obtained.
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Chapter 11
An Expert Knowledge Approach
to Stochastic Mortality Forecasting
in the Netherlands
Maarten Alders and Joop de Beer
11.1 Introduction
The Dutch population forecasts published by Statistics Netherlands every other year
project the future size and age structure of the population of the Netherlands up to
2050. The forecasts are based on assumptions about future changes in fertility,
mortality, and international migration. Obviously, the validity of assumptions on
changes in the long run is uncertain, even if the assumptions are expected to describe
the expected future according to the forecasters. It is important that users of forecasts
are aware of the degree of uncertainty. In order to give accurate information about
the degree of uncertainty of population forecasts Statistics Netherlands produces
stochastic population forecasts. Instead of publishing two alternative deterministic
(low and high) variants in addition to the medium variant, as was the practice up to a
few years ago, forecast intervals are made. These intervals are calculated by means
of Monte Carlo simulations. The simulations are based on assumptions about the
probability distributions of future fertility, mortality, and international migration.
In the Dutch population forecasts the assumptions on the expected future changes
in mortality primarily relate to life expectancy at birth. In the most recent Dutch
forecasts assumptions underlying the medium variant1 are based on a quantitative
model projecting life expectancy at birth of men and women for the period
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1The description ‘medium variant’ originates from the former practice when several deterministic
variants were published. Since no variants are published anymore it does not seem appropriate to
speak of a medium variant anymore. However, abandoning this terminology would make users
think that the medium variant is different from the expected value. For this reason we will still use
‘medium variant’ while we mean the expected value.
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2001–2050. The model describes the trend of life expectancy in the period
1900–2000 taking into account the effect of changes in smoking behaviour, the
effect of the rectangularization of the survival curve and the effect of some other
factors on changes in life expectancy at birth. Since the model is deterministic, it
cannot be used directly for making stochastic forecasts. For that reason, the assump-
tions underlying the stochastic forecasts are based on expert judgement, taking into
account the factors described by the model.
This paper examines how assumptions on the uncertainty of future changes in
mortality in the long run can be specified. More precisely, it discusses the use of
expert knowledge for the specification of the uncertainty of future mortality.
Section 11.2 briefly describes the methodology underlying the Dutch stochastic
population forecasts. Section 11.3 provides a general discussion on the use of expert
knowledge in (stochastic) mortality forecasting. Section 11.4 applies the use of
expert knowledge to the Dutch stochastic mortality forecasts. The paper ends with
the main conclusions.
11.2 Stochastic Population Forecasts: Methodology
Population forecasts are based on assumptions about future changes in fertility,
mortality, and migration. In the Dutch population forecasts assumptions on fertility
refer to age-specific rates distinguished by parity, mortality assumptions refer to age-
and sex-specific mortality rates, assumptions about immigration refer to absolute
numbers, distinguished by age, sex and country of birth, and assumptions on
emigration are based on a distinction of emigration rates by age, sex and country
of birth.
Based on statistical models of fertility, mortality, and migration, statistical fore-
cast intervals of population size and age structure can be derived, either analytically
or by means of simulations. In order to obtain a forecast interval for the age structure
of a population analytically a stochastic cohort-component model is needed. Appli-
cation of such models, however, is very complicated. Analytical solutions require a
large number of simplifying assumptions. Examples of applications of such models
are given by Cohen (1986) and Alho and Spencer (1985). In both papers assump-
tions are specified of which the empirical basis is questionable.
Instead of an analytical solution, forecast intervals can be derived from simula-
tions. On the basis of an assessment of the probability of the bandwidth of future
values of fertility, mortality, and migration, the probability distribution of the future
population size and age structure can be calculated by means of Monte Carlo
simulations. For each year in the forecast period values of the total fertility rate,
life expectancy at birth of men and women, numbers of immigrants and emigration
rates are drawn from the probability distributions. Subsequently age-gender-specific
fertility, mortality and emigration rates, and immigration numbers are specified.
Each draw results in a population by age and gender at the end of each year. Thus
the simulations provide a distribution of the population by age and gender in each
forecast year.
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To perform the simulations several assumptions have to be made. First, the type
of probability distribution has to be specified. Subsequently, assumptions about the
parameter values have to be made. The assumption about the mean or median value
can be derived from the medium variant. Next, assumptions about the value of the
standard deviation have to be assessed. In the case of asymmetric probability
distributions additional parameters have to be specified. Finally, assumptions
about the covariances between the forecast errors across age, between the forecast
years, and between the components have to be specified (see e.g., Lee 1998).
The main assumptions underlying the probability distribution of the future
population relate to the variance of the distributions of future fertility, mortality,
and migration. The values of the variance can be assessed in three ways:
(a) an analysis of errors of past forecasts may provide an indication of the size of the
variance of the errors of new forecasts;
(b) estimates of the variance can be based on a statistical (time-series) model;
(c) on the basis of expert judgement values of the variance can be chosen.
These methods do not exclude each other; rather they may complement each
other. For example, even if the estimate of the variance is based on past errors or on a
time-series model judgement plays an important role. However, in publications the
role of judgement is not always made explicit.
11.2.1 An Analysis of Errors of Past Forecasts
The probability of a forecast interval can be assessed on the basis of a comparison
with the errors of forecasts published in the past. On the assumption that the errors
are approximately normally distributed – or can be modelled by some other distri-
bution – and that the future distribution of the errors is the same as the past
distribution, these errors can be used to calculate the probability of forecast intervals
of new forecasts. Keilman (1990) examines the errors of forecasts of fertility,
mortality, and migration of Dutch population forecasts published between 1950
and 1980. He finds considerable differences between the errors of the three compo-
nents. For example, errors in life expectancy grow considerably more slowly than
errors in the total fertility rate. Furthermore, he examines to what extent errors vary
between periods and whether errors of recent forecasts are smaller than those of older
forecasts, taking into account the effect of differences in the length of the forecast
period.
The question whether forecast accuracy has been increasing is important for
assessing to what extent errors of past forecasts give an indication of the degree of
uncertainty of new forecasts. One problem in comparing old and new forecasts is
that some periods are easier to forecast than others. Moreover, a method that
performs well in a specific period may lead to poor results in another period. Thus
one should be careful in drawing general conclusions on the size of forecast errors on
the basis of errors in a given period. For example, since life expectancy at birth of
11 An Expert Knowledge Approach to Stochastic Mortality Forecasting in. . . 125
men in the Netherlands has been increasing linearly since the early 1970s, a simple
projection based on a random walk model with drift would have produced rather
accurate forecasts. Figure 11.1 shows that a forecast that would have been made in
1980 on the basis of a random walk model in which the intercept is estimated by the
average change in the preceding 10 years would have been very accurate for the
period 1980–2000. However, this does not necessarily imply that forecasts of life
expectancy are very certain in the long run. If the same method would have been
used for a forecast starting in 1975 the forecast would have been rather poor
(Fig. 11.1). Thus simply comparing the forecast errors of successive forecasts does
not tell us whether recent forecasts are ‘really’ better than preceding forecasts.
The fact that a forecast of life expectancy of men made in 1980 is more accurate
than a forecast made in 1975 does not imply that recent forecasts are more accurate
than older forecasts. This is illustrated by Fig. 11.2 which shows projections of
life expectancy of women. Projections of the life expectancy at birth of women based
on a random walk model starting in 1980 are less accurate than projections starting
in 1975.
In order to be able to assess whether new forecasts are ‘really’ better than older
ones, we need to know the reasons why the forecaster chose a specific method for a
certain forecast period. This information enables us to conclude whether a certain
forecast was accurate, because the forecaster chose the right method for the right
period, or whether the forecaster was just more lucky in one period than in another.
Thus, in order to assess whether errors of past forecasts provide useful informa-
tion about the uncertainty of new forecasts, it is important not only to measure the
size of the errors but also to take into account the explanation of the errors. One main
explanation of the poor development of life expectancy of men in the 1960s is the
increase in smoking in previous decades, whereas the increase in life expectancy in
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Fig. 11.1 Life expectancy at birth, men, projections of random walk (RW) with drift
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started to smoke some decades later than men, the development of life expectancy of
women was affected negatively not until the 1980s. This explains why a linear
extrapolation of the trend in life expectancy of women starting in 1980 leads to
overestimating the increase in the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand a linear
extrapolation of the trend in life expectancy of men starting in 1975 leads to
underestimating the increase in subsequent years.
The question to what extent an analysis of past errors provides useful information
about the degree of uncertainty of new forecasts depends on the question how likely
it is that similar developments will occur again. The 1970- based forecasts were
rather poor because forecasters did not recognize that the negative development was
temporary (Fig. 11.3). If it is assumed that it is very unlikely that such developments
will occur again, one may conclude that errors of new forecasts are likely to be
smaller than the errors of the 1970- based forecasts. For that reason, the degree of
uncertainty of new forecasts can be based on errors of forecasts that were made after
1970.
The decision which past forecasts to include is a matter of judgement. Thus,
judgement plays a role in using errors of past forecasts for assessing the uncertainty
of new forecasts. Obviously one may argue that an ‘objective’ method would be to
include all forecasts made in the past. However, this implies that the results depend
on the number of forecasts that were made in different periods. Since more forecasts
were made after 1985 than in earlier periods, the errors of more recent forecasts
weigh more heavily in calculating the average size of errors. On the other hand, for
long-run forecasts one major problem in using errors of past forecasts for assessing
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Fig. 11.2 Life expectancy at birth, women, projections of random walk (RW) with drift
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be biased towards the older ones, as for recent forecasts the accuracy cannot yet be
checked except for the short run (Lutz et al. 1996a). Forecast errors for the very long
run result from forecasts made a long time ago. Figure 11.3 shows that the 30 and
25 years ahead forecasts made in 1970 and 1975 respectively are rather poor, so
including these forecasts in assessing the uncertainty of new forecasts may lead to
overestimating the uncertainty in the long run. Figure 11.3 suggests that the forecasts
made in the 1980s and 1990s may well lead to smaller errors in the long run than the
forecasts made in the 1970s, since the former forecasts are closeer to the observa-
tions up to now than the latter forecasts were at the same forecast interval.
One way of assessing forecast errors in the long run is to extrapolate forecast
errors by means of a time-series model (De Beer 1997). The size of forecast errors
for the long run can be projected on the basis of forecast errors of recent forecasts for
the short and medium run. Thus, estimates of ex ante forecast errors can be based on
an extrapolation of ex post errors.
Rather than calculating errors in forecasts that were actually published, empirical
forecast errors can be assessed by means of calculating the forecast errors of simple
baseline projections. Alho (1998) notes that the point forecasts of the official Finnish
population forecasts are similar to projections of simple baseline projections, such as
assuming a constant rate of change of age-specific mortality rates. If these baseline
projections are applied to past observations, forecast errors can be calculated. The
relationship between these forecast errors and the length of the forecast period can be
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Fig. 11.3 Life expectancy at birth, men, observations and historic forecasts
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11.2.2 Model-Based Estimate of Forecast Errors
Instead of assuming that future forecast errors will be similar to errors of past
forecasts, one may attempt to estimate the size of future forecast errors on the
basis of the assumptions underlying the methods used in making new forecasts. If
the forecasts are based on an extrapolation of observed trends, ex ante forecast
uncertainty can be assessed on the basis of the time-series model used for producing
the extrapolations. If the forecasts are based on a stochastic time-series model, the
model produces not only the point forecast, but also the probability distribution. For
example, ARIMA (Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average)-models are stochas-
tic univariate time-series models that can be used for calculating the probability
distribution of a forecast (Box and Jenkins 1970). Alternatively, a structural time-
series model can be used for this purpose (Harvey 1989). The latter model is based
on a Bayesian approach: the probability distribution may change as new observa-
tions become available. The Kalman filter is used for updating the estimates of the
parameters.
One problem in using stochastic models for assessing the probability of a forecast
is that the probability depends on the assumption that the model is correct. Obvi-
ously, the validity of this assumption is uncertain, particularly in the long run. If the
point forecast of the time-series model does not correspond with the medium variant,
the forecaster does apparently not regard the time-series model as correct. Moreover,
time-series forecasting models were developed for short horizons, and they are not
generally suitable for long run forecasts (Lee 1998). Usually, stochastic time-series
models are identified on the basis of autocorrelations for short time intervals only.
Alternatively, the form of the time-series model can be based on judgement to
constraint the long-run behaviour of the point forecasts such that they are in line
with the medium variant of the official forecast (Tuljapurkar 1996). However, one
should be careful in using such a model for calculating the variance of ex ante
forecast errors, because of the uncertainty of the validity of the constraint imposed on
the model. In assessing the degree of uncertainty of the projections of the model one
should take into account the uncertainty of the constraint, which is based on
judgement.
11.2.3 Expert Judgement
In assessing the probability of forecast intervals on the basis of either an analysis of
errors of past forecasts or an estimate of the size of model-based errors, it is assumed
that the future will be like the past. Instead, the probability of forecasts can be
assessed on the basis of experts’ opinions about the possibility of events that have
not yet occurred. For example, the uncertainty of long-term forecasts of mortality
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depends on the probability of technological breakthroughs that may have a substan-
tial impact on survival rates. Even though these developments may not be assumed
to occur in the expected variant, an assessment of the probability of such events is
needed to determine the uncertainty of the forecast. More generally, an assessment of
ex ante uncertainty requires assumptions about the probability that the future will be
different from the past. If a forecast is based on an extrapolation of past trends, the
assessment of the probability of structural changes which may cause a reversal of
trends cannot be derived directly from an analysis of historical data and therefore
requires judgement of the forecaster. With regard to mortality the assessment of the
probability of unprecedented events like medical breakthroughs cannot be derived
directly from models. Lutz et al. (1996b) assess the probability of forecasts on the
basis of opinions of a group of experts. The experts are asked to indicate the upper
and lower boundaries of 90% forecast intervals for the total fertility rate, life
expectancy, and net migration up to the year 2030. Subjective probability distribu-
tions of a number of experts are combined in order to diminish the danger of
individual bias.
In the Dutch population forecasts the assessment of the degree of uncertainty of
mortality forecasts is primarily based on expert judgement, taking into account errors
of past forecasts and model-based estimates of the forecast errors.
11.3 Using Expert Knowledge
Expert knowledge or judgement usually plays a significant role in population
forecasting. The choice of the model explaining or describing past developments
cannot be made on purely objective, e.g., statistical criteria. Moreover, the applica-
tion of a model requires assumptions about the way parameters and explanatory
variables may change. Thus, forecasts of the future cannot be derived unambigu-
ously from observations of the past. Judgement plays a decisive role in both the
choice of the method and the way it is applied. “There can never be a population
projection without personal judgement. Even models largely based on past time-
series are subject to a serious judgemental issue of whether to assume structural
continuity or any alternative structure” (Lutz et al. 1996a).
Forecasts of mortality can be based on extrapolation of trends in mortality
indicators or on an explanatory approach. In both cases forecasters have to make a
number of choices. In projecting future changes in mortality on the basis of an
extrapolation of trends, one important question is which indicator is to be projected.
If age- and gender-specific mortality rates are projected one may choose to assume
the same change for each age (ignoring changes in the age pattern of mortality) or
one may project each age-specific rate separately (which may result in a rather
irregular age pattern). Instead of projecting separate age-specific mortality rates
one may project a limited number of parameters of a function describing the age
pattern of mortality, e.g., the Gompertz curve or the Heligman-Pollard model. One
disadvantage of the Heligman-Pollard model is that it includes many parameters that
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cannot be projected separately. This makes the projection process complex. On the
other hand, the disadvantage of using a simple model with few parameters is that
such models usually do not describe the complete age pattern accurately. Another
possible forecasting procedure is based on a distinction of age, period and cohort
effects. If cohort effects can be estimated accurately, such models may be appropri-
ate for making forecasts for the long run. However, one main problem in using an
APC model is that the distinction between cohort effects and the interaction of period
and age effects for young cohorts is difficult. Finally the indicator most widely used
in mortality forecasting is life expectancy at various ages, especially life expectancy
at birth. Using life expectancy at birth additional assumptions have to be made about
changes in the age pattern of mortality rates.
In addition to the choice of the indicator to be projected, other choices have to be
made. One main question is which observation period should be the basis for the
projections. An extrapolation of changes observed in the last 20 or 30 years may
result in quite different projections than an extrapolation of changes in the last 50 or
more years. Another important question is the choice of the extrapolation procedure:
linear or non-linear. This question is difficult to be answered on empirical grounds:
different mathematical functions may describe observed developments about equally
well, but may lead to quite different projections in the long run. In summary,
judgement plays an important role in extrapolations of mortality.
Instead of an extrapolation of trends forecasts of mortality may be based on an
explanatory approach. In making population forecasts usually a qualitative approach
is followed. On the basis of an overview of the main determinants of mortality (e.g.,
changes in living conditions, life style, health care, safety measures, etc.) and of
assumptions about both the impact of these determinants on the development of
mortality and future changes in the determinants, it is concluded in which direction
mortality may change. Clearly, if no quantitative model is specified, the assumptions
about the future change in mortality are largely based on judgement. However, even
if a quantitative model would be available, judgement would still play an important
role, since assumptions would have to be made about the future development in
explanatory variables.
In most developed countries life expectancy has been rising during a long period.
Therefore, in assessing the uncertainty of forecasts of mortality the main question
does not seem to be whether life expectancy will increase or decrease, but rather how
strongly life expectancy will increase and how long the increase will continue.
Basically, three types of change may be assumed. Firstly, one may assume a linear
increase in life expectancy (which is not the same as a linear decrease of age-specific
mortality rates) or a linear decline in the logarithm of the age-specific mortality rates.
Such a trend may be explained by gradual improvements due to technological
progress and increase in wealth. Secondly, one may assume that the rate of change
is declining. For example, one may assume that the increase in life expectancy at
birth will decline due to the fact that mortality rates for the youngest age groups are
already so low that further improvements will be relatively small. More generally,
the slowing down of the increase in life expectancy is related to the
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rectangularisation of the survival curve. Thirdly, it may be assumed that due to future
medical breakthroughs life expectancy may increase more strongly than at present.
The assumption about the type of trend is not only relevant for the specification of
the medium variant but also for assessing the degree of uncertainty of the forecasts.
Obviously, if one assumes that trends will continue and that the uncertainty only
concerns the question whether or not the rate of change will be constant or will
decline gradually, the uncertainty of the future value of life expectancy is much
smaller than if one assumes that life expectancy may change in new, unprecedented
directions due to medical breakthroughs.
As discussed above, one problem in determining the long-run trend in life
expectancy is the choice of the base period. If one fits a mathematical function to
the observed time series of life expectancy in a given period, the results may be quite
different than if a model is fitted to another period. Either the estimated values of the
parameters of the function may differ or even another function may be more
appropriate. One cause of the sensitivity of the fitted function to the choice of the
period is that part of the changes in life expectancy are temporary. For example, the
increase in smoking by men in the Netherlands starting before the Second World
War to a level of about 90% in the 1950s and the decline in the 1960s and 1970s to a
level of about 40% had a significant effect on the trend in life expectancy: it caused a
negative development in life expectancy in the 1960s and an upward trend in the
1980s and 1990s. It is estimated that smoking reduced life expectancy at birth around
1975 by some 4 years. If the percentage of smokers stabilizes at the present level, the
negative effect of smoking can be expected to decline to 2 years. This pattern of
change in mortality due to smoking is one explanation why the choice of the base
period for projecting mortality has a strong effect on the extrapolation. It makes a lot
of difference whether the starting year of the base period is chosen before the
negative effect of smoking on life expectancy became visible or around the time
that the negative effect reached its highest value. Another example of transitory
changes is the decline in mortality at young ages. In the first half of the twentieth
century the decline in mortality of newborn children was much stronger than at
present. As a consequence, life expectancy at birth increased more strongly than at
present. If these transitory changes are not taken into account in fitting a function to
the time series of life expectancy, the long-run projections may be biased as
temporary changes are erroneously projected in the long run.
In order to avoid these problems, Van Hoorn and De Beer (2001) developed a
model in which the development of life expectancy over a longer period,
1900–2000, is described by a long-term trend together with the assumed effects of
smoking, the rectangularization of the survival curve, the introduction of antibiotics
after the Second World War, the increase and subsequent decline in traffic accidents
in the 1970s and changes in the gender difference due to other causes than smoking.
The long-run trend is described by a negative exponential curve. Figure 11.4 shows
the assumed effects of selected determinants on the level of life expectancy. Fig-
ure 11.5 shows that the model fits the data very well (see the appendix for a more
extensive description of the model). Figure 11.5 also shows projections up to 2050.
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This model projects a smaller increase in life expectancy of men than, e.g., a linear
extrapolation of the changes in the last 25 years or so would have done.
Since the model is deterministic, it cannot be used directly for making stochastic
forecasts. The projections of the model are uncertain for at least two reasons. Firstly,
it is not sure that the model is specified correctly. Several assumptions were made
about effects on life expectancy which may be false. Secondly, in the future new
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Fig. 11.5 Life expectancy at birth: observations and model
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observations. For example, future medical breakthroughs may cause larger increases
in life expectancy than what we have seen so far. For this reason expert knowledge is
necessary to estimate the probability and the impact of future events that have not
occurred in the past.
11.4 Expert Knowledge in the Dutch Stochastic Mortality
Forecasts
For making stochastic forecasts of mortality it is assumed that the projections of the
model described in Sect. 11.3 correspond with the expected values of future life
expectancy. Assuming future life expectancy to be normally distributed, assump-
tions need to be made on the values of the standard deviations of future life
expectancy.
As mentioned in Sect. 11.2 both an analysis of previous forecasts and model-
based estimates of forecast variances can be combined with expert judgement. One
problem in using information on historic forecasts to assess the uncertainty of new
long-run forecasts is that there are hardly any data on forecast errors for the long run.
Alternatively, forecast errors for the long run can be projected on the basis of forecast
errors for the short and medium term. Time-series of historic forecast errors can be
modelled as a random walk model (without drift). On the basis of this model the
standard error of forecast errors 50 years ahead is estimated at 2 years. This implies
that the 95% forecast interval for the year 2050 equals 8 years. Alternatively, the
standard error of forecast errors can be projected on the basis of a time-series model
describing the development of life expectancy. The development of life expectancy
at birth for men and women in the Netherlands can be described by a random walk
model with drift (Lee and Tuljapurkar 1994, model mortality in the United States as
a random walk with drift too). The width of the 95% forecast interval produced by
this model for the year 2050 equals 12 years. Thus, on the basis of the time-series
models of life expectancy and models of forecast errors of life expectancy it can be
expected that the 95% forecast interval of life expectancy in 2050 will be around
8–12 years. The decision which interval is to be used is based on judgement.
Judgement ought to be based on an analysis of the processes underlying changes
in life expectancy. The judgemental assumptions underlying the Dutch forecasts are
based on four considerations.
(1) It is regarded highly likely that the difference in mortality between men and
women will continue to decrease. This difference has arisen in the past decades
largely because of differences in smoking habits. As smoking habits of men and
women have become more similar, the gender difference in life expectancy is
assumed to decrease in the forecasts.
(2) Changes in life expectancy at birth are the result of changes in mortality for
different age groups. In assessing the degree of uncertainty of forecasts of life
expectancy, it is important to make a distinction by age as the degree of
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uncertainty of future changes in mortality differs between age categories. The
effect of the uncertainty about the future development of mortality at young ages
on life expectancy at birth is only small, because of the current, very low levels
of mortality at young ages. On the basis of the current age specific mortality
rates, 95.3% of live born men and 96.6% of women would reach the age of 50.
Clearly, the upper limits are not far away. According to the medium variant of
the 2000 Dutch population forecasts the percentage of men surviving to age
50 will rise to 97.0% in 2050 and the percentage of women to 97.4%. A much
larger increase is not possible. A decrease does not seem very likely either. That
would, e.g., imply that infant mortality would increase, but there is no reason for
such an assumption. The increase in the population with a foreign background
could have a negative effect on mortality, since the infant mortality rates for this
population group are considerably higher than those for the native population.
However, it seems much more likely that infant mortality rates for the foreign
population will decline rather than that they would increase. Furthermore, the
effect on total mortality is limited. Another cause of negative developments at
young ages could be new, deadly diseases. The experience with AIDS, however,
has shown that the probability that such developments would have a significant
impact on total mortality in the Netherlands (in contrast with, e.g., African
countries) does not seem very large. A third possible cause of negative devel-
opments at young ages would be a strong increase in accidents or suicides.
However, there are no indications of such developments. Thus it can be con-
cluded that the effect of the uncertainty about mortality at young ages on the
uncertainty about the future development of life expectancy at birth is limited.
(3) As regards older age groups one main assumption underlying the Dutch mor-
tality forecasts is that the main cause of the increase in life expectancy at birth is
that more people will become old rather than old people becoming still older.
This implies the assumption that the survival curve will become more rectangu-
lar, an assumption based on an analysis of changes in age-specific mortality
rates. The development of mortality rates for the eldest age groups in the 1980s
and 1990s has been less favourable than for the middle ages. Another reason for
assuming ‘rectangularisation’ of the survival curve is that expectations about a
large increase in the maximum life span seem rather speculative, and even if they
would become true, it is questionable whether their effect would be large during
the next 50 years or so. A very strong progress of life expectancy can only be
reached if life styles would change drastically or if medical technology would
generate fundamental improvements (and health care would be available for
everyone). Assuming a tendency towards rectangularisation of the survival
curve implies that uncertainty about the future percentage of survivors around
the median age of dying is relatively high. If the percentage of survivors around
that age would be higher than in the medium variant (i.e., if the median age
would be higher), the decrease in the slope of the survival curve at the highest
ages age will be steeper than in the medium variant. Thus, the deviation from the
medium variant at the highest ages will be smaller than around the median age.
This implies that the degree of uncertainty associated with forecasts of life
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expectancy at birth mainly depends on changes in the median age of dying rather
than on changes in the maximum life span. According to the medium variant of
the 2000 population forecasts the percentage of survivors at age 85 in the year
2050 will be little under 50% for men and slightly over 50% for women. For that
reason the degree of uncertainty of the mortality forecast is based on the
assessment of a forecast interval at age 85.
(4) The last consideration concerns the important point of discussion whether
medical breakthroughs can lead to an unexpectedly strong increase of life
expectancy. Even in case of a significant improvement of medical technology,
it will be questionable to what extent this future improvement will lengthen the
life span of present generations. It should be kept in mind that the mortality
forecasts are made for the period up to 2050, and thus primarily concern persons
already born. Experts who think that a life expectancy at birth could reach a level
of 100 years or higher usually do not indicate when such a high level could be
reached. It seems very unlikely that this will be the case in the period
before 2050.
The four considerations discussed above are used to specify forecast intervals.
According to the medium variant assumptions on the age-specific mortality rates for
the year 2050, 41% of men will survive to age 85 (Fig. 11.6). According to the
present mortality rates, little more than 25% of men would reach age 85. Because it is
assumed to be unlikely that possible negative developments (e.g., a strong increase
in smoking or new diseases) will predominate positive effects of improvement in
technology and living conditions during a very long period of time, the lower limit of
the 95% forecast interval for the year 2050 is based on the assumption that it is very
unlikely that the percentage of survivors in 2050 will be significantly lower than the
current percentage. For the lower limit it is assumed that one out of five men will
survive to age 85. This would imply that the median age of death is 77.5 years. The
upper limit of the forecast interval is based on the assumption that it is very unlikely
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Fig. 11.6 Survivors at age 85; medium variant and 95% forecast interval
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would increase to 88 years. Currently, only 16% of men survive past the age of 88. A
higher median age at dying than 88 seems thus very unlikely.
As discussed above, the medium variant assumes that the gender difference will
become smaller. This implies that life expectancy of women will increase less
strongly than that of men. This is in line with the observed development since the
early 1980s. Consequently, the probability that future life expectancy of women will
be lower than the current level is higher than the corresponding probability for men.
The lower limit of the 95% forecast interval corresponds with a median age at dying
of 81 years, which equals the level reached in the early 1970s. This could become
true, e.g., if there would be a strong increase in mortality by lung cancer and
coronary heart diseases due to an increase in smoking. The upper limit of the forecast
interval is based on the assumption that three quarters of women will reach age 85.
This would imply that half of women would become older than 91 years. This is
considerably higher than the current percentage of 21. It does not seem very likely
that the median age would become still higher.
The intervals for the percentage of survivors at the age of 85 for the intermediate
years are assessed on the basis of the random walk model (Fig. 11.6).
On the basis of these upper and lower limits of the 95% forecast interval for
percentages of survivors at age 85, forecast intervals for percentages of survivors at
the other ages are assessed, based on the judgemental assumption that for the
youngest and eldest ages the intervals are relatively smaller than around the median
age (Fig. 11.7). The age pattern of changes in mortality rates in the upper and lower
limit are assumed to correspond with the age pattern in the medium variant.
The assumptions on the intervals of age-specific mortality rates are used to
calculate life expectancy at birth. These assumptions result in a 95% forecast interval
for life expectancy at birth in 2050 of almost 12 years. For men the interval ranges
from 73.7 to 85.4 years and for women from 76.7 to 88.5 years (Fig. 11.8). The
width of these intervals closely corresponds with that of the interval based on the
random walk with drift model of life expectancy at birth mentioned before.
The intervals for the Netherlands are slightly narrower than the intervals for
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Fig. 11.7 Survival curves; medium variant and 95% forecast interval
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the 90% interval equals 10 years in 2030. This is based on the assumption that the
lower and upper limits of the 90% interval of the annual increase in life expectancy at
birth equal 0 and 0.3 years respectively. This would imply that the width of the 90%
interval in 2050 equals about 15 years.
11.5 Conclusions
Long-term developments in mortality are very uncertain. To assess the degree of
uncertainty of future developments in mortality and other demographic events
several methods may be used: an analysis of errors of past forecasts, a statistical
(time-series) model and expert knowledge or judgement. These methods do not
exclude each other; rather they may complement each other. For example, even if the
assessment of the degree of uncertainty is based on past errors or on a time-series
model judgement plays an important role. However, in publications the role of
judgement is not always made explicit.
The most recent Dutch mortality forecasts are based on a model that forecasts life
expectancy at birth. Implementation of the model is based on literature and expert
knowledge. The model includes some important determinants of mortality, such as
the effect of smoking and gender differences. Since the model is deterministic, it
cannot be used for stochastic forecasting. Therefore, an expert knowledge approach
is followed. This approach can be described as ‘argument-based forecasting’. Basi-
cally, four quantitative assumptions are made: (1) the difference in mortality
between men and women will continue to decrease, (2) the effect of uncertainty
about mortality is limited at young ages and is highest around the median age of
dying, (3) the effect of medical breakthroughs on the life span will be limited up to
2050, and (4) more people will become old rather than old people will become still
older (rectangularisation of the survival curve). Based on these assumptions target
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Fig. 11.8 Life expectancy at birth; medium variant and 95% forecast interval
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width of the 95% interval of life expectancy at birth in 2050 is almost 12 years, both
for men and women. This interval closely resembles the interval based on a random
walk model with drift. It is about 4 years wider than the interval based on a time-
series model of errors of historic forecasts.
Appendix: An Explanatory Model for Dutch Mortality
There are several ways to explain mortality. One approach is to assume a dichotomy
of determinants of mortality – internal factors and external factors. For instance age,
sex and constitutional factors are internal, whereas living and working conditions as
well as socio-economic, cultural and environmental conditions are external. Other
factors, such as life styles and education are partly internal, partly external.
An alternative approach takes the life course as a leading principle for a causal
scheme. Determinants that act in early life are placed in the beginning of the causal
scheme, those that have an impact later in life are put at the end. In this way heredity
comes first and medical care comes last. Factors like life styles are in the middle. In
the following scheme this approach is elaborated, though some elements of the first
approach are used also. Eight categories of important determinants are distinguished:
A. Heredity (including gender)
B. Gained properties (education, social status)
C. Life styles (risk factors like smoking, relationships)
D. Environment (living and working conditions)
E. Health policy (prevention of accidents, promotion of healthy life styles)
F. Medical care (technological progress and accessibility of cure and care)
G. Period effects (wars, epidemics)
H. Rectangularity of survival curve
Interactions of gender with other factors should be taken in account in forecasting
mortality because a lot of differences between men and women exist. Categories A,
B, C and D reflect heterogeneity in mortality in the population, while groups E, F and
G reflect more general influences. As life expectancy is the dependent variable in the
explanatory model, a supplementary factor (H) is needed which is dependent on the
age profile of the survival curve. When the survival curve becomes more rectangular,
a constant increase in life expectancy can only be achieved through ever-larger
reductions of mortality rates.
Most of the eight categories listed above contain many determinants. Of course it
is not possible to trace and quantify all determinants. The selection of variables is
based on the following criteria:
1. there is evidence about the magnitude of the effect and about changes over time;
2. independence of effects; and
3. there is a good possibility to formulate assumptions for the future.
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In category C (life styles), smoking is a good example of a suitable explanatory
factor since there is considerable evidence about the prevalence of smoking in the
population and the effect on mortality. In category E the effect of safety measures on
death from traffic accidents is an example of an independent and relatively easy
factor to estimate. The same holds for category F for the introduction of antibiotics
which caused a sharp drop in mortality by pneumonia.
On the contrary, general medical progress is not a very suitable factor, because
there is much uncertainty and divergence of opinions about the impact on life
expectancy. The effect is hard to separate from that of social progress, growth of
prosperity, cohort-effects etc.
Part of the variation in mortality (life expectancy) can be modelled by separate
effects, the rest is included in the trend. It must be stressed that the model does not
quantify the effect of the determinants on causes of death (for instance smoking on
death rates of lung cancer and heart diseases), but directly links them with overall
mortality (life expectancy).
Six determinants that meet the three criteria were included in the model. Fig-
ure 11.4 in the paper shows the assumptions about the effect of these determinants on
life expectancy at birth in the observation period (1900–2000) and the forecast
period (2001–2050).
A. Heredity: gender difference. Part of the gender difference in mortality can be
attributed to differences in smoking behaviour (see C). Gender differences due to
other factors were not constant through the entire twentieth century. However,
since 1980 the difference seems to have stabilised. The change in the gender
difference in life expectancy in the twentieth century can be described by a log
normal curve.
B. Gained properties. There are strong differences in mortality between social
groups. However, these effects were not included in the model. One reason is
that there is a strong correlation with, e.g., life styles, living and working
conditions and access to medical care. Thus, the second criterion mentioned
above is violated.
C. Life style: smoking. On the basis of the literature the different effects for men and
women are estimated. The effects can be quantified with a combination of a
normal and a logistic curve. Smoking largely explains the quite different devel-
opments of life expectancy for men and women in the past decades. As smoking
habits of men and women become more similar, in the forecasts the gender
difference in life expectancy is assumed to decrease and finally become 3 years
(in favour of women).
D. Environment. These effects can be characterised as gradual long-term changes. It
is hard to distinguish these effects from a general long-term trend. Hence these
factors are not included in the model as separate effects but are included in the
trend.
140 M. Alders and J. de Beer
E. Health policy: traffic accidents. In the early 1970s measures were taken to
improve safety of traffic. As a result the number of deaths by traffic accidents
declined. This effect is modelled as a deviation of the trend. Around 1970 the
number of traffic accidents reached its highest level. A log normal curve appears
to be appropriate for describing changes through time.
F. Medical care: introduction of antibiotics. After the Second World War the
introduction of antibiotics caused a sharp decline of mortality by pneumonia.
A logistic function describes the rise in life expectancy and the flattening out to a
constant level.
G. Period effects: outliers. The Spanish flue and the Second World War caused
sharp negative deviations of life expectancy, which are modelled by dummies.
H. Rectangularity. The shape of the survival curve has an important impact on the
pace of the increase of life expectancy. If the survival curve in year t is more
rectangular than in year s, a given reduction in all age-specific death rates in both
years will result in a smaller increase in life expectancy in year t than in year s.
We define the rectangularity effect as the growth of life expectancy in year
t divided by the growth in the year 1895 caused by the same percentage of
decline of all age-specific mortality rates. A linear spline function is used to
smooth the results. The increase in life expectancy in 1995 appears to be only
40% of that in 1895.
The new model contains a lot of parameters and simultaneous estimation can be
problematic (unstable estimates). Therefore, the parameters were estimated in two
steps. In the first step values of parameters of the functions describing the effect of
smoking, traffic accidents, the introduction of antibiotics, and rectangularity were
chosen in such a way that the individual functions describe patterns that correspond
with available evidence. In the second step the values of the trend parameters and the
outliers were estimated on the basis of non-linear least squares and some values of
parameters fitted in the first step were ‘fine-tuned’.
Several functions were tested to fit the trend. A negative exponential curve
appears to fit the development since 1900 best (see Fig. 11.5 in the paper). This
function implies that there is a limit to life expectancy. However, according to the
fitted model this is not reached before 2100.
The model is:
e0,g, t ¼ Tt þ Sg, t þ Vt þ At þ Gg, t þ
X1919
j¼1917
u j,g, t þ
X1945
j¼1940
u j,g, t þ εg, t
Tt ¼ a0 þ HtRt
Ht ¼ a1ea2 tt1ð Þ
Rt ¼ 1 b1 t  t2ð Þ  b2 t  t3ð ÞD1, t
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D1, t ¼ 0 if t < t3 andD1, t ¼ 1 if  t3
Sg, t ¼ cg,1ecg,2 tt4ð Þ
2 þ cg,3
1þ cg,4ecg,5 tt5ð Þ
þ cg,6
1þ cg,7ecg,8 tt6ð Þ
þ cg,9
Vt ¼ d1ed2 ln t=t7ð Þ
2
At ¼ f 1
1þ f 2ef 3 tt8ð Þ
þ f 4




D2,g ¼ 1 if g ¼ female andD2,g ¼ 0 if g ¼ male
u j,g, t ¼ 1 if t ¼ j and u j,g, t ¼ 0 in other years,
where e0,g,t is life expectancy at birth for gender g in year t, T is trend, S is the effect
of smoking, V is the effect of traffic accidents, A is the introduction of antibiotics,
G is the unexplained gender difference, u are outliers, ε is error, H is slope of the
trend and R is the effect of the rectangularity of the survival curve.
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Chapter 12
Stochastic Forecasts of Mortality,
Population and Pension Systems
Shripad Tuljapurkar
12.1 Introduction
This paper discusses the construction of stochastic forecasts of human mortality and
fertility rates and their use in making stochastic forecasts of pension funds. The
method of mortality analysis was developed by Lee and Carter (1992), henceforth
called the LC method. Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994) combined the LC method with a
related fertility forecast to make stochastic population forecasts for the
US. Tuljapurkar and Lee (1999) and Lee and Tuljapurkar (2000) combined these
population forecasts with a number of other forecasts to generate stochastic forecasts
of the US Social Security system.
My goal is to explain the distinctive features, strengths, and shortcomings of the
stochastic method rather than to explain the method. I begin with a discussion of
stochastic forecasts and their differences from scenario forecasts. Then I discuss
mortality forecasts using Swedish mortality data, including a new forecast for
Sweden. I go on to consider briefly how population forecasts are made and their
use in modeling pension systems.
12.2 Stochastic Forecasts
A population forecast made in year T aims to predict population P(t) for later years,
where P includes numbers and composition. The information on which the forecast
is based includes the history of the population and of environmental factors (eco-
nomic, social, etc.). Every forecast maps history into a prediction. Scenario forecasts
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rely on a subjective mapping made by an expert, whereas stochastic forecasts
attempt to make an explicit model of the historical dynamics and project this
dynamic into the future. Stochastic forecasts may rely partly on a subjective mapping
as well. What are the pros and cons of the two approaches?
When historical data contain a strong “signal” that describes the dynamics of a
process, it is essential to use the signal as a predictive mechanism. Equally, it is
important to include information that is not contained in the signal – this residual
information is an important element of uncertainty that should be reflected in the
forecast. The LC method shows that there is such a signal in mortality history. When
there is no strong signal in the historical data, a subjective prediction may be
unavoidable. Fertility history tends to reveal relatively little predictive signal. Even
here, uncertainty ought to be included because history does tell us about uncertainty,
and we can estimate the variability around a subjective prediction.
The use of history to assess uncertainty certainly does make assumptions about
persistence in the dynamic processes that drive the variables we study. This does not
imply that we assume an absence of surprises or discontinuities in the future. Rather
it assumes that all shocks pass through a complex filter (social, economic, and so on)
into demographic behavior, and that future shocks will play out in the same
statistical fashion as past shocks. I would not abandon this assumption without
some demonstration that the filtering mechanisms have changed – witness for
example the stock market bubble in the US markets in 1999–2000 and its subsequent
decline. It may be useful to think about extreme scenarios that restructure aspects of
how the world works – one example is the possibility that genomics may change the
nature of both conception and mortality in fundamental ways – but I regard the
exploration of such scenarios as educational rather than predictive.
I argue strongly for the systematic prediction of uncertainty in the form of
probability distributions. This position does not argue against using subjective
analysis where unavoidable. One way of doing a sound subjectively based analysis
is to follow the work of Keilman (1997, 1998) and Alho and Spencer (1997) and use
a historical analysis of errors in past subjective forecasts to generate error distribu-
tions and project them. The practice of using “high-low” scenarios should be
avoided. Uncertainty accumulates, and must be assessed in that light. In my view,
the best that a scenario can do is suggest extreme values that may apply at a given
time point in the future – for example, demographers are often reluctant to believe
that total fertility rate (TFR) will wander far from 2 over any long interval, so the
scenario bounds are usually an acceptable window around 2, such as 1.5–2.2. Now
this may be plausible as a period interval in the future but in fact tells us nothing
useful about the dynamic consequences of TFR variation over the course of a
projection horizon.
Uncertainty, when projected in a probabilistic manner, provides essential infor-
mation that is as valuable as the central location of the forecast. To start with,
probabilities tell us how rapidly the precision of the forecast degrades as we go
out into the future. It can also be the case that our ability to predict different aspects
of population may differ, and probability intervals tell us about this directly.
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Probabilities also make it possible to use risk metrics to evaluate policy: these are
widely used in insurance, finance, and other applications, and surely deserve a bigger
place in population-related planning and analysis.
12.3 Mortality Forecasts
The LC method seeks a dominant temporal “signal” in historical mortality data in the
form of the simplest model that captures trend and variation in death rates, and seeks
it by a singular-value decomposition applied to the logarithms log m(x, t) of central
death rates. For each age x subtract the sample average a(x) of the logarithm, and
obtain the decomposition
logm x; tð Þ  a xð Þ ¼
X
i
si ui xð Þvi tð Þ:
On the right side above are the real singular values s1  s2 . . . 0. The ratio of s21
to the sum of squares of all singular values is the proportion of the total temporal
variance in the transformed death rates that is explained by just the first term in the
singular-value decomposition.
In all the industrialized countries that we have examined, the first singular value
explains well over 90% of the mortality variation. Therefore we have a dominant
temporal pattern, and we write
logm x; tð Þ ¼ a xð Þ þ b xð Þk tð Þ þ E x; tð Þ:
The single factor k(t) corresponds to the dominant first singular value and
captures most of the change in mortality. The far smaller variability from other
singular values is E(x, t).
The dominant time-factor k(t) displays interesting patterns. Tuljapurkar et al.
(2000) analyzed mortality data in this way for the G 7 countries over the period from
approximately 1955–1995. They found that the first singular value in the decompo-
sition explained over 93% of the variation, and that the estimated k(t) in all cases
showed a surprisingly steady linear decline in k(t). The mortality data for Sweden
from 1861 to 1999 constitute one of the longest accurate series, and a similar analysis
in this case reveals two regimes of change in k(t). The estimated k(t) for Sweden is
shown in Fig. 12.1. There is steady decline from 1861 to about 1910 and after 1920
there is again steady decline but at a much faster rate. Note that the approximately
linear long-term declines are accompanied by quite significant short-term fluctua-
tions. It is possible that we can interpret period-specific fluctuations in terms of
particular effects (e.g., changes in particular causes of death) but it is difficult to
project these forward. For example, the change in the pattern in the early 1900s is
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consistent with our views of the epidemiological transition, but we do not know if
the future will hold such a qualitative shift. Within the twentieth century we take the
approach of using the dominant linearity coupled with superimposed stochastic
variation.
Mortality decline at any particular age x is proportional to the signal k(t) but its
actual magnitude is scaled by the response profile value b(x). Figure 12.2 shows the
b(x) profiles computed for Swedish data using 50 year spans preceding the dates
1925, 1945, 1965, and 1985. Note that there is a definite time evolution, in which the
age schedules rotate (around an age in the range 40–50) and translate so that their
weight shifts to later ages as time goes by. This shifting corresponds to the known
sequence of historical mortality decline starting with declines initially at the youn-
gest ages and then in later ages over time. An intriguing possibility is that temporal
changes in the b(x) schedules may be described by a combination of a scaling and
translation – a sort of nonlinear mapping over time. An important matter for future
work is to explore the time evolution of the b(x), even though it appears (see below)
that one can make useful forecasts over reasonable time spans of several decades by
relying on a base span of several decades to estimate a relevant b(x).
What accounts for the regular long-term decline in mortality that is observed over
any period of a few decades? It is reasonable to assume that mortality decline in this
century has resulted from a sustained application of resources and knowledge to
public health and mortality reduction. Let us assume, as appears to be the case, that
societies allocate attention and resources to mortality reduction in proportion to
observed levels of mortality at different ages (e.g., immunization programs against
childhood disease, efforts to reduce cardiovascular disease at middle age). Such
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Fig. 12.1 Lee Carter k(t) Sweden 1861 to 1999
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not necessarily at a constant rate over time. Over time, the rate of proportional
decline depends on a balance between the level of resources focused on mortality
reduction, and their marginal effectiveness. Historically, the level of resources has
increased over time but their marginal effectiveness has decreased over time
(because, for example, we are confronted with ever more complex causes of
mortality that require substantial resources or new knowledge). The observation of
linearly declining k(t) – roughly constant long-run exponential rates of decline –
implies that increasing level and decreasing effectiveness have balanced each other
over long times. It is of course possible that the linear pattern of decline we report has
some other basis. For the future, we expect a continued increase in resources spent
on mortality reduction, and a growing complexity of causes of death. The balance
between these could certainly shift if there were departures from history – for
example, if new knowledge is discovered and translated into mortality reductions
at an unprecedented rate. But this century has witnessed an amazing series of
discoveries that have altered medicine and public health, and there is no compelling
reason why the future should be qualitatively different. Therefore, I expect a
continuation of the long-run historical pattern of mortality decline.
The LC method uses the long-term linear decline in k(t) to forecast mortality. A
naive forecast based on the long-run trend is not sensible because the short-term
variation will accumulate over time, so it is essential to employ a stochastic forecast.
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Fig. 12.2 b(x) Response factors Sweden
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procedure leads to forecasts for Sweden as shown in Fig. 12.3, for life expectancy at
birth, e00, and in Fig. 12.4 for life expectancy at age 65, e65. In both cases we use a
50-year span of historical data prior to a launch date of 1999. The intervals shown are
95% prediction intervals for each forecast year. Notice that there are separate fore-
casts for each sex, as well as a combined-sex forecast. The joint analysis of the two
sexes in an LC framework has not been fully resolved, although Li et al. (2004)
suggest one method for doing this.
Some previous comments on the LC method have asserted that it is simply
equivalent to a linear extrapolation in the log scale of the individual rates at each
age, but it is not. For one thing, the extrapolations would include elements of the E
(t) terms in each age, and these may be larger at some ages than at others. For
another, I take the stochastic variation seriously as an integral part of the forecast,
and the realized long run trend can be rather different depending on where in the
prediction interval one ends up. Without this variability, the forecasts would not be
terribly useful over long horizons.
To illustrate the robustness of the LC method, Lee and Miller (2001) have
analyzed the performance of the method using internal validation. A more extensive
analysis for Sweden echoes their finding that the method is surprisingly robust. To
illustrate, I use different base periods to forecast e0 in 1999. I first select a starting
base year, say 1875, and then a launch year which is chosen from the set 1935, 1945,
. . ., 1995; this gives a total of seven forecasts starting in 1875. We expect that a
forecast for 1999 using the 1875–1935 base period would be much less accurate than
a forecast which uses the 1875–1995 base period. The object of the exercise is to see
whether the projection intervals for e0 in 1999 will decrease in some systematic way
as we include more recent (relative to 1999) history and whether they speak to the
accuracy of the method. Figure 12.5 plots the projection intervals obtained in this
way, using each of three starting years (1875, 1900, or 1925) and the seven launch
years indicated above, so for each starting year we have an upper and lower
prediction “fan” for e0 in 1999. The figure shows that as we use more recent
histories, we close in on the true 1999 value of e0 of 79.4 years – the 95% prediction
interval brackets the true value most of the time which is impressive especially when
compared with the historical performance of scenario forecasts. From a practical
point of view, the prediction interval width is under 7 years for launch dates from
1960 to 1980 and any of the starting base years. This means that we may expect a
reasonable performance from LC forecasts for as far as 40 years into the future.
12.4 From Population to Pension Systems and Policy
For a population forecast we must supplement mortality forecasts with similar
forecasts for fertility and if necessary for immigration. These elements can then be
combined in the usual cohort-component procedure to generate stochastic popula-
tion forecasts. Fertility forecasts pose special challenges because there does not seem
to be a strong temporal pattern to fertility dynamics. Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994) use
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Fig. 12.3 e0 Stochastic forecast Sweden launch 1999





















Fig. 12.4 e65 Stochastic forecast Sweden, launch data 1999
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time series models for fertility to make stochastic forecasts for the US. Their simple
models have been considerably extended by Keilman and Pham (2004) who suggest
several ways of modeling and constraining the volatility of fertility forecasts.
How can stochastic forecasts be used in analyzing pension policy? At a purely
demographic level, it is well known that the old-age dependency ratio is the key
variable that underlies pension costs. As the old-age dependency ratio for a popu-
lation increases, the more retirees-per-worker there are in the population, which
implies greater stress on a pay-as-you-go pension system which relies on today’s
workers to pay the benefits of today’s retirees. An interesting insight into the
demographic impact of aging on the dependency ratio can be created by asking
the following question. Suppose that the age at which people retire is, e.g., 65. If this
“normal retirement age” age cutoff could be changed arbitrarily, how high would we
have to raise it in order to keep the dependency ratio constant? If we have a
population trajectory forecast, then we can simply compute in each year the retire-
ment age, say R(t), at which the old-age dependency ratio would be the same ratio as
in the launch year. When we have stochastic forecasts, there is, in each forecast year
t, a set of random values R(t); in our analysis we look for the integer value of R(t) that
comes closest to yielding the target dependency ratio. Figure 12.6 shows the results
of computing these stochastic R(t) for the US population. What is plotted is actually
three percentiles of the distribution of R(t) in each year, the median value, and the
upper and lower values in a 95% projection interval. The plots show some long steps
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Fig. 12.5 Forecasts that use data going back to 1875, 1900, 1925
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smooth line shows the average value of R(t) for each forecast year, which is
surprisingly close to the median. Observe, for example, that there is a 50% chance
that the “normal retirement age” would have to be raised to 74 by 2060 in order to
keep the dependency ratio constant at its 1997 value. There is only a 2½% chance
that the “normal retirement age” of 69 years would suffice. Given that current US
Social Security policy is only intended to raise the “normal retirement age” to
67 years, and that even the most draconian proposals would only raise it to
69 years, we conclude that changes in the “normal retirement age” are very unlikely
to hold the dependency ratio constant. Anderson et al. (2001) present similar results
for the G7 countries. In Tuljapurkar and Lee (1999) there are additional examples of
how stochastic forecasts can be combined with objective functions to analyze fiscal
questions.
To go beyond this type of analysis we need a full model of the structure of a
pension system which may be “fully funded” or “pay-as-you-go” or some mixture.
Many systems, in order to operate with a margin of security, are modified versions of
pay-as-you-go systems that include a reserve fund. In the United States the OASDI
(Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance, or Social Security) Trust Fund, the
holdings of the system are federal securities, and the “fund” consists of federally-
held debt. A fund balance earns interest, is subject to withdrawals in the form of
benefit payments, and receives deposits in the form of worker contributions (usually
in the form of tax payments). Lee and Tuljapurkar (2000) discuss such models for
the US Social Security system and also for other fiscal questions. The dynamics of
such models proceed by a straightforward accounting method. Starting with a launch




















Fig. 12.6 Normal retirement age to maintain US old-age dependency ratio, 1997-2072
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subsequent year, as well as interest earned. This procedure yields a trajectory of fund
balance over time. Future contributions depend both on how many workers contrib-
ute how much to the system. Future benefit payments depend on how many
beneficiaries receive how much in the future. Our population forecasts do not
directly yield a breakdown in terms of workers and retirees. Therefore, we estimate
and forecast per-capita averages by age and sex, for both contributions and benefits.
We combine these age and sex-specific “profiles” with age and sex-specific popu-
lation forecasts to obtain total inflows and outflows for each forecast year.
Contribution profiles evolve over time according to two factors. First, increases in
contributions depend in turn on increases in the real wage. We forecast real wage
increases stochastically (as described below), and contributions increase in propor-
tion to wages. Second, changes in the labor force participation rates also affect
contributions; we forecast labor force participation rates deterministically. Benefit
profiles evolve over time in response to several factors. In our model of the
U.S. Social Security system, we disaggregate benefits into disability benefits and
retirement benefits. Retirement benefit levels reflect past changes in real wages
because they depend on a worker’s lifetime wages. Also, legislated or proposed
changes in the Normal Retirement Age (the age at which beneficiaries become
eligible to collect 100% of their benefits) will reduce benefits at the old NRA.
Demographic variables are obviously not the only source of uncertainty facing
fiscal planners; there are sizable economic uncertainties as well. Taxes and future
benefits usually depend on wage increases (economic productivity) and funds can
accumulate interest or investment returns on tax surpluses. Our models combine
uncertainty in productivity and investment returns by converting productivity to real
1999 dollars, subtracting out increases in the CPI. We then model productivity rates
and investment returns stochastically.
There is substantial correlation between interest rates on government bonds and
returns to equities, so it is important to model these two variables jointly. For our
historical interest rate series we use the actual, effective real interest rate earned by
the trust fund, and for historical stock market returns we use the real returns on the
overall stock market as a proxy. These two series are modeled jointly as a vector
auto-regressive process.
Our stochastic model allows us to simulate many (1000 or more, usually)
trajectories of all variables and obtain time trajectories of the fund balance from
which we estimate probabilities and other statistical measures of the system’s
dynamics. This method may be used to explore the probability that particular policy
outcomes are achieved, for example, that the “fund” stays above a zero balance for a
specified period of years, or that the level of borrowing by the fund does not exceed
some specified threshold.
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Part III
The Linear Rise in Life Expectancy: History
and Prospects
Tommy Bengtsson
Jim Oeppen and James Vaupel’s study “Broken limits to life expectancy”, published
in Science in 2002, provided the background for this part. This study showed that
increases in life expectancy were initially due to reductions in death rates in the
younger ages, later followed by a decrease in rates for older persons. This develop-
ment was initially triggered by a decline in infectious diseases and at a later stage a
downward trend in chronic diseases. The resulting substantial improvements in life
expectancy led to what these authors identify as “best-practice populations.” The
authors show that the development of “best-practice populations” are best approx-
imated by a linear trend, estimated over the past 160 years. Females have continu-
ously gained almost 3 month per year, males slightly less. The amazing fact is not the
increase as such, since countries entering the mortality transition at a later point of
time will experience an even faster improvement in life expectancy than those that
preceded them, but the regularity with which the world record has been broken. This
leads at once to the questions: What are the causes of this linear increase and how
much longer can it proceed? These are the questions discussed in this part.
The chapter by Jim Oeppen and James Vaupel brings their 2002 article up to the
forefront once more, developing further the arguments put forward there and discuss
the implications of their findings for mortality forecasting. They argue that the
increase in life expectancy is not slowing down and that in the near future we should
expect average life expectancy to continue to increase at the same rate as before.
They also argue that countries lagging behind tend to catch up with the best-practice
populations. Thus, best-practice life expectancy should be used when making
national forecasts.
In the chapters by Ronald Lee and Juha M. Alho respectively, this standpoint is
partly called into question and, from different perspectives, they argue that individ-
ual countries are unable to stay at the best-practice line for long time periods. Instead,
T. Bengtsson
Centre for Economic Demography, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
e-mail: tommy.bengtsson@ekh.lu.se
the trends for leading countries tend to “bend down” as time passes. When making
forecasts, the issue is thus not only to capture the catch-up phase but also thereafter a
phase when improvements no longer keep pace with newly emerging best-practice
countries.
In his chapter, Jim Oeppen explores further the discussion of identifying the
processes that have led to the linear increase in life expectancy over the past
160 years. By employing a causal model acknowledging the significance of factors
such as per capital income and technical change for a large number of countries,
Oeppen analyses convergence in national trends in life expectancy. The final
chapter, by Tommy Bengtsson, is also devoted to the causes of the linear decline.
Bengtsson argues that there is a variety of factors changing over time that determine
trends in life expectancy, economic performance only being one of these and not
always the most important one. A circumstance that has to be taken into consider-
ation is that countries catching up and taking over the lead have had relatively small
elderly populations. This would also imply that the elderly in these populations have
gone through a process of selection. In addition, they may have access to more
modern care resources per capita than their counterparts in countries that have
experienced a slower mortality transition, albeit combined with a similar economic
development. Since this advantage is not permanent, it disappears and the advantage
of backwardness turns into a penalty for taking the lead.
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Chapter 13
The Linear Rise in the Number of Our Days
Jim Oeppen and James W. Vaupel
If life expectancy1 – also known as the expectation of life, is the mean life-span of a
cohort of newborns if current age-specific death rates remain unchanged – in
developed countries were close to an ultimate limit, then increases in record life
expectancy – the average length of life in the best-practice population – should slow
as the ceiling is asymptotically approached.
Best-practice national life expectancy has, contrary to what many believe2
(Olhansky et al. 2001; Riley 2001; Dublin 1928; Dublin and Lotka 1936; Olshansky
We are grateful to the many people who have provided comments and information, including Kenneth
Wachter and Yasuhik Saito. A version of this article that does not include some of the material
here but that includes some additional material was published by Oeppen and Vaupel in 2002.
1Most of the life-expectancy calculations in this article are based on data on death rates over age and
time in the Human Mortality Database, see http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/wilmoth/mortality.
Recent Japanese data can be found at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/index.html. Some
data for the period before 1950 are from Keyfitz and Flieger (1968) and other sources.
2For reviews, see Preston (1974); Keilman (1997). For a critical account of the low mortality
assumptions used by the U.S. Social Security Administration, see Lee (2000). A review of mortality
forecasting in 13 European Union countries in the early- and mid-1990s found that all assumed that
mortality improvements would decelerate and 10 constrained life expectancy to reach an ultimate
limit by a target date (Cruijsen and Eding 2001). In a report notorious for missing the baby boom,
Whelpton et al. (1947) focused their discussion on life-expectancy limits for U.S. native white
males. They concluded that for this population a life expectancy in the year 2000 of 72.1 years was
the upper limit of what could be achieved by the largest mortality “declines that seem reasonable”
and close to what could be attained at the “biological minimum of mortality”. In two publications
Frejka (1973, 1981) focus on population growth rather than life expectancy. In the first, Frejka
writes that “within broad limits mortality can be fairly well predicted.” He believes that life
expectancy will approach a limit and that 77.5 is the most likely limit. He notes, however, that
“mortality might even take a course absolutely different from what has been assumed.”
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et al. 1990; Bourgeois-Pichat 1952, 1978; Fries 1980, 1990; Siegel 1980; Demeny
1984; United Nations 1973, 1985, 1989, 1999, 2001; NIPSSR 1997), risen for
160 years at a steady pace of 3 months per year as shown in Fig. 13.1.
Before 1950 most of the gain in life expectancy was due to large reductions in
death rates at younger ages. The conventional view is that “future gains in life
expectancy cannot possibly match those of the past, because they were achieved
primarily by saving the lives of infants and children – something that happens only
once for a population” (Olshansky et al. 2001). The sustained improvement in best-
practice life expectancy belies this contention. In the second half of the twentieth
century improvements in survival after age 65 propelled the rise in the length of
people’s lives. For Japanese females, remaining life expectancy at age 65 grew from
13 years in 1950 to 22 years today, and the chance of surviving from 65 to 100 soared
from less than 1 in 1000 to 1 in 20.3
The linear climb of record life expectancy suggests that reductions in mortality
should not be seen as a disconnected sequence of unrepeatable revolutions but rather
as a regular stream of continuing progress. Mortality improvements result from the
intricate interplay of advances in income, salubrity, nutrition, education, sanitation,
and medicine, with the mix varying over age, period, cohort, place and disease
(Riley 2001). Reinforcing processes may help sustain the increase. For instance,
reductions in premature deaths reduce bereavement, an important risk factor for
mortality. The improvements also increase the number of people who survive to high
ages, leading to greater attention to health at those ages. Increasingly prosperous,
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Fig. 13.1 Best-practice national life expectancy over the last 160 years
3Recent Japanese data can be found at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/index.html
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health workers incessantly seize opportunities to push death back. The details are
complicated but the resultant – the straight line of life-expectancy increase – is
simple.
For the world as a whole life expectancy has more than doubled over the past two
centuries, from about 25 years to about 65 for men and 70 for women (Riley 2001).
This transformation of the duration of life has greatly enhanced the quantity and
quality of people’s lives. It has fueled enormous increases in economic output and in
population size, including an explosion in the number of the elderly (Fogel and
Costa 1997; Martin and Preston 1994).
13.1 Better Forecasts
Although students of mortality eventually recognized the reality of improvements in
survival, they blindly clung to the ancient notion that under favorable conditions the
typical human has a characteristic lifespan, the Biblical three score and ten. As the
expectation of life rose higher and higher, most experts were unable to imagine it
rising much further. They envisioned various biological barriers and practical
impediments. The notion of a fixed lifespan evolved into a belief in a looming
limit to life expectancy.
Continuing belief in imminent limits is distorting public and private decision-
making. Forecasts of the expectation of life are used to determine future pension,
health-care and other social needs. Increases in life expectancy of a few years can
produce large changes in the numbers of the old and very old, substantially
augmenting these needs. The officials responsible for making projections – at the
United Nations, the World Bank, and various national bureaus – recalcitrantly insist
that life expectancy will increase slowly and not much further. The official forecasts
distort people’s decisions about how much to save and when to retire. They give
politicians license to postpone painful adjustments to social-security and medical-
care systems (Vaupel 2000).
Officials charged with forecasting trends in life expectancy over future decades
should base their calculations on the empirical record of mortality improvements
over a corresponding or even longer span of the past4 (Lee and Carter 1992; Alho
1998; Tuljapurkar et al. 2000; Wilmoth 1998; Olshansky et al. 2001; Lee 2001).
Because best-practice life expectancy has increased linearly by two and a half years
per decade for a century and a half, one reasonable scenario would be that this trend
will continue in coming decades. If so, record life expectancy will reach 100 in about
six decades. This is far from immortality: modest annual increments in life
4Olshansky et al. (2001) use changes in age-specific probabilities of death over the decade from
1985 to 1995 to make long-term projections, one out to the year 2577. It is more appropriate to base
long-term projections on long-term historical data and to use changes in central death rates. See
Wilmoth (1998); Notestein et al. (1944); Lee (2001).
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expectancy will never lead to immortality. It is striking, however, that centenarians
may become commonplace within the lifetimes of people alive today.
In all countries except the record holder, female life expectancy will be shorter
than the best-practice level. Life expectancy could be estimated by forecasting the
gap. The U.S. disadvantage varied from a decade in 1900 to less than a year in 1950
and about 5 years in 2000. If the trend in record life expectancy continues and if the
U.S. disadvantage is between a year and a decade in 2070, then female life expec-
tancy would be between 92.5 and 101.5, considerably higher than the U.S. Social
Security Administration’s forecast of 83.9.
An alternative method for forecasting life expectancy is to compute the average
rapidity of improvement in age-specific death rates over many decades and then to
use this information to project death rates over coming decades5 (Lee and Carter
1992; Alho 1998; Tuljapurkar et al. 2000; Wilmoth 1998; Olshansky et al. 2001; Lee
2001). In the early 1940s, when he was a student at Princeton University, the
eminent demographer Ansley Coale developed and applied a version of this method
(Notestein et al. 1944). Today vastly superior data resources are available6 and
powerful, practicable methods have been developed to do more than Coale
attempted (see e.g. Lee and Carter 1992; Alho 1998; Tuljapurkar et al. 2000).
These methods use information about fluctuations in the speed of change in the
past to estimate confidence bounds for the uncertainty enveloping life expectancy in
the future. The official Japanese forecast, issued in 1997, for life expectancy (for
males and females combined) in the year 2050 is 82.95 years (NIPSSR 1997).
Projections based on the pattern of reductions in death rates in Japan since 1950
result in a life expectancy some 8 years longer, 90.91 years, with a 90% confidence
range from 87.64 to 94.18 years (Tuljapurkar et al. 2000).
Progress in reducing mortality might be systematically slower than in the past.
Officials could produce low life-expectancy scenarios to capture this eventuality.
Then, however, they should also publish high scenarios that recognize that biomed-
ical research may yield unprecedented increases in survival. Given the extraordinary
linearity of the increase in best-practice life expectancy and given the ludicrous
record of specious life-expectancy limits, the central forecast should be based on the
long-term trend of sustained progress in reducing mortality.
13.2 Continuing Belief in Looming Limits
Faith in proximate longevity limits endures, sustained by ex cathedra pronounce-
ments and mutual citations. In their quest to impose a cap on average longevity,
students of mortality ignored essential research questions. Major changes in life
expectancy hinge on improvements in survival at advanced ages, but comprehensive
5See footnote 4 above.
6See footnote 1 above.
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analysis of the remarkable reductions since the mid-twentieth century in death rates
after age 80 first flourished in the 1990s (Kannisto et al. 1994; Kannisto 1996;
Vaupel 1997; Wilmoth et al. 2000; Vaupel et al. 1998). Hypothesized biological
barriers to longer lifespans also first received systematic attention (and refutation) a
decade ago (Vaupel et al. 1998; Carey et al. 1992; Curtsinger et al. 1992; Wachter
and Finch 1997; Carey and Judge 2001). The impact of continuing mortality
improvements on life expectancy attracted empirical and theoretical attention in
the late 1980s, with refined methods developed over the past decade (Lee and Carter
1992; Alho 1998; Tuljapurkar et al. 2000; Vaupel 1986; Vaupel and Canudas Romo
2000). It now appears plausible that life expectancy in several post-industrial
countries may approach or exceed 90 by the middle of this century (Tuljapurkar
et al. 2000; Wilmoth 1998) and that half the girls born today in countries such as
France and Japan may become centenarians (Vaupel 1998, 1997).
If the expectation of life in developed countries were approaching an imminent
maximum, then the pace of improvement in mortality in the countries with the
highest life expectancies would be slower than the pace in countries with shorter
life expectancies. There is, however, no correlation between the level of life expec-
tancy and the pace of improvement (Kannisto et al. 1994; Wilmoth 1997). Indeed, in
the current life-expectancy leader, Japan, death rates are falling exceptionally rap-
idly. Furthermore, as life expectancy rose over the course of the twentieth century,
the pace of mortality improvement at older ages accelerated (Kannisto et al. 1994;
Kannisto 1996; Vaupel 1997, Wilmoth et al. 2000; Wilmoth 1997). Even after age
100, death rates are falling (Kannisto 1996; Vaupel 1997; Wilmoth et al. 2000).
Female life expectancy is higher than the male level in long-lived countries, but
female life expectancy is increasingly somewhat more rapidly (Kannisto et al. 1994;
Wilmoth 1997).
Olshansky et al. (2001) emphasize a theoretical barrier: “entropy in the life table
means that small but equal incremental gains in life expectancy require progressively
larger reductions in mortality. . . . Projections based on biodemographic principles
that recognize the underlying biology within the life table would lead to more
realistic forecasts of life expectancy that reflect the demographic reality of entropy
in the life table.” Entropy in the life table is merely the statistic
Z
s a; tð Þ ln s a; tð Þda=
Z
s a; tð Þda,
where s(a, t) is the probability of surviving from birth to age a at age-specific death
rates prevailing at time t. Contrary to Olshansky et al.’s claim, in countries with long
life expectancies a continuing rate of decline in age-specific death rates of N percent
per year will increase life expectancy at birth by about N years per decade (Vaupel
1986; Vaupel and Canudas Romo 2000). Note that steady rates of change in
mortality levels produce steady absolute increases in life expectancy: this relation-
ship may underlie the linear trend of record life expectancy. In any case, valid
biodemographic principles impose no insurmountable barriers to longer lives
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(Vaupel et al. 1998; Carey et al. 1992; Curtsinger et al. 1992; Wachter and Finch
1997; Carey and Judge 2001).
In sum, the past decade of mortality research has refuted the empirical mis-
conceptions and purported theories that underlie the belief that the expectation of
life cannot rise much further. In this article we have added a further line of cogent
evidence. If life expectancy were close to its maximum, then the increase in the
record expectation of life should be slowing. It is not. For 160 years, best-
performance life expectancy has steadily increased by a quarter of a year per year,
an extraordinary constancy of human achievement.
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Chapter 14




Two important articles on aggregate mortality trends were published in the spring of
2002, with important implications for our perspective on modeling, forecasting, and
interpreting mortality trends. One such article was Oeppen and Vaupel (2002,
henceforth OV), which shows a remarkable linear trend in the female life expectancy
(at birth, period basis) of the national population with the highest value for this
variable from 1840 to 2000. Of course the set of nations reporting credible life
expectancy values has greatly expanded over this period, but that is unlikely to have
mattered much for the results. Over this entire 160-year period, the record life
expectancy consistently increased by 0.24 years of life per calendar year of time,
or at the rate of 24 years per century. Extrapolation would lead us to expect a female
life expectancy of around 108 years at the end of the twenty-first century.
A closely related article by White (2002) finds a linear trend in sexes-combined
life expectancy for 21 industrial nations from 1955 to 1995, with an increase of
0.21 years of life per calendar year. White also finds that a linear trend in life
expectancy gives a better fit to the experience of almost all the individual countries
than does a linear trend in the age-standardized death rate, or the log of the age
standardized death rate. He also found that when a quadratic time trend was fitted to
the standardized rates, the coefficient on the squared term was significantly positive,
indicating that the rate of improvement has been accelerating.
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computations for this paper. Monique Verrier provided editorial assistance. I am grateful to
workshop participants for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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Both OV andWhite discuss the processes of catch-up and convergence. OV notes
that some countries converge toward the leader (e.g. Japan), some have moved away
from it (e.g. the US in recent decades), and some move more or less parallel to
it. White finds that nations experience more rapid e0 gains when they are farther
below the international average, and conversely, and therefore tend to converge
toward the average. The variance across countries has diminished markedly over the
forty years. However, there has been no tendency for the rate of increase of average
e0 to slow down. Based on the current position of the US, which is somewhat below
the average (just as OV shows that the US is below the record line), White predicts
that e0 will grow a bit more rapidly than the average rate of 0.21 years per year,
perhaps at 0.22 years per year. At this rate, the US would reach e0 ¼ 83.3 in 2030—
about 1.5 years above the Lee-Carter (1992) forecast, and about 3.8 years above the
Social Security Administration (2002) projection for that year. Extrapolation of the
linear trend in either OV orWhite generates more rapid gains in future longevity than
are foreseen by Lee-Carter (1992, henceforth LC), which projects increases of
0.144 years per year between now and 2030. This is only two-thirds as fast as
0.22 years per year in White, and 0.23 years per year in OV (averaging the female
and male rates for OV).
Two major points are made in both articles. First, life expectancy (record or
average) appears to have changed linearly over long periods of time. Second,
national mortality trends should be viewed in a larger international context rather
than being analyzed and projected individually. In this paper I will discuss both these
points, and conclude with suggestions for incorporating them in forecasting
methods. I will draw on the Human Mortality Database or HMD (at http://www.
mortality.org/), to fit various models.
Figure 14.1 plots the OV maximum life expectancy together with that of the
HMD and we see that they sometimes coincide, and sometimes the OV record
exceeds the HMD, which includes fewer countries.
14.2 Linear Change in Life Expectancy over Long
Historical Periods
Before reading the OV article, I had expected that the trajectory of record life
expectancy over the past two centuries would have a tilted S shape, in which life
expectancy began at first to increase slowly, then accelerated, and then decelerated in
the second half of the twentieth century. If we go back far enough in time, we know
that life expectancy had no systematic trend at all, although there might have been
long fluctuations. We also can be pretty sure that initial gains in life expectancy, once
the trend began, were slow. Based on the OV results, it appears that these portions of
the history occurred out of our sight, before the start date of 1840. Indeed, Fig. 5 in
the OV Supplementary Materials on the Science Web site plots English life expec-
tancy over a longer period, and its trajectory conforms to this description.
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OV do not actually test or explore the constancy of the slope for record life
expectancy, so it is worth examining this point more carefully here. As a start, we
can compute the average rates of life expectancy increase for the OV data by sex and
sub-period, as follows:
Average Annual Rates of Decline of Record e0 By Subperiod
Females Males Average
1840–1900 0.24 0.24 0.24
1900–1950 0.27 0.26 0.27
1950–2000 0.23 0.15 0.19
Fig. 14.1 Record life expectancy, by sex, from Oeppen-Vaupel and the Human Mortality Data-
base, 1840 to 2000
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From this we see that the regularity of the linear decline is not quite as strong as it
appears from the striking figure in OV. For males in particular, there has been a
noticeable deceleration over the past 50 years. For both sexes, there is a hint of the S
shaped path that I had expected to see.
I have taken two more simple steps. First, I fitted a cubic polynomial to the data,
and found that all three terms were significantly different than zero. The fitted curve,
as shown in Fig. 14.2 for females, does have a slight S-shape. To see more clearly the
implied rate of change, I plot the first derivative of the polynomial for females in
Fig. 14.3. This suggests that the rate of change in fact increased substantially, more
than doubling from 1840 to 1925 or so, and then substantially declining again
thereafter, challenging the linear interpretation of the OV plot. Second, I calculated
a 25-year moving average of the annual pace of increase for females, and this also is
plotted in Fig. 14.3.
This less severe smoothing of the rate of change cautions us against drawing any
firm conclusions from the data about linearity or nonlinearity. A case could be made
for either.
If we accept that the OV trajectory is strikingly close to linear, then we are led to
ponder why the record life expectancy might have risen in this way. After consid-
erable thought, I find I have little useful to contribute on this important question. I
find I am equally unable to explain the relative constancy of age-specific propor-
tional rates of mortality decline, as summarized by the trend in the Lee-Carter (1992)
k for the US since 1900, and the G7 countries since 1950 (Tuljapurkar et al. 2000).
Of the two striking regularities, linear life expectancy trends and constant rate of
decline of age-specific mortality, it is the linearity of life expectancy increase which I
find most puzzling. In my mind, the risks of death (that is, the force of mortality or
death rates, by age) are the fundamental aspect of mortality which we should model
and interpret. One view, perhaps an incorrect view, is that period life expectancy is
just a very particular and highly nonlinear summary measure, with little or no causal
significance. If age-specific death rates (ASDRs) decline at constant exponential
rates, then life expectancy will rise at a declining rate, at least for a long time.
This point is worth elaborating because OV, in the Supplementary Materials on
the Science Web site, say: “Note that steady rates of change in mortality levels
produce steady, absolute increases in life expectancy: This relationship may
underlie the linear trend of record life expectancy.” I agree that ultimately, it is
likely that life expectancy would rise linearly, once death rates below the ages
which obey Gompertz’s Law have fallen to near zero, as Vaupel (1986) has pointed
out. If θ is the Gompertz parameter (rate of increase of mortality with age in a
period life table or cohort life table) and ρ is the annual rate of decline over time in
mortality at all ages above, say, 50, then the rate of increase of e50 will be ρ/θ years
per year (Vaupel 1986). However, there is substantial mortality at younger ages
before Gompertz’s Law applies, particularly in the nineteenth century. There we
would expect a “steady” rate of decline in death rates to lead to a declining rate of
increase in life expectancy.
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These points are illustrated in Fig. 14.4, based on Swedish mortality experience.
The average exponential rate of decline is calculated for each age-specific death rate
for the period 1861 to 1961. This rate of decline is then applied to the initial
age-specific death rates, and used to simulate them forward for 200 years. The
resulting life expectancy is plotted in Fig. 14.3 along with the actual life expectancy.
It can be seen that the simulated life expectancy trajectory is highly nonlinear, and its
pace of improvement decelerates.
Fig. 14.2 Linear and cubic trends fitted to the Oeppen-Vaupel record female life expectancy,
1840–2000
Fig. 14.3 Rate of change in female life expectancy calculated from linear and cubic fits to Oeppen-
Vaupel record and 25-year moving average of change in record
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As time passes, the gains in life expectancy become more nearly linear, and for
the last 50 years, are quite close to linear. By construction, the lines cross in 1961.
Figure 14.4 shows that the constant exponential rates of decline in age-specific death
rates could not account for the linearity of the increase in record e0 since 1840.
When we look at the trajectories of the logs of the Swedish ASDRs from 1861 to
2000, they appear very far from linear, even if we restrict attention to the last
50 years, see Fig. 14.5 for selected rates. Most rates decline rapidly in some periods,
and slowly in others, with patterns varying across the age span. One would not think
to characterize these patterns as showing a constant rate of decline at each age. Yet
this is a period over which the Lee-Carter model does a good job of fitting life
expectancy, and projecting it within sample (Lee and Miller 2001). Evidently, the
Lee-Carter method succeeds by picking out average tendencies from among a welter
of variation, not by describing strong real-world regularities.
14.3 What Is Fundamental, Age at Death or Risk of Death?
The OV and White findings challenge the view that risks of death are fundamental,
and age at death is derivative. If life expectancy (e0) changes linearly, then rate of
decline of death rates must be nonlinear, and in particular must be accelerating for at
least some ages, as found by White for many of the 21 countries he analyzed. How
can we reconcile the linearity of the change in e0 with the fact that when LC models
are fit, they have almost always revealed linear changes in k over rather long periods,
such as a century in the US? To focus on the US case, there are two explanations.
First, as the second figure in OV makes clear, over the twentieth century the US first
Fig. 14.4 Actual and simulated Swedish female life expectancy assuming constant proportional
rates of decline for age-specific death rates, at average rates for 1861–1961
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approached the record line, then briefly was close to being the leader, and finally fell
away from the line starting in the 1960s. (This falling away very likely reflects the
relatively early uptake of smoking in the US.) Since the trajectory of US e0 in fact
had the shape we would expect with a constant rate of decline in ASDRs, perhaps
there is no puzzle to explain for the US case. But can the same story hold for all the
G7 countries analyzed and projected by Tuljapurkar et al. (2000)? This brings us to
































Fig. 14.5 Log of selected age-specific death rates for Swedish females, 1861–2000, showing
irregular rates of decline
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the second explanation, which is that contrary to the LC assumptions, the rates of
decline have not been constant for each age, which is to say that the LC bx
coefficients have not been constant over the sample period. Instead, they have
changed shape between the first half of the century, when the mortality decline
was much more rapid for the young than for the old, and the second half, when there
is little difference among the rates of decline above age 20 or so. Just when the
ASDRs of the young became so low that their further decline could contribute little
to increasing e0, the rates of decline at the older ages began to accelerate, as noted by
Horiuchi and Wilmoth (1998). This tilting of the bx schedule has meant that a given
rate of decline of k can produce more rapid rates of increase in e0 than would have
been the case with the old bx schedule. The tilting of the bx schedule is shown for the
US in Fig. 14.6, and for Sweden, France, Canada, and Japan in Fig. 14.7. In each
case the annual rate of decline for mortality is plotted by age for the first and second
halves of the twentieth century, except for Japan, for which the break point is 1975.
14.4 Using These Findings to Improve Mortality Forecasts
The first question is whether or not we should expect record e0 to continue to
increase at this rate in the future, and if so for how long? Since I do not understand
why this linearity has occurred in the past, I have no reason to think it should, or
Fig. 14.6 Average annual reductions in age-specific death rates, US (sexes combined), showing
the changing age pattern of decline
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should not, continue in the future. The regularity in the past invites the forecaster to
assume it will continue in the future, at least for a while. Suppose then that we do
assume it will continue. How can we use that assumption to mold our forecasts? This
line of thinking leads us unavoidably to consider national mortality change in an
international context, to which we now turn.
14.5 Considering National Mortality Change
in an International Context
Let E(t) be the best-practice life expectancy at time t. It is imperfectly estimated by
the OV record series. The White average e0 measure reflects a different concept. Let
ei(t) be actual life expectancy at birth for country i in year t. I will consider a number
of possible kinds of models describing the relation between changes in ei(t) and E(t).
I will write the equations in continuous time, but they are readily rewritten for
discrete annual changes for purposes of estimation.
First Category of Models: All Countries Are Structurally Similar, But Start at
Different Levels
dei tð Þ=dt ¼ ϕþ α E tð Þ  ei tð Þð Þ þ εi tð Þ ð14:1Þ
Fig. 14.7 Average annual reductions in age-specific death rates, selected low mortality countries
(sexes combined), showing the changing age pattern of decline
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Here, life expectancy tends to increase at some constant rate ϕ, and in addition it
tends to move a proportion α toward the best practice level (record level) E(t) each
year. It is also subject to a disturbance ε which could move it toward or away from this
trajectory. This specification is consistent with the equation estimated by White. In
estimation, I allow the εi(t) for each country tobeautocorrelated (εi (t)¼ ρεi(t ‐1) + ηi (t))
with all countries sharing the same autocorrelation coefficient ρ.
I fit this and later models to life expectancy series for 18 countries with relatively
low mortality, with data drawn from the Human Mortality Database (HMD) at http://
www.mortality.org/. The data series are of varying historical depth, with the shortest
covering 29 years and the longest 159 years. Models are fit using an unbalanced
design, so that the full range of data could be exploited. However, the estimation
range is sometimes restricted to the period since 1900.
Table 14.1a reports estimates of α for females and for males, based on model
specifications with and without autocorrelated errors, and using the OV record.
In all cases α is highly significantly different than 0, with values lying between
0.06 and 0.08, indicating a tendency for the life expectancy of the countries to
converge towards the leader country. The half-life of a deviation from the record
level is around 10 years (e10*.07 ¼ 0.5). Here and throughout, results are very
similar if the equation is estimated with no constant, so that the only source of life
expectancy increase is catching up with the leader, or if there is no allowance for
autocorrelated errors. Note that the R2 is low at around 0.04, and that the estimated
autocorrelation is negative, which is somewhat surprising. Table 14.1b is the same,
except that it uses the HMD record life expectancy in place of OV. The results are
also very similar, but with a slightly slower rate of convergence and lower R2.
Rather than taking the actual record e0 from OV or HMD as an estimate of the
target trajectory toward which life expectancy in all countries is tending, we can
instead estimate the implicit unobserved target as part of fitting the model, as in the
following equation:
Table 14.1a Estimated rate of convergence of national life expectancy to Oeppen-Vaupel record

























Observations 1332 1155 1332 1155
Number of countries 18 18 18 18
Rho 0.109 0.126 0.064 0.076
R-squared 0.037 0.045 0.043 0.045
Estimates are based on panel corrected SE using Prais-Winstein regression (assuming first-order
autocorrelation. SE of the coefficients are in brackets
**Significant at 1%
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dei tð Þ=dt ¼ ϕþ γtDt  αei tð Þ þ εi tð Þ ð14:2Þ
Here Dt is a period dummy for year t (else 0) and γt is its coefficient. γt/α gives the
target trajectory, playing a role much like the OV record level. Results are reported in
Table 14.2 (with estimates of γ not shown, to save space). Because the target is
chosen to maximize its explanatory power, the R2 is now much greater, while rates
of convergence, α, are somewhat slower.
Figure 14.8 plots the estimated values of γt/α, corresponding to the implicit target
trajectory. For comparison the record life expectancy for the HMD is also plotted.
We see that the target trajectory lies above the maximum about half the time and also
that the target trajectory is highly erratic, possibly with negative autocorrelation.
Table 14.1b Estimated rate of convergence of national life expectancy to the highest level in the

























Observations 1332 1155 1332 1155
Number of countries 18 18 18 18
Rho 0.136 0.153 0.092 0.101
R-squared 0.020 0.017 0.030 0.029
Estimates are based on panel corrected SE using Prais-Winstein regression (assuming first-order
autocorrrelation). SE of the coefficients are in brackets
*Significant at 5%; **Significant at 1%
Table 14.2 Estimated rate of convergence of national life expectancy to an annual implicit target in

























Observations 1332 1155 1332 1155
Number of countries 18 18 18 18
Rho 0.131 0.171 0.053 0.045
R-squared 0.607 0.678 0.500 0.511
Estimates are based on panel corrected SE using Prais-Winstein regression (assuming first-order
autocorrrelation). SE of the coefficients are in brackets
**Significant at 10%
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When life expectancy is generally above trend, as might happen in a year with a
mild winter affecting many countries, for example, the regression will try to fit this
by estimating a very high target value, and conversely. This will lead to an under-
estimate of the size of the convergence coefficient, α. To avoid these problems, it is
desirable to impose a smoothness constraint of some kind on the target trajectory.
Here I will take the simplest route, assuming that the target trajectory is a linear
function of time, leading to the following equation:
dei tð Þ=dt ¼ ϕþ α

aþ bt  ei tð Þ þ εi tð Þ ð14:3Þ
Fig. 14.8 Estimated implicit target of convergence (Eq. 14.2) in the 18 countries of the Human
Mortality Database (erratic line), compared to the HMD record life expectancy (smooth line)
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The results are shown in Table 14.3. The estimated rate of convergence, α, is now
slightly higher than in the first set of estimates. The rate of increase of the linear
target trajectory is found by dividing the coefficient on “year” by the estimate of α,
that is the coefficient on –ei,0, which is also given in the table. The rate of increase in
the target calculated in this way is slightly higher than for the record for OV or the
HMD. For example, the gain per year in target e0 estimated here for the whole period
is 0.271 years per year, while in OV it is 0.243 years per year. Other comparisons are
similar.
It is possible that countries that are twice as far from E(t) may not converge twice
as quickly. To allow for this, we can add a term that is quadratic in the size of the gap
(the quantity in parentheses in Eq. 14.2). A negative coefficient on the quadratic term
would indicate that the pace of increase in e0 is less than proportionate to the size of
the gap, and a positive coefficient that it is more than proportionate.
dei tð Þ=dt ¼ ϕþ α

E tð Þ  ei tð Þ þ β E tð Þ  ei tð Þð Þ2 þ εi tð Þ ð14:4Þ
The results of estimating this specification are given in Table 14.4a and 14.4b,
and are unambiguous: In every case, the coefficient on the quadratic, β, is highly
significantly greater than zero, and the coefficient on the linear term is negative. In
order to interpret these coefficients, I show in Fig. 14.9 the derivative of the change
in ei(t) with respect to the size of the gap, E(t) – ei(t).
Under the linear specification used earlier, this plot would be a straight line with
height α. Here, however, we see that all the lines slope decisively upward to the
right, indicating that the rate of convergence increases more than proportionately
with the size of the gap. The initial negative values most likely reflect the
limitations of the quadratic specification, rather than a true tendency of the rate
Table 14.3 Estimated rate of convergence of national life expectancy to a linear implicit target in

































Calculated: Year/α 0.271307 0.220137 0.235838 0.198817
Observations 1332 1155 1332 1155
Number of countries 18 18 18 18
Rho 0.071 0.118 0.037 0.055
R-squared 0.042 0.045 0.052 0.055
Estimates are based on panel corrected SE using Prais-Winstein regression (assuming first-order
autocorrrelation). SE of the coefficients are in brackets
**Significant at 10%
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of change to decline as the gap increases in this low range. Most of the gaps, 90 to
95% of them, are less than 8 years. Only a few fall outside that range, and are
subject to the higher sensitivities to the right on the plot. In future work it should be
possible to examine the nonlinearity of the response better, drawing on data for
Third World countries with higher mortality, but these have not yet been added to
the HMD.
Table 14.4a Estimated quadratic rate of convergence of national life expectancy to Oeppen-

































Observations 1332 1155 1332 1155
Number of countries 18 18 18 18
Rho 0.118 0.153 0.099 0.114
R-squared 0.047 0.068 0.074 0.080
Estimates are based on panel corrected SE using Prais-Winstein regression (assuming first-order
autocorrrelation). SE of the coefficients are in brackets
*Significant at 5%; **Significant at 10%
Table 14.4b Estimated quadratic rate of convergence of national life expectancy to HMD record

































Observations 1332 1155 1332 1155
Number of countries 18 18 18 18
Rho 0.148 0.174 0.110 0.110
R-squared 0.036 0.038 0.065 0.072
Estimates are based on panel corrected SE using Prais-Winstein regression (assuming first-order
autocorrrelation). SE of the coefficients are in brackets




If the foregoing models were the whole story, we would expect the life expectancies
of countries to be distributed randomly around E(t), since their mortality would have
had decades or centuries in which to converge to E(t) under the influences described
in the equations. But of course, this is not the case. A more realistic model would
take into account the heterogeneity of international experience, by incorporating
additional factors that influence the level toward which each country’s e0 converges,
which may not be the best practice level. I will call this modified target the
idiosyncratic target. We can take it to equal E(t) + πX(t), where X is a vector of
relevant factors and π is a vector of coefficients. X includes relevant variables such as
per capita income, educational attainment, nutritional measures, dietary measures,
smoking behavior, and geographic/climatic conditions. πX expresses a deviation
from the best practice level. Over time, E(t) rises. If X remained constant, the target
level would nonetheless increase with E(t). More likely, πX also increases, indicat-
ing an additional source of increase in the target level of e0. πX could capture
influences like those included in Preston’s (1980) analysis, in which he fit socioeco-
nomic models to international cross-sections of life expectancy, and then
decomposed gains in life expectancy into movements along the πX curve with
economic development, and upward shifts in the whole equation, which would
here be reflected in the combination of convergence and a common growth rate, ϕ.
The ε shocks could reflect political, military, weather, or epidemiological factors of a
transitory nature. This model would be:
Fig. 14.9 Derivative of quadratic convergence to the Oeppen-Vaupel target: how the proportional
effect of a gap increases with the size of the gap
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dei tð Þ=dt ¼ ϕþ α E tð Þ þ πXi, t  ei tð Þð Þ þ εi tð Þ ð14:5Þ
Once again, it would be possible to estimate E(t) as part of fitting the model, either
unconstrained or constrained to have a linear trajectory. If estimated in this way it
will reflect changes in the target net of socioeconomic progress, a concept closer to
Preston’s residual improvement of life expectancy. Country i will have a target or
equilibrium life expectancy in year t of E(t) + πXi, t so heterogeneity in equilibria is
now incorporated. Countries that are poor, smoke, eat a high cholesterol diet, have
low education, or perhaps have a tropical climate, will tend towards lower levels of
life expectancy.
14.6.2 Heterogeneous Rates of Convergence
It is also possible that different countries will have different rates of convergence, α.
For isolated countries, or perhaps for very poor ones, or ones with very little
transportation or communication infrastructure, α may be smaller.
We can take this into account by making α a function of a set of variables Z.
dei tð Þ=dt ¼ ϕþ αþ δZi, tð Þ E tð Þ þ πXi, t  ei tð Þð Þ þ εi tð Þ ð14:6Þ
Z would include factors indicating the degree of integration of country i in the
global community, and perhaps other factors bearing on the strength of government
and the communications and transportation infrastructure in the country. It might be
difficult to identify factors that belonged in Z rather than in X.
14.7 Forecasting Mortality
Let us assume that the linear trend in record or average life expectancy will continue.
Then the next steps are straightforward. We use the linear trend to project the record
life expectancy (or the target trend that was estimated as part of the convergence
model). We will know the current life expectancy for a particular country of interest.
We can use the appropriate or preferred equation for det/dt to estimate e0 one year
later, and then continue recursively. The projected e0 will gradually approach the
projected linear trend.
This procedure could be improved by using a model version which allowed for
some heterogeneity, as in Eqs. (14.5) and (14.6). Not all countries will approach the
same trend line, but each should approach a trajectory that is parallel to it. In these
specifications, we would also have to consider the advisability of projecting changes
in the X and Z variables, and methods for doing so.
The assumption of a pure linear trend could also be questioned, dropping the
initial assumption. The central tendency (record, average, or other) could be modeled
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as a stochastic time series, and forecasted in that way. That could certainly be done
for the γ series, for example.
In general, the approach of forecasting mortality for individual countries in
reference to the international context is very appealing, and I believe it is the natural
way to go in future work. Whether this approach is applied to life expectancy itself,
or to a Lee-Carter type k, or in some other way, will have to be settled by further
research. In the meantime, these recent papers, and particularly OV, challenge our
current perceptions of mortality change and expectations about future trends.
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Chapter 15
Forecasting Life Expectancy: A Statistical
Look at Model Choice and Use of Auxiliary
Series
Juha M. Alho
15.1 Why Forecast Life Expectancy?
Let μ (x,t) be the hazard (or force) of mortality in age x at time t. Define p(x,t) as the
probability of surviving to age x, under the hazards of time t, or
p x; tð Þ ¼ exp 
Zx
0





Then, the expectation of the remaining life time in age x  0, equals
ex tð Þ ¼
Z1
0
p xþ y; tð Þdy=p x; tð Þ:
These are synthetic period measures, i.e., they are intended to summarize the
chances of survival at time t. Life expectancy at birth, e0(t), is the most frequently
used summary measure. Despite their popularity life expectancies are not directly
used in cohort-component population forecasting. Instead, proportions of type
p xþ 1ð Þ=p xð Þ ¼ exp Λx tð Þð Þ,
where Λx(t) is the increment of the cumulative hazard in age [x, x + 1), are used for
proportions of survivors from exact age x to exact age x + 1. Similarly, in the
computation of present values of annuities, for example, a cohort perspective is
J. M. Alho (*)
University of Joensuu, Joensuu, Finland
e-mail: juha.alho@helsinki.fi
© The Author(s) 2019
T. Bengtsson, N. Keilman (eds.), Old and New Perspectives on Mortality
Forecasting, Demographic Research Monographs,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05075-7_15
185
necessary. In that case, the more relevant concept is the remaining life time of a
person alive at exact age x  0, at time t, which equals











Since mortality has typically declined, we expect that ex(t)  cx(t). We note that
even if life expectancies ex(t) have considerable descriptive value, they are of limited
direct usefulness in population forecasting.
Taken together the values of ex(t) do determine the hazards μ(x,t) for a given t, but
if only e0(t) is known, then infinitely many patterns μ(x,t)‘s would produce the same
value e0(t). In special cases, such as a proportional hazards model (μ(x,t) ¼ μ(x)g
(t) with μ(x) known) or a log-bilinear model of the Lee-Carter type (μ(x,t)¼ a(x) + b
(x)g(t) with a(x) and b(x) known), a one-to-one correspondence exists (e.g., Alho
1989). In these cases forecasting e0(t) leads directly to estimates of age-specific
mortality, but the assumption of known multipliers is strong. Given that the multi-
pliers may change over time, it is not clear that this would, in practice, lead to a more
accurate forecast of mortality hazards than forecasting the latter directly.
On the other hand, e0(t) might perform as an “auxiliary measure” if it behaves in a
more time-invariant manner (e.g., Törnqvist 1949) than the age-specific series
themselves. The recent finding of Oeppen and Vaupel (2002), in which the
so-called best-practice life expectancy, i.e., the life expectancy of the country that
is the highest at any given time, was shown to have evolved almost linearly for
160 years, points to this possibility. The first purpose of this paper is to establish the
empirical relationship of the best-practice life expectancy to country-specific life
expectancies in selected industrialized countries, during the latter part of the 1900’s.
Simple regression techniques will be used. The second purpose is to examine the
statistical underpinnings of using best practice life expectancy as an auxiliary series
for the prediction of the country-specific life expectancies.
15.2 Changes in Life Expectancy in 19 Industrialized
Countries in 1950–2000
Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) show that the best practice life expectancy for females
has followed remarkably well (R2 ¼ 0.99) the model:
~e0 tð Þ ¼ 45þ t  1840ð Þ=4,
for t  1840. Could this “invariant” be used as an auxiliary series to improve
accuracy?
To examine this question empirically we have collected data on female life
expectancies for 14 European countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand,
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and the United States, for the periods 1950–55, 1955–1960,. . ., 1995–2000 (United
Nations 2000). For ease of exposition, we denote the 5 year periods as t ¼ 1953,
1958,. . ., 1998. Denoting life expectancy at birth in country i ¼ 1, 2,. . ., 19 by e0,i
(t) we define the variables of interest as:
early life expectancy LE53 ið Þ ¼ e0, i 1953ð Þ;
later life expectancy LE78 ið Þ ¼ e0, i 1978ð Þ;
deviance Dev ið Þ ¼ ~e0 tð Þ  e0, i tð Þ,
early annual improvement Early ið Þ ¼ e0, i 1978ð Þ  e0, i 1953ð Þð Þ=25,
later annual improvement Later ið Þ ¼ e0, i 1998ð Þ  e0, i 1978ð Þð Þ=20:
Figure 15.1 shows the life expectancies of the 19 countries together with the best
practice line. Two facts stand out. First, Japan has behaved in a radically different
manner from the rest of the countries. A formal test using Mahalanobis’ distance
(e.g., Afifi and Azen 1979, 282) also suggests that Japan is an outlier with a P-value
<0.001. Second, all other countries appear to gradually veer off below the line. It is
this set of 18 countries that we will be primarily concerned with in this paper.
To quantify the latter effect the following descriptive statistics were calculated for
the 18 countries (Japan omitted):
Variable N Mean Median StDev
Dev53 18 1.956 1.550 1.942















Fig. 15.1 Life expectancies in 19 countries (Japan with a circle), and the best practice life
expectancy (solid)
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Thus, the 18 countries that were an average of 2 years behind the best country in
the early 1950’s (the best country being a member of the set of 18!), have fallen
2 years further behind in approximately 45 years. We also see that the spread among
the 18 countries has decreased by a half.
For reference later, we note that had one forecasted life expectancy 45 years
ahead in the first part of the 1950’s, by assuming that life expectancy will increase at
the same rate as best practice life expectancy, then the average error in the 18 coun-
tries would have been 2 years.
Figure 15.2, which includes Japan, illustrates how different Japan is. However, it
also reveals other interesting changes. For example, Denmark that was just under the
best-practice line in the early 1950’s has fallen a full 6 years behind. The neighboring
countries of Iceland, Norway and Sweden also fell behind, but by “three years only”.
Thus, Denmark has, during a half a century, gradually distanced itself from the
neighbors.
To examine country-specific changes more closely, we regressed the early
improvement (Early) on life expectancy in the early 1950’s (LE53), among the
18 countries. The estimated coefficients are:
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Constant 1.4708 0.3257 4.52 0.000
LE53 0.017432 0.004537 3.82 0.002
with R2 ¼ 47.7%. Regressing later improvement (Later) on life expectancy in the
late 1970’s (LE78) yielded:
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Constant 2.5127 0.6091 4.13 0.001
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Fig. 15.2 Deviances in 1953 and 1998
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with R2 ¼ 47.9%. Figures 15.3 and 15.4 illustrate the same phenomenon. We find
that in both cases the countries that had high life expectancy grew, on average,
slower than those with low life expectancy. The well-known phenomenon of
“regression to the mean” explains part of the changes, but we cannot ignore the
possibility that there would be a tendency of having a lower rate of improvement
when starting from a high value.
We then examined the persistence of improvement among the 18 countries.
Correlations (with P-values for the hypothesis of zero correlation in parenthesis)
between Later, LE78, and Early were (Japan omitted):





































Fig. 15.3 Early annual improvements as a function of life expectancy in 1953




































Fig. 15.4 Later annual improvements as a function of life expectancy in 1978








This suggests that there may be some persistence. However, when Later is
regressed on LE78 and Early, the coefficients are
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P
Constant 2.3514 0.5855 4.02 0.001
LE78 0.029288 0.007525 3.89 0.001
Early 0.3617 0.2163 1.67 0.115
with R2 ¼ 50.2% (adjusted for the number of explanatory variables). While the
regression is marginally better than the one not including Early (with R2 ¼ 47.9%),
the effect of Early is small and not significant. The regression is compatible with the
notion that current level rather than past improvement has had a systematic associ-
ation with the later development.
Descriptive statistics on early and later improvement among the 18 countries are
as follows (Japan omitted):
Variable N Mean Median StDev
Early 18 0.2280 0.2140 0.0490
Later 18 0.1789 0.1950 0.0618
Had these statistics been used to forecast life expectancy in the late 1970’s for the
late 1990’s, the average error would have been 20 (0.2280–0.1789) ¼ 0.982, as
opposed to the average error of 20 (0.25–0.1789) ¼ 1.422 years that would have
resulted from the use of the best practice line. I.e., the error of the latter forecast
would have been about 50% higher.
We conclude that during 1950–2000, as life expectancy has increased, its annual
improvement has gradually decreased. Based on Figs. 15.3 and 15.4 this holds for
Japan, as well. The 18 countries have also come closer together, and they have fallen
further behind Japan.
15.3 Conditions on the Usefulness of an Auxiliary Series
The model for the best-practice life expectancy says that (female) life expectancy at
birth increases by 0.25 years every calendar year, but the 18 countries have fallen
from 1.5 years behind in the 1950’s to nearly 4 years behind in the late 1990’s, on
average. The deviance for the average of the 18 countries is a roughly linear function
of time (R2 ¼ 86.1%), and we estimate that the deviance has increased by about
0.05 years each calendar year. In 50 years time the best-practice line would imply an
increase of 12.5 years, but if the average of the 18 countries continues to fall behind,
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the increase would be less, or 12.5–0.05  50 ¼ 10.0 years. In general, we might
wish to establish an empirical relationship between the best practice line and the
measure of interest, which we take here to be the average of the 18 countries.
Suppose there are some functions fj(t), j ¼ 0,1,2,. . ., such that an invariant g(t) is
of the form
g tð Þ ¼
Xm
j¼0
α jf j tð Þ:
Suppose the series of interest, say e(t), is related to the invariant via
e tð Þ  g tð Þ ¼
Xn
j¼0
β jf j tð Þþ2 tð Þ
Where 2(t) is random with expectation E[2(t)] ¼ 0. If n  m, then the same (e.g.,
generalized least squares) forecast for e(t) is obtained by (a) modeling the difference
e(t) – g(t) and adding the result to g(t) that is assumed to be known, or (b) by
modeling e(t) directly with the same explanatory variables fj(t), j¼ 1,. . ., n, but with
modified coefficients γj ¼ βj + αj (take αj ¼ 0 for j > m). This follows from the fact
that if the result of (a) is known, then the result of (b) can be deduced, and vice versa.
Thus, in this case the knowledge of the invariant provides no help.
On the other hand, suppose m > n, or the invariant g(t) behaves in a more complex
manner than the deviance e(t) – g(t). In this case, if the future values of the invariant
can be assumed to be known for all t, we can reduce the dimensionality of the
problem to m explanatory variables by modeling the deviance from the invariant.
This can be of important practical use, especially if the future values of some of the
functions fj(t), j ¼ n + 1,. . ., m, are unknown. From this perspective having a linear
invariant (with m ¼ 2 only) is, paradoxically, the least helpful!
An alternative point of view is that if there is information about the difference e
(t) – g(t) that has not been reflected in the past values of the series e(t), then such
information can be introduced via judgment into forecasting. In the example at hand,
suppose one believes that there is a feedback mechanism in operation such that if the
life expectancy of a country falls sufficiently far behind the best-practice life
expectancy, then corrective action will be taken by the society to reduce the
deviance, in the future. This is a reasonable hypothesis, and presumably such an
effect could manifest itself in the future. For example, even though Denmark has
distanced itself from its neighbors for a half a century, perhaps later it will recoup
some of the loss. More generally, if the 18 countries that have fallen behind Japan
transform their life style in such a way that it resembles more that of Japan in terms
of nutrition, job-security, attitude to leisure etc., then maybe they will begin to catch
up. However, as this is a strong judgmental assumption that has to be defended by
means other than statistical analysis, we will next pursue a number of alternatives
that a statistical analyst might consider.
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15.4 Model Choice
Figure 15.5 shows, in accordance with the earlier analyses, that the average improve-
ment was higher in the early part of the observation period than in the later part. If the
intention is to forecast until, say, 2050, the observation period is rather short, and
alternative ways of viewing the trend are plausible. (a) Disregarding the first
appearance, if we assume that the series is actually stationary, then the mean (*) is
approximately the best predictor after a few years. (b) If we think that the series is a
random walk, then the last observation () is the best predictor. (c) If we think that
there is an exponentially linearly declining trend in the series, then the best predic-
tion also declines exponentially (). (d) If we think there is a linear trend, then the
best predictor is the estimated linear line (+).
Forecasting as far as 2050, a choice between (a) – (d) can make a tremendous
difference (this was pointed out in a more general context by Whelpton et al. 1947,
already):
– using the historical average we expect to gain 50  0.2062 ¼ 10.3 years;
– using the latest value we expect to gain 50  0.15 ¼ 7.5 years;
– using the exponential trend we expect to gain 5.9 years;
– using linear trend we expect to gain 4.0 years.
All values are below the expected gain of 12.5 years derived from the linear model
for the best practice life expectancy.
To distinguish between the models we can first examine the estimated variance of





















Fig. 15.5 Average annual improvement in average life expectancy during five-year periods, of the
18 countries (Japan excluded), in 1950–2000, and four forecasts based on historical average (*), last
observed value (), exponential trend () and linear trend (+)
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constant rate of increase of 0.25 years per calendar year. The number of data points is
n ¼ 10 (from ten 5-year periods), and the number of estimates of annual increase is
n – 1 ¼ 9. The residual degrees of freedom in models (a) – (d) are 8, 8, 7, and
7, respectively. The best practice line model has 9 degrees of freedom, because it has
no estimated parameters. Compared in this manner we find that the estimated
variances of the residuals in the five models are 0.0041, 0.0042, 0.0031, 0.0031
and 0.0056. In view of Fig. 15.5, it is not surprising that the two regression models
lead to the best fit. Similarly, it is not surprising that the last model with a rate coming
from the outside of the data set fits the worst. The fact that the random walk model is
not among the best is informative. Although the regression models fit the best, we
recognize that the data period is short and one cannot take results of this type as
decisive.
Another possibility is to try to find supporting evidence based on alternative
approaches to the same problem. Here the “rates-to-life expectancy” comparison is
available. The life expectancy of the Finnish women in 2000 was 81.0 years, or
essentially the same as the average of 80.6 for the late 1990’s, of the 18 countries. A
stochastic forecast (Alho 2002) that assumed the decline in age-specific mortality to
continue in each age at the rate of the most recent 15 years lead to a median of female
life expectancy in 2050 of 86.7, indicating a gain of 6 years. This agrees with the
assumption of an exponential decline model (c). We will examine this model further.
Consider a function e(t) such that e(0) ¼ A and e0(t) ¼ eα βt, β > 0, for t  0. It
follows that
e tð Þ ¼ Aþ B 1 eαtð Þ,
where B¼ eα/β Taking t¼ 0 to correspond to the late 1990’s, we have A¼ 80.6 and
our empirical estimates can be translated to values α ¼ 1.8472 and β ¼ 0.01151,
which imply that B ¼ 13.7. Under this model the average life expectancy of the
18 countries would never exceed 80.6 + 13.7 ¼ 94.3 years. For the year 2050 we
would get the value 80.6 + 6.2 ¼ 86.8, for example. (The increase here is slightly
larger than the 5.9 years given above, because the starting period is earlier.)
To complement the above point estimates we note that by using the so-called
delta-method (e.g., Rao 1973, 385–6) we can compute a standard error for the
estimate of B, as 9.4 years. Thus a 95% confidence interval for the additional
improvement is quite wide, approximately 13.7  18.4 years. From this, the 95%
upper limit for the average life expectancy of the 18 countries would be about
94.3 + 18.4 ¼ 112.7 years. Of course, even under this model, individual people
can live much longer.
Figure 15.6 has a graph of the past data together with a point forecast until the late
2040’s. Visually, the slight concavity smoothly continues from the past data to the
point forecast.
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15.5 Concluding Remarks
We have investigated statistically the possible use of the best-practice life expec-
tancy as an aid in forecasting the life expectancy of industrialized countries. The
evidence shows that during the past 50 years this would have been overly optimistic.
The results do not preclude the possibility that in the longer term a comparison to the
best practice line might prove to be useful, but beliefs concerning this cannot be
based on statistical analyses of the type we have conducted. Instead, arguments
concerning processes, whose effects have not manifested themselves yet, are
required.
Better fits would have been provided by models that incorporate the slowing
down of improvement in life expectancy, among the countries studied. A model that
assumed a geometric slowing down leads to an absolute upper bound for life
expectancy, but estimates about this upper bound are statistically quite uncertain.
The validity of such a model cannot be ascertained based on the short data period we
consider.
Independently of whether life expectancy turns out to be approximately linear or
concave (or convex!) in the long run, there may well be other periods besides the
latter part of the twentieth century, in which groups of countries veer off the trend for
decades. From the perspective of individual countries this possibility would have to
be allowed in the construction of prediction intervals.
In case one is not willing to choose an appropriate model at all, one can try to
assign probabilities to each model, and do model averaging (Draper 1995). This















Fig. 15.6 Average life expectancy of the 18 countries in 1950–2000 continued with a forecast
based on an exponential trend in annual improvements for 2001–2050
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not condition on a particular choice, but the disadvantage is that it requires the
assignment of probabilities. It may be difficult to achieve a consensus on the latter.
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Chapter 16
Life Expectancy Convergence Among
Nations Since 1820: Separating the Effects
of Technology and Income
Jim Oeppen
16.1 Limits and Convergence in Life Expectancy
Figure 16.1 shows some details of the probable trajectories of limits and conver-
gence for average life expectancy over the past four centuries. The curved line is an
attempt to define the upper bound, or “best practice”, average life expectancy that
could be achieved at any one time.1 We can think of this as an evolving upper bound
to the “technophysio” evolution of the human population, in the sense proposed by
Fogel and Costa (1997). The bottom limit of the graph is drawn at an average life
expectancy of 22.5 years, to approximate the lowest level that a population could
experience and still be viable in the long term.2 Today, even a country like Sierra
Leone, with one of the lowest life expectancies recorded by the U.N., is close to the
upper limit for a pre-1800 population.
If these two limits are plausible, then the history of average life expectancy over
the last four centuries must lie between them. It is immediately apparent that the
scope for absolute divergence after 1850 is much greater than before. Since the
I should like to gratefully acknowledge the enormous help I have received, from a large number of
kind individuals and institutions, in building the demographic data-series for this paper. A full list of
their names and the sources used will appear in the longer version of this paper. It is also clear that
this topic could not have been addressed at all without the economic data published by Angus
Maddison.
1For details of its definition, and particularly its linearity after 1840, see Oeppen and Vaupel (2002)
and associated Web material.
2The lower limit to viability is somewhat uncertain as it depends on assumptions about age-specific
mortality patterns and about the dependence between mortality and reproductive health.
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middle of the twentieth century, data on life expectancy or U.N. estimates are
available for most countries and convergence has been generally apparent, although
there has been recent concern about sub-Saharan Africa and the former communist
bloc. A particularly effective way of depicting this convergence was published by
Wilson (2001).3 He weighted national averages by populations to estimate the
concentration of life expectancy for the World population at three dates. The vertical
bars show the inter-quartile range of life expectancy for countries containing half the
World’s population.
The bars emphasise three massive changes: rapid improvement in life expectancy,
greater symmetry in the distribution, and the globalisation, or compression, of
mortality experience. It also becomes clear that the years from 1850 to 1950 were
probably the period of maximum diversity in the history of human mortality. After
1950 cross-sectional, or sigma, convergence is apparent, with compression from
below, but the gap between the 75th percentile and the national “best-practice” limit
seems to be growing.4 This might be interpreted as evidence of a new period of
divergence. Today’s highest levels of life expectancy can only be achieved by
reducing the mortality of the elderly and it may be that some countries will find
this harder to achieve than the gains they made at younger ages.
So how do we explain these broad patterns of rising and converging life expec-
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Fig. 16.1 Limits and convergence for national average female life expectancy at birth
3This article contains similar analyses of fertility.
4Of course, it is possible that this process began before 1950.
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assumed that survival improvements follow automatically from economic develop-
ment. This is supported by the observation that the rank ordering of countries across
both variables is broadly similar and persistent over time, although the ratio of
highest to lowest in income is massively bigger than that for mortality, suggesting
a non-linear relationship.5 Thus rising world life expectancy could be a simple
function of rising real incomes, but what role should be assigned to technology
transfers?
A second problem is that while the mortality range is compressing across nations
over time, the consensus seems to be that the same is not true for income, although
this is a subject of debate among economists. One might seek to explain it as the
approach to a fixed biological upper bound to average life expectancy, resulting in
diminishing returns to wealth, but this common idea of a fixed and imminent limit
receives no support in two recent investigations (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002; White
2002). We have also seen that the World population does not seem to be converging
on the evolving upper bound.
For insights into the roles of wealth and technology in determining the levels and
convergence of life expectancy we turn to the classic article in the field.
16.2 The Classic Article: Preston (1975)6
Speculation and assumption regarding the link between income and health persist.
The first concrete, macro-level, study seems to have been undertaken by Preston
(1975). In this article, Preston partitioned an historic fall in mortality into two
factors: modern economic growth, and improvements in health technology. The
first step was to find a function linking national income per head and life expectancy.
Figure 16.2 is an updated version of Preston’s graph – the original included cross-
sections for the 1900s, 1930s, and 1960s, with logistic functions fitted to the latter
two.7 The idea is that there is a level of technology, or universal production function,
5The stability over time of the rankings for survival is a curious phenomenon because there has been
a massive “sectoral” redistribution since 1820 in the pattern of deaths by age. Why should a country
like Norway maintain its position close to the top of the list, regardless of whether mortality is
concentrated among infants, adults or the elderly – perhaps the equivalent of changing from an
organic, to a mineral, to an information economy?
6Slightly longer versions detailing cause-of-death effects are contained in Preston (1976)
and (1985).
7The data shown are for female life expectancy and GDP per capita, expressed in 1995 international
Geary-Khamis dollars. Preston used life expectancy for the sexes combined and national income per
head in 1963 U.S. dollars, truncating the horizontal axis below the income level reached by the four
richest countries in 1960. His list of countries grows over time, and by 1960 overlaps heavily with
the one used here, but is not an exact match, especially among the poorer nations. Preston fitted
logistic curves to the un-truncated data with an a priori asymptote of 80 years and scaled each cross-
section’s income from 0 to 100. The lines shown here are polynomials in the log of GDP per capita.
The 1960s outlier with poor survival but high income is Venezuela.
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that links input (National Income per capita) to output (average life expectancy) at
any one moment in time, but that these functions are subject to temporal shifts. For
example, an input of 5000 dollars per head “produced” an average lifetime of
50 years with the technology prevailing in the 1900s, but the same amount of
money realised about 70 years in the 1960s. The addition of data for the 1990s
does not alter the basic finding and shows that the curve is still shifting upwards in
the wealthier countries.
Easterlin (1996) has pointed out the similarities between Preston’s approach and a
pioneering study of modern economic growth by Solow, who divided growth in
output into two components: (1) input growth with fixed technology, and (2) shifts in
the production function due to technological change. In between technological
shifts, countries could still make gains by increasing inputs. Easterlin describes
Preston’s study as “done independently of Solow’s work and no less deserving of
classic status” (1996, p. 75).
Preston calculated the rise in life expectancy that would have occurred if health
technology had been fixed at the 1930s curve, but real incomes per head had risen as
observed. Subtracting the hypothetical gain due to income change from the total gain
led to the conclusion that about 80% of the rise in life expectancy from 1930 to 1960
could not be attributed to increases in income. This model of mortality treated
changes in health technology as an unidentified, exogenous component expressed
as a function of time. In subsequent papers, Preston (1980) included variables






















0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
1995 Dollars
Fig. 16.2 Female life-expectancy at birth and GDP per capita
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LDCs (excluding China) between 1940 and 1970 could not be accounted for by
changes in income. For the period 1965 to 1979, again for LDCs, he has estimated
that the technology share has fallen to 30% (Preston 1985).
16.3 Extending the Analysis
Preston’s model of the linkage between health and national income offered a new
way of looking at an old problem, but it still leaves some questions unanswered. The
two cross-sections enclose a period of rapid technological change in health, includ-
ing the introduction of antibiotics, so we have to question whether the dominance of
technological change over income change is a long-term phenomenon. The “best-
practice” line in Fig. 16.1 suggests that these cross-sections enclosed the only
marked “step” in survival over the last century. The rest of the period suggests
stable change at the top level. For countries lower down the list, some authors have
suggested that the period of inter-war retrenchment in international trade may have
deferred demographic innovations, accentuating “catch-up” in the immediate post-
war period (see e.g. Bloom and Williamson 1998).
Another important question is whether the dynamics of the model are well
specified. Is health technology simply scalable with income? The “sectoral” changes
in the age-distribution of deaths required to move from a life expectancy of 50 to one
of 80 have been associated with major shifts of emphasis; changes in the importance
of infectious versus chronic diseases, public health measures versus medicine, and
the changing share of responsibility between the individual and the state. It seems
unlikely that every country will experience these changes in the same way. We
should expect persistent, “national” effects within the overall relationship.
For this paper on convergence, Preston’s major result is that if we assume a fixed
and universal health technology function then the curves show that rising real
incomes will lead to convergence in life expectancy, without the requirement that
the real income distribution should itself converge. But since Preston argues that
technological change dominated between the 1930s and the 1970s, a mechanism
based only on income offers little insight into the full mechanisms of long-run
convergence. Today there is a considerable literature on economic convergence,
but almost no formal analyses of demographic convergence (Wilson 2001). Demog-
raphers have concentrated on transition models, with time-scale compression for the
late-entrants. The discussion favours technology transfer rather than economic
growth, and emphasises the countries that have achieved high life expectancy with
relatively low incomes. As with economic growth, late-entrants are recognised to
have experienced rates of life expectancy increase never seen in the pioneering
countries, but this is not framed in an analysis of the lower costs of imitation
compared with innovation.8
8For an economic approach, see van Elkan (1996).
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This paper tries to expand the wealth of results that Preston’s article generated
into three new areas. Firstly, the temporal range of the data can be extended.
Secondly, new statistical methods may allow us to learn more about the precise
roles of time/technology and income. Finally, these same methods may provide
more insights into country-level patterns, treated as residuals in the Preston model.
16.4 New Data
The desire to look at change in life expectancy over the long course of the health
transition is severely restricted by the available data, and thus the resulting model
will be unsatisfactory in many ways.9 Time and GDP per capita are poor proxies for
the things we would really like to know.
This paper takes advantage of the collection of national time-series for 56 coun-
tries published by Maddison (1995).10 GDP per capita is used here, expressed in
1990 Geary-Khamis dollars to remove the effects of inflation and currency. The
series were made comparable using a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) approach
rather than relying on exchange rates, which are often distorting.11 For most
advanced capitalist countries, there are estimates for 1820, 1850, and then annually
from 1870 to 1994. For other countries, the starting dates and continuity are variable.
Despite the recent increase in the number of countries with annual life-table
series, much of the life expectancy data is sporadic and covers varying periods.12
The GDP data has been averaged to match the time spans of the life expectancy
estimates, which are shown for females in Fig. 16.3. The nineteenth century has few
low-survival countries and is largely confined to countries in Europe, or of European
origin. Some Asian and Latin American estimates start in the first half of the
twentieth century, but the U.N. estimates for African countries only begin in 1950.
This results in a very unbalanced design with discontinuous data, and places a
limitation on the kinds of models that can be used. Initial experiments in modelling
showed that the 1918 flu epidemic created problems with the residuals, as did wars.
9For the years after 1950, a much richer selection of socio-economic variables is available. See
Jonathan Temple’s website at http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/Economics/Growth/ for a guide to data
and literature.
10The data extends over 56 countries and from 1820 to 1994. A more extensive set of countries from
1950 to 1998 is contained in Maddison (2001). The additional countries will allow this analysis to
extend to the poorer nations of Africa, Asia, and Central and South America and it is being revised
to incorporate these new data.
11PPP attempts to compare currencies by their power to buy similar products.
Preston switched to PPP after his first article. Non-traded items are typically cheaper in poor
countries and thus PPP adjusted wealth estimates are usually higher than those based on exchange
rates for poor countries. This may explain why Preston found that a log model did not fit the
low-income range.
12Collections of mortality data can be found by following the links at http://www.demogr.mpg.de/
202 J. Oeppen
An attempt has been made to identify the years when countries were subject to the
direct and indirect effects of war and these, together with data for 1918, have been
omitted.
The income data used in the model is log GDP per capita in real dollars, and the
life expectancy data is expressed as the log-odds of survival assuming an upper limit
on life expectancy of 100 years.13
Equation 16.1: Log Odds of Life Expectancy at Birth
ln odds e0ð Þ ¼ ln e0= 100 e0ð Þð Þ
The average number of years lived is divided by the average number of years
“lost” assuming an upper limit on average life expectancy of 100 years. Taking the
natural log means that the measure is unbounded on the positive and negative sides.
This has the advantage of linearising the life expectancy data and removing any
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Fig. 16.3 Female life-expectancy at birth
13This transformation is probably unnecessary and may be dropped in the final analyses.
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16.5 National Effects: A Shopping Analogy
Although economists would be quick to point out that there is no real market,
Preston introduced us to the idea of an international price/technology/quantity
relationship for life expectancy. We can hold any one constant and think about the
other pair. Five thousand dollars in 1960 “bought” 70 years of life expectancy, but
the same money in 1900 could only buy 50 years. Most people are familiar with this
from buying personal computers and other electrical goods. A thousand dollars
today buys a greater quantity of computing power than it did 5 years ago because
technology has shifted the supply curve upwards.
Is a model based on an international relationship sufficient to reproduce the data?
Preston considered that there were also national relationships hidden within the
international model, but he didn’t integrate them and treated them as residuals. He
observed, for example, that Japan seemed to have very high life expectancy in the
1900s, relative to its income per head, and cites Taeuber’s explanation of “personal
cleanliness and the assumption of health responsibility by government organizations
as important factors in counteracting the adverse effects of poverty”(Preston 1975,
n. 22, p. 236).
To extend the shopping analogy, suppose that technology is always a year ahead
in Japan compared to the U.S. – as a result you get a better PC at any given price in
Japan, because the technology/price relationship is higher.
Similarly, if delivery costs are high in a country, then the quantity/price ratio is
pulled down for any given technology. Thus there may be persistent technological
leads and lags, and pricing discounts and surcharges at the national level.
This viewpoint prompts new questions. For example, Norway seems to have
always been close to the top of the life expectancy rankings, yet it was relatively poor
by European standards at the start of the nineteenth century. Has it always been able
to “buy” its life expectancy at a discount, perhaps because an egalitarian society
gives a real meaning to “per capita” income, and more easily translates this into
health for all the population? Or have they always had a technological lead, perhaps
because literacy was so high, not gender specific, and created a tradition of invest-
ment in human capital? (Graff 1987, p. 375; Houston 1988, p. 135). Maybe both
factors were at work and they were lucky? When they were poor, they knew how to
control infant mortality at little cost. By the time mortality reduction required
expensive items, like advanced health care for all and State support for the elderly,
they had become rich.
Preston’s analysis was for the sexes combined, but we can also consider who is
doing the “shopping” – a man or a woman?Why, in the modern era, do women seem
to be able to buy more? Each discipline that addresses this question – from
evolutionary biology to sociology – has its own explanation.
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16.6 Multilevel Models14
In Preston’s original paper, the model was fitted to cross-sectional data. This raises a
number of familiar estimation problems. We can illustrate this in an intuitive way by
examining the points in Fig. 16.1. It is likely that had lines been plotted for countries
rather than cross-sections, a very different impression of the data would have been
gained. Each country’s data can be thought of as a number of repeated measures on a
single unit or group. Preston’s plot shows us the between-groups picture at three
points in time, but we also need to understand the within-group change.
This paper uses a multilevel model to go beyond Preston’s “series of cross-
sections” approach. Multilevel models are designed to respect the hierarchical nature
of both data and explanations. The textbook examples often use school data. Pupils
may be tested several times; they are grouped within classes and by teachers, which
are grouped within schools, districts, and so on. Historical demographers are used to
seeing nested data on regions, villages, families, parents, siblings, and individuals.
Treating the hierarchy explicitly solves a number of problems. Factors may be
significant at one level and not at another, or they may work differently at two
levels. For example, the income of a family may have one effect on infant mortality
and the average income of the village may have another. One may reflect familial
access to resources, and the other may affect community provision of health infra-
structure. Many studies ignore the hierarchy and force all the variables to one level.
Thus we might see person-level regressions of infant mortality, with population
density, a higher level measure, as an explanatory variable.
Equation 16.2 shows a naïve regression model that we can use as a means of
introducing the concepts of multilevel models.
Equation 16.2: Regression Model
ln oddsf j, t ¼ β0 þ β1  t þ β2  ln GDP j, t þ ε j, t
This equation models the log odds of female life expectancy in all countries,
indexed by j, and for all time periods t, as the sum of a constant, a function of time, a
function of log GDP per capita in the country at time t, and an error term. This is a
“one size fits all” model, and it probably wouldn’t work very well, judging by the
plots of the data. A standard method of extending such a model is to fit a separate
intercept term, or constant, for each country. In bivariate regression, this results in a
series of parallel lines, one for each country. In this regression, it leads to a family of
parallel planes. The model is usually referred to as Analysis of Covariance, or
ANCOVA. The intercepts are really weighted means of the extent to which a
particular country differs from the international model. A similar model is
RANCOVA, or Random ANCOVA, shown in Eq. 16.3. In this model, we have a
14For information on multi-level models, in increasing order of complexity, see Kreft and de Leeuw
(1998), Snijders and Bosker (1999), and Goldstein (1995).
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global intercept β0, 0 and an additive term, β0, j, for each country j. The additive terms
are estimated as a sample from a normal distribution with mean zero. They sum to
zero, so they can also be regarded as a “national” residual that doesn’t vary
with time.
Equation 16.3: RANCOVA Model
ln oddsf j, t ¼ β0,0 þ β0, j
 þ β1  t þ β2  lnGDP j, t þ ε j, t
This idea of national offsets, or residuals, about an international model can be
extended to the other parameters. Equation 16.4a shows a multilevel model with
country-specific offsets for all parameters – β1, j for time, and β2, j for income.
Equation 16.4a: Multilevel Model
ln oddsf j, t ¼ β0,0 þ β0, j
 
þ β1,0 þ β1, j
  t þ β2,0 þ β2, j
  ln GDP j, t þ ε j, t
Rearranging the terms to Eq. 16.4b reveals another view of the model and
exposes its levels. The first line is an international model (or fixed part in mutilevel
model terminology); line two is a country-specific level expressed as offsets or
residuals from the higher level (level 2); and finally there is a lowest level residual
term (level 1). We now have a model that is interpretable at the international and
national levels. It can also be forecast, in both the international and national
components.15
Equation 16.4b: Multilevel Model Separated into a Fixed Part and Two Resid-
ual Levels
ln oddsf j, t ¼ β0,0 þ β1,0  t þ β2,0  ln GDP j, t
þβ0, j þ β1, j  t þ β2, j  ln GDP j, t þ ε j, t
To make the interpretation easier, Eq. 16.5 illustrates such a model, which we will
pretend is for Finland, country number 6 in this dataset. The international intercept
for the log odds is .45, but ceteris paribus, Finland always seems to lag behind by a
factor of 0.01. Overall, the measure of survival rises 0.15 for each additional unit
of time, but Finland lags a little behind by 0.07, with a combined effect giving a
rise of +0.08 per year. On the other hand, Finland seems to be “buying” its survival at
a discount of 0.26. Instead of the international gain of 0.19 per additional unit of
income, it gets 0.45 for each extra income unit.
15This assumes that GDP forecasts are available. We might also use the model to back-project, or
interpolate.
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Equation 16.5: Illustrative Multilevel Equation for Country Number 6
ln oddsf 6, t ¼ 0:45þ 0:15 t þ 0:19 ln GDP6, t
0:01 0:07 t þ 0:26 ln GDP6, t þ ε6, t
Turning back to Eq. 16.4a, we can interpret the combined effects on the explan-
atory variables. 1,j results in a growing lead when it is positive, and a growing lag
when it is negative. Similarly, β2, jis a discount when it is positive, and a surcharge
when it is negative. As with the intercept in the regression model, we don’t really
know how to interpret a particular β0, j parameter. It could represent a fixed lead
(lag), independent of time. Or if it were associated with income, then it is a stable
rebate (cost). In practice, these two fixed possibilities cannot be logically
differentiated.
This is a very simplified introduction to the use of the model in this context. It
would take too long to recount the full properties of multi-level models here, but a
number are particularly relevant. Firstly, the model recognises that the structure of
the data is hierarchical. Each country’s data is a set of repeated measures over time
which share certain implicit factors that cannot be ignored. Secondly, the model does
not require that the time points are evenly spaced, or that the data are known for all
countries. This allows us to use unbalanced data.
16.7 Model Results
As expected, the model represented in Eq. 16.4 does not work very well. Examina-
tion of the residuals shows that they have significant patterns. The strategy adopted
for this paper, which concentrates on the national effects, is to make the fixed or
international part of the model as flexible as possible. This is an attempt to avoid
having the failures of the fixed part interpreted as national effects. Conversely, the
national component of the model has been kept as simple as simple as possible, and
the form used in that part of Eq. 16.4 is retained.
The final form of the international model uses a polynomial in time because the
log transforms do not fully linearise the data. It is also clear that there are epochs in
the data. For this reason, the data has been partitioned into pre-World War I, Inter-
War, and post World-War II epochs for both time and income. Even then, the post-
World War II reconstruction decade presents significant problems. This is an
extremely important period in the diffusion of antibiotics and other health
technologies, and a time of rapid economic change, so rather than delete the data
points, affected countries have been identified and a special component fitted in the
model. Finally, even with this expanded model, it was clear that the variance in the
level 1 residuals seemed to be a negative function of income, so the model was
expanded to allow complex level 1 variation to remove this heteroscedasticity
(Goldstein 1995).
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The parameter estimates for the fixed, or international, part of the model are
shown in Table 16.1.16
This model suggests that the long-term upward trend in survival was depressed in
the inter-war period, but jumped up after 1945. In both periods men seem to be in a
worse position. Income terms for females are positive, particularly so in the inter-war
period, but there is evidence for a post-war diminution in the effect of income, and
this contrasts with Preston’s conclusions for combined male and female life expec-
tancy in LDCs. The inter-war period does seem to show a period of retrenchment –
temporal gains slowed and wealth became more important. For men, income seems
to be less important than for women and is not statistically significant after 1945.
Broadly speaking, the parameters for females and males show similar patterns,
although the model is less successful in explaining the male data.
16.8 National Patterns
The nation-specific component of the model for country j is
The Nation-Specific Component of the Multi-level Model
β0, j þ β1, j  t þ β2, j  ln GDP j, t




Time squared 0.0179 0.0185
Time cubed 0.0004 0.0005
Inter-war dummy 0.7258 0.9735
Post-war dummy 0.9255 0.7637
Ln GDP pre-war 0.1999 0.1173
Ln GDP inter-war 0.2892 0.2403
Ln GDP post-war 0.1122 [0.0486]a
Post-war reconstruction dummy 2.0817 1.6653
Time * post-war reconstruction dummy 0.1349 0.1082
2 * log likelihood 5635 4938
aBracketed parameters are not significant
161810 has been subtracted from the Time variable in these models, to limit the scale of the
polynomial terms.
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and this can be interpreted as the national “offset” that can be added to the
international prediction to get the full prediction for any country.17 It tells us how
one country is performing after controlling for the functions of income and time
common to all countries. Figure 16.4 plots the three elements that sum to the national
component for the USA and Japan. Because it is controlled out, the international
level can be thought of as the horizontal line at zero years. The first panel shows the
country-specific constants. Multilevel models are usually fitted to grand-mean
centred data so that the variance of the intercept has meaning. The second panel
shows the temporal components. Japan’s offset relative to overall temporal change
seems to be fixed and approximately zero. The USA has a broadly similar “health
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Fig. 16.4 Components of national level life-expectancy estimates
17Normally, intercepts are estimated setting all the explanatory variables to zero. For most social
science data, this leads to intercept values outside the plausible range of the data. For these data, it is
not so extreme for the variable t, as 1810 was subtracted from the year, but the general position
holds for GDP. In multilevel models, it is customary to centre the variables that are used at this level
and this has been done here. Kreft and de Leeuw (1998) give an excellent description of the role of
centring data in conventional regression, and multilevel models.
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difference in their contemporary position is shown in the third panel. The US has
become progressively unable to translate log dollars into health. It is now about
10 years behind the position we would expect based on income alone, a figure
slightly offset by a small advantage of about 2 years in technology. The American
pattern is typical of the countries of Northwest European origin, but only the
southern European countries come close to Japan’s position of combining a high
income with a good conversion rate. The sums of the three components that make up
the national offset from the international model are shown in the fourth panel. The
USA has regressed to the mean, but Japan shows some strengthening of a long-term
advantage.
Figure 16.5 shows the raw data for Japan and the USA, together with dashed lines
showing the life expectancy we would expect if they had zero offsets from the
international model. As we might expect from the previous graph, this model fits
quite well for Japan but overestimates US life expectancy for women today by about
5 years. The full model fits the US data quite well by setting diminishing returns to
log GDP per capita. Figure 16.6 shows the same data plotted against income. The
slope of the US response to log GDP seems to have changed around 1950, but it
could be argued that both Japan and the US may now be back on the long-term path.
Figure 16.7 shows these offsets for all the countries, plotted against time. It is
immediately apparent that the model is estimating convergence. The fixed part of the
model predicts an overall life expectancy in the low twenties for 1820. This is both
viable and plausible, and suggests that countries like Norway had a female life
expectancy about 25 years above the international prediction. Over time they have
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Fig. 16.7 National level female life-expectancy estimates against time
16 Life Expectancy Convergence Among Nations Since 1820: Separating the. . . 211
that some of the low life expectancy countries are also converging, although perhaps
not at the same temporal pace when the disadvantage is greater than 10 years. It
should also be noted that these data stop in 1994 and do not show the recent effects
of the AIDS epidemic.
Plotting the same data against GDP in Fig. 16.8 is even more striking. Now it
seems much clearer that there is overall convergence in life expectancy as income
increases. There doesn’t seem to be much evidence that there are different points of
convergence for some countries, although the poorest ones are not well represented
in Maddison’s data.
In general, examination of the level 1 residuals shows that the fits for each
country are very good, but there is temporal autocorrelation that has not been
removed.18 An exception to the encouraging results concerns the former commu-
nist countries of central and Eastern Europe. Paradoxically, the model gives better
fits in the 1990s during and after the transition problems than it does in the 1960s.
There is a consistent pattern of under-estimation in that period. One plausible
possibility is that the economies were difficult to quantify and the GDP estimates
are too low. The alternative explanation is that command economies really could
deliver good health at lower cost when the challenge was to keep infants, children,
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Fig. 16.8 National female life-expectancy estimates against GDP per capita
18Autocorrelation is ignored in this presentation, although the MlwiN software used is capable of
dealing with autocorrelation in irregularly recorded time-series. See Goldstein et al. (1998).
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16.9 Convergence
Many researchers have commented on the apparent convergence in life expectancy
over time, and also identified a significant number of countries where the progress in
health easily outruns their economic performance (Caldwell 1986). Despite this,
there seems to have been no attempt to address convergence in a formal way,
although there is an extensive literature in Economics on estimating convergence
across countries (Jones 1998; Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995). Among the many
insights this provides for demographic studies is the distinction made between
“sigma” and “beta” convergence. The former, as the name suggests, is assessed by
calculating cross-sectional standard deviations (sigmas). Their evolution over time is
then examined. If the trend is towards lower dispersion, it may be interpreted as
convergence.19 Sigma convergence is a measure of what actually happened, but
calculating it is difficult with the demographic data before 1950 because they are
unbalanced and sporadic.
Beta convergence exists if the slope of a regression line over time is negatively
related to the intercept. For example, if a country has a high starting position, or
intercept, and a negative slope over time relative to the average, then it is an
indication that this country may eventually converge towards the mean. Beta
convergence is really a measure of the propensity to converge, holding other effects
constant. While it may lead to sigma convergence, it may also be overtaken by
changes in other variables or random shocks.
The multilevel model facilitates the estimation of beta convergence, because of
the explicit national-level intercepts and slope parameters, but two departures from
the conventional intercept-slope regression approach should be borne in mind
when interpreting the results. Firstly, all the “national” parameters are estimated
from zero-mean normal distributions, so they can be thought of as offsets from the
fixed or international model. Secondly, the intercepts in this paper are estimated at
the grand means of the data. This is not a requirement of the method, although
conventional in multi-level modelling, but it means that the variance of the
intercept distribution has meaning within the scales of the data. This allows one
to compare the variances across parameters and convert the parameter estimates
into z-scores for comparative purposes.
Returning to a consideration of Eq. 16.4b, the national parameter estimates β0, j,
β1, j, and β2, j may reveal correlation. Suppose that the intercept terms, the β0, j are
negatively correlated with the lead/lag parameters, the β1, j. In this case a high (low)
intercept will be associated with a falling (rising) national offset over time, and the
country will tend to converge on the international model. The same applies to the β0, j
and β2, j parameters. Negative (positive) correlation means that a country with a good
starting discount will have a falling (rising) response with respect to income. Finally,
19There is a debate in the Economics literature on the difference between convergence and
regression to the mean, see Friedman (1992) and Quah (1993).
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if β1, j, and β2, j are negatively (positively) correlated, then relative gains with respect
to one variable may be offset (reinforced) by the other.
Before examining convergence in the life expectancy data, we need to consider
whether the income data are converging, although the Preston model reveals that this
is not a necessary condition for convergence. If there were a simple linkage between
income and survival, then economic convergence might be driving mortality con-
vergence directly. Economic convergence is a subject of great debate and the general
opinion seems to be that there is no unconditional convergence (Jones 1998). Some
groups of countries seem to be converging within their own “club”, but it has been
argued that this is conditional on the structures of their economies.20 My own very
simple attempts to look at convergence in the full Maddison GDP dataset, using a
multilevel model without covariates, also indicate that there is no evidence of global
convergence. In fact, divergence is suggested.
Figure 16.9 plots the national intercepts, β0, j against the parameters on Time, β1, j,
after they have been converted to z-scores. There is a negative correlation of 0.38,
which indicates a slight but statistically significant tendency for countries with high
intercepts to decline against time, and vice versa, leading to convergence.21 There is
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Fig. 16.9 National level parameters for female life expenctancy
20As an epidemiological example, we might speculate on whether the malarial and non-malarial
nations could converge on different trajectories.
21The country abbreviations are shown in Table 16.2 at the end of the chapter.
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scale, advanced economies with high life expectancies seem to be progressing faster.
These correspond to the economies that Sachs and Warner identified as “open” to
international trade in 1960 (Sachs and Warner 1995). By 1992, the few remaining
“closed” economies are confined to a peripheral arc running from China to Egypt.
The former communist countries are making slower progress.
Figure 16.10, with a correlation of 0.63 shows that income is the major factor
driving beta convergence. As incomes rise, laggard countries are adding years
faster than the leaders. Countries of north-west Europe, and their wealthier former
colonies, seem to be doing badly, with Britain, the Netherlands, and New Zealand
in the worst position. Figure 16.11 shows that the correlation between the time and
income parameters, β1, j and β2, j is also negative and significant at 0.39,
indicating that the effects are offsetting to some degree. Two countries are worth
highlighting across all three graphs. Japan is the only wealthy country that is close
to the origin on all three scales. Ireland seems to be associated with the countries of
the former communist bloc!
The full possibilities of this model are not covered here, but some work has been
done. For exploratory purposes one can treat the parameter estimates as data. The
intercept for females is strongly related to educational attainment as measured in
1985, so the broad ranking may be a long-run feature. There is some evidence that
countries with mid-range average education of between 5 and 9 years have the
positive time-parameters that indicate “catch-up”. The GDP parameter is strongly
and negatively associated with education. It seems that the educated countries are in
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Fig. 16.10 National level parameters for female life-expectancy
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The effect of income inequality on life expectancy has been a subject of debate
(Wilkinson 1998). It could be that, with the international parameter controlling for
the broad effect of GDP, the national parameter might be associated with the income
distribution of the country. Countries where there is high inequality may have below
par conversion of income into health. Using contemporary data from the World
Bank on the share of income held by the lowest 20%, there seems to be no
relationship with the GDP parameters. However, the more egalitarian countries do
seem to have higher intercepts, but they also have lower rates of change over time.
No relationships are significant when the data are restricted to the 17 countries
described by Maddison as “advanced capitalist”, although the hypothesis is only
expected to apply to richer countries.
Because the model is parameterised at the “national” level it would be possible
to use country-specific GDP forecasts to forecast life expectancy. Another exper-
iment is to enter the US GDP time-series into each country’s equation. I expected
that this would lead to impossible values, but they looked plausible. For example,
the model suggests that in the post-Independence era, Indian women would have
had US life expectancy if they had had US incomes. The only forecast that
exceeded the “best practice” line in Fig. 16.1 was for Russian women. In general,
there seemed to be little evidence that there were “structural” limits in the fitted
equations that would prevent life expectancy approaching the best levels if
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have trajectories that are independent of GDP. Chile and China, for example, have
national parameters that are approximately equal to the international parameter on
GDP, but with a negative sign, so that changing GDP has no effect at all.
16.10 Conclusion
Multilevel models offer considerable scope for disentangling effects in collections of
unbalanced, repeated-measures data. These results are preliminary and designed to
explore what can be done, rather than suggesting final interpretations. Preston’s
finding that time seems to be becoming less important in LDCs is contradicted in the
international component of this model, where it is the income effects that seem to
Table 16.2 56 countries
Country Abbreviation Country Abbreviation
Argentina Arg Korea Kor
Australia Aus Mexico Mex
Austria Aut Morocco Mar
Bangladesh Bgd Myanmar Mmr
Belgium Bel Netherlands Nld
Brazil Bra New Zealand NZl
Bulgaria Bgr Nigeria Nga
Canada Can Norway Nor
Chile Chl Pakistan Pak
China Chn Peru Per
Colombia Col Philippines Phl
Cote d’Ivoire Civ Poland Pol
Czechoslovakia Cze Portugal Prt
Denmark Dnk Romania Rom
Egypt Egy Russia Rus
Ethiopia Eth South Africa Zaf
Finland Fin Spain Esp
France Fra Sweden Swe
Germany Deu Switzerland Che
Ghana Gha Taiwan Twn
Greece Grc Tanzania Tza
Hungary Hun Thailand Tha
India Ind Turkey Tur
Indonesia Idn UK GBr
Ireland Irl USA USA
Italy Ita Venezuela Ven
Japan Jpn Yugoslavia Yug
Kenya Ken Zaire Zar
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have diminished in the post-war era, particularly for men. On the other hand,
changes in income seem to be more important than health technology in explaining
survival convergence. Breaking down the national level effects into their constituent
components suggests that countries of Northwest European origin have translated a
diminishing proportion of their gains in income into gains in health. Combined with
the “catch-up” opportunities for the laggard countries, this has led to rapid conver-
gence. Japan and the Southern European countries seem to be the exceptions to this
diminishing return to log income.22 They seem to have emerged from the “pack” by
maintaining a small long run advantage over the international position. The story of
why women’s patterns are different from men’s will have to wait for another day.
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Chapter 17
Linear Increase in Life Expectancy: Past
and Present
Tommy Bengtsson
Improvements in human stature, real income and life expectancy have taken place at
an unprecedented speed during the last 200 years. In the case of life expectancy at
birth, the record has been broken at an amazingly constant pace since 1840. Females
have continuously gained 2.92 months per year, males slightly less (Oeppen and
Vaupel 2002). While the increase is considerable, with improvements in life expec-
tancy of some 8 years from parent to child, it is the regularity of the advancement that
is remarkable, not the speed as such. The reason is that the countries entering the
mortality transition at a later stage in history tend to exhibit an even faster improve-
ment. Japan, for example, experienced improvements of 6 months per year in life
expectancy during its catch-up in the twentieth century. In China the corresponding
figure was well above 1 year in the 1960s and 70s. Thus, while the increase of best-
practice countries is not astonishing in itself, the linearity of the improvement
certainly is. This raises obvious questions: What are the causes of this linear increase
and how long can it be sustained? Other questions concern whether the observed
linear increase in life expectancy can be used in forecasting life expectancy both for
countries lagging behind and countries in the lead.
To Oeppen and Vaupel, the linear development of life expectancy suggests that
the process of mortality reductions “should not be seen as a disconnected sequence
of unrepeatable revolutions but rather as a regular stream of continuing progress”
(Oeppen and Vaupel 2002:1029), referring to Lee and Carter (1992), and
Tuljapurkar et al. (2000). Still, in the next sentence Oeppen and Vaupel state, with
reference to Riley (2001), that mortality improvements are the result of a complex
process of “advances in income, salubrity, nutrition, education, sanitation, and
medicine, with the mix varying over age, period, cohort, place, and diversity”
(Oeppen and Vaupel 2002:1029). Thus, on the one hand the advance in life
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expectancy is a regular stream of continuous progress but on the other it is also an
intricate interplay of a mixture of social, economic and medical factors, which
sounds almost like a paradox that calls for further clarification. As starting point, I
will take a closer look at the countries that are the leaders in life expectancy: a very
small number indeed, consisting of nine countries altogether. What mixture of
factors varying over age, period, cohort, diversity of diseases, and place has made
them the global leaders of life length? I will then turn to the issue of causality.
17.1 Descriptive Overview
Starting with age and period, to quote Oeppen and Vaupel (2002:1029), “most of the
gain in life expectancy was due to large reductions in death rates at younger ages. In
the second half of the 20th century, improvements in survival after age 65 propelled
the rise in the length of people’s lives”. This is indeed one of the most well-known
and universal facts regarding the historical mortality transition. It holds true both for
countries that have experienced the mortality decline recently and for those where it
started hundreds of years ago. In Sweden, an example of the latter, the level of infant
mortality dropped almost without interruptions from the mid-eighteenth century
onwards. The other Nordic countries showed a similar development (Bengtsson
and Lundh 1999). England and other parts of Western Europe, as well as North
America, initially followed the same pattern of infant mortality decline in the
eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century but after that point in time,
the decline levelled out. Alfred Perrenoud (1984) consequently differentiates
between a Nordic model, with continued decline, and a West-European model,
with an interrupted decline. From around the end of the nineteenth century to present
day, however, all countries in the industrialized world have exhibited the same
development of rapid decline in infant and child mortality, which was the main
reason for the rise in life expectancy. Though death rates for the elderly started to
drop already in the latter part of the nineteenth century, it was not until the
mid-twentieth century that life expectancy was largely propelled by falling mortality
at age 65 and above. Since the change from infant and child mortality to mortality
among the elderly as the major explanation of the observed improvements in life
expectancy has not yet occurred in many countries, most of the increase in life
expectancy during the twentieth century in these countries has still been due to the
decline in infant and child mortality.
Another striking and commonly-shared pattern is the change over time in the
diversity of diseases. Here Oeppen and Vaupel refer to Bongaarts and Bulatao’s
volume Beyond Six Billion (2000) and Riley’s book Rising Life Expectancy: A
Global History (2001). In turn, Riley’s way of reasoning is much in line with the
Epidemiological Transition Theory, according to which the pestilences and famines
are followed by receding pandemics, and later by degenerative and man-made
diseases (Omran 1971). This line of theory argues that the changes are mainly the
result of man’s control over his environment. How mortality patterns change over
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time is not the object of much controversy; more so the causes behind these changes.
General agreement prevails that decline in infant and child mortality starts off in the
form of reduced mortality in highly virulent infectious diseases but is upheld by a
decline in less virulent infectious diseases. The role of famines in this process is
more debated but it is unlikely that it has influenced trends in infant and child
mortality to any significant degree (Wrigley and Schofield 1981). Thus, it was a
reduction in the mortality among children in highly virulent diseases, primarily a
drop in smallpox mortality, together with further reductions in mortality in low
virulent infectious diseases, which brought the best-practice countries to the lead
in 1840.
The second crucial change came after the mid-twentieth century and consisted of
the fall in mortality in ages 65 years and above. This decline was largely caused by
reductions in chronic diseases (cardiovascular, cerebrovascular and some cancer
diseases), possibly in combination with a general health amelioration due to
improvements of conditions in early life in the beginning of the twentieth century.
In fact, when the great mortality decline of Western Europe was first analysed by
Derrick (1927) and Kermack et al. (1934), they clearly advocated the role of cohort
factors. They believed that the decline in adult mortality in England, Wales, and
Scotland, as well as in Sweden, to a large extent was the result of improved
conditions in childhood. This argument later lost ground as the Demographic
Transition Theory evolved and the process of modernization and other period
factors came into focus (UN 1953). It was not until the late seventies that Preston
and van deWalle (1978), Fridlizius (1989) and later Barker (1994) and Fogel (1994),
brought these issues into play again. Today, there is an extensive and lively debate
on the importance of early-life factors on mortality in later life vis-à-vis period
factors.
Regarding place, it is striking that so few countries have been record-holders in
female life expectancy over the past 160 years, as shown in Table 17.1. The linear
line is based on the experience of only nine countries, starting off with Sweden and
Norway in the first two decades after 1840, and followed by Australia in the 1860s.
New Zealand came into the lead in 1876 and almost monopolised this position until
Table 17.1 The nine world
record holding countries
Country Years in lead Starting year Last year
Sweden 10 1840 1973
Norway 48 1841 1969
Australia 8 1861 1920
New Zealand 57 1876 1947
Denmark 2 1918 1919
Iceland 19 1941 1984
The Netherlands 1 1964 1964
Switzerland 1 1985 1985
Japan 15 1986 2000
Source: Oeppen and Vaupel (2002, Supplementary Material,
Table 2)
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1941, with the exception of a brief period between 1916 and 1919 when first Sweden
and then Denmark surpassed all others. During the Second World War, Norway and
Sweden, now in company with Iceland, showed the best-practice levels in life
expectancy and remained leaders until 1986 when Japan took over the lead position.
Except for 2 years, during which the Netherlands and Switzerland respectively
out-performed all other countries, Japan has continued to hold the world record
until the present day. Thus, three of the nine countries demonstrate outstanding life
expectancy figures for very limited periods, i.e. a year or two, and for one of these,
Australia, annual data is in fact lacking. Only two single values are used for
Australia, of which one is used to cover a 7-year period in the 1860s and 1870s
(Oeppen and Vaupel 2002, Supplementary Material, Table 2).1 That leaves five
countries which among them share the world record for 148 out of the 160 years that
the analysis covers: Sweden, Norway, New Zealand, Iceland, and Japan. The focus
will hence be placed on these five leading nations.
Sweden and Norway have the highest levels of life expectancy from 1840 until
data become available for New Zealand in 1876. For a decade, the New Zealand
level exceeds the two Nordic countries with almost 5 years. However, the improve-
ment is somewhat faster in the two Nordic countries than in New Zealand, which
means that they converge and finally catch-up in the beginning of the 1940s, as
shown in Fig. 17.1. This is the period in which the decline in infant and child
mortality drives up life expectancy. It is also the period when mortality in low
virulent infectious diseases declines. Thus, the question is what makes these three
countries stay ahead of all others as regards mortality in infectious diseases among
infants and children during this 100-year period. Further, if comparing the three, why
is New Zealand unable to improve as fast as Sweden and Norway and keep its
superiority?
In the period after the Second World War, in the countries that started the
mortality decline in the nineteenth century, life expectancy was mainly driven by
reductions in mortality among the elderly due to a reduction in chronic diseases. Up
until 1985, when Japan took over the lead, Iceland, and for some years Norway and
Sweden, exhibit the highest life expectancy rates. It is noticeable that while
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and also Iceland, level off as they come into the
phase where life expectancy no longer mainly is driven by reductions in infant and
child mortality, Japan does not. Once again, the question is what factors make these
five countries more successful than the rest of the world.
1The data that Oeppen and Vaupel use stems from Rowland and cover periods between 9 and
16 years in length. The value for 1861–63, 1867–68, and 1874–75, when Australia is in lead, is
based on the average of the period 1860–1875, in which the value is lower than for Norway. Since




Beyond Six Billion by Bongaarts and Bulatao (2000:117–123), which Oeppen and Vaupel
refer to as regards changes in lethal diseases, not only gives an overview of the diversity of
diseases during various phases but also supplies an explanation much in line with Riley
(2001) and Omran (1971) and which can be summarised as follows:
1st stage 1700–1800.
Reduction in volatility/epidemics due to
1. more stable consumption (better storage and transportation) giving higher
resistance
2. decline in virulence of pathogens
2nd stage 1800–1900.
Reduction in infectious diseases (influenza, pneumonia, bronchitis, TB, and small-
pox) due to
1. increasing standard of living through improved health behaviour
2. public health measures including smallpox vaccination
3rd stage 1900–1960.
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Fig. 17.1 Female life expectancy 1751–2001. (Sources: The Human Mortality Database, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Ger-
many), available at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de (data downloaded on 7 October
2005); Hagskinna. Icelandic Historical Statistics (1997). Jónsson G. and M.S. Magnússon (eds.);
and Nanjo and Kobayashi (1985))
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4th stage 1960–1996.
Reduction in chronic diseases (cardiovascular, cerebrovascular and some cancer
diseases) due to
1. early detection and prevention
2. improvement in surgical procedures
3. refinement of medical therapies
The question is whether these factors explain why the five countries are in the
lead and why the development of female life expectancy is linear. How well did
Norway, Sweden and New Zealand do in terms of standard of living, improved
health behaviour, and public health measures in comparison to other countries up
until the Second World War?
Regarding Norway and Sweden, they did not perform well in terms of living
standards in the latter 1800s. GDP per capita in 1870 (in 1990 international dollars)
was low compared with the US, the Netherlands and England, as shown in
Table 17.2.
While real wages for workers in Sweden increased after 1870 (Bengtsson and
Dribe 2005; Jörberg 1971), we are less certain of the development prior to that. In
fact, during the first part of the nineteenth century, the majority of people might even
have been worse off than during the eighteenth century (Bengtsson and Dribe 2005).
GDP per capita for Norway was even lower than for Sweden. In New Zealand, GDP
per capita was well above the Nordic countries, to the extent that it was almost on a
par with the most advanced European countries. While the ranking of New Zealand
versus the two Nordic countries correctly reflects their position regarding life
expectancy, the rest is contrary to what we could expect given the countries’
economic performance.
The Nordic countries are today known for their flat income distribution. Histor-
ically, though, this has not been the case. The income distribution in the beginning of
the nineteenth century – a period of commercialization of agriculture and rapid
economic transformation – was most likely spread. Several indicators show that
while the income for landowners increased, it decreased for non-landed groups
making the latter more vulnerable to variations in food prices (Bengtsson 2004;
Bengtsson and Dribe 2005).
Turning to health behaviour, we have no evidence that Norwegians and Swedes
were better-off than other Europeans; rather the opposite. Malthus, for example,
Table 17.2 GDP per capita









Source: Maddison (2001, Table B-21)
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reports from travelling in Scandinavia that Swedes were dirty and poorly fed (James
1966:67). They did not even have proper inns for travellers. Malthus statement refers
to the beginning of the nineteenth century but similar depictions can be found well
into the 1930s, when the depreciatory concept Lortsverige (Dirty-Sweden) was
coined (Nordström 1938).
Riley claims that Sweden was very successful in terms of public health measures
(Riley 2001). He states that the vaccination campaigns eradicated smallpox. While it
is true that Sweden experienced rather few deaths in smallpox mortality after
vaccination started in 1801, most of the decline in smallpox mortality, nevertheless,
took place before this time (Bengtsson 1998, 2001; Sköld 1996). Smallpox vacci-
nation was not the only public health improvement undertaken. Other measures
include breast-feeding campaigns, education of midwives, disease control, invest-
ments in water supply and sewage systems, and promotion of improved personal
hygiene.
Without doubt, investments in water supply and sewage control did have effects
on mortality in urban areas after c. 1880, even more so in more urbanized countries
than Norway and Sweden, both of which both were predominantly rural countries at
this time. In fact, most cities in both Norway and Sweden in the mid-nineteenth
century, when the two were in the lead, were small; no more than large villages by
contemporary West European standards. By the same standards, only the two
capitals could rightly be defined as cities, which gave Norway and Sweden a
comparative advantage at a time when water supply and sewage control still were
insufficient in most urban regions. The urban toll was thus less heavy in less
urbanized countries, like Sweden and Norway, than in the more developed parts of
Western Europe.
As for other public health measures, such as the breast-feeding campaigns that
took place in Sweden from the 1830s and onwards, a certain local impact in areas
where breast-feeding was uncommon was reported (Brändström 1984), but the
influence on national levels of infant mortality was slight. Incidentally, childhood
mortality in fact went up in Sweden during the period when these campaigns started
(Fridlizius 1984). Other measures, like the training of midwives, commenced about
the same time as the breast-feeding campaigns. Taken together, it is likely that they
had some impact on the infant mortality decline from around the 1830s onwards.
The question of improved storage of food and other undertakings aimed at
stabilizing consumption which, according to Bongaarts and Bulatao (2000) were
important for the mortality reduction in the eighteenth century, constitutes a contro-
versial issue. Firstly, we have no evidence of such measures being taken in the
Nordic countries and secondly, it is unlikely that such initiatives would have
influenced trends in infant and child mortality to any significant degree (Wrigley
and Schofield 1981).
To summarize, Sweden and Norway had no advantage in terms of living stan-
dards or equal income distribution in the nineteenth century when they exhibited the
highest level of recorded life expectancy in the world. Neither were they particularly
well-organized with regard to, for example, the poor relief system. However, several
public measures, like the above mentioned education of midwives and breast-
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feeding campaigns, were carried out in order to improve public health. They were
also favoured by a low degree of urbanization. But perhaps most important of all,
they were lucky to escape from highly virulent diseases, i.e. smallpox, even before
vaccination programs started.
For New Zealand, which held the position of world leader in life expectancy for
57 years of the 160-year period, other factors were instrumental. In 1876, the first
year data is available for New Zealand, there are indications showing that the
country’s white population was the most long-lived on Earth and that the level of
living standard was well above the Nordic countries, as well as most other countries
of the world. The situation also differed in that a large share of its rapidly increasing
population was made-up by immigrants. Furthermore, not only is it reasonable to
assume these immigrants to be of reasonably good health, in particular considering
that they had travelled long distance, most of them were selected for their qualities
and also underwent at least one health test, for phthisis (Pool and Cheung 2005).
New Zealand also became a well-organized society with an expanding public sector.
It can easily be compared to Britain in terms of health organisation and institutions
but without the burden of large cities and with a selected population, thus almost as a
natural experiment with the UK as a point of departure.2 Still, however, improve-
ments in life expectancy were slower than in Norway and Sweden. Thus, the lead for
New Zealand is much a result of its initial superiority: a selected, well-fed, well-
organized population in combination with a low disease load.
In comparing New Zealand with Norway and Sweden, and the three of them with
the rest of the world, it is difficult to distinguish any “regular stream of continuing
progress” that could explain why these three specific countries on a global scale
perform so outstandingly in life expectancy. It is seemingly a basket of factors, partly
different in New Zealand from the two Nordic countries, which make them stay at
the top. They share the low degree of urbanization and a low disease load and differ
in terms of economic resources. They are well-organized in that public schooling
was introduced early and that they took public measures to improve health, but so
did many other countries without advancing to the lead position and without
contributing to the linear development of life expectancy.
Moving on to the latter part of the twentieth century, this period is characterised by
propelled life expectancy due to declining death rates among the elderly, mainly as an effect
of mortality reduction in chronic diseases (cardiovascular, cerebrovascular and some cancer
diseases). According to Bongaarts and Bulatao (2000) this is brought about by early
detection and prevention of diseases, improvements in surgical procedures, and refinements
of medical therapies. The question is why Iceland and, post-1986, Japan perform better than
all other countries within these areas.
Starting with Iceland – the world leader for 19 years between 1941 and 1984 – it
has an historical development that sets it apart from the other Nordic countries.
2Jim Oeppen made this point during the workshop that this volume is based on. He also noticed that
life expectancy on the English country side was on a par with New Zealand during the latter part of
the nineteenth century.
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While Iceland had a stagnant population throughout the nineteenth century, the other
countries experienced steady population growth. In addition, mortality was higher
and life expectancy was lower than in any of the other Nordic countries. The
Icelandic life expectancy at birth during the 1880s is about 10 years less than
Norway and Sweden. In the last decades of the nineteenth century and in the
beginning of the twentieth century, however, mortality drops dramatically and in
the 1940s, Iceland is on a par with Norway and Sweden, as shown in Fig. 17.1.
Causing the catch-up is a fall in infant and child mortality. Due to the high infant and
child mortality in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the proportion surviving to
ages above 65 years in the 1940s was very low compared with the countries in the
lead. Thus, the population at risk in Iceland is constituted in a different way than
New Zealand, Norway and Sweden since the females in older ages represented a
much smaller proportion of their birth cohorts than in the other three countries. As
the difference with the other countries diminishes, Iceland follows the same pattern
of life expectancy as Norway and Sweden. In some of the years in the post-World
War II period their life expectancy is slightly higher, in some years it is lower.
Japan differs somewhat from the other countries and had it not been for this
country, the linear development would have been interrupted by the 1980s since the
life expectancy in Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and New Zealand is levelling off. Japan
is a country with a very high income level, attained only over the last decades.
Previous to its rapid economic development from the 1960s onwards, the situation
was less favourable and life expectancy was rather low. In fact, Japan is an example
of one of the newly industrialized countries that have shown a tremendous devel-
opment during the course of the twentieth century. Life expectancy for women rose
from 60 years in 1950 to 80 years in 1984. This is not a development of life
expectancy by 2.92 but by 6.00 months per year! Is this due to early detection and
prevention of diseases, improvements in surgical procedures, and refinements of
medical therapies causing mortality among the elderly to decline? It is surely not;
rather it is an exemplary case of the catch-up of a rapidly developing country. The
increase in life expectancy is not mainly driven by mortality improvements solely
among the elderly but within a wider age span.
The rapid change in Japan also has some characteristics in common with Iceland
that are important in making comparisons with the old leaders. The rapid transition
from high to low mortality within a short period of time means fewer elderly
relatively speaking. For example, while 90% of the women born in Sweden in
1935 have reached the age of 65 years, the corresponding figure for Japan is only
60%3. Thus the population age structure in 2000 is entirely different in Japan
comparative to Sweden. This has two implications. First, the Japanese women at
higher ages contributing to the period life-expectancy in year 2000 are highly
selected in comparison to the Swedish older women. If the “scarring” effect is
3Based on data from Population Statistics of Japan 2003, complied by National Institute of
Population and Social Security Research, Japan, and Befolkningsutvecklingen under 250 år (Pop-
ulation Development in Sweden in a 250-year perspective), Demografiska rapporter 1999:2,
Statistics Sweden.
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smaller than positive selection effects then the Japanese elderly would be expected to
be less fragile than their Swedish counterparts4. Second, due it its late fertility
transition, the elderly are relatively speaking fewer in Japan compared with Sweden.
While the proportion 65 years and over in Sweden reached 8% in 1900, the
corresponding figure was reached in Japan more than 70 years later. Because the
Japanese elderly are fewer, relatively speaking, the costs for pensions and care are
smaller for the Japanese vis-à-vis the Swedish working generation.
17.3 Summary and Discussion
We started off by pointing out that very few countries, only nine, have held the
leading position in life expectancy at birth over the last 160 years, and only five of
them did so for more than a few years. Typically, new countries caught up with and
replaced former best-practice countries for several decades. However, we can note
that this has not only been the case for life expectancy but has also occurred in other
areas of human activity, such as economic performance. The total number of leaders
in GDP per capita corresponds in size to the number of leaders in life expectancy,
albeit they are not the same countries. The list of GDP leaders, ranked from high to
low according to years at the lead and for roughly the same period, is as follows: the
USA, Australia, Switzerland, the UK, and New Zealand (Maddison 2001). The fact
that this list is different from that for life expectancy, emphasizes the relevance of
Easterlin’s conclusions that the mortality decline since the mid-nineteenth century
was not mainly driven by economic development (Easterlin 1999). Instead, there are
a variety of factors that lie behind the improvements in life expectancy, economic
factors constituting only one of these.
High life expectancy in Sweden and Norway in the mid-nineteenth century was
due to low infant and child mortality, in particular in infectious diseases. It was not
the result of private or societal investments, strong nation-states, high living stan-
dards or an equal income distribution. What favoured the Nordic countries was
instead a low degree of industrial development and urbanization combined with a
low disease load. When New Zealand took over the lead position in 1876 (the first
year for there is data), it shared these favourable characteristics of the two Nordic
countries, in addition to other favourable conditions such as high income levels and a
positively selected population.
Mortality in all age-groups dropped quickly in the early twentieth century but the
improvements in life expectancy were still mainly due to the decline in infant and
child mortality. During this period it was largely due to societal investments of
reducing disease exposure; directly through eradication programs, indirectly through
water purification systems and better transportation. This was the case for the most
developed countries. For example, the previously large differences between hospital
wards in many US cities disappear within a few decades (Fogel 2004). The same
4See Preston et al. 1998, p. 1232.
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process was at hand in countries like Singapore, Sri Lanka, Argentina, Costa Rica,
Chile, Cuba, and Uruguay, which later affected the mortality transition (Bongaarts
and Bulatao 2000:124). Still, none of these countries reached the highest level of life
expectancy. New Zealand remained in the lead and it was instead the Nordic
countries, making the same sorts of societal investments, which caught up in the
1940s. Thus, societal investments in infrastructure and high per capita income alone
were not that important in determining life expectancy at birth. If this were the case,
the US, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand would be at the top.
Iceland had been lagging far behind the leading nations when it started its catch-up
which brought it to lead in the 1940s, and for Japan this was even more the case before it
became the world leader in the 1980s. Both countries, especially Japan, had a very small
elderly population when reaching the top position in terms of life expectancy. Today, life
expectancy in the developed countries is not entirely the result of low infant and child
mortality, as used to be the case, but instead old age mortality has become important.
Medical care and private investments in health are also of greater significance nowadays.
Thus Japan had the advantage of rapid improvements in living standards and societal
investments in infrastructure, facilitated by access to new types of medical care, all of which
they share with the most advanced countries of the world. In addition, they have a smaller
group of elderly in the population. This means that the elderly are a selected group. Since
the proportion of elderly is lower in Japan due to its late fertility decline, it also means,
ceteris paribus, that Japanese senior citizens will have access to more care resources than
their equals in countries that have experienced an earlier fertility transition.
Why then has life expectancy in the flow of best-practice countries followed a
linear trend for a 160 year period? It is hard to find any specific continuous process
that explains such a development. It resembles more the outcome of a diversity of
processes, of which some but not all are directly related to human activity. If one
compares with economic performance, it is reasonable to ask why life expectancy
does not follow the exponential trends of economic output, the signum of economic
growth ever since Malthus wrote his first essay, but instead only a linear trend? As
regards economic development, more resources create more resources for good
investments, thus generating an exponential trend. In the Malthusian world, popu-
lation expanded at an exponential rate and production at a linear rate at best. Here we
are confronted with the opposite situation: The economy expands at an exponential
rate while the population stagnates and life expectancy develops at a linear rate. The
question is then ‘why have we been less successful in investments in health than in
economic growth’?
It is reasonable that the best-practice path of linearity could be used for forecast-
ing life expectancy for countries still in the catch-up phase, assuming that they have
the economic means and incentives to invest in best-practice technology. Countries
with a rapid catch-up, like Iceland and Japan, also has the advantage of having a
relatively smaller proportion of elderly for several decades, constituting a sort of
population momentum, which works in their favour and which helps them to stay on
the path of linear advancement. The momentum, however, disappears after some
time and then it is likely that they, like their predecessors at the lead, face a
downward bend in life expectancy. Few countries finally became world leaders,
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still they tend to be replaced and their life expectancy curve levels off. Thus, new
countries are catching up and replacing the former leader and contributing to the
linear development of life expectancy.
A parallel within economics can be drawn with the so called Cardwell’s Law
(Mokyr 1990) economics, which states that no country can maintain technological
lead for very long. It implies turnover at the top, just as the case was with regard to
life expectancy. Several other economists could be referred to, such as Alexander
Gerschenkron who developed the concept of Economic Backwardness
(Gerschenkron 1966). Perhaps even more to the point are the concepts of the
institutional economist Torstein Veblen, who coined the phrases “the penalty of
taking the lead” and “the advantage of borrowing the technological arts”. Both
phrases refer to the disadvantage of old investments, or in the case of human capital,
“aged” capital vis-à-vis new capital. These concepts therefore seem highly relevant
to apply when evaluating the significance of low proportions of elderly (i.e. “aged”
capital) in populations that has more recently undergone demographic transition, as
for example Japan. Will then the future pace of life expectancy in Japan slack as a
result of the penalty of taking the lead (population ageing) as has be the case for
previous world leaders? And will new countries take the advantage of a backward
position and reach the top ranks in terms of life expectancy? My answer is ‘yes’ on
both of these questions.
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Tommy Bengtsson and Kaare Christensen
This part addresses the question of how information on changes in patterns in the
cause of death can be used to improve mortality forecasting. While the increase in
life expectancy was largely propelled by the decline in infant and child mortality up
until the middle of the twentieth century, it has since then been sustained by the
decline in old age mortality. The improvement in life expectancy among the elderly
is mainly due to progress in combating chronic diseases. Mortality in cardiovascular
and cerebrovascular diseases and some forms of cancer has declined. While
improved medical care – earlier detection, improved surgery, and better therapies
– is a major factor behind this, it is not the only one. Changes in working conditions,
life styles and improvements early in life have contributed to the reduction of
mortality in chronic diseases, as have other factors. In this volume, the focus is on
the changes in the patterns of cause of death.
The chapter by Graziella Caselli, Jacques Vallin, and Marco Marsili discusses the
usefulness of making extrapolations of past trends in major diseases. They discuss
the problems related this method. In spite of clear drawbacks in using this informa-
tion for extrapolation, they do not categorically reject it since it can provide a fairly
realistic overview of what is behind trends and in doing so alert policy makers of
possible effects if these trends continue. Other means of making use of causes of
death information for forecasting are discussed as well, including making use of
information from other countries.
Måns Rosén starts from an epidemiological perspective, discussing the relation-
ships between incidence, prevalence and mortality. In addition to examining possi-
bilities of extrapolating past trends in cause specific mortality, Rosén brings up the
central discussion of whether prolongation of life leads to compression or
T. Bengtsson
Centre for Economic Demography, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
e-mail: tommy.bengtsson@ekh.lu.se
K. Christensen
Institute of Public Health, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark
prolongation of morbidity. While many studies in the past have concluded that
compression is dominating, some recent Swedish studies indicate that this may not
be the case. Thus it may well be that improvements in medical care and therapy will
lead to an increase in the demand for health expenses but not necessarily health care
in this group.
The third and final chapter, by Richard Willets, discusses how analyses of
mortality by cause of death will influence forecasts in the UK. His conclusion is
that, despite well-documented difficulties in making cause of death projections in the
past, there still appears to be a good case for continuing to do so. This is particularly
the case when predicting mortality among the not very old elderly, say those below
80 years of age. It can also be used to test “extreme” scenarios. Thus while using
information on causes of death in making mortality forecasts has proven to be
difficult, there still is a substantial potential to be gained.
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Chapter 18
How Useful Are the Causes of Death When
Extrapolating Mortality Trends. An Update
Graziella Caselli, Jacques Vallin, and Marco Marsili
Old age and adult mortality have over the last decades enjoyed a remarkable decline
throughout the western world, posing the researcher with new challenges and
opening up fresh horizons in life expectancy trends. The recent drop in mortality
may be largely traced to the unexpected decline in cardiovascular diseases and
certain cancers. Thus it could be hoped that in the future these trends would continue
and extend to include other causes where, for the moment, little change has occurred.
Such a hypothesis is all the more realistic in view of the fact that recent changes are
linked, not just to advances in more efficacious medical treatment, but also to a
growing awareness on the part of the general public regarding questions of health
and the crucial role played by life style and behaviour. These include improved
dietary habits, for example, a better attitude to risk factors, particularly to smoking,
alcohol abuse, dangerous driving, etc. This awareness, which prevails among more
recent, well-informed and better educated cohorts, not only produces immediate
results, but maybe even more so in the future, should this spare coming generations
the accumulation of risks which were and continue to be the burden particularly of
older cohorts.
These considerations have increasingly encouraged researchers to refute the timid
claims regarding future mortality generally made by Institutes of Statistics when
This paper is an update of Caselli and Vallin (1999a) (in French) and Caselli and Vallin (1999b)
(in English).
G. Caselli (*)
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producing population estimates (Vallin 1989, 1992; Vallin and Meslé 1989; Meslé
1993; Caselli 1993; van Poppel and de Beer 1996) and to seek to take better account
of more recent progress when estimating future mortality trends. This has led to
including causes of death as a component of mortality (Benjamin and Overton 1985;
Caselli and Egidi 1992; Wilmoth 1996) and to seek methods to account for the
cohort effect, and indeed to combine the two at times (Caselli 1996).
More complex data or more sophisticated methods are not themselves a guarantee
for better results. Numerous experiences of this nature have ended up more as a
disappointment than anything else. Our goal here is to focus on the advantages and
disadvantages of taking causes of death into consideration when making mortality
estimates and to explore the results of the different possible methods. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to take a stand regarding the present debate on life expectancy
outcomes or even to contribute to this. Rather, our task is to establish whether, by
refining the methods, the results of a simple extrapolation of past trends could be
improved, without making future hypotheses and irrespective of those directly
stemming from an analysis of past trends.
The first obstacle one meets when projecting mortality trends cause by cause
depends on the fact that even if there is one cause for which mortality increases, this
will inevitably, sooner or later, depending on the relative importance of this cause,
lead to a general increase in mortality for all causes, the overall perspective thus
being more pessimistic than that yielded by extrapolating total mortality, as we will
show below. In other words, it is almost not worthwhile considering mortality
outlooks by cause if we are unable to “predict” the inflexion points or the changes
in the direction of the evolution curve. Therefore the question which must be posed
is if by some means, when using the model of past trends, we can predict such
changes in the trends.
To do so we will focus on the England &Wales male population and on mortality
risks between 60 and 85 years. Opting for this population will help focus on
mortality trends among the elderly, these being more sensitive to changes described
above, and elude the thorny question of life expectancy thresholds, which to our
mind calls for an entirely different approach.
When dealing with causes of death, for the sake of clarity, obviously only a
limited number of groups of specific causes may be referred to, albeit with ade-
quately diverse recent trends to be able to highlight the difficulties involved and
evaluate the possible solutions. Five sufficiently descriptive causes were selected:
– cardiovascular diseases,
– bronchial and lung cancers,
– digestive cancers,
– other tumours,
– other diseases and violent deaths.
This classification is particularly suited to England &Wales as it includes a cause,
bronchial and lung cancer, for which male mortality underwent a sharp rise followed
by a decline, from the 1970s.
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A reference period also had to be selected to elaborate a model of past trends. It
was decided to focus alternatively on a long series, 1950–2000, which includes the
period where mortality from bronchial and lung cancers was steep, as well as a
shorter series (1981–2000), showing more recent trends.
The estimations made were obtained by extrapolating the logarithms of age
specific mortality rates, which vary according to the number and types of variables
considered to adapt the data sources.
Having, first of all, highlighted the absurdity of extrapolations based on a simple
linear adjustment of a chronological series of age specific mortality rates (referred to
here as the “linear” model), we will then try to obtain better results by gradually
refining the modelling of the data series. Thus three increasingly complex models
will be explored. First, while keeping to the approach where an independent
adjustment is made for each chronological series of rates by age, an effort will be
made to improve the outcome by selecting the best curve possible to adjust the data
series (referred to here as the “least squares” method). Then, a model elaborated by
Ronald Lee and Lawrence Carter, referred to here as “Lee-Carter”, will be used,
where the logarithm of age specific mortality rates is a function of age as well as of
period. Finally, thanks to a solution described elsewhere (Caselli 1993; Burgio and
Frova 1995), a third component, that is the cohort effect, will be considered, using
the “APC” model (age, period, and cohort).
However, to judge the comparable validity of these different approaches, extrap-
olations using older series must be compared with reality as it occurred. We will do
this by using data from 1950–1980 to make projections for 1981–2000, which can
then be compared with real mortality trends.
18.1 Extrapolation of Mortality by Cause Risks Absurdity
Figure 18.1 describes the results of a simple logarithmic extrapolation for mortality
rates for all causes (the “linear” model), for each of the five age groups considered
here (from 60–64 to 80–84 years), until the year 2050, based on data for 1950–2000,
and shows a mortality projection which ignores individual trends for each cause of
death. Average life expectancy between 60 and 85 years for an English male passes
from 18.1 years in 2000 to 20.0 years in 2050, in other words a two-year gain.
Figure 18.2, on the other hand, illustrates the results of summing similar type
extrapolations performed separately for each group of causes. A systematic increase
in total mortality immediately occurs at older ages between 75 and 85 years, while
the trend of reduction for ages between 60 and 75 years is less important than that
obtained from the extrapolation for all causes, to such an extent that the average
number of years one could expect to live between 60 and 85 years remains quite
stable (around 18.0) over all the projection period (Table 18.5). Not only is this
absent increase in survival at older ages hard to believe, it also appears somewhat
absurd as sooner or later it yields mortality rates twice as high as the present for the
highest ages. The problem, as we know, stems from the fact that causes of death are
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Fig. 18.1 Extrapolation of mortality rates for all causes by age group 2001–2050, based on a
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Fig. 18.2 Mortality trends by age group 2001–2050 obtained by summing specific rates by cause
extrapolated using a “linear” adjustment of 1950–2000 data (England and Wales, males)
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included where mortality trends were rising during a large part of the period of
reference. This is the case with bronchial and lung cancers, as well as “other
tumours”, where unfavourable trends are contrasted with favourable trends in
cardiovascular diseases and digestive cancers (Fig. 18.3).
According to this outline, the impact of bronchial and lung cancers on total
mortality comparative rates at 60–84 years would rise from 9.9% in 2000 to
30.9% in 2050, while that of cardiovascular diseases would fall from 45.7 to
23.4% (Table 18.1)!
No doubt this example is too extreme. Obviously, for England & Wales no one
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Fig. 18.3 Extrapolation of mortality rates by age group 2001–2050, for 4 groups of causes, the
trends of which are in contrast, using a “linear” adjustment of 1950–2000 data (England and Wales,
males)
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Fig. 18.3 (continued)
Table 18.1 Percent of each group of causes as part of the standardized mortality rates for all causes
at 60–84 years, in 2000 and 2050, following an extrapolation using a “linear” adjustment of 1950–
2000 rates, and then 1981–2000 rates (England & Wales, males)
Group of causes of death 2000
2050
Base 1950–2000 Base 1981–2000
Cardiovascular diseases 45.7 23.4 16.2
Bronchial and lung cancers 9.9 30.9 3.6
Digestive cancers 7.7 4.0 5.6
Other tumours 16.9 24.0 37.6
Other diseases and violent deaths 19.8 17.7 37.1
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
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2001–2050 by a linear adjustment of the entire period 1950–2000, when in fact a
reversal trend occurred in the early 1970’s.
Thus fresh calculations were made, restricting the adjustment of past trends to the
period 1981–2000. The results are visibly improved for bronchial and lung cancer,
as this time mortality for this cause decidedly follows a downward trend for all age
groups (Fig. 18.4). However, the problem is still not solved as mortality from “other
tumours” increases for all ages. Therefore, in the final calculation the sum of the
extrapolations by cause generate a reduction in overall mortality (Fig. 18.5). There is
no doubt, given this scenario, that the total number of years lived between 60 and
84 years increases, rising from 18.1 years in 2000 to 20.2 years in 2050. However,
this rise is less rapid than when total mortality is extrapolated (reaching 22.0 years),
but continues to fall if the extrapolation continues beyond 2050 and does not top for
the oldest old high levels, as in the previous instance.
18.2 Would More Sophisticated Methods Be Any Better?
Could we do any better with more sophisticated methods? The first attempt to be
made, while keeping to the approach which adjusts only one dimension of mortality
(chronology), is to choose, should it exist, an adjustment curve which is more
appropriate than a simple straight line.
18.2.1 A Better Adjustment of Chronological Series of Rates
by Age
Here a choice was made between four classic functions (straight line, parabole,
hyperbole, logistic) which offered the least sum of the square distances to the
observed values being selected. Thus, for bronchial and lung cancers, for example,
the parabolic method was opted for, as this would effectively appear to prolong more
satisfactorily observed trends in mortality by age (Fig. 18.6).
Again, the fact that mortality tends towards zero is obviously disputable. Unfor-
tunately, for “other tumours”, the “least-squares” are obtained by the straight line
method and we come up again against the same problem which arose previously,
albeit not quite as quickly, where a major cause such as bronchial and lung cancers
has been totally eliminated. Thus, we have merely delayed the march of time towards
the unlimited increase in mortality for older ages (as in Table 18.2), but in 2050, the
mortality profile by cause is much more deformed than in the previous instance, with
cardiovascular diseases are no longer at the top of the list, falling from 46% in 2000
to 5.5% in 2050, while the impact of “other tumours” is remarkably increased, from
17% to 55%, keeping the lead, to such an extent that the role of bronchial and lung
cancer is eliminated.
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If the data observed are only adjusted for the most recent period (1981–2000),
bronchial and lung cancers remain largely unchanged, but this tends to modify the
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Fig. 18.4 Extrapolation of mortality rates by age group 2001–2050, for bronchial and lung cancers
and for “other tumours”, using a “linear” adjustment of 1981–2000 data (England & Wales, males)
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the sum of the total rates by cause. The mortality profile by cause for 2050 is thus
considerably modified, with an increase to 16% for cardiovascular diseases and a
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Fig. 18.5 Mortality trends by age group 2001–2050, obtained by summing rates by cause
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Fig. 18.6 Extrapolation of age group mortality rates for bronchial and lung cancers, using a “least-
squares” adjustment of 1950–2000 data (England & Wales, males)
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Figures 18.7, 18.8, and 18.9 report the different outcomes obtained to date
regarding standardized mortality rates at 60–84 years, referring alternatively to the
periods 1950–2000 and 1981–2000.
Based on data observed for 1950–2000, the improvement gained by using the
“least-squares” method to adjust the curve, generates overall within the limits of the
extrapolation period explored here, a trend in the sum of mortality rates by cause
which is clearly less preposterous than that obtained with a strictly “linear” model
even though still far removed from that yielded by the direct extrapolation of
mortality for all causes. According to the sum of the extrapolations by cause, the
Table 18.2 Percent of each group of cause as part of the standardized mortality rates for all causes
at 60–84 years, in 2000 and in 2050, after a “least-squares” extrapolation of 1950–2000 rates and
then 1981–2000 rates (England & Wales, males)
Group of causes of death 2000
2050
Base 1950–2000 Base 1981–2000
Cardiovascular diseases 45.7 5.5 15.9
Bronchial and lung cancers 9.9 0.0 3.5
Digestive cancers 7.7 6.9 5.6
Other tumours 16.9 55.3 37.6
Other diseases and violent deaths 19.8 32.3 37.4
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Fig. 18.7 Results compared, in terms of standardized mortality rates at 60–84 years, “linear” and
“least-squares” models, for mortality for “all causes” and the “sum of rates by cause” based on
observed data for 1950–2000 (England & Wales, males)
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Fig. 18.8 Compared results, in terms of standardized mortality rates at 60–84 years, “linear” and
“least-squares” models, for mortality for “all causes” and the “sum of rates by cause” based on
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Fig. 18.9 Results, in terms of standardized mortality rates at 60–84 years, of the Lee-Carter model
for mortality for all causes and the sum of the rates by cause, according to the reference period used
(1950–2000 and 1981–2000) (England & Wales, males)
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mean number of years lived between 60 and 85 years rises from 18.1 in 2000 to 20.6
for 2050, compared with 24.0 obtained with the direct extrapolation of mortality for
all causes.
Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that the reference period used for the
adjustment can notably change the end result. If this is limited to the most recent
period, the role (favourable) played by trends in cardiovascular diseases is more
quickly obliterated than that (unfavourable) played by “other tumours” (Fig. 18.8).
Surprisingly, in 2050, by summing the extrapolations by cause the average number
of years lived would be exactly the same as in the previous instance (20.2 years), and
this time, too, it is lower than that obtained by a direct extrapolation of mortality for
all causes (22.1).
One could, while maintaining the same approach, whereby a model is elaborated
using a period component of age rates, attempt a further refinement, by choosing for
each cause of death not only the best adjustment function but also the reference
period which would best reflect recent trends. The limits of such an approach emerge
fairly quickly, which risks being over-subjective and in any case fails to solve the
problem of the impossibility of foreseeing an eventual reversal of the upward trends
in “other tumours”.
18.2.2 “Age-Period” Adjustment (Lee-Carter Model)
In order to continue, more complex models are needed, which take into account
other aspects of mortality, possibly able to anticipate trends already germinating in
certain available data sources. First of all, using the model proposed by Ronald Lee
and Lawrence Carter (1992), we will perform our extrapolations using a combina-
tion of past information on age and period. This stochastic model may be denoted by:
ln mx, tð Þ ¼ ax þ bxkt þ ex, tð Þ
where, of course, mx,t is the mortality rate at age x at times t, ax, bx, and kt, the
model’s parameters, and ex,t the stochastic error, so that the average E(ex,t) is equal to
zero and the variance V(ex,t) is constant. When the model is adjusted by the least-
squares method, the interpretation of the parameters is very simple: the adjusted
value of ax is strictly equal to the average of ln(mx,t) for the period, so that bx
represents change in mortality age structure and kt period trends. Regardless of
whether the extrapolation is based on overall data observed between 1950 and
2000 or only on those for the most recent period (1981–2000), the outcomes
obtained for each group of causes is little different from those obtained using the
classic adjustment of the least squares: cause profiles in 2050 in Table 18.3 are more
or less the same as those in Table 18.2.
As before, when looking back, two facts are quite remarkable. On the one hand
the result obtained by directly extrapolating mortality for all 18.1 years lived
between 60 and 85 years in 2000 rises to 22.0 years in 2050, when referring to the
period 1981–2000, instead of only 23.9 when referring to the period 1950–2000.
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However, on the other hand, a cause by cause extrapolation considerably reduces
over time these differences, until by summing the rates by cause extrapolated, in
2050 we obtain, respectively, 20.1 and 20.8 years lived, depending on the reference
period considered. This occurs, as previously was the case, so that with this model as
with the standard adjustment of the least squares, a marked increase may be foreseen
in mortality for other tumours. Finally, this model, despite the fact that it is much
more sophisticated, contributes little more than that offered by the standard adjust-
ment of the least squares.
18.2.3 “Age-Period-Cohort” Adjustment (APC Model)
Are further refinements necessary when using an “APC” model based on the
combined effects of age, period and cohort? APC models have been used chiefly
to interpret past mortality trends (Osmond and Gardner 1982; Hobcraft et al. 1982;
Osmond 1985; Caselli and Capocaccia 1989; Wilmoth et al. 1990). Their application
in mortality forecasts is more recent (Caselli 1996) or limited to certain specific
causes. Burgio and Frova (1995), based on the fact that, generally speaking, the
mortality risk, m, may be expressed as a function m ¼ f(ZΘ) of factors Z ¼ (z1, . . .,
zn) and the parameters Θ ¼ (θ1, . . ., θk), hypothesised that the logarithms of the
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Table 18.3 Percent of each group of causes as part of the standardized mortality rates for all causes
at 60–84 years, in 2000 and in 2050, after extrapolating with the Lee-Carter method 1950–2000
rates and 1981–2000 rates (England and Wales, males)
Group of causes of death 2000
2050
Base 1950–2000 Base 1981–2000
Cardiovascular diseases 45.7 4.0 16.2
Bronchial and lung cancers 9.9 0.8 3.6
Digestive cancers 7.7 7.9 5.6
Other tumours 16.9 54.4 38.1
Other diseases and violent deaths 19.8 32.9 36.5
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
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i ¼ 1, . . . ,h1,j ¼ 1, . . . ,h2 and k ¼ 1, . . . , h3
In this function, yt,x* denotes the theoretical value of mortality rates at age
x during the year t (total or by cause) and a, b1, . . ., bh1, c1, . . ., ch2, d1, . . ., dh3
are the parameters estimated by the least-squares method.
While this adequately describes past trends, it is not directly applicable to fore-
casts, to the extent that it does not pretend to prognosticate short-term fluctuations,
translated by variations of the “period” parameter. For this reason the authors
subdivided this parameter into two additive components, a basic movement,
described by the straight line uniting the points relative to the first and last observa-
tions, and deviations in this trend. To perform the extrapolation they simply
prolonged the basic movement, presuming deviations equal to zero in the basic
trend.
The cause profile for 2050, for the reference period 1950–2000 (Table 18.4), is
very similar to that obtained for the previous two attempts (Tables 18.2 and 18.3).
What can be noted is a slightly larger impact of “other tumours” (55.6%) compared
with a lesser impact of “cardiovascular diseases” (3.4%). On the other hand, results
differ when, in the projection by cause, the more recent reference period 1981–2000
is taken. An important role is played by “other tumours” (47% as opposed to 38%),
compared with a lesser impact of “other diseases” (25% as opposed 37%), while that
of tumours of the digestive trace increases (17% compared with 6%). Nonetheless,
regarding the number of years lived between 60 and 85 years (Table 18.5), the
outcome of the APC approach for the years 1981–2000 is particularly interesting.
Only with the APC model is the number of years lived according to the sum of the
extrapolations by causes (23.2 years) close to that obtained with the direct extrap-
olation of mortality for all causes (24.0 years). It can be clearly seen that the APC
model, which takes into account cohort effects, is better able to embrace the
complexities of more recent trends.
Figure 18.10 compares trend estimates of the sum of standardized mortality rates
by cause for each of the four models used here, applied alternatively to the two
periods 1950–2000 and 1981–2000.
Table 18.4 Percent of each group of causes as part of the standardized mortality rates for al causes
at 60–84 years, in 2000 and 2050, after extrapolating with the “APC” model rates for 1950–2000
and for 1981–2000 (England & Wales, males)
Group of causes of death 2000
2050
Base 1950–2000 Base 1981–2000
Cardiovascular diseases 45.7 3.4 9.9
Bronchial and lung cancers 9.9 0.0 1.5
Digestive cancers 7.7 7.3 16.6
Other tumours 16.9 55.6 46.6
Other diseases and violent deaths 19.8 33.6 25.4
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Compared with the results of the “linear” model applied to the entire period
1950–2000, this is largely unaware of a further acceleration in the 1980’s mortality
decline among the elderly, particularly regarding cardiovascular diseases. This pre-
dicts almost constant mortality levels, if not a slight increase toward 2040, while all
the other cases on the figure (comprising the “linear” model applied to the period
1981–2000) all appear to have grasped the drop in mortality for this cause although
the intensity tends to vary. In other words, at this level of appreciation, choosing the
right reference period is very important.
Nonetheless, if further refinement is sought, two aspects may be noted. Even
when applied to the entire period 1950–2000, the results of the “APC”, “Lee-Carter”
and “least-squares” models are not different from each other and the same as for the
“linear” model when restricted to the most recent period and, thus, offer greater
resistance should a poor choice be made regarding the reference period.
Table 18.5 Trends from today to 2050 in the number of years lived between 60 and 84 years,
according to the model and the reference period used (England & Wales, males)
Reference period and model used
Observed values Extrapolated values
2000 2015 2030 2050
Reference period: 1950–2000
Linear model:
Total all causes 18.1 18.2 19.0 20.0
Sum of specific rates by cause 18.1 17.7 18.0 18.1
Least-squares model
Total all causes 18.1 20.3 22.3 24.0
Sum of specific rates by cause 18.1 19.8 20.5 20.6
Lee-Carter model
Total all causes 18.1 20.2 22.2 23.9
Sum of specific rates by cause 18.1 19.6 20.5 20.8
APC model
Total all causes 18.1 20.3 22.3 24.1
Sum of specific rates by cause 18.1 19.8 20.7 20.8
Reference period: 1981–2000
Linear model:
Total all causes 18.1 19.5 20.7 22.0
Sum of specific rates by cause 18.1 19.0 19.7 20.2
Least-squares model
Total all causes 18.1 19.5 20.8 22.1
Sum of specific rates by cause 18.1 19.1 19.8 20.2
Lee-Carter model
Total all causes 18.1 19.5 20.7 22.0
Sum of specific rates by cause 18.1 19.0 19.7 20.1
APC model
Total all causes 18.1 20.3 22.3 24.0
Sum of specific rates by cause 18.1 20.1 21.8 23.2
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Finally, in each instance, whether for one reason or another, when attempting an
extrapolation over the long term, undoubtedly it is advisable to use the most
sophisticated model, the APC model, the only one to take into account the cohort
effect and thus has the advantage of being able to detect the variety of changes which
occur during the entire period. The divergence between the results obtained arises
when accounting for recent or current reversal of certain tendencies. The actual
performance of the different projections may be appreciated even more clearly if
focus is given to how a specific cause has developed for which a fresh reversal has
been recorded. This can be seen in Fig. 18.11, illustrating patterns for bronchial and
lung cancers. Leaving aside the obvious absurdity of the application of the “linear”
model to the entire period 1950–2000, it can be seen at which point this model is
distinguished from the other three. When the reversed trend has been evident for
10 years or more, the results of all the projections are fairly similar. Of course what
can be seen are the same nuances noted above for the sum of the rates by cause, but
these are more attenuated. The trend, less pronounced in causes such as “other
tumours”, is more decisive at this level.
However, coming back to our question: is it worth considering the cause of death?
This exercise, which is purely a forecast, does not suffice to provide an answer.
Nonetheless, two comments are worth making. If a long reference period is opted for
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Fig. 18.10 A comparison, in terms of standardized mortality rates at 60–84 years, of the four
approaches used (“linear”, “least-squares”, “Lee-Carter”, and “APC” models), of the sum of the
rates by cause, according to the reference period used for the extrapolation (1950–2000 and
1981–2000) (England & Wales, males)
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results of the “linear” model are more pessimistic than others, with a “stagnation” in
the number of years lived between 60 and 85 years around 18.1 (in 2050), compared
with 20.0 years obtained by directly extrapolating rates for all causes (Table 18.5).
With the other three approaches used only slight differences arise when the cause of
death is considered, with the number of years lived between 60 and 85 years just
topping 20.6–20.8 in 2050. It should be noted that for each of the three models, the
sum of the extrapolated rates by cause is even less favourable than that obtained by
directly extrapolating mortality for all causes (24 years instead of 20.6 and 20.8).
If the reference period is confined to the end of the observation period
(1981–2000) the situation is reversed for the “linear” model which generates a
sizeable increase in the number of years lived between 60 and 85 years (20.2 in
2050), but, again, this result is visibly lower than the result obtained by extrapolating
mortality for all causes (22.0 in 2050). On the other hand, with the “least-squares”
and “Lee-Carter”models the outcome of the projection by cause is not very different
from that which is got using the longer period of reference and, for these models, too,
the number of years lived is lower than that for all causes. Results for the more recent
reference period regarding the application of the APC model are decidedly more
interesting. As will be recalled, values for years lived in 2050 differ little among each
other according to whether we consider the sums of rates extrapolated by cause or
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Fig. 18.11 A comparison of comparative mortality rates at 60–84 years, of the four approaches
used (“linear”, “least-squares”, “Lee-Carter” and “APC” models), for mortality from bronchial and
lung cancers, according to the reference period used for the extrapolation (1950–2000 and
1981–2000) (England & Wales, males)
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These results may be easily explained. In the first instance (the long reference
period), major importance is given to the role played by reversed mortality from
bronchial and lung cancers. This is quite well accounted for relatively speaking by
the more sophisticated extrapolation by cause models, but not by the “linear”model,
which by spreading the effects of the changing situation over the entire period,
ignores the substantial decline in mortality for this cause. More importantly, it
completely overlooks this decline among the oldest old that has only occurred
quite recently (see Fig.18.3). In the second instance (more recent, shorter period),
where reversed mortality from bronchial and lung cancers is “recognized” by all of
the models, differences mainly arise with regard to how they perceive the role played
by “other tumours”, which neither the “least-squares” nor the “Lee-Carter” models
were able to apprehend fully, while only the APC model managed to grasp these
changes.
18.3 The Models Put to the Proof
While providing food for thought, a comparison of the different projections does not
help us objectively in assessing how meaningful it is to take into account the causes
of death nor the validity of the models used to do so. What it does show us are the
differences among the results obtained and to suppose that this or that result is more
or less plausible. To determine whether a quality leap has occurred one can estimate
the model on an earlier period and compare the model’s projections with how reality
has unfolded thereafter. This is our approach.
It turns out that for any extrapolation the period opted for is of paramount
importance. We saw that if the period selected is too long, or too short, the risk is
that the different trends underway will not be detected. Thus it was decided to apply
the models to the period 1950–1980 and compare extrapolations for the period
1981–2000 to reality.
In this case it is clear that, regardless of the model used, apart from the APC
model the extrapolation of mortality for all causes largely underestimated the drop in
mortality (Fig. 18.12a). It is equally astonishing to see to what extent the results of
the first three models are confounded: Absolutely nothing in from the trends in
mortality rates by age for all causes in the 1960’s and 1980’s was captured by the
refinements in these models. All yield a little less than 16 years to live between the
ages of 60 and 85 years in 2000, instead of the 18.1 years observed (Table 18.6).
Considering the first three models, the picture is not better when causes of death
are considered (Fig. 18.12b): despite differences in outcome among the models,
none of them corresponded at all to the reality. Each of them underestimated the fall
in mortality. This underestimation, as expected, is totally exaggerated in the “linear”
model (just about 15 years to live between 60 and 85 years). Regarding “least
squares” and “Lee-Carter” models, it is better to avoid working on a cause-by-
cause approach and, thus, the projection was notably improved, although none of
them succeeded in arriving at a realistic result (Table 18.6). Moreover, the APC
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Fig. 18.12 Extrapolations for 1981–2000 of trends for 1950–1980 according to the four models,
compared with real trends (England & Wales, males) (a) Direct extrapolation of mortality for all
causes, (b) Sum of the extrapolations for mortality for all causes
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model is the only one that approached reproducing reality. In particular when
considering cause by death in the years 1981–2000 values often coincided with
those observed (Fig. 18.12b), while for the year 2000 survival between 60 and
85 years differed by half a year.
However, when considering the results obtained by cause, it is clear that the APC
model is not always better in capturing the renewed decline in mortality from
bronchial and lung cancers (Fig. 18.13). The linear model naturally gave the most
far-fetched results, extrapolating a preposterously high mortality rate, while on the
other hand, the “Lee-Carter” projections best reflected the changing trends.
Even given this success the “Lee-Carter” model may not be conferred universal
acclaim as of yet. Indeed, although the decline in bronchial and lung cancer mortality
was the main reason for the rapid improvement in mortality trends in the 1970’s and
Table 18.6 Number of years lived between 60 and 85 years in 2000: comparison between
observed values and those obtained by extrapolating the data for 1950–1980, according to the
four models (England & Wales, males)
Model
Observed values Extrapolated values
2000 Total all causes Sum of specific rates by cause
“Linear” model 18.1 15.7 14.9
“Least-squares” model 18.1 15.7 16.3
“Lee-Carter” model 18.1 15.8 16.2
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Fig. 18.13 Extrapolations for 1981–2000 of trends for 1950–1980 in bronchial and lung cancer
mortality, according to the four models, compared with real trends (England & Wales, males)
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1980’s, it was not the only reason. In fact, no single model, not even the APC model,
is capable of fully apprehending this accelerated decline, because the “buds” of this
even were not contained in any of the parameters of the models (Fig. 18.14).
Otherwise what one finds for diseases of the cardio-vascular system is a perfect
overlapping of the results of the first three models for the extrapolation of mortality
for all causes (Fig. 18.12a).
In other words, there is no advantage in taking into account the causes of death to
extrapolate mortality except in the case where future trends go strictly hand in hand
with cohort phenomena, for example in the case of behaviour patterns with regard to
smoking. In this case, the APC model performs best. No extrapolation model can
foresee trends, the premises of which are not detectable in a reading of past trends.
18.4 Conclusion
Finally, if the aim is to foresee as realistically as possible mortality for all causes, by
extrapolating past tendencies, we must make do with only extrapolating mortality
rates for all causes. This is not to say that the idea of extrapolating mortality by cause
is to be completely rejected. This can be useful from two points of view: to provide a
fairly realistic overview of the consequences of cohort effects (in which case the
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Fig. 18.14 Extrapolations for 1981–2000 of trends for 1950–1980 in mortality from cardiovascular
diseases according to the four models, compared with real trends (England & Wales, males)
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expected should past trends be prolonged over time (in which case the “linear”
model suffices).
The extrapolation of past trends is not the only means of making forecasts. The
future may also be fairly realistically based on observed data or that foreseen for
elsewhere. Experiences of other countries may be used, where trends have already
occurred similar to those one imagines will come to pass in the countries under
focus. England was a precursor with regard to smoking habits and their experience
may be used to anticipate reverse trends in bronchial and lung cancers, even if only
based on current tobacco consumption. Moreover, the effects of recent policies may
also be considered. A vaccination programme in a developing country may not be
overlooked when estimating future mortality trends. One can, moreover take into
account epidemiological facts which are already well-known, but whose effects on
mortality are not yet evident. Perhaps even trends in the AIDS epidemic will help us
estimate fairly precisely expected mortality over the next few years using only
tendencies among the seropositive population. In each of these instances, working
with a cause-by-cause model is to be favoured.
To make models, extrapolate trends, is all very well. However, the most complex
method is not necessarily the best. The truth may be summed up by by two sayings:
The only good tools are those which are fashioned to suit the purpose and it is better
to dream with your eyes open than make models with your eyes closed.
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Chapter 19
Forecasting Life Expectancy and Mortality
in Sweden – Some Comments




Since mortality is affected by innumerable factors in society, an inter-disciplinary
approach seems most appropriate. My contribution and point of departure starts from
an epidemiological perspective and from the overall objective of the Swedish Centre
for Epidemiology, i.e. to monitor public health in Sweden.1 An advantage of
epidemiology is the close link to public health and medicine as well as its focus
on analyses of risk factors and the search for causal chains between risk factors,
diseases and mortality. Mortality forecasting is a well-established discipline in
demography, but maybe less developed within epidemiology. Still, there have
been attempts to forecast mortality within the field of epidemiology (see
e.g. Wilhelmsen et al. 2004; Gunning-Schepers 1989; Gunning-Schepers et al.
1989; Kruijshaar et al. 2002; Conroy et al. 2003). Usually, epidemiologists have
focused on estimating mortality for specific causes of death (Wilhelmsen et al. 2004;
Conroy et al. 2003) but there are also attempts to predict total mortality (Gunning-
Schepers 1989; Kruijshaar et al. 2002). A common application has been to predict
coronary heart mortality based on data on risk factors, e.g. smoking, level of
cholesterol and blood pressure in the population (Wilhelmsen et al. 2004; Conroy
et al. 2003). Knowledge of risk factor patterns is therefore an essential element in
epidemiology. The risk factor approach will be discussed later. First, some com-
ments on the outline of this paper.
M. Rosén (*)
Centre for Epidemiology, National Board of Health and Welfare, Stockholm, Sweden
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I will start by introducing the two most widely used measures in epidemiology,
i.e. incidence and prevalence, and the relationships between those two measures and
mortality. Second, I will give some general comments on pros and cons with
different options for mortality forecasting. The different options discussed are
extrapolating mortality trends, predicting disease-specific causes of death, predicting
mortality trends based on potential elimination of causes of death or predicting
mortality based on risk factors or other developments in the community. Third,
some methodological problems will be discussed. Finally, I will advocate a risk
factor based approach and speculate about future mortality and longevity based on
our attempts to monitor public health in Sweden.
19.2 The Relationships Between Incidence, Prevalence
and Mortality
Incidence is defined as the number of new cases of a disease during a specified time
period while prevalence is the total number of people with a disease at a specific
point in time. It is well illustrated by a bath tube (Fig. 19.1) where the water coming
through the tap is the incidence and the water in the bath tube is the prevalence. The
prevalence is affected by the incidence, but also by the number of people cured or
deceased.
Those who die will no longer belong to the population at risk while those who are
cured still belong to the population at risk. The cured survivors will have a proba-
bility of contracting a new disease. Primary prevention may influence incidence
while prevalence is more of a measure of the total disease burden for society.
Mortality is affected by the incidence, which could be divided into different
components from demographic characteristics (number of people, population
growth and changing age distribution) to the risk of having/attracting a disease
(based on risk factor patterns). Mortality is also influenced by the chance of
surviving a disease. All these components are important to consider in mortality
forecasting.
Fig. 19.1 The relationships between incidence, prevalence, mortality and cured
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19.3 Extrapolating Mortality Trends or Predicting Disease-
Specific Causes of Death
Life expectancy has increased impressively during the past 150 years. In Sweden,
life expectancy for a man has improved from 35 years in the beginning of the 1800s
to 61 years in the 1920s and up to 77.91 years in 2003. For women, life expectancy is
82.43 years in 2003. This success story seems to be never ending. In the 1980s, many
believed there was little potential for improvement, but they were wrong. Still, it
seems unlikely and atheoretical to believe this can persist forever.
History can also show us the danger of only extrapolating existing trends. A
recent and dramatic story is the development of mortality and life expectancy in
Russia.2 Between 1970 and 1985 life expectancy in Russia was quite stable around
68 years (WHO). Between 1985 and 1987 it rose to 70 years followed by a
substantial drop to about 64 years. Several studies have analysed the reasons to
this dramatic and rapid change. The main explanations suggested are economic and
social instability as well as changes in alcohol consumption (Shkolnikov et al. 2001;
Notzon et al. 1998; Nemtsov 2002). The anti-alcohol campaign, launched in 1985,
and the market reforms launched in 1992 were associated with large and rapid
changes of alcohol consumption in Russia (Nemtsov 2002).
Trends in life expectancy among women in Denmark and the Netherlands can
serve as other examples of the danger of only extrapolating trends. Since 1970, there
is a steady increase in life expectancy for men both in Denmark and the Netherlands
(WHO). However, extrapolating trends from the early 1970s would highly
overestimate the longevity of women in Denmark and the Netherlands. Danish
women increased their life expectancy substantially from about 76 years in 1970
to 78 years in 1977 followed by no increase at all up to 1995. After 1995 life
expectancy among women in Denmark has started to increase again. For women in
the Netherlands, life expectancy increased substantially up to 1990, but has thereaf-
ter not followed the increasing trends of many other western European countries.
These changes in trends indicate clearly that the risk factor patterns of women in
these two countries have been different than in other European countries.
The danger of extrapolating mortality trends is also evident when studying some
disease-specific causes of death in Sweden. Lung cancer mortality among men
increased substantially from the 1950s up to around the end of the 1970s followed
by a decrease in both incidence and mortality (Fig. 19.2).
This trend break could easily have been anticipated if declining smoking rates had
been considered. Smoking rates among men started to decline in the early 1960s
accompanied with a trend break for lung cancer about 20 years later. Smoking rates
among women have increased up to the late 1970s followed by a small decrease in
smoking rates. So far, no shift in lung cancer rates among women can be seen.
However, lung cancer rates among women seem to be levelling off.
2WHO Europe Health for All database, see http://www.who.dk; Shkolnikov et al. (2001); Notzon
et al. (1998); Nemtsov (2002).
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Alcohol-related mortality rose dramatically after the abolishment of the Swedish
rationing system in 1955 and it was first around 1980 a decreasing alcohol mortality
trend was noticed (Fig. 19.3). This trend break was probably due to intensified
efforts in society as a whole. Cohorts born in the 1960s and 1970s also seem to be
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Fig. 19.3 Alcohol-related mortality in Sweden 1970–2002
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The development of acute myocardial infarction and other coronary heart dis-
eases among middle-aged men is another example of a trend break (Fig. 19.4). This
trend break took place in the beginning of the 1980s and was due to several changes
in risk factors, especially the decline in smoking rates among men. The level of
serum cholesterol has also decreased in the Swedish population contributing to a
decreasing trend in coronary heart mortality. All these examples clearly indicate
caution in respect to merely extrapolating mortality trends.
19.4 Predicting Mortality Based on Potential Elimination
of Causes of Death
To gain an idea of how great the potential is for increasing life expectancy one can do
hypothetical calculations of how much it would increase if a disease no longer led to
death (Curtin and Armstrong 1988; Haglund and Rosén 2001). In the Swedish
Public Health Report of 2001 such calculations have been made (Haglund and
Rosén 2001). The results are summarised in Table 19.1, which shows that the
elimination of cardiovascular disease as a cause of death is the single most important
step to prolong life expectancy followed by cancer. For cardiovascular disease more
than 5 years could be gained for men by eliminating this disease group. Many may
be surprised by the small gains obtained by eliminating traffic accidents (3 months
for men and 1 month for women) or infectious diseases (1 month).
Social factors play an important role in the etiology of diseases and for mortality
predictions. Upper white-collar workers have the lowest mortality. If the death risk
for the whole population between 25 and 74 were reduced to the same level as for


























































Fig. 19.4 Ischaemic heart disease mortality in Sweden 1970–2002, 45–64 years
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5 months longer and women’s life expectancy 1 year and 5 months longer (Haglund
and Rosén 2001).
19.5 Predicting Mortality Based on Development of Risk
Factors
Predicting mortality based on social developments and predictions on risk factor
changes seems most appropriate since these are the driving forces for mortality. The
major problems are the lack of knowledge we have concerning all risk factors
affecting all diseases. The three most important risk factors for coronary heart
disease (CHD) are smoking, hypertension and high blood cholesterol levels. How-
ever, 247 risk factors for CHD have been suggested in the scientific literature
(Hopkins and Williams 1981). It is impossible to make predictions for all these
and many of them are not very well evidence based. Still, the three major risk factors
explain quite a large proportion of CHD deaths and it is therefore much easier to
predict the future CHD trends than to predict mortality for other causes of death,
e.g. cancer where the knowledge base is more limited. Since about half of all deaths
are caused by cardiovascular disease, it seems meaningful to make mortality pre-
dictions based on the risk factor development of this disease group.
19.6 Methodological Problems in Predicting Mortality
Based on Risk Factor Predictions
In this paper I advocate a risk factor prediction approach to mortality forecasting. I
hope the earlier presentation convincingly has shown the advantages of this
approach in comparison with extrapolating mortality trends.
However, several methodological problems still exist. Four problems could be
highlighted. Relative risks vary over time and by regions, latency times differ,
co-morbidity and competing causes of death complicate the predictions and the
lack of appropriate risk factor data limit the possibilities.
Table 19.1 Changes in life
expectancy in months through
elimination of certain diseases
or risk factors in Sweden
1993–1997
Disease/risk factor Men Women
Infections 1 1
Cancer 34 37
Cardiovascular diseases 64 48
Injuries and accidents 12 6
Traffic accidents 3 1
Tobacco 16 8
Social inequalities 29 17
Source: Haglund and Rosén (2001)
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In the case of coronary heart disease, longitudinal studies from different parts of
the world have displayed the same major and independant risk factors, but with
varying relative risks (Wilhelmsen et al. 2004; Conroy et al. 2003; Empana et al.
2003). The Framingham risk functions based on U.S. populations overestimate the
absolute coronary heart disease risk of middle-aged men when they are applied to
different European populations (Empana et al. 2003). A problem in estimating
mortality trends is the long latency times between exposure to risk factors and
when the individuals are strucked by the disease. For smoking and lung cancer
latency time is usually more than 20 years of smoking. These kinds of considerations
must be taken into account when making mortality predictions. However, the
greatest problem in mortality modelling is usually lack of reliable risk factor data.
Our own experiences of testing the Dutch mortality model (Gunning-Schepers 1989)
on Swedish data showed the lack of risk factor data even in a data affluent society
like Sweden.
19.7 Future Mortality and Longevity
As a simple exercise, Rosén and Haglund (2002) estimate future life expectancy in
Sweden, not based on sophisticated dynamic population models, but merely on
assumptions about risk factor developments and general knowledge about public
health, recent successes in health care and the potential of eliminating certain causes
of death (Table 19.2).
Social differences in mortality are large even in economically well-developed
countries like Sweden. The reasons for these differences are multi-factorial and are
most likely due to an accumulation of health risks during the whole life-cycle. Lower
socio-economic groups have usually lower birth weights, have been brought up in
more disadvantaged areas, have less education, smoke more, eat more unhealthy
products, have more often monotonous work or are more often unemployed. How-
ever, history has shown that lower socio-economic groups will eventually reach the
life expectancy of higher socio-economic groups, but that they are always
10–20 years behind. Eliminating the present social differences in health seems
therefore a realistic scenario.
Table 19.2 Future estimated
life expectancy (years) in
Sweden
Intervention Men Women
Life expectancy, year 2000 77.4 82.0
Eliminating social differences +2.5 +1.5
Improved lifestyle +1.5 +1.5
Improved medical care +1.5 +0.5
Optimist supplement +1.0 +1.0
Estimated life expectancy 84.0 87.0
Source: Rosén and Haglund (2002)
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It is also obvious that eliminating cardiovascular disease has the greatest impact
on longevity. This is an area where we have evidence based knowledge of risk
factors and great potential for primary prevention. Since the 1990s medical technol-
ogies have had a success story in developing life-saving interventions in the field of
coronary heart disease. Altogether, this implies a high potential for improving
longevity by reducing mortality for cardiovascular disease. We estimated a gain of
1.5 years due to improved lifestyle, mainly reduced smoking rates, and further gains
due to improved medical technologies of 1.5 years for men and 0.5 years for women.
The larger estimated gain for men is due to the fact that medical interventions will
influence cardiovascular disease most, which is a larger burden for men than women.
Finally, we added an optimist supplement of 1 year for improvements not foreseen
by our estimates.
19.8 Implications for the Future
Mortality forecasting plays an important role for development and maintenance of
national and private insurance schemes. However, there are also other social and
economic consequences of changing mortality trends. A lively discussion has been
whether prolonging lives may lead to compression or expansion of morbidity
(Thorslund et al. 2004). Many studies in the past have indicated decreasing morbid-
ity and improved functional status among the elderly, i.e. supporting the hypothesis
of compression of morbidity. Recent studies in Sweden show, however, deteriorat-
ing health in some aspects among the elderly (Thorslund et al. 2004; Rosén and
Haglund 2005). This development supports the hypothesis that we now are going
from healthy survivors to sick survivors due to improvement in health care (Rosén
and Haglund 2005). Since the late 1980s, new and very effective life-saving drugs
and treatments have been developed, especially in the field of cardiovascular disease.
This has had tremendous effect on survival among patients with acute myocardial
infarction, heart failure and diabetes. Those surviving will, however, live with their
chronic diseases and demand more care than earlier “healthy” survivors.
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Chapter 20
How Analysis of Mortality by Cause
of Death Is Currently Influencing UK
Forecasts
Richard Willets
The purpose of this paper is to examine the potential benefits of cause of death
analysis in the context of projecting future mortality rates in the UK.
In the first section of the paper the main features of recent mortality trends in the
UK are briefly described. In the second methods currently used to project mortality
in the UK are outlined. Current issues and topics for research are also discussed. In
section three potential causes of the “UK cohort effect” are listed and the role of
cigarette smoking, in particular, is discussed. A model of mortality which includes a
year of birth component is discussed in section four. It is argued that models such as
this can be used to analyse mortality from different causes and this analysis can have
important benefits. Conclusions and implications are given in section five.
Throughout the paper most emphasis is placed on understanding and modelling
mortality trends for older adults. This part of the age range is currently the focus of
most research in the UK and has the greatest financial significance in terms of its
impact on pension schemes and public finances.
20.1 Mortality Improvement in the UK
In common with many developed countries round the world, the UK has recently
experienced substantial reductions in mortality rates. The pace of improvement,
especially at older ages, has accelerated strongly as the figures in Table 20.1
demonstrate.
Table 20.1 shows that broadly the same fall (circa 20%) in the rate of mortality for
males aged 65–74 has occurred in successive periods of 68, 17, 10 and then 6 years.
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The pace of change at the beginning of the twenty-first century has therefore been more
than ten times as rapid as that seen in the first seven decades of the twentieth century.
This simple example illustrates the extent to which the pace of change in
mortality rates at older ages has improved over time. More generally, we have
seen a trend towards faster improvements at older ages, but less rapid change at
younger ages. This feature of mortality change has applied to many developed
countries and is sometimes referred to as the “aging of mortality improvement”
(Wilmoth 1997).
Figure 20.1a, b illustrate this trend of more rapid improvement at increasingly
advanced ages by comparing average annual rates of mortality improvement1 over
the past four decades with rates for the previous 50 years.
In terms of individual causes of death, the single most important driver of these
accelerated improvements has been the substantial reduction in heart disease mor-
tality seen in recent decades. This is illustrated by Fig. 20.2a, which shows the crude
rate of heart disease mortality for men aged 65–74.
Figure 20.2a shows that the death rate from heart disease for men aged 65–74 has
fallen by almost 60% since 1985. The reduction is equivalent to an annual rate of
improvement of 4.8% p.a.
The major contributor to the decline in heart disease mortality is believed to be
reduced cigarette smoking prevalence (Kelly and Capewell 2004). However, reduc-
tion in population blood pressure and cholesterol levels and improvements in
treatment have also played a significant role. These positive trends have comfortably
outweighed the impact of adverse trends in obesity, diabetes and lack of physical
activity, which together contributed approximately 8000 extra deaths in England &
Wales between 1981 and 2000 (Unal et al. 2004).
There have also been substantial reductions in other leading causes of death, such
as stroke and cancer, at these ages, as illustrated by Figs. 20.2b and 20.2c.
However, the major contributor to the recent rapid improvement in mortality at
older ages has been heart disease. Willets et al. (2004) showed that over half of the
recent mortality improvement for men in their 60s in England & Wales was due to
heart disease alone. The figures in Table 20.2 also show that most of the remainder of
the improvement was due to reductions in stroke and cancer mortality.
Table 20.1 Reduction in the mortality rate for males aged 65–74 in the England & Wales
population since 1901
Time period Reduction in the mortality rate for males aged 65–74
1901–1969 (68 years) 19.4%
1969–1986 (17 years) 21.6%
1986–1996 (10 years) 19.4%
1996–2002 (6 years) 21.1%
Source: The Office for National Statistics
1Throughout this paper the term “mortality improvement rate” is taken to mean the rate of change in
the mortality rate at a given age from year to the next, i.e. 1 – m(x,t)/m(x,t-1), where m(x,t) is the
central mortality rate for age x and time t.
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It is also worth noting that at younger ages, such as the 30–39 age group,
improvements in mortality due to heart disease, stroke and cancer have been more
than offset by adverse trends in other causes, notably those linked to drug and
alcohol abuse.
In addition to this trend of accelerating improvements at older ages, UK patterns
of mortality change have also been influenced by the feature sometimes referred to as
the “UK cohort effect”.
Figure 20.3a, b show how the pace of improvement (the average annual reduction
in mortality rates) has varied by year of birth in successive 10-year periods. Three
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Source: The Office for National Statistics
Fig. 20.1 Average annual mortality improvement rates, England &Wales population, 1911–2001.
(a) males, (b) females. (Source: The Office for National Statistics)
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• The pace of improvement has been consistently higher for people born in the
period 1925–1945 than for people born either side of this generation (this being
the so-called “UK cohort effect”). In particular more rapid improvement has been
a feature of mortality change for those born in the period 1925–1935, with a
secondary peak around 1945.
• Many of the peaks and troughs in the rates of improvement are replicated over
time, showing the enduring significance of year of birth in determining the pace
of change at different ages.
• The pace of improvement within birth cohorts has increased over time. In other
words, the pace of improvement has been accelerating in recent decades, after
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Fig. 20.2a Heart disease deaths per 1,000,000, ages 65–74, England & Wales population,









1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Fig. 20.2b Stroke deaths per 1,000,000, ages 65–74, England & Wales population, 1968–2003,
males
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It is also worth noting that a similar effect can be seen in other developed
countries. Data from the Human Mortality Database maintained by the University
of California, Berkeley (USA) and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research
(Germany) was analysed for 172 developed countries (all those included on the
database excluding those in Eastern Europe). For each of the 17 countries data from
1950 to 2003 for ages 40 to 89 (subject to the years available in each case) were used
to calculate average rates of mortality improvement by year of birth.
The results are illustrated by Fig. 20.4. It is notable that the pace of improvement
has been significantly more rapid for males born in or around 1935–1940 than
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Fig. 20.2c Cancer deaths per 1,000,000, ages 65–74, England & Wales population, 1968–2003,
males. (Source: The Office for National Statistics)
Table 20.2 Breakdown of
contributions to the overall
rate of mortality improvement
over the period 1989–2001,
by cause, England & Wales
population, males
Cause Ages 30–39 Ages 60–69




Drugs/alcohol/liver disease 0.8% 0.0%
Violent/accidental 0.3% +0.3%
All others 0.0% +0.4%
Aggregate 0.1% +3.4%
2Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, England & Wales, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA and West Germany.
3It is also worth noting that the trough in the pace of improvement for the “1920-born” generation is
actually far lower than Figure 20.4 suggests. Without the impact of smoothing, the figure for this
year is minus 7.8% p.a. This feature is likely to have been caused by the impact of the 1919
influenza pandemic.
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20.2 Current Methodologies and Research in the UK
Mortality projections for the UK population are currently produced by the Govern-
ment Actuary’s Department (GAD). The projections assume that “current” rates of
mortality improvement – based on the most-recent trends in aggregate mortality –
will converge with target rates over a 25-year time-frame.
The latest projection, the so-called “2002-based” projection (GAD 2003),
assumed target rates of improvement of 1.0% p.a. for both males and females.
The rates of improvement are projected on a cohort basis for generations born
prior to 1947.
A number of variant projections are also made using alternative improvement
scenarios.
Projections of future mortality for pensioners and annuitants in the UK are























1910 1920 1930 1940 1950
Source: The Office for National Statistics
Fig. 20.3 Rate of mortality improvement by year of birth and 10-year period, England & Wales,
smoothed using 7-year rolling averages. (a) males, (b) females. (Source: The Office for National
Statistics)
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the UK Actuarial Profession. The last official projection, published in conjunction
with the “92 series” of mortality tables for pensioners and annuitants, is based on
assumed rates of future improvement in historic trends by age group (CMI 1999).
Rates of improvement in the so-called “CMIR17” basis were assumed to diminish
over time, consistent with the idea of ultimate (or minimum) rates of mortality.
In 2002 interim “cohort” projections were published by the CMI (CMI 2002)
which combined the rates of change in the CMIR17 basis with blocks of rapid
improvement consistent with the projection of the UK cohort effect into advanced
ages. Three variant projections were produced which differed in the extent to which
the cohort effect was assumed to be projected forwards into the future.
Both the GAD and CMI projection methodologies project aggregate rates of
mortality, rather than using a cause-of-death methodology.
Cause-of-death modelling has not, and is not, generally favoured as an approach
for projecting future mortality rates in the UK. The 1976-based GAD projection of
UK population mortality did model future improvements for 10 distinct groups of
causes of death. However, this methodology was not adopted for future projections
and a major review of the projection methodology for the UK population (GAD
2001) concluded that: “projections of mortality should not be carried out by cause
of death”.
A similar review paper published by the CMI (CMI 2004) sought feedback from
the UK Actuarial Profession on the methodology to be adopted for future mortality
projections. One question it asked was whether projections should be carried out on
an aggregate or a cause-of-death basis. The response was overwhelmingly in favour
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Source: Human Mortality Database
Fig. 20.4 Average annual rate of mortality improvement by year of birth for 17 developed
countries, males, ages 40–89, data from 1950 to 2003, figures smoothed using rolling averages.
(Source: Human Mortality Database)
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Arguments against cause-of-death projections included:
• interactions between different causes are difficult to model, especially at older
ages;
• medical/research effort will shift as the relative importance of different causes
changes over time;
• there are problems with classifying the true cause of death in the very old; and
• changing methods of cause classification over time can distort trends.
Much of the research on future mortality improvement currently being carried out
in the UK is being driven by regulatory change in the UK insurance industry which
favours a stochastic approach to modelling risk.
Major topics of research include all forms of stochastic mortality modelling, such
as Lee-Carter and variants, and advanced methods of smoothing mortality surfaces
such as p-splines (CMI 2005).
However, two big questions at the time of this writing – at least for the UK
insurance and pensions industries – are:
• whether the UK cohort effect will be projected forwards into the future as the
1925–45 generation ages; and,
• whether the pace of improvement in mortality rates for older ages will continue to
accelerate.
For instance, a Guidance Note recently published by the UK Actuarial Profession
(2004) states that in determining the capital requirements of an insurance company:-
the ICA [Individual Capital Assessment] should consider firstly, with justification, how any
historically observed trends (including cohort effects) might continue, or might continue to
accelerate or decelerate.
It is difficult to see how such a justification could be obtained without a consid-
eration of the underlying causes of mortality trends, such as the cohort effect.
20.3 Understanding the “UK Cohort Effect”
A number of possible causes for the UK cohort effect have been discussed. These
include:
• patterns of cigarette consumption;
• the adverse impact of World War II;
• patterns in birth rates;
• the development of the UK Welfare State after World War II;
• the impact of diet in early life/maternal malnutrition; and
• early life exposure to infectious disease/lifetime levels of inflammation.
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These possible causes are discussed in more detail in Willets (2004). However, to
illustrate the value of considering mortality trends for different causes of death, the
impact of cigarette smoking will be analysed in more detail here.
Cohort effects in lung cancer mortality rates have been well-documented in recent
decades (see, for example, Caselli 1996). Indeed, in women especially, the trends in
lung cancer mortality in the UK have been described as providing “an almost perfect
example of a cohort effect” (Office for National Statistics 1997).
Figure 20.5 shows rates of lung cancer mortality for females in England &Wales
by year of birth. It can clearly be seen that the rate of lung cancer deaths at each age
group has peaked for those women born in or around 1925.
A similar pattern can be seen for males in England &Wales, with the peak rates of
lung cancer mortality occurring for men born in or around 1905.
This data closely matches the pattern shown in figures for lifetime consumption
of cigarette tar by year of birth (Lee et al. 1990). There is, therefore, strong
evidence that trends in lung cancer mortality by year of birth are correlated with
trends in cigarette consumption by year of birth. As a result it is a relatively
straightforward task to project future rates of lung cancer mortality for mature
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Fig. 20.5 Rate of lung cancer mortality for females in England &Wales by year of birth, using data
from 1950 to 2003. (Source: The Office for National Statistics)
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As a result of this clear link between lifetime smoking behaviour and mortality
from one of the major smoking-related causes of death, it is sometimes argued that
the UK cohort effect is unlikely to be projected forwards far into the future.
This argument is based on the suggestion that the UK cohort effect has been
largely caused by past patterns in smoking, but that cigarette smoking prevalence has
now stabilised in the UK (Office for National Statistics 2004). Furthermore it is
argued that smoking-related causes of death (such as lung cancer) are less significant
in relative terms at older ages.
In order to explore whether this theory is supported by experience, it is useful to
consider historic trends in different causes of death.
20.4 Modelling Mortality by Cause of Death
Tables 20.3a, 20.3b, and 20.3c illustrate the pattern of mortality improvement in
three major causes of death for females in England & Wales, namely lung cancer,
heart disease and breast cancer. In each case the average annual rate of improvement
has been derived for successive periods of 10 years using log linear regression on
cause-specific mortality rates.
Table 20.3a clearly shows that the rate of improvement in lung cancer mortality
has been particularly rapid for a group of females born in the same period, who are
ten years older in each successive 10-year period. The shaded figures relate chiefly to
women born in or around 1930. It is notable that the pace of improvement for this
cohort has remained relatively constant over time and also that the pace of improve-
ment for adjacent age groups has been far lower.
The equivalent figures for heart disease mortality are given in Table 20.3b.
The pattern of improvement is somewhat different for heart disease. It is evident
that the pace of improvement has accelerated over time for all birth cohorts, but that
the most rapid pace of change has applied, consistently, to a much wider range of
birth years than was the case for lung cancer.
In the case of breast cancer the pace of improvement has also accelerated over
time, but was generally greatest for those aged under 50 in 1973–1983, those aged
under 60 in 1983–1993 and those aged under 70 in 1993–2003.
Tables 20.3a, 20.3b, and 20.3c only give an approximate indication of cohort
effects, by considering age-related improvements in successive periods of time. A
more formal analysis can be achieved by modelling mortality rates using an
approach in which year of birth parameters are included.
Such a model was constructed using a database of England & Wales population
experience for the period 1968–2003. This period covers the years when deaths were
classified using ICD8, ICD9 and ICD10; three versions of the International
Classification of Diseases.
Raw deaths data for years from 1968 to 2000 were taken from the 20th Century
Mortality database produced by the Office of National Statistics (ONS). More recent
data relating to the period 2001–2003 were taken from the twenty-first Century
Mortality database (ONS).
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Mid-year population estimates were also taken from the most up-to-date ONS
publications which incorporate the most recent revisions resulting from the 2001
Census results (October 2004).
For each calendar year (1968–2003) death numbers, split by 5-year age groups
(up to 80–84) by gender and cause of death, were divided by the equivalent mid-year
population estimates. Hence, central mortality rates for 5-year age bands were
derived.
Table 20.3a Average annual rate of lung cancer mortality improvement in successive 10-year
periods, England & Wales population, females
Age group 1973-1983 1983-1993 1993-2003
40-44 +1.5% -1.9% +4.2%
45-49 +3.7% +0.3% +0.4%
50-54 +0.4% +0.2% +0.5%
55-59 -2.7% +3.8% -0.5%
60-64 -3.7% +0.3% +1.3%
65-69 -4.7% -1.9% +3.5%
70-74 -4.8% -2.6% +0.7%
75-79 -4.5% -3.1% -2.0%
80-84 -4.3% -3.5% -2.4%
Source: The Office for National Statistics
Table 20.3b Average annual rate of heart disease mortality improvement in successive 10-year
periods, England & Wales population, females
Age group 1973-1983 1983-1993 1993-2003
+4.4% +2.9%45-49 3 6 5 4 +1.4%
50-54 +0.6% +5.3% +5.0%
55-59 -0.1% +4.8% +6.6%
60-64 +0.4% +3.2% +7.1%
65-69 +0.7% +2.2% +7.2%
70-74 +1.1% +2.1% +6.3%
75-79 +1.2% +1.6% +5.2%
80-84 +1.5% +1.0% +4.7%
Source: The Office for National Statistics
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Using these central mortality rates for each age group (x) and calendar year (t),
mortality improvement rates were calculated for age groups between 40–44 and
80–84 inclusive, i.e.
improvement rate, δ x; tð Þ ¼ 1m x; tð Þ=m x; t-1ð Þ
Each improvement rate was then assigned to one central year of birth. For
example, the improvement rate for the 60–64 age group, for calendar year 2003,
was assigned to year of birth 1941.
Various models can be constructed to decompose the rates of improvement for
different causes using a combination of age, period and cohort factors. Age-period-
cohort models have been widely used by epidemiologists and demographers to
model mortality rates (see, for example, Tabeau 2001). These models are commonly
fitted to log mortality rates. However, for this purpose, the rates of improvement
themselves (i.e. the δ(x, t) terms) have been modelled. This approach is felt to
produce results which are relatively easy to interpret and adapt for the projection
of future mortality rates.
One feature of age-period-cohort models is that they do not provide a unique
solution because of the interdependence of the three terms. There are various
strategies to overcome this “identification problem”. However, for this particular
paper, it was decided to consider the results of a simplified version of the model only,
i.e. one with just period and cohort terms:-
δ x; tð Þ ¼ β tð Þ þ γ t-xð Þ
where t ¼ calendar year, t-x ¼ year of birth, Σwγ(t ‐ x) ¼ 0, w ¼ a weighting factor
for each cohort taken as the number of deaths observed for that cohort.
Table 20.3c Average annual rate of breast cancer mortality improvement in successive 10-year
periods, England & Wales population, females
Age group 1973-1983 1983-1993 1993-2003
+0.8% +0.9% +3.6%45-49 5 1 6 9
50-54 -0.6% +1.6% +3.5%
55-59 -1.1% +1.7% +2.8%
60-64 -0.7% +0.6% +2.9%
65-69 -0.5% +0.2% +3.2%
70-74 -1.1% +0.3% +2.6%
75-79 -0.6% -0.5% +1.3%
80-84 -1.0% -1.1% +1.9%
Source: The Office for National Statistics
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This approach can be justified because the model fits rates of improvement rather
than log mortality rates.
The missing age term is of far less significance than would be the case with a
traditional age-period-cohort model. In fact, this age term can be seen as equivalent,
in very broad terms, to the b(x) term in the Lee-Carter model (Lee and Carter 1992),
where:
logm x; tð Þ ¼ a xð Þ þ b xð Þk tð Þ
Most significantly there is not a clear pattern to the model residuals by age and
time, which would indicate a poor fit.
The model can be fitted using a weighted least squares approach applied directly
to actual and expected improvement rates or by using a maximum likelihood or
minimum chi-squared function derived for the underlying mortality rates. All three
approaches give similar results. In this instance results derived by applying the
maximum likelihood approach have been used.
The two functions (i.e. period and cohort) derived from fitting the simplified
model to cause-specific mortality data for females are given in Figs. 20.6a, 20.6b,
20.6c, 20.6d, 20.6e, and 20.6f. In each case rolling averages were used to identify
underlying patterns in the data. In the case of the period function, the improvement
rates for 1984 and 1993 were removed from the analysis as they were distorted by
changes in the methodology used to assign a main cause to a death certificate. Like-
wise the rates for 2001 were also removed because ICD10 was first applied as a
method of cause classification in this year.
It is interesting to note that the pattern of the cohort function is very different for
lung cancer and heart disease. There is clear evidence that the cohort effect applies to
later-born generations in the case of heart disease. This does not correlate well with
trends in lung cancer or cigarette consumption by generation.
Another way of exploring how year of birth factors have influenced trends in
different causes of death is to analyse how well a basic Lee-Carter model fits
mortality rates for different birth years. This approach is illustrated by Fig. 20.7 in
which fitted and actual rates are compared. For the three causes of death analysed the
Lee-Carter model systematically over-estimated mortality rates for those born in
1935–1945, consistent with the impact of the cohort effect. However, it was again
evident that this over-estimation applied to a significantly earlier generation in the
case of lung cancer than for the other causes.
It is worth considering some of the characteristics of the causes of death in
relation to cigarette smoking.
A review paper by Lee (2000) concluded that the relative lung cancer risk among
current smokers was 10–20 times that of those who have never smoked. Further-
more, it was found that it generally took ex-smokers 20–25 years after giving-up to
reduce the additional risk by 75%.
On the other hand, a similar review paper on heart disease risk (Lee 2001)
concluded that the average relative risk of current smokers to those who have
never smoked was 212%. Furthermore, it took ex-smokers 5–9 years after quitting
to reduce this additional risk by 75%.
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Thus, it can be argued, historic patterns of smoking are much more likely to cause
cohort effects in lung cancer than heart disease mortality.
There is also evidence that breast cancer mortality improvements have been faster
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Fig. 20.6a Period function β(t) derived by fitting a model of mortality improvement to lung cancer
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Fig. 20.6b Cohort function γ(t-x) derived by fitting a model of mortality improvement to lung
cancer rates for females, England & Wales, 1968–2003
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be due to changing patterns of smoking behaviour as smoking is not considered to be
a major risk factor in breast cancer. A review paper by McPherson et al. (2000) made
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Fig. 20.6c Period function β(t) derived by fitting a model of mortality improvement to heart
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Fig. 20.6d Cohort function γ(t-x) derived by fitting a model of mortality improvement to heart
disease rates for females, England & Wales, 1968–2003
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The observed cohort effect may be partly due to the fact that the NHS Screening
Programme for breast cancer was initiated in 1988. This was aimed – initially – at
women aged 50–65, so would have most benefited those born in the 1930s and
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Fig. 20.6e Period function β(t) derived by fitting a model of mortality improvement to breast
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Fig. 20.6f Cohort function γ(t-x) derived by fitting a model of mortality improvement to breast
cancer rates for females, England & Wales, 1968–2003
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relatively high (compared with other age groups) for women aged in their 30s in the
1970s and in their 40s in the 1980s.
It can therefore be argued that prevalence of cigarette smoking from one gener-
ation to the next has certainly been one factor which has driven the UK cohort effect
and that, as a result, there is a degree of inevitability in some element of likely future
improvement, especially for mortality at older ages from conditions strongly linked
to smoking.
However, trends in heart disease and breast cancer mortality suggest that smoking
may not be the only factor. In Willets (2004) it is argued that there appear to be two
‘sub-cohorts’ of the 1925–45 cohort: an earlier group where the improvements are
largely due to smoking and a later one where other factors, such as diet in early life or
exposure to infectious diseases, may have played a greater role.
The key point for this paper is that analysis of mortality trends by cause of death
can play a vital part in determining the factors driving mortality trends, such as the
cohort effect. Furthermore it is argued that such an understanding allows trends to be
appropriately allowed for in the projection of future mortality rates.
20.5 Implications and Conclusions
In section four it was argued that in order to understand trends and observed features
in aggregate mortality, trends in individual causes of death need to be analysed.
This understanding is necessary because subjective judgments are always made
when projecting future rates of mortality, no matter what method is selected. Even
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Fig. 20.7 Ratio of “expected” to actual mortality rates derived using a Lee-Carter model fitted to
mortality rates for lung cancer, heart disease and breast cancer for females, England & Wales,
1968–2003, averaged by year of birth
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to be taken. Specifically, the precise structure of the model needs to be decided and
the period of past data on which to base the future projection needs to be chosen.
In projecting future mortality rates for UK pensioners, it is necessary to form a
view on (at least) the following points in deriving a suitable methodology:
• Should the model by parameterised using year of birth or attained age compo-
nents (or both)?
• If year of birth parameters are used, should their effect reduce with time,
increasing age or neither?
• Should the general pace of improvement continue at its current pace or be
assumed to accelerate or decelerate over time? Should it revert to a long-term
average rate and, if so, what time period should be used to calculate that average?
• Should the pace of improvement for males and females converge over time? If so,
how long should the period of convergence last?
• Should the pace of improvement be assumed to be faster for (for example, higher
socio-economic class) pensioners than for the average population? If so, how
much faster and at which ages?
An understanding of the forces driving historic trends is an essential element of
making decisions of this nature.
In fact, despite the historical experience of using cause-of-death projections and
the well-documented difficulties, there nevertheless appears to be a good argument
for utilising cause-of-death projections in making forecasts.
In forecasting mortality rates for those under the age of (say) 80 it can be
instructive to divide deaths into a small number of cause-groupings, perhaps those
with very strong historic trends, and compare the results with equivalent aggregate
projections.
Cause-of-death modelling can also be a good methodology to test “extreme
scenarios”, which are becoming of increasing interest to insurance regulators and
capital markets. Such an approach tends to be welcomed by users of such pro-
jections, who can see the methodology “grounded in reality.” It can also provide a
suitable mechanism for allowing for expert medical opinion in different diseases.
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Part V
Cohort Factors: How Conditions in Early
Life Influence Mortality Later in Life
Tommy Bengtsson
The chapters of the final part address the question of how cohort factors such as
nutrition and diseases in early life affect health and mortality in later life and how
information on cohort effects best can be used to improve mortality forecasting. The
idea that conditions both in infancy and early childhood and during the fetal stage
have an impact on adult health dates far back in time, at least to the seventeenth
century. It was advocated again in the 1930s, when demographers and epidemiolo-
gists became aware of the great mortality decline that started in the West around
1800. While cohort factors were of substantial importance up until the 1920s, it
seems that period factors, such as improved water supply, sanitation, and antibiotics
– in other words factors that influence health status of all age groups at the same time
– gained importance thereafter. Cohort factors were revitalised again in the 1990s by
the work of David Barker and his group and from that time on, there has been an
upsurge in the number of studies on this topic. While many give support to the idea
that early life conditions present in the fetal stage and the first years of life are
important for health later in life, others question this conclusion. The question posed
here is, if children very early in life are “programmed” for a certain health status, due
to their mother’s health and prevailing living conditions, can this information be
used to improve mortality forecasting? To approach this issue, this part gives an
overview of findings and criticism of how conditions in early life influence adult and
old age mortality, as well as some examples of recent studies.
The first chapter, by Martin Lindström and George Davey Smith, provides an
overview of recent research in this area, with special emphasis on Sweden. In doing
so they not only give a summary of empirical findings, historical and contemporary,
but also of the various mechanisms that have been attributed to the link between
health in early life and later in life. The mortality decline in three specific diseases,
respiratory tuberculosis, haemorrhagic stroke, and bronchitis, which have accounted
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for two-thirds of the total decline in mortality in ages 15–64 years from the
mid-nineteenth century to the first decade of the twentieth century in Britain, have
all demonstrable influences from infancy and childhood. The timing of improve-
ments of conditions during infancy and childhood and health improvements later in
life is precisely as expected for this period. Such a high degree of specificity and
timing, however, is often lacking in analyses of contemporary data. Thus, while
cohort factors were partly important for the decline from high to low mortality, their
importance today needs to be verified further.
Kaare Christensen, in the second chapter, evaluates Barker’s “fetal origins
hypothesis” using data on twins and famines. Considerable evidence exists of the
significant association between fetal growth and later life health outcomes, such as
blood pressure and cardiovascular mortality. Firstly, the question is how large is this
effect? Secondly, is the effect causal, or do other factors, such as genes or socioeco-
nomic conditions, lie behind the association? Christensen begins by pointing out that
the association between retardation of fetal growth and health in later life is not
corroborated without exception, referring to several studies of famines. He then turns
to twin studies, which are particularly interesting in this respect since twins usually
experience retarded fetal growth and on average are 900 g lighter at birth than single
children. Using the Danish twin register, which includes a large population with a
long follow-up period, Christensen and his colleagues find no differences between
twins and singles with regard to all-cause or cardiovascular mortality, and a similar
study for Sweden confirms this result. Twins often differ in birth weight, which
means that it is possible to control for genetic factors. Christensen and colleagues
also use data for the US and find a very modest impact of birth weight on blood
pressure, confirming previous analyses using twin data. Taken together, the effect of
birth weight on blood pressure, after controlling for genetic factors, is too weak to be
used to predict future mortality.
In the third chapter, Gabriele Doblhammer focuses on how factors related to
season of birth influence mortality in later life comparing the United States, Austria,
Denmark, and Australia. In all four populations, significant differences in lifespan
exist by month of birth. Those born in the spring generally face lower life expec-
tancy, likely due to nutritional factors, possibly also due to a lower disease load. The
difference diminishes over time, which is consistent with improved diets but also a
decline in morbidity in infectious diseases. Taken together, improvements in diet and
reduction of infectious diseases in the beginning of life gave improved health later in
life and contributed to the overall increase in life expectancy.
The fourth and final chapter, by Tommy Bengtsson and George Alter, analyses
how conditions of nutrition and diseases in the first year of life affect old age
mortality in historical populations in Belgium and Sweden. They make use of
longitudinal individual level demographic data with information on socioeconomic
factors at household level combined with data on food prices. They find that children
born in years of excess infant mortality, generally due to outbreaks of epidemic
diseases, face higher mortality in older ages. For Belgium, high food prices have a
similar effect.
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To summarize, there is a considerable amount of evidence as regards the ways
health incidents in early life influence health later in life and mortality in certain
causes of death. There is also evidence as regards its timing for England during the
mortality decline from the mid-nineteenth century up to the 1920s and possibly also
for Sweden and some other western countries. For the period afterwards, the results
are less conclusive. While many studies show significant associations between
conditions in early life and health later in life, others do not. Whether this association
is causal has also been questioned, as has its overall impact on the mortality decline.
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Chapter 21
A Life Course Perspective to the Modern
Secular Mortality Decline
and Socioeconomic Differences inMorbidity
and Mortality in Sweden
Martin Lindström and George Davey Smith
During the past 200 years, most countries in the world have experienced a great
increase in life expectancy. The timing of the onset of this decrease in mortality and
corresponding increase in life expectance has vastly differed between different
countries, and this is true for the pace of the development as well. Some countries
have still not achieved the life expectancy experienced by the most developed
countries already 100 years ago or even earlier. Some countries have even experi-
enced a backlash in the form of declining life expectancy in the 1990s due to, for
instance, unemployment and alcohol consumption in some eastern European coun-
tries, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic in some African countries. Nevertheless, the
general picture of improvement remains massively impressive, and in Sweden life
expectancy has increased continuously for more than 200 years.
The secular mortality decline may be explained by a multitude of causes rather
than one single cause. These causes may be categorised in different ways and from
varying perspectives. Some causal effects (exposure leading to disease) are direct or
short-term effects, others are long-term effects. The causes do not only include
direct, period effects on mortality and survival such as the immediate effects of
outbreaks of infectious diseases, the presence of endemic infections, as well as
current hygiene, income, nutrition, housing and health care conditions. The causes
also include long-term, sometimes very long-term, effects. The latter group of long-
term causal mechanisms by which risk factors and protective factors affect health
and disease many years later are often referred to as cohort effects, because different
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birth cohorts are exposed to different sets of risk factors as well as protective factors
during their childhood and adolescense that affect their health in later life.
This contribution will deal with long-term cohort or early life effects on disease in
later life, their biological mechanisms in general (not only in Sweden) and their
implications for socioeconomic differences in mortality, with particular reference to
Sweden. It will also shortly deal with the possibility of making predictions
concerning future mortality based on cohort mortality and its indicators in Sweden
and in other countries. In the following sections, we will discuss the early life effects
and then their biological mechanisms without particular reference to Sweden.
21.1 The Secular Mortality Decline: Early Life and Cohort
Explanations and Their Indicators
By the term period effect, we mean effects on health and survival caused by health
determinants (see above) with a short time period between exposure and health/
disease outcome (exposure factors which affect the risk of disease may promote
either salutogenesis or pathogenesis). For instance, most infectious diseases give rise
to symptoms in the very short term (hours-days-weeks) after the initial exposure to
infection. However, for some infectious diseases such as tuberculosis (caused by
mycobacterium tuberculosis) and leprosy (caused by mycobacterium leprae), the
time interval from exposure to disease/symptoms may be much longer (months-
years) due to the slow pace of multiplication of the pathogen in the infected human
host. Other diseases, especially non-infectious chronic diseases such as many can-
cers and forms of cardiovascular disease, may have much longer latent periods,
i.e. time intervals from exposure of determinants to disease amounting to several
decades.
For some diseases, the time lag between exposure and disease may even range
from early life (intra-uterine or first year(s) of life) exposure resulting in old-age
morbidity and mortality. This set of factors is causally related to the mortality decline
and concerns the effects of cohort or early life events on mortality in later life. The
general idea behind the notion of cohort effects is that varying forms of stress or
heavy disease load on the different organs or organ systems in the human body
experienced in early life, most importantly during pregnancy and the first year(s) of
life after birth, may “program” the organs to increased susceptibility to various
diseases much later in life. However, the notion of cohort or early life causes of
disease in later life is not restricted to purely biological mechanisms. Early life events
of psychological significance experienced in early life may also give rise to psycho-
logical problems or certain persistent personality traits in adulthood (Suomi 1997).
The cohort or early life explanation was proposed by Kermack et al. 1934 (see
also Davey Smith and Kuh 2001). They studied age-specific mortality in England,
Wales, Scotland and Sweden. Their conclusion was that reductions attained at any
particular time in the death rates of the various age groups depended primarily on the
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date of birth of the individuals, and only secondarily on the actual year of death. The
essential beneficial effects on health and survival among adults and older persons
were mainly caused by a decrease in disease load achieved in these birth cohorts
during early childhood several decades earlier, according to Kermack et al. (1934).
The past decades have witnessed a renewed interest in the cohort or early life
approach to disease in Sweden (Bengtsson and Lindström 2000, 2003) as well as in
other countries (Preston et al. 1998), particularly in chronic disease epidemiology
(Kuh and Ben-Shlomo 1997, 2004; Galobardes et al. 2004). This approach has been
heavily supported particularly by the work of Barker and colleagues. They have both
hypothesised and investigated the early life preconditions for later life development
of cardiovascular diseases and the metabolic syndrome, i.e. coronary/ischaemic
heart disease, hypertension, adverse levels of blood cholesterol and lipids, stroke,
type II diabetes mellitus, and overweight/obesity (i.e. the components of what some
call the “metabolic syndrome”). The causal mechanism behind these diseases
induced in early life is suggested to be inadequate cellular development in utero
due to lack of sufficient nutrition (Barker 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2001). The
concept of down-regulation of fetal growth has been developed further into the
nutritional programming (or fetal origins) hypothesis. According to this hypothesis
the development of cardiovascular and other diseases in later life depends on
whether fetal growth retardation due to insufficient nutrition is “proportionate” or
“disproportionate”. The “disproportionate” growth retardation induced by insuffi-
cient nutrition during the mid and late trimesters of pregnancy seems to be respon-
sible for cardiovascular diseases later in life, while the “proportionate” growth
retardation of the first trimester is not (Barker 1995), although this distinction has
later been tuned down by Barker (1998).
Not all evidence suggests an exclusive or even important role of malnutrition in
the fetal origins hypothesis. For instance, maternal tuberculosis also impairs fetal
growth (Riley 2001). The famine in rural Finland from 1866 to 1868 tripled death
rates but did not alter the survivors’ lifespans (Kannisto et al. 1997).
The original disease load mechanism proposed by Kermack et al. has been
developed and further investigated. Later Fridlizius (1989) suggested that the devel-
opment of diseases in later life might be due to exposure to certain infectious
diseases. For example exposure to smallpox in the late eighteenth century and
exposure to scarlet fever in the mid nineteenth century, in the first 5 years after
birth, resulted in reduced immunity against other diseases throughout life and thus a
higher susceptibility to getting other infectious diseases in later life. In neither case
did susceptibility to disease in adulthood seem to have been connected with nutrition
in early life, because the risks of being infected with for instance smallpox and
scarlet fever are to a high extent independent of nutrition (Rotberg and Rabb 1985).
However, some findings of recent empirical investigations have suggested an asso-
ciation between nutrition and morbidity and mortality of scarlet fever epidemics in
the Sundsvall region in northern Sweden (Curtis 2004). In contrast to nutrition,
Fridlizius suggested deranged immunological balance between some specific infec-
tious agents and the human host, which has implications for later life experiences of
disease (Fridlizius 1989).
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In recent years, the rather unspecified mechanisms suggested by Fridlizius have
received some support from the bio-medical literature. Chronic inflammatory mech-
anisms may drive much of the influence of early life infections on later morbidity
and mortality. Populations living in high mortality contexts are highly exposed to a
wide variety of infectious diseases. Such populations also have high risks of
acquiring chronic infectious diseases such as tuberculosis (Lawn et al. 2000) and
infections caused by escherichia coli and helicobacter pylori (Cadwgan et al. 2000).
These diseases lead to chronically elevated levels of inflammatory markers such as
C-reactive protein, interleukin-6, tumour necrosis factor-α and fibrinogen that may
mediate between early life infection and later life chronic disease morbidity and
mortality (Finch and Crimmins 2004). Thus, reduced morbidity and mortality from
infectious diseases in populations experiencing the great mortality decline could
produce decreases in exposure to these markers of inflammation. Whether these
inflammatory mediators actually have causal influence on chronic disease risk is not
established (Timpson et al. 2005).
Helicobacter pylori is an established cause of peptic ulcers, and is associated
(although maybe not causally) with coronary heart disease (Harvey et al. 2002).
Infections caused by helicobacter pylori are most commonly contracted in infancy
and childhood and they persist throughout life. Helicobacter pylori infections are
now declining in most low-mortality countries due to improvements in public health
and hygiene (Li et al. 2000).
Exposure to infections during the fetal, perinatal and postnatal stages may affect
both anatomical/organ development and development of the immune system. The
effects of infections during the fetal stage depend on a number of fetal and maternal
factors such as nutrition, genetic factors, fetal development stage and anatomical
factors. Other examples of such infections are influenza and rubella. One example of
a causal association between postnatal infection and adult disease is the association
between Hepatitis B and primary liver cancer (Hall and Peckham 1997). A contem-
porary study from the USA on Americans aged 55–65 years shows that infectious
disease during childhood multipled the incidence of lung conditions, such as
emphysema and bronchitis, by four in the 55–65-year age group. Non-infectious
diseases showed much weaker associations with adult disease (Blackwell et al.
2001). It thus seems plausible that the prenatal and postnatal development of the
lungs and the immune system are sensitive to critical events which may influence
susceptibility to infections, allergic reactions or toxic exposures, but the exact and
specific timing and critical periods for such early life influence on health later in life
remain to be disentangled (Strachan 1997). A study of children born in 1921–1935 in
Scotland also shows reduced lung capacity (in 1986) for those who experienced
pneumonia before the age of 2 years (Shaheen 1997). Factors in utero and during the
first years of life may affect the development of asthma later in childhood and
adulthood (von Mutius 2001). A review of the effects on human lifespans of the
inflammation/infection exposure in early life has proposed a “cohort morbidity
phenotype” which represents inflammatory processes that persist from early age
into adult life (Finch and Crimmins 2004). Early life experience of diarrhoea with
subsequent dehydration may plausibly lead to higher blood pressure, a risk factor for
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cardiovascular diseases in general and haemorrhagic stroke in particular in later
childhood and adulthood, a hypothesis which has been found to be supported by
some empirical findings (Davey Smith et al. 2006; Lawlor et al. 2006).
There is also some support in the literature of an effect of both nutrition and
disease load (particularly infectious diseases) in early life. Unfavourable early life
conditions generally seem to cause permanent biological damage, resulting in higher
mortality in later life (Doblhammer and Vaupel 2001). The results of a large sample
study of 15 million US deaths between 1989 and 1997 has also suggested effects of
season of birth on mortality risk in later life. Being born during a season of hardships
is associated with higher mortality in later life (Doblhammer 1999; Doblhammer
2008). Seasonal differences in exposure to infectious disease in early life are
associated with mortality in adult life. Seasonal differences in the nutrition of the
mother during pregnancy also seem to affect mortality in later life (Doblhammer
2002). A study from contemporary rural Gambia has shown that higher mortality
levels are explained by permanently damaging effects during early life of disease
exposure as well as malnutrition during the yearly dry-season. Both the damaging
effects of disease load and malnutrition during the fetal stage of development are by
some authors (Moore et al. 1997) attributed to effects on the immune system, a
conclusion that may be supported by historical data (Bengtsson and Lindström 2000,
2003). Several recent studies, however, have cast doubt on this conclusion
(Simondon et al. 2004; Moore et al. 2004).
Finch and Crimmins (2004) have recently argued that the inflammatory infection
and nutrition hypotheses are not competing or contradictory but complementary in
linking two mechanisms of morbidity in early and later life. For example, childhood
diarrheas impair cardiac muscle synthesis (Hunter et al. 2001), which could explain
associations of infant diarrhea with later cardiovacular disease (Blackwell et al.
2001). Slowed infant growth in the Barker hypothesis might consequently hypo-
thetically be explained by inflammatory reactions in combination with impaired
nutrient absorption. There is growing evidence from historical data (1766–1894)
in Sweden in support of the disease load (particularly infectious diseases) mecha-
nism suggested in two articles by Bengtsson and Lindström (2000, 2003).
There is also a rapidly accumulating amount of evidence in support of the early
life conditions or life course approach in general from modern data (Kuh and
Ben-Shlomo 2004; Kuh and Hardy 2002; Davey Smith 2003). The relative abun-
dance (compared to historical data) and diversity of variables in modern data make it
possible to attempt to understand the interactions between different determinants and
successive exposures during the life course. It should thus be noted that modern data
support not only the critical period model, which may be exemplified by the already
referred to fetal-origins hypothesis. Modern data also support models following
Omran’s assumptions concerning multicausality and interaction of different causal
factors in demography and epidemiology (Omran 1971). In contrast to the simpler
mono-causal critical period model and fetal-origins hypothesis, the accumulation of
risk model assumes that effects accumulate over the life course, although some
particular developmental periods may entail greater susceptibility (Ben-Shlomo and
Kuh 2002). Harmful effects on health may increase with the duration and/or number
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of harmful exposures. Exposure to poor socioeconomic conditions may for instance
lead to additive effects of experiencing low socioeconomic position during different
parts of the life course, which may influence the risk of several diseases (Heslop et al.
2001). The accumulation of risk may also be due to the clustering of exposures
(Ben-Shlomo and Kuh 2002).
In modern times, chronic diseases dominate the disease patterns both when it
comes to morbidity and mortality. Such diseases include for instance cardiovascular
diseases, cancers, rheumatoid arthritis, thyroiditis, and musculosceletal disorders.
Coronary heart disease is a good example (Davey Smith and Lynch 2005). It
manifests itself during adulthood and old age, but the disease process starts many
years earlier with the gradual development of atherosclerosis. This development
begins with fatty streaks in the artery walls of children (Berenson et al. 1987).
Arterial lesions are also evident in young men suffering from violent death (Strong
et al. 1999). Risk factors for coronary heart disease include blood cholesterol levels,
smoking, obesity, diabetes mellitus, hypertension, oral contraceptive use among
women, psychosocial factors, mental illness, chronic infection/inflammation, coag-
ulation factors, and air pollution (Marmot and Elliot 2005). Several studies have
demonstrated that unfavourable pre-adult measures of cholesterol, blood pressure
and adiposity are associated with increased intimal-medial thickness, which is a
presymptomatic measure of coronary heart disease (Li et al. 2003; Raitakari et al.
2003; Davey Smith and Lynch 2005). These risk factors do not only affect coronary
heart diseases in a mono-causal way, but they may also affect coronary heart disease
by interacting with each other in order to increase or attenuate each other’s effects on
the disease aetiology leading to coronary heart disease.
21.2 Historical Trends and Socioeconomic Mortality
Differences in a Life Course and Cohort Perspective
The research area that concerns the mortality decline entails a number of important
issues that can each contribute to the understanding of the modern mortality decline
and its complexity. The eradication of smallpox mortality (Sköld 1996a, b) and the
variations in sex differences in mortality (Willner 1999) have been thoroughly
investigated and discussed. Another issue concerns socioeconomic mortality differ-
ences and socioeconomic differences in the short term as well as secular mortality
decline. This socioeconomic gradient to this day remains apparent, despite the
development of the modern welfare state and active policies to redistribute income
in many countries, e.g. Sweden. In fact, during the past two decades, Sweden has
witnessed a continuous decline in age specific mortality rates in most age intervals
and a corresponding increase in life expectancy. This mortality decrease is observed
in all socioeconomic groups in Swedish society. However, the decrease has been
more pronounced in higher socioeconomic strata (high education, high income,
non-manual employees in higher positions according to occupational status) than
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in lower socioeconomic strata, which has resulted in increasing socioeconomic
differences in life expectancy in Sweden during the late 1980s, 1990s and early
2000s (National Public Health Report 2001, 2005).
It is often stated that socioeconomic mortality gradients, with the poor having
worse health and increased risk of death compared to the rich, are ubiquitous
phenomena, having always existed everywhere. This is an erroneous assumption,
however (Davey Smith 2003). Reviewers (e.g., Macintyre 1998) often start with
well-known historical examples, such as when Chadwick assembled data from
different areas of Great Britain, and generalise to all situations. Chadwick’s data,
however, did suggest large socioeconomic differences in mortality in the first
decades of the nineteenth century in Britain. The socioeconomic differences existed
within many UK locales, although the high socioeconomic position gentry and
professional population only lived on average 35 years in Liverpool compared to
55 years in Bath. The corresponding average for the labourer and artisan class was
15 and 25 years, respectively (Chadwick 1842; Wohl 1983). Although data from
Geneva indicate presence of socioeconomic mortality differences in pre-modern
society (sixteenth century) (Perrenoud 1975) and data from an English township
1650–1830 also suggest permanent presence of socioeconomic mortality differences
(King 1997), the generalisation by MacIntyre concerning the presence throughout
history of socioeconomic differentials in mortality contrasts to important extent with
the observation by Livi-Bacci (1991). According to Livi-Bacci, rudimentary older
data from England suggest the absence of socioeconomic differentials in mortality in
England from approximately 1550 to ca. 1750 (Livi-Bacci 1991). The data that Livi-
Bacci refers to are calculations of life expectancy from demographic data on English
peers (Hollingsworth 1977) compared with life expectancy of the total English
population calculated from the Wrigley and Schofield reconstitution data (Wrigley
and Schofield 1981). In fact, the ducal families in England seem to have had a
somewhat lower life expectancy than peers in general as well as the general
population during the period prior to 1750. This pattern remains even after the
increased risk of violent causes of death (including the “Agincourt” factor, i.e. the
death-in-combat factor) are taken into account (Hollingsworth 1957). Furthermore,
the reigning families of Europe seem to have had a life expectancy of 34 years in the
sixteenth century, 30.9 years in the seventeenth and 37.1 years in the eighteenth
century, i.e. life expectancies which fairly well correspond with the life expectancies
of the general population in the corresponding countries during the same period. In
the city of Rouen, fluctuations in grain prices during the ancien régime had a similar
effect in various social classes (Galloway 1987).
A similar pattern has been observed in the parishes in the Scanian Demographic
Database in southern Sweden, where fluctuations in grain prices also had strong and
similar effects in all social classes before the agrarian revolution in the early
nineteenth century. In contrast, the onset and progress of the agrarian revolution
resulted in both weaker associations between short-term fluctuations in grain prices
and mortality. It also resulted in increasing socioeconomic differentials in the
mortality response to fluctuations in grain prices, as the more prosperous segment
of the population seems to have become much less exposed to the effects of the
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fluctuations (Bengtsson 2000, 2004). These observations seem to constitute further
proof in support of the notion that social differences in mortality were small or
absent. Furthermore, the observations support the notion that socioeconomic differ-
ences in mortality increased during the eighteenth century because of the agrarian
revolution.
Sweden started to gather and record demographic and socioeconomic data
(including mortality), different measures of socioeconomic position and, in many
parishes, causes of death for the whole country already in 1749. Hence, it is possible
to go further back in time in Sweden than in probably any other country in the
investigation of reliable demographic and socioeconomic data in order to better
understand the dynamics of socioeconomic differences in longevity.
One explanation for the lack of socioeconomic differences in mortality in the
rudimentary data presented by, for example, Livi-Bacci for England, may be that
epidemic and endemic infectious diseases dominated the disease and mortality
panorama in the general population, which is certainly not the case today. In many
pre-modern societies, population density seems to have been positively associated
with mortality due to increased risk of disease (i.e. infectious disease) exposure in
densely populated areas. For instance, the remarkable healthiness of many frontier
settlements in colonial North America in spite of their comparatively primitive
material living conditions must have been partly due to the infrequent contact with
others (Wrigley et al. 1997). The virulence of many such epidemic and endemic
infectious diseases, e.g. smallpox, malaria, plague, typhoid, tetanus, yellow fever,
encephalitis and poliomyelitis, are not at all influenced (or only minimally affected)
by nutritional factors such as total energy intake, nutritional contents of the food and
physical habitus. Other infectious diseases such as typhus, diphteria, staphylococcus
infections, streptococcus infections, influenza, syphilis and systemic worm infec-
tions are only affected by such nutritional factors to a limited or variable extent
(Rotberg and Rabb 1985). This means that the upper socioeconomic strata (i.e. the
nobility) must have been exposed to risks of disease and death from common
infections prevailing at that time to the same extent as members of the lower social
strata. In fact, as social contacts and networks of the upper strata most likely were
more extensive than among the lower classes, the exposure in those groups may even
have been higher than in the lower strata. As many of the infectious diseases
mentioned above decreased in importance during the time period studied, all
age-specific mortality rates declined and life expectancy increased. Consequently,
other diseases and diagnoses more related to nutritional status and the protecting
effects of higher socioeconomic position increased in relative importance as causes
of morbidity and mortality, which would have served to increase socioeconomic
differences in morbidity and mortality during the period under study. The result
would be an increase in socioeconomic mortality differences and thus increased
socioeconomic differentials in life expectancy.
In modern times, chronic diseases with long latent, asymptomatic phases between
the induction/onset of the disease and the first symptoms dominate the patterns of
morbidity and mortality in developed countries. Socioeconomic differences
according to social characteristics such as occupational status, education and income
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are well-known and have been described extensively both in Sweden (National
Public Health Report 2005) and other countries (Marmot 2004; Davey Smith et al.
1990; Kaplan and Keil 1993) regarding morbidity and mortality in a wide variety of
diseases. A recent review of the literature on the association between socioeconomic
circumstances during childhood and cause-specific mortality during adulthood
shows similar results. Adverse socioeconomic conditions during childhood were
positively associated with increased all-cause mortality (in 18 of 22 studies), overall
cardiovascular mortality (in 5 of 9), coronary heart disease mortality (in 7 of 10),
stroke (in 4 of 6), and accidents and violence (in 3 of 5 studies). No such associations
were found for rheumatic heart disease mortality (only 1 study) and overall cancer
mortality. For lung- and smoking-related cancer mortality, respiratory disease mor-
tality, suicides, alcohol- and illegal drug-related mortality only few studies showing
no associations or studies showing diverse results concerning the association
between childhood socioeconomic circumstances and cause-specific mortality
were demonstrated (Galobardes et al. 2004). It thus seems that the association
between childhood socioeconomic circumstances and risk of cardiovascular diseases
in adulthood is particularly important in explaining life course effects on adult
mortality (Galobardes et al. 2006a, b).
In Sweden only a few studies concerning socioeconomic conditions in childhood
and health in adulthood have been conducted, but new data sets have been developed
(Stenberg et al. 2007). Birth order position within the same family had statistically
significant consequences for the health and survival (overall mortality) over the life
course (Modin 2002). Socioeconomic inequities in overweight seem to reflect the
cumulative influence of multiple adverse circumstances experienced from adoles-
cence to young adulthood (Novak et al. 2006). Several Swedish studies demonstrate
statistically significant associations between disadvantaged socioeconomic condi-
tions during childhood as well as adverse socioeconomic mobility, and aspects of
cardiovascular diseases such as all-cause and overall cardiovascular mortality
(Rosvall et al. 2006), coronary heart disease (Wamala et al. 2001), myocardial
infarction (Hallqvist et al. 2004), and carotid atheroschlerosis (Rosvall et al.
2002). In one Swedish study, IQ in early childhood was found to be unrelated to
adult cancer mortality (Batty et al. 2007). Childhood conditions such as family
disruption and child abuse were found to be unrelated to adult sense of coherence
(Krantz and Östergren 2004). The markedly few results from Sweden thus still seem
to be consistent with other findings from the international literature.
21.3 Cohort Effects on Mortality and Mortality
Predictions: Indicators and Models
A number of models exist to forecast future mortality in populations (Bengtsson and
Keilman 2003). There are several reasons why these models should include a
historical and long-term perspective on mortality and the development of
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age-specific mortality. First, living conditions, i.e. living standards and diet, public
health institutions and medicine and other areas relevant for the physical well-being
of the population, improve from one period to the next. Such changes in living
conditions are termed period effects. Second, the health and remaining lifespan of
people living today are determined not only by contemporary period factors but also
by living conditions earlier in life. Living conditions during childhood may affect
health in later life through cohort effects on mortality. Third, the prediction of future
mortality calls for a multivariate approach, including not one but a multitude of
factors to predict mortality. These factors include long-term early life factors
(Bengtsson 2003).
It thus seems obvious that early life and cohort factors should be included in the
models when making predictions concerning future mortality. The crucial question
is what indicators to use in order to assess how early life and cohort factors influence
future mortality. The original work by Kermack and colleagues (1934) analysed the
relationship between early life mortality, including infant (0–1 year) mortality, and
its association with the age-specific mortality of different birth cohorts later during
their life courses. Age-specific mortality is now commonly used as an indicator of
mortality trends (United Nations 1999). Given the plausibility and scientific evi-
dence for early life effects on cohort mortality presented earlier in this paper,
age-specific mortality seems to be an obvious choice of indicator for making pre-
dictions concerning future mortality in a population when considering early life
cohort effects. Infant mortality seems to be the most crucial measure of all
age-specific mortality intervals in this respect (Bengtsson et al. 1998).
Fogel (1994) has used height as an indicator of early life effects on life expec-
tancy and health in later life. In fact, recently both age-specific early life mortality
(including infant mortality) and height have been demonstrated to be associated with
mortality in later life using historical data from birth cohorts born before the
twentieth century in four North European countries (Crimmins and Finch 2006).
Timing and specificity are key factors in life course epidemiology. Davey Smith
and Lynch (2004) have pointed out that the mortality decrease in the three specific
diseases respiratory tuberculosis, haemorrhagic stroke and bronchitis may have
accounted for approximately two-thirds of the total decline in mortality for men
and women aged 15–64 from the middle of the nineteenth century to the first decade
of the twentieth century in Britain. Some other specific diseases including stomach
cancer and rheumatic heart disease may account for some of the residual decline.
These diseases have demonstrable influences from infancy and childhood, which
have already been discussed. The timing for this time period when it comes to early
life/cohort effects is also very good. Underlying factors such as decrease of child
labour, increase in real wages, improved nutrition and increased height, a decrease in
the proportion of working mothers, a decrease in family size, and improved housing
conditions are also present for this period (Davey Smith and Lynch 2004). There is
often a lack of such a high degree of specificity and timing in modern data. Specific
exposures and outcomes should always be identified as well as the exact timing. The
high availability of data in Sweden will plausibly make this task possible to
accomplish in the years to come.
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Chapter 22
Early Life Events and Later Life Health:
Twin and Famine Studies
Kaare Christensen
22.1 Introduction
During more than a decade, the relation between early life conditions and late life
health has been one of the major topics in the epidemiological literature. The interest
for the connection between early life conditions and later life health is by no means
new. As early as in the sixteenth century, Francis Bacon suggested that the nutrition in
the womb and the first year of life is very important for later life health. In more recent
times, especially the classical paper from 1934 by Kermack et al., and Forsdahl’s work
in the 1970s (Forsdahl 1977), have been important contributions. However, since the
early 1990s, one of the main advocates for the importance of early life conditions for
later life health has been David Barker and his group in Southhampton. They
revitalized the so-called “fetal origins hypothesis” and have produced an impressive
series of papers on the topic. The studies were motivated by this intriguing hypothesis
proposed by Barker and co-workers which asserts that a baby’s nourishment before
and during infancy programmes its susceptibility to cardiovascular diseases as well as
several other diseases and adverse outcomes, ranging from diabetes mellitus to cancer
and suicide. There is evidence that an association exists between fetal growth and later
life health outcomes such as blood pressure and cardiovascular mortality. The key
question is, however, whether it is fetal nourishment or other factors such as genes or
socioeconomic conditions that cause the association. Some studies suggest that socio-
economic confounding cannot explain the association between fetal growth and
cardiovascular mortality (Leon et al. 1998), but they are few, and even fewer studies
have evaluated the influence of genetic confounding (Figs. 22.1 and 22.2).
A major concern about the work on the fetal origins hypothesis has been the wide
range of exposure proxies and outcomes. Among the exposure proxies measured are
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birth weight, birth length, ponderal index, abdominal circumference, and
corresponding measurements have been performed at age 1 year. The measurements
have been related to outcomes such as survival, cardiovascular diseases, hyperten-
sion, diabetes, suicide, and even to getting married (Barker 1994, 1998). Further-
more, these relations have been investigated in hundreds of data sets and very often
in subtypes like obese mothers or children with rapid catch-up growth etc. This
increases the risk of type 1-errors, i.e. statistically significant random findings,
considerably, and has therefore created a certain amount of scepticism (Kramer
and Joseph 1996). To avoid some of these problems, in our group at the University
of Southern Denmark, we have focused on famine and twin studies which are
dealing with extreme conditions in early life, and we have examined how these
conditions affect later life health.
Basic observation:
Birth weight ~ Cardiovascular Diseases (CVD)
Hypothesis:
Early life nutrition
Birth weight “Programming of CVD
metabolism”
Later life overfeeding (?)
Fig. 22.1 The fetal origins
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22.2 Famine Early in Life and Later Life Health
During the late 1990s, three reports have addressed the influence of prenatal
exposure to famine on health in later life. We studied 161,744 individuals born
during the 1866–1868 Finnish famine and found, on the basis of a comparison with
more than 600,000 individuals born before and after the famine, that nutritional
deprivation in utero has no effect on survival in adult life (Kannisto et al. 1997).
Stanner et al. (1997) investigated a broad range of coronary heart disease and
diabetes mellitus risk factors among 169 people exposed to malnutrition in utero
during the siege of Leningrad in 1941–1942 and nearly 400 born before or outside
the area of the siege. They found no association between intrauterine malnutrition
and glucose intolerance, dyslipidaemia, hypertension, or cardiovascular disease in
adulthood. Finally, Ravelli et al. (1998), studied 279 individuals who were exposed
to malnutrition in utero during the Dutch hunger winter 1944–1945 and nearly
425 controls born before and after. They found an association between intrauterine
exposure to famine and decreased glucose tolerance in adults aged around 50 years.
However, it was disappointing that Ravelli and colleagues, among all the suggested
outcomes related to fetal nourishment, initially only reported glucose tolerance.
Later reports showed that, for example, blood pressure showed no association with
blood pressure in the Dutch famine study (Roseboom et al. 1999).
22.3 Later Life Health for Twins
Twin studies are especially interesting because twins experience severe growth
retardation in the uterus, especially in the third trimester and, furthermore, studies
of twins can control for the influence of the mother’s socioeconomic status and for
the effect of genes. Twins experience considerable retardation in intrauterine growth
– for example, they are on average more than 900 g lighter than single children at
birth (MacGillivray et al. 1988; Kline et al. 1989). Phillips (1993) has argued that
even small birth weight differences in twins could reflect important differences in
intrauterine conditions important for programming of diseases later in life, because
the mean birth weight among twins is already considerably lower than in singletons.
Therefore, birth weight differences in twins offer a unique opportunity to test the
“fetal origins hypothesis”.
This also raises a question important to twin researchers: Does the reduced
growth pattern in the last trimester make twins more vulnerable in adult life with
an increased risk of cardiovascular diseases, diabetes mellitus and other assumingly
“programmed” diseases? If so, then twin studies may be a poor model for studying
these diseases because the causal field of the diseases could be different from that of
singletons.
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If twins are “programmed” due to the considerable growth retardation during the
third trimester, one could expect an increased mortality and especially an increased
cardiovascular mortality in adulthood for twins compared to the general population.
Both a Swedish and our earlier Danish twin study found similar mortality patterns
among twins and singletons in adulthood (Vågerö and Leon 1994; Christensen et al.
1995). However, the Swedish twin study (Vågerö and Leon 1994) had a limited
follow-up period with no distinction between monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic
(DZ) twins (the latter having slightly higher birth weights on average), and our
Danish twin study (Christensen et al. 1995) did not include causes of death.
Therefore we studied cause-specific mortality of 19,986 Danish twin individuals
from the birth cohorts 1870–1930 followed from 1952 through 1993 (Christensen
et al. 2001). Despite the large sample size and follow-up period, we were not able to
detect any difference between twins and the general population with regard to
all-cause mortality or cardiovascular mortality. Hence, the intrauterine growth retar-
dation experienced by twins does not result in any “fetal programming” of cardio-
vascular diseases.
22.4 Twins and Genetic Confounding
The potential for genetic confounding in relation to the fetal origins hypothesis has
been illustrated by Dunger et al. (1998), who showed that variation in the insulin
gene (INS VNTR) is associated with fetal growth. Based on studies of fetal insulin
secretion and monogenic diseases, Hattersley and Tooke (1999) proposed that
genetically determined insulin resistance contributes substantially to the association
of low birth weight with diabetes, hypertension and vascular diseases and named this
hypothesis “the fetal insulin hypothesis”.
We used the Minnesota Twin Family study (Iacono et al. 1999) to test the
potential influence of genetic confounding on the association between birth weight
and systolic blood pressure, which is the best documented association between fetal
growth and later life health outcome (Barker 1998; Kuh and Ben-Shlomo 1997; Law
and Shiell 1996; Taylor et al. 1997). The effect of genetic confounding was
evaluated by analysing individual twin data as well as intrapair differences in birth
weight and systolic blood pressure. This approach enables controlling for the effect
of all genetic factors in monozygotic pairs and on average half of the genetic factors
in dizygotic pairs as well as environmental maternal effects. Two recent twin studies
(Poulter et al. 1999; Dwyer et al. 1999) using a similar design did not find evidence
for a genetic component to the association, but as pointed out in the accompanying
editorial (Leon 1999), the number of monozygotic twin pairs in these studies was
sparse.
We used the following statistical analysis:
As in Hopper and Seeman (1994), for each twin, i, of a pair (i¼ 1,2) let Yi be systolic
blood pressure and X1i ¼ birth weight and X2i¼ current weight.
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Let
Yi ¼ a0 þ a1X1i þ a2X2i þ Ei ð22:1Þ
where Ei represents measurement error and effects specific to twin i. Each of the
coefficients a1 and a2 represents the strength of a linear association between the
blood pressure and a corresponding variable. The intrapair difference is
D ¼ Y1  Y2 ¼ a1D1 þ a2D2 þ E ð22:2Þ
where Dj ¼ Xj1– Xj2(j ¼ 1,2) and E ¼ E1– E2. From (22.2) it can be seen that the
same coefficients a1, a2 can be estimated by regressing D against D1, D2, and
constraining the fitted line to pass through the origin (because (22.2) does not have
an intercept term). This second regression approach controls for age, sex and genetic
factors (all in monozygotic twins and on average half in dizygotic twins).
From the Minnesota Twin Family Study (Iacono et al. 1999) we included 1311
pairs of adolescent twins, and we found a negative association between birth weight
and systolic blood pressure in the overall sample. The regression coefficient after
controlling for current weight was 1.88 mm Hg/kg (SE 0.61), which corresponds
to results from previous studies of singleton adolescents. The regression coefficient
fell to0.64 mmHg/kg (SE 0.86) when the intrapair analyses were used. The largest
reduction was observed among monozygotic twins: from 2.44 mm Hg/kg
(SE 0.75) in the overall monozygotic twin sample to 1.06 mm Hg/kg (SE 1.14)
in the analyses of the within monozygotic pair differences.
22.5 Overview
In 2002, Huxley and co-workers published an overview of the available data on the
relation between birth weight and later life blood pressure. This relation has been put
forward as one of the most consistent and strong evidence of the association between
birth weight and later life health. This overview found a clear indication of publica-
tion bias as smaller studies reported a large effect while larger studies reported a
small effect. Furhermore, it was somewhat disturbing to see that the hypothesis-
generating group consistently reported a larger effect than other research groups.
Huxley et al. (2002) also summarized the available interpair comparison studies
in twins and found, based on the above-mentioned study of the Minnesota twins and
on other studies, that the confidence interval for the effect estimated by intrapair
differences in twins was not different from zero. Even if the largest estimate of the
relation between birth weight and blood pressure is accepted, that is to say a 2 mm
Hg increase in blood pressure for every increase in birth weight by 1 kilo, this is
clearly not an important factor on the individual level. Theoretically, it might be an
important finding for understanding the etiology of blood pressure, but from a public
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health perspective, the change of 2 mm Hg per 1 kilo difference in birth weight
would not call for intervention. This view is underlined by the observation by
Huxley and colleagues who draw attention to the fact that increase in birth weight
also correlates with an increase in weight which might have an even stronger effect
on the adult blood pressure than the inverse relation between birth weight and blood
pressure, when current weight is controlled for. At present, therefore, too little is
known about the effect, and the evidence of the correlation between early life growth
and later life health and survival is not strong enough to have any practical impor-
tance for forecasting models.
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Chapter 23
The Month of Birth: Evidence for Declining
but Persistent Cohort Effects in Lifespan
Gabriele Doblhammer
23.1 Introduction
In the second half of the nineteenth century, mortality started to decline and this
decline seemed to follow a cohort pattern. A cohort pattern is direct evidence for the
effect of early-life circumstances on adult mortality: improvements in the living
environment early in life lead to reduced mortality during the whole life course.
Early studies for England, Wales and Scotland (Kermack et al. 1934, 2001) suggest
that, as far as mortality up to the year 1925 is concerned, the year of birth had more
predictive power than the year of death. Around 1925, the responsible factors for the
mortality decline changed and the year of birth lost its predictive power. Period
factors became more and more important. In a recent study, Davey Smith and Kuh
(2001) updated the table of relative death rates for England and Wales from the
Kermack paper. They showed that from 1925 onwards at younger ages, death rates
fell faster than predicted based on birth cohort regularities, whereas at older ages,
mortality declined at a much slower rate than predicted.
Elo and Preston (1992) point out that the early studies were probably so success-
ful in demonstrating cohort effects because they were based on mortality data from a
time period before the process of mortality decline on a period level had begun. Once
both cohorts and periods began to show mortality improvements, it became more
difficult to separate the two.
The cohort decline at the beginning of the epidemiological transition is not
without contest either. In their study of the Swedish mortality decline, Kermack
et al. (1934, 2001) admitted that the cohort effect is not as clear as it was for England
andWales. The authors argue that a rectangular block dating from 1855 onwards and
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affecting the age groups 10 to 30 years was the primary cause of disturbances in the
cohort decline. If the block is omitted, a cohort decline is observed. This result could
not be replicated, however, in a study of Swedish mortality between 1778 and 1993
by Vaupel et al. (1997). The conclusion according to Vaupel et al. is that “the pattern
is clearly more complex than a pure cohort-effect model would suggest” (Vaupel
et al. 1997: 63).
As a result of the loss of the predictive power of cohort factors around 1925, the
emphasis turned towards period factors such as advances in medical technology,
life-style, smoking, physical activity and diet. In the 1970s, however, Forsdahl
(1973, 1977, 1978) observed that regional differences in adult lung cancer and
heart disease were not related to contemporary differences in lifestyle, smoking
behaviour, or socioeconomic status but rather to differences in regional infant
mortality during childhood and youth of the cohorts under study. His study is now
considered the starting point of a large and productive area of research that tries to
link early-life conditions to the manifestation of chronic disease later in life. The
discussion about early-life effects on health at adult ages gained momentum with
studies conducted by the Southampton group of Barker and colleagues (Barker
1994; Barker and Osmond 1986a, b, 1987). The group developed the fetal-origins
hypothesis of adult disease (also known as the ‘Barker hypothesis’), which suggests
that coronary heart disease at adult ages results from poor conditions in utero caused
by inadequate nutrition on the part of the mother and infectious diseases she suffered
during pregnancy. Since inadequate nutrition of the fetus is reflected in low birth
weight, the Barker hypothesis claims that growth retardation in utero leads to low
birth weight and to an increased risk of chronic disease later in life. It seems that the
main connection between birth weight and heart disease later in life is systolic blood
pressure – infants with a low birth weight experience increased systolic blood
pressure at adult ages.
The fetal-origins hypothesis has led to a large amount of research that generally
concludes that low birth weight is associated with an increased risk of heart disease
at adult ages and that low-birth weight infants suffer from increased systolic blood
pressure later in life. The interpretation of these outcomes has been repeatedly
challenged, however. The main idea underlying the fetal-origins hypothesis is that
a critical period exists early in life and that negative effects during this period cannot
be reversed later in life. Critics of the hypothesis frequently bring forward the
argument that birth weight is confounded with socioeconomic status. Negative social
factors in the early-life environment may set people onto life trajectories that
negatively affect their health over the whole life course. Therefore, the almost
universally observed relationship between birth weight and the risk of chronic
disease later in life may be an outcome of the whole life course rather than the result
of a critical period early in life (Joseph and Kramer 1996; Kramer 2000).
This criticism leads to the question whether one can find an indicator for the
prenatal and early postnatal environment that is not related to the life-course. Birth
weight certainly does not fulfil this criterion and, in addition, it is not widely
available. Studies that use birth weight or other direct indicators of early-life
circumstances are usually based on hospital data, which are invariable subject to
selection bias. Moreover, their sample sizes tend to be modest.
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The fetal-origins hypothesis suggests that nutrition and infectious diseases during
the pregnancy of the mother are responsible for growth retardation in the infant,
which leads to an increased risk of heart disease at adult ages. Both nutrition and
infectious diseases are highly seasonal: respiratory infections peak in the autumn and
winter, and gastrointestinal infections peak during warm periods of the summer
months. The availability of fresh fruits and vegetables – and thus of micronutrients –
tends to change according to the seasons of the year. An indicator that reflects the
seasonally changing environment during the prenatal and early postnatal period is
month of birth.
Epidemiological research on the underlying factors of schizophrenia has long
used month of birth as an indicator for early-life circumstances that affect the risk of
schizophrenia later in life. This line of research dates back to Ellsworth Huntington,
who in 1938 published his book about seasonality (Huntington 1938), in which he
describes the relationship between the seasons of the year and social, psychological,
and demographic phenomena. By 1997, more than 250 studies about the month-of-
birth effect in schizophrenia had appeared and many more are still being published
(Torrey et al. 1997). Most of the research on the relationship between month of birth
and the incidence of diseases has been conducted for mental disorders, in particular
schizophrenia and bipolar disorders. The season-of-birth effect has also been studied
for autistic disorder, Alzheimer patients, anorexia nervosa patients, and for diseases
of the nervous system such as Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclerosis and epilepsy.
Recently much attention was for example given to the month-of-birth effect in
insulin dependent childhood diabetes. For a review of studies about the relationship
between month of birth and certain diseases, see Doblhammer (2004). Many of these
studies suggest that virus infections in utero or in the first few months of life are
responsible for the increased risk of developing a certain disease. None of these
studies, however, provides concrete evidence for a specific causal mechanism.
Although widespread evidence exists concerning the month-of-birth effect for
certain diseases, little attention has been given to the question whether there is a
correlation between the month of birth and lifespan and whether this relationship has
changed over cohorts. If the month-of-birth effect decreases in younger cohorts then
this suggests that the influence of the very first period of life on adult lifespan has
reduced over time. Two recently published studies point in this direction. A study of
young adults in rural Gambia found a significant difference in survival to age 45 by
month of birth (Moore et al. 1997). When the authors repeated their study on a rural
Bangladeshi population, they could not detect an effect of season of birth on survival
(Moore et al. 2004). Furthermore, a study of early adult death in rural Senegal also
failed to find any influence between month of birth and survival at young adult ages
(Simondon et al. 2004). Both Moore and colleagues and Simondon and colleagues
suggest that the negative findings in the Bangladeshi and Senegal population are due
to cohort effects. While the data for Gambia are based on births during the 1950s and
1960s, the Bangladeshi and Senegal data include individuals born between 1974 and
2000 (Bangladesh), and 1962 and 2000 (Senegal).
This article takes up the question whether the season-of-birth effect in life-span
has changed over time and whether it is less important for more recent than for older
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cohorts. To answer this question the article first describes the month-of-birth pattern
in lifespan for selected countries of the Northern (Austria, Denmark, and United
States) and Southern Hemisphere (Australia). Second, a cohort analysis is performed
based on the Danish register data and of consecutive US census rounds that include
information about the season of birth. Third, the underlying causal mechanisms
behind the month-of-birth effect are reviewed and finally, outcomes are discussed in
the light of mortality forecasting.
23.2 Data
The optimal data to test for differences in lifespan by season of birth are longitudinal
data. Birth cohorts born in a specific season are followed from birth to death and life
expectancy can be calculated using simple life-table methods. Such data rarely exist
however. The data that are closest to this requirement are register data from the
Scandinavian countries. The Danish data used in this study consist of a mortality
follow-up of all Danes who were at least 50 years old on 1 April 1968. This totals
1,371,003 people, who were followed up to week 32 of 1998. The study excludes
1994 people who were lost to the registry during the observation period. Among
those who are included in the study, 86% (1,176,383 individuals) died before week
32 of 1998; 14% (192,626 individuals) were still alive at the end of the follow-up.
Population registers do not exist for Austria, Australia and the US, where only
individual death records are available. Exact dates of birth and death are known for
in all 681,677 Austrians who died between 1988 and 1996 and for 219,820 native-
born Australians who died between 1993 and 1997 at ages 50+. Two data sources are
used for the United States. First, US death records for the years 1989 to 1997, which
include place of birth, are the basis for the analysis of the month-of-birth pattern in
lifespan. Second, the three US census rounds 1960, 1970, and 1980 are used to study
cohort patterns. These three census rounds are the only rounds that include infor-
mation about the quarter of birth. Data are extracted from the “Public Use Microdata
Samples”, which are accessible under http://usa.ipums.org/usa/. The extract is
restricted to the native-born white US population aged 0 to 100. For whites, this
gives a sample size of 1,490,444 in 1960, 1,672,107 in 1970, and 1,812,839 in 1980.
23.3 Methods
For Denmark, both the risk population and the number of deaths are known which
means that it is possible to estimate remaining life expectancy at age 50 based on life
tables that were corrected for left truncation. This was achieved by calculating
occurrence and exposure matrices that take into account an individual’s age on
1 April 1968. For example, a person who was 70 at the beginning of the study and
who died at age 80 enters the exposures for ages 70 to 80 but is not included in the
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exposures for ages 50 to 69. The central age-specific death rate is based on the
occurrence-exposure matrix. The corresponding life-table death rate is derived by
means of the Greville Method (Greville 1943).
For Austria, Australia and the United States, the population at risk is unknown,
which means that lifespan by month of birth cannot be estimated based on simple
life-table techniques. For these three countries, remaining lifespan at age 50 was
therefore estimated by calculating the average of the exact ages at death. It has been
pointed out that using mean age at death as an approximation for life expectancy may
lead to serious bias in the observed month-of-birth pattern (Gavrilov and Gavrilova
2003). It is well known that mean age at death does not correctly estimate life
expectancy in non-stationary and non-extinct populations. The emphasis of this
study, however, is not life expectancy per se but the month-of-birth pattern in life
expectancy, which generally should not be affected. There is one exception, how-
ever. If the seasonal distribution of births has changed over time then not only life
expectancy but also the month-of-birth pattern is biased when estimated based on
mean ages at death. If more people proportionally are born in spring in younger
cohorts than in older cohorts, then for a given time period the mean age at death will
be biased downward for those born in spring. In the case of Austria and Denmark,
the changes in the seasonal distribution of births over time are minor, however, and
the effect on the month-of-birth pattern is negligible (Doblhammer 2004).
The Danish register data consist of sufficiently large numbers of exposures and
deaths to distinguish between age and cohort effects. Two ten-year birth cohorts are
followed over an age-span of 20 years. The birth cohort April 1908 to March 1918
enters the study period between the ages of 50 and 59 and 11 months. They are
followed from age 60 to age 79 in order, theoretically, to allow each member of the
cohort to reach each age. The second cohort is aged 60 to 69 and 11 months at the
1968-baseline and is followed from age 70 to age 89. This specification allows the
study of age-specific death rates at ages 70 to 79 for both cohorts. Conditional on
surviving to age 70, all individuals are followed from age 70 to age 79. Those who
survived age 79 are treated as censored. Mortality of the two cohorts between ages
70 and 79 is modelled by a proportional hazard model with the baseline hazard
following a Gompertz function,
μ xjyið Þ ¼ aeb0xeb1y1þb2y2þb3y3 ð23:1Þ
where μ(x| yi) is the force of mortality at age x conditional on covariates yi, a is the
age-independent level of mortality and b0 the increase in mortality over age. The
three indicator-variables, y1, y2 and y3, denote the quarter of birth and take the value
one if a person is born in a specific quarter, and zero otherwise; the first quarter is
defined as reference group. The parameters a, b0, b1, b2, and b3 are estimated by
maximising the likelihood function. For each of the two cohorts, a separate model is
estimated.
To estimate differences in survival according to the quarter of birth based on the
US censuses for the year 1960, 1970, and 1980, a method called Survival-Attributes
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Assay (Christensen et al. 2001) is applied. This method uses cross-sectional data on
“fixed-attributes” to estimate the effect of a fixed trait on survival.
Let Nx be the number of people at age x. Let px be the proportion of x-year-olds
who have some fixed attribute such as the season of birth. Let px + n be the proportion
at age x + n. Let s be the conditional survival probability from age x to age x + n for
the individuals who have the fixed attribute. Let S be the conditional survival
probability from age x to x + n for the entire cohort.
Then, because
pxNx s ¼ Nx Spxþn ð23:2Þ
it follows that
s ¼ S pxþn
px
ð23:3Þ
Thus, the relative risk of surviving from age x to age x + n for people born in a
specific quarter is the ratio of their observed proportions in the two cross-sections.
The proportion of the population within 10-year age groups that is born in a certain
quarter of the year is followed over the three census rounds.
This method relies on the assumption that the x + 20-year-olds in the third cross-
section were similar to the x-year-olds in the first cross-section 20 years earlier;
e.g. the 70-year-olds in 1980 are the survivors of the 60-year-olds in 1970 and the
50-year-olds in 1960. In other words, the change in the proportion of the fixed
attribute over an age range of 20 years is solely due to age effects and not affected by
cohort effects. Differences in the survival probability of ages that are further apart
than 20 years can be both due to cohort and age effects. The method of Survival-
Attributes Assays therefore, does not permit a clear distinction between age and
cohort effects. The main advantages of the method are, however, that it does not
require the calculation of death rates in order to verify the month-of-birth effect and
that it can be used to study differences in survival at ages where death rates are low
and therefore subject to random fluctuations. Thus, it can be used to study whether
differences in survival by season of birth not only exists among today’s elderly but
also among more recent cohorts.
23.4 Results
23.4.1 Differences in Lifespan in the United States, Austria,
Denmark and Australia
A similar relationship between month of birth and lifespan exists in all of the
Northern Hemisphere countries (Fig. 23.1). Adults born in the autumn (October–
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December) live longer than do adults born in the spring (April–June). The difference
in lifespan between the spring- and autumn-born is twice as large in Austria
(0.6 years) as in Denmark (0.3 years).
In Denmark for those born in the second quarter, lifespans are 0.19  0.05 years
shorter than average; for those born in the fourth quarter they are 0.12  0.04 years
longer than average. This difference is statistically significant (Cox-Mantel statistic:
p<0.001). Also in Austria the deviation in mean age at death is highly significant
(Bonferroni test: p<0.001) for those born in the second and the fourth quarters. The
lifespans of people born between weeks 14 and 26 are 0.28  0.03 years below
average; lifespans of those born between weeks 40 and 52 are 0.32  0.03 years
above average. A highly significant difference in mean age at death by month of
birth exists for US decedents who died between 1989 and 1997. Those born in June
and July die about 0.44 years earlier than the October-born. The pattern in the
Northern Hemisphere is mirrored in the Southern Hemisphere. The mean age at
death of people born in Australia in the second quarter of the year is 78.0; those born
in the fourth quarter die at a mean age of 77.65. The difference of 0.35 years is
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Fig. 23.1 Deviation from average remaining lifespan at age 50 for people born in a specific month
in Austria, Australia, Denmark and the United States
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23.4.2 Changes in the Month-of-Birth Pattern over Cohorts
in Denmark
Table 23.1 contains the parameter estimates ln(a) and b0 and the odds ratios of the
Gompertz models for the two cohorts 1889 to 1908 and 1909 to 1918. In the older
cohort (1889 to 1909), there exists a significant excess mortality of those born in the
second quarter (+3% as compared to those born in the first quarter). People born in
the fourth quarter experience the lowest mortality risk (2% compared to those born
in the first quarter). In the younger cohort (1909 to 1918), the differences in mortality
by quarter of birth become statistically not significant.
23.4.3 Changes in the 20-Year Survival Probability by
Quarter of Birth in the United States
Figure 23.2 shows the relative risks of the 20-year survival probabilities conditional
on age for people born in a specific quarter compared to the average population.
At younger ages, the mortality advantage of the autumn-born and the disadvan-
tage of the spring-born is minor. For males, it is a maximum of 1% over an age range
of 20 years. In other words, up to the age of 40 the conditional survival probability of
surviving the next 20 years is about 1% higher for the autumn-born than for the
average population; it is 1% lower for the spring-born. Differences in the 20-year
survival start to accelerate from the age group 40–49 onwards, when those born in
the fourth quarter have a higher chance of 2.4% to survive the next 20 years; this
Table 23.1 Parameter
estimates and 95% confidence
intervals of the Gompertz
models estimated for Danes
born in a specific quarter for
birth cohorts 1898–1909 and









2nd quarter 1.03 1.02 1.04
3rd quarter 1.00 0.99 1.02
4th quarter 0.98 0.96 0.99
Ln(a) 3.44 3.45 3.43
b0  102 8.59 8.42 8.76
Cohort 1909–1918
1st quarter 1.00
2nd quarter 1.08 0.96 1.21
3rd quarter 1.05 0.94 1.18
4th quarter 1.06 0.95 1.19
Ln(a) 3.51 3.62 3.39
b0  102 8.08 7.49 8.68
Source: The Office for National Statistics
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advantage increases to 7.8% for ages 60–69. The disadvantage in the 20-year
survival of people born in the second quarter starts at ages 50–59 and is about
minus 2.8%. It increases to minus 6.6 per cent for the age group 60–69. Similar
trends emerge for women.
23.5 Discussion
In all four populations, Austria, Australia, Denmark and United States, significant
differences in lifespan exist by month of birth. Those born in spring generally face a
lower life expectancy than those born in autumn This finding is independent of the





















































































































































Fig. 23.2 Relative risk of 20-year survival by age in the 1960 US census by sex (males ¼ white-
dotted bars, females ¼ grey bars) and quarter of birth
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The US death data contain detailed information about the state of birth, education,
marital status, and race of the deceased (Doblhammer 2004). Among the white US
population, the age-standardised peak-to-trough difference in the month-of-birth
pattern increases from the North to the South while the basic pattern remains
unchanged. The difference is smallest in New England, with 0.31 years and largest
in the East South Central Region, with 0.86 years. The differences in the West are
intermediate. The age-standardised differences in lifespan by month of birth vary
significantly according to education levels. The difference between the spring trough
and the winter peak is 0.62 years for those with a low education and 0.38 years for
the highly educated. There exists a highly significant difference in the month-of-birth
pattern by marital status. The difference between the peak and the trough is largest
for the never-married (0.62 of a year), and smallest for the married (0.40 of a year);
the widowed (0.45 of a year) and the divorced (0.44 of a year) are intermediate. The
month-of-birth pattern of the 1.7 million US African Americans differs significantly
from that of the white population. It differs not only with respect to the number of
years between the trough and the peak (0.57 years) but also with respect to the shape
of the curve. The mean age at death is highest for those born between January and
March. As in the case of the white population, the mean age at death for African
Americans is lowest for decedents born in July.
In a multivariate analysis of ages at death in the United States (Doblhammer
2004), the main effects of sex, month of birth, education, race, region of birth,
marital status and all the two-way interactions of the variables are highly significant.
This implies that the regional differences in the month-of-birth pattern are neither
due to differences in education nor to differences in race but they exist independently
of them. Overall, above factors explain 25% of the variation in ages at death. About
86% of the model explanation is due to the effect of marital status and only 0.4% to
the effect of month of birth. The large majority (70%) of this 0.4% result from the
interactions of month of birth with region of birth and race.
What are the causal mechanisms behind the month-of-birth effect on life-span?
One frequently raised concern is that the month-of-birth effect reflects the seasonal
distribution of deaths rather than the seasonal changes in the early-life environment.
More specifically, the concern is that the interaction between the seasonal distribu-
tion of deaths and the monthly increase in adult mortality causes a month-of-birth
pattern. This hypothesis has been already widely discussed in the research about the
month-of-birth effect in schizophrenia, whose incidence is seasonal and whose risk
increases with age. Two studies (Doblhammer and Vaupel 2001; Doblhammer
2004) have shown that, although month of birth, age, and month of death influence
mortality simultaneously, they are independent of each other.
A second, frequently raised concern is that the month-of-birth effect is caused by
socioeconomic differences in the seasonal distribution of births. The number of
births is distributed seasonally over the year with the exception of only a few
populations. If the seasonality in births is partly driven by the preference of couples
for giving birth in certain seasons of the year, then this preference may differ
between social groups. In schizophrenia research, this explanation is generally
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known as the procreational habits theory. Individuals with schizophrenia may have a
procreational pattern that differs from those of the non-schizophrenic population
(Torrey et al. 1997). On basis of the 1981 census for Austria, it was possible to refute
this hypothesis (Doblhammer 2004). This is also true for the deadline hypothesis.
Starting school is usually tied to reaching a certain age before a certain deadline.
Children who are born shortly after the deadline have to wait an additional year
before the can start school and will therefore be among the oldest of their classmates.
This may pose a special advantage compared to those who are born shortly before
the deadline, who will thus always be among the youngest. However, since the mean
age at death of the autumn-born is higher than that of the spring-born, the deadline
hypothesis cannot explain the month-of-birth effect on the lifespan.
Public health experts at the beginning of the twentieth century felt that the health
status of mothers and whether mothers breastfed their babies were the two most
important factors determining the survival of an infant, followed by housing,
sanitation and general poverty (Preston and Haines 1991). The health status of
pregnant women depended largely on their diet and on the general disease load.
Breastfeeding the infant is related primarily to a lower incidence of infectious
diseases of the gastrointestinal tract, which historically is the major cause of infant
mortality. Danish data on historical infant mortality between the years 1911 and
1915 show that it is the spring-born who experience higher mortality in their first
year of life (Doblhammer 2004). The standardised death rate of the June-born infants
is 30 per cent higher than the death rate of the December-born. This finding implies
that those factors that contributed to the high infant mortality of the past are also the
factors that cause the differences in lifespan by month of birth.
Nutrition is highly seasonal. Diet at the beginning of the twentieth century did not
much resemble contemporary dietary patterns. People ate less meat, fruits, and
vegetables and more starchy staple food. The first vitamins were not discovered
until 1911, and in the early 1900s, nutritionists were even opposed to greens, which
were considered to require more bodily energy for digestion than they provided.
Although severe malnourishment was not widespread, people had inadequate nutri-
tion – particularly during the winter and early spring. Peak growth of the fetus in
utero occurs during the third trimester. For infants born in spring, the third trimester
coincides with a period of largely inadequate nutrition; for those born in the autumn
it coincides with a period of plenty.
The effect of nutrition early in life on adult health is highly contested. Studies
that looked at the old-age mortality of cohorts born shortly after periods of famine,
which were thus presumably marked by severe malnutrition of the mother during
the gestational period of their unborn, did not find any differences (Kannisto et al.
1997). Two studies about the long-term effects of severe starvation during the
siege of Leningrad come to contrary results (Stanner et al. 1997; Sparén et al.
2003). The effect of the Dutch famine in 1944–1945 on later life disease and
mortality is explored in a series of studies (Rosenboom et al. 2001, 2000a, b). The
authors find that mortality up to age 18 was higher for those born before the
famine and those exposed to the famine in the third trimester. Between the ages of
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18 and 50, however, no effect of prenatal exposure to the famine could be
demonstrated. Thus, the evidence is weak concerning the effect of nutrition
during gestational age on mortality later in life.
The incidence of infectious diseases depends on the climate and on the seasons of
the year. The incidence of waterborne infectious diseases, which affect mainly the
gastrointestinal tract, is correlated with warmer temperatures and flooding. Peak
climatological temperatures coincide with the incidence of foodborne diseases.
Many childhood diseases are highly seasonal; airborne diseases affecting the respi-
ratory tract usually peak in autumn and winter. Historically, people born in years
with extremely high infant mortality caused primarily by whooping cough and
smallpox tend to have higher mortality later in life (Bengtsson and Lindström 2003).
Infant mortality at the turn of the twentieth century was mainly caused by
exogenous factors, in particular infectious disease. Infants born in spring had an
increased risk to die from infectious disease during their first year of life. The month-
of-birth patter in adult lifespan suggests that those who survived were debilitated and
suffered from higher mortality during adult ages.
Explanations other than nutrition and infectious disease have also been brought
forward to explain the month-of-birth effect. One of the first to study the influence of
the month of birth on the lifespan was Elsworth Huntington, who formulated the
hypothesis in 1936 that high temperatures at the time of conception weaken the
“germ plasma” of the parents, with negative effects on the development of the foetus.
Recent research has shown that the sperm quality of men who work outdoors does
indeed decrease during periods of high temperatures (Centola and Eberly 1999). A
related hypothesis is that hot summers are the cause of protein deficiencies at the
time of conception (Pasamanick 1986). This hypothesis is clearly ruled out on basis
of the US death data. The United States consists of six major climatic zones with
very different climatic conditions. Since the US death data contain the state of birth,
it is possible to correlate the peak-to-trough difference in lifespan by month of birth
for people born in a specific state with maximum and minimum temperature and with
the maximum difference in temperature. It appears that no correlation exists between
the peak-to-trough difference and the temperature variables, neither for total mor-
tality nor for major causes of death (Doblhammer 2004).
Another explanation is that seasonal changes in the hours of daylight influence
the human endocrine functions and that the month-of-birth effect might be caused by
variations in the internal chemistry or neural development brought about by the
seasonal variations in light (Wehr 1998; Turnquist 1993; Quested 1991; Morgan
1978; Jongbloet 1975; Pallast et al. 1994).
23.6 Conclusion
The analysis of the Danish register data and the consecutive US census rounds shows
that the differences in lifespan by month of birth have become smaller over time.
This is consistent with the explanation of nutrition and infectious disease since both
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have considerably improved over time. Although diet still differs between spring and
fall, the difference in the nutritional value is much smaller than at the beginning of
the twentieth century. In addition, the epidemiological transition has reduced infec-
tious disease to a minor cause of death.
Ample evidence exists that the health of today’s elderly is scarred by negative
events that they experienced during their pre-natal or early post-natal life. This study
shows that already among the elderly, those born in more recent years are less
affected by seasonal early life factors and that the month-of-birth effect has become
smaller. This finding suggest that in more recent cohorts period factor as opposed to
cohort factors have gained increased importance and that period factors may there-
fore predominantly determine future gains in life expectancy.
On the other hand, the US census rounds indicate that differences in the 20-year
survival still exist at young ages between 1960 and 1980. In addition, a study of
twins born in the 1970s in Minnesota (Doblhammer 2004) shows that the seasonal
pattern in birth weight – a widely used indicator for growth retardation in utero – is
positively correlated with the month-of-birth pattern in the mean age at death of
decedents aged 50+ who were born in Minnesota. Thus, there exists evidence that
the seasonal fluctuations in the early life environment of recent cohorts have still an
effect on life expectancy.
Huge gains have been made in the health environment during the very first
period of life during the last century. Infant mortality has fallen drastically during
the last century. Since infant mortality in the early twentieth century was primarily
due to exogenous factors such as infectious disease, the decline in infant mortality
points to a largely improved health environment of infants and children. However,
in the 1980s and 1990s researchers have repeatedly pointed out that decreasing
poverty among the elderly has led to increasing poverty in childhood (Preston
1984), particularly in the United States. A recent article by Komlos and Baur
(2004) finds that in the most recent decades the height of Americans has been
lagging behind that of Europeans while at the beginning of the twentieth century
they were the tallest of the world. The authors even present some evidence that
heights have been stagnating among US men and might actually be decreasing
among females born in the 1960s. Height primarily reflects the socioeconomic and
epidemiological environment during childhood and adolescence. It is signifi-
cantly correlated with health and longevity at adult ages. Height and life expec-
tancy rises together.
In an ageing society with too few children and an ever increasing proportion of
the old and very old the danger exists that resources in general and social transfers
in particular are channelled towards the elderly which may lead to increasing
poverty among children. In his 1984 article, Preston wrote, “that the transfers
from the working age population to the elderly are also transfers away from
children [. . .]”. Thus, childhood poverty may become an ever more widespread
phenomenon leading to a deterioration of the social and epidemiological environ-
ment early in life. In this case, cohort factors may gain importance again in
mortality forecasting.
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Early-Life Conditions and Old-Age
Mortality in a Comparative Perspective:
Nineteenth Century Sweden and Belgium
Tommy Bengtsson and George Alter
24.1 Introduction
Kermack et al. (1934) proposed the cohort explanation in their analysis of the
aggregated mortality decline in England, Wales, Scotland, and Sweden. Their
conclusion was that reductions in the death rates of the various age groups attained
at any particular time depended primarily on the individuals’ date of birth, and only
indirectly on the particular year under consideration. The essential effects on health
and survival of adults and older persons were mainly caused by improvements and
beneficial effects on their respective birth cohorts during childhood several decades
earlier. Jones (1956) brought up the cohort approach anew and recently it has gained
focus again through works in medicine but also in historical demography (Barker
1994; Elo and Preston 1992; Fogel 1994; Fridlizius 1989; Kuh and Ben-Shlomo
1997; Preston et al. 1998; Finch and Crimmins 2004). The plausible causal relation-
ships between early-life experiences and old-age mortality have been discussed, with
special attention to intrauterine cellular development and cellular development
during early childhood. Robert Fogel (1994) has proposed several plausible causal
mechanisms that connect malnutrition in utero and during early life to chronic
diseases in later life. These propositions are also supported by the work of Barker
(1994, 1995) who suggested that the preconditions for coronary heart disease,
hypertension, stroke, diabetes, and chronic thyroiditis are initiated in utero without
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becoming clinically manifest until much later in life. In contrast, Jones (1956), and
later Fridlizius (1989), in his analysis of the aggregated mortality decline in Sweden,
proposed that the genesis of disease in later life could be due to exposure to certain
infectious diseases in the first years of life. Fridlizius argued that this was caused by
life-long reduced immunity, which consequently gave higher general risk of other
infectious diseases in later life. The knowledge of the medical mechanisms today
seems to be more in favour of permanent retardation of organs due to infections
rather than immunological mechanisms (Finch and Crimmins 2004). Either way, it
implies that factors other than nutrition are important early-life determinants of
mortality in later life, because the outcome of some other important infectious
diseases, like smallpox, is almost completely unrelated to the nutritional status of
the infected individual (Rotberg and Rabb 1985).
In two recent essays, Bengtsson and Lindström (2000, 2003) investigated the
different cohort hypotheses using longitudinal data for individuals instead of aggre-
gated data like Kermack et al., Fridlizius, and many others. Bengtsson and
Lindström analysed demographic and economic data for individuals and households
and combined with community data on food prices and disease load. The analyses
included variables measuring conditions during the fetal stage and the first year of
life, as well as the disease load and access to nutrition (food prices). Strong support
was found for the hypothesis that the disease load experienced during the birth year
had a consistent impact on mortality in later life (Bengtsson and Lindström 2003).
This was particularly the case with the outcome of airborne infectious diseases
during old age (Bengtsson and Lindström 2000). The hypotheses that access to
nutrition and the disease load on mothers during the fetal stage had impacts on
mortality in later life were not supported and neither was the hypothesis about the
effects of access to nutrition during the first year of life (Table 24.1)
The influence of short-term variations in infant mortality on old-age mortality was
due to both cycles in infant mortality and trend (Bengtsson and Lindström 2003). A
test of potential nonlinearity of the cycle effect reveals that only years with partic-
ularly high disease load had an impact on mortality in later life (Bengtsson and
Lindström 2003). Highly virulent infectious diseases, especially smallpox and
whooping cough, dominated infant mortality in those years (Bengtsson and
Lindström 2003). These diseases are so virulent that the outcome shows no social
Table 24.1 Estimation of effects of infant mortality rate at birth on mortality in ages 55–80 years in
various diseases
Death cause Deaths Rel. risk Wald P-value
Airborne infectious disease 343 4.65 0.00
Non-infectious diseases 208 3.41 0.05
Old-age mortality 339 1.46 0.45
All causes of death 1400 1.80 0.03
Source: Bengtsson and Lindström (2000: table 5)
Note: The model controls for sex, birth year, birthplace, socioeconomic status, time period, and
logarithm of current rye prices in four Scanian parishes, 1766–1894. Number of deaths ¼ 1400
336 T. Bengtsson and G. Alter
gradient, and they probably penetrated the entire population. Smallpox, which was
mainly a childhood disease during the eighteenth century, was not only highly
virulent but also equally mortal with an overall fatality rate of about 15% (Sköld
1996: 70–75; Riley 2001). The eighteenth-century pattern of total childhood dom-
inance in smallpox mortality indicates that during this period the majority of the
adult population had already been exposed to smallpox as children, and had sur-
vived. The fact that airborne infectious diseases in the first year of life particularly
affected old-age mortality may imply that exposure to airborne infectious diseases
during the first year of life may make individuals more vulnerable throughout life.
Cohorts exposed during infancy to such infectious diseases may thus be much more
susceptible to high morbidity and mortality rates in old age than cohorts exposed
later in childhood to epidemics of smallpox and other infectious diseases. The causal
biological mechanisms in early life that might explain these significant associations
are only partly known (for further discussion, see Bengtsson and Lindström 2003;
Lindström and Davey Smith 2008).
In another recent essay on the effect of different forms of community variables,
Bengtsson et al. (2002), analyse early-life links in further detail. The essay supports
the earlier conclusion that the functional form of the effect of exposure is nonlinear
and includes valuable information about the causal link.
Furthermore, it shows that while both observed and unobserved characteristics at
family level – whether the result of genetics or of shared experience – had a
significant impact on mortality in later life, their inclusion in the models only
marginally alters previous estimates.
The main question in this paper is whether these historical findings for rural
Sweden are a local, or possibly a Nordic, phenomena, or if we find the same pattern
outside Sweden. We have therefore replicated the study for southern Sweden with
one for the rural parish of Sart in eastern Belgium. The population we analyze in Sart
are born in the period 1799 to 1846 and followed until 1899. For southern Sweden,
we analyze the population born between 1750 and 1840, followed to 1895. The
longitudinal demographic data on individuals and household socioeconomic data
from parish registers were combined with community data on food costs and disease
load, using a Cox regression analysis for the mortality among ever-married persons
in ages 55–80 years. In addition to trying to answer the main question, we will briefly
discuss whether information about conditions early in life can be used to improve
mortality forecasting.
24.2 Models
We use a proportional hazards model (Cox 1972). This means that we assume that a
relative effect on mortality of any covariate is constant over age. The model allows
time-varying covariates. It is very important to check the assumptions behind this
model, especially the proportionality assumption. We have therefore routinely tested
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all models for deviations from the proportionality assumption.1 The test we have
used is based on the correlation between log(t) and the Schoenfeld residuals for each
covariate. A large correlation indicates that the corresponding coefficient varies with
time, which means that the hazards are not proportional. We found no signs of
nonproportionality for any of the covariates or globally.2
24.3 Data for Scania
The Swedish data come from the Scanian Demographic Database, which consists of
records of births, marriages, deaths, and migrations for nine rural.
parishes and one town situated in the southernmost part of Sweden. The material
for two of the parishes dates back to 1646 and for the others to the 1680s. The
publicly available records end in 1895. Four of the rural parishes – Hög, Kävlinge,
Halmstad, and Sireköpinge – are included in this study. The parish register material
is of high quality and shows few gaps for births, deaths and marriages. Migration
records are less plentiful, but continuous series exist from the latter part of the
eighteenth century. Information concerning farm size, property rights, and various
other items from the poll tax records and land registers, are linked to the family
reconstitutions based on the parish records of marriages, births, and deaths.
Our interest in life-course effects on later-life mortality further limits our dataset.
We need information about socioeconomic conditions at birth not only for those
born in the parish but also for in-migrants. Data needed to create information for the
socioeconomic condition at birth of an in-migrant can be obtained from the birth
parish, but is generally available only after 1829. We have therefore had to limit the
period of our analyses to 1829–1894.
The sampled parishes are compact in their geographical location, showing the
variations that could occur in peasant society with regard to size, topography, and
socioeconomic conditions, and they offer good, early source material. The entire
area was open farmland, except northern Halmstad, which was more wooded.
Halmstad and Sireköpinge were noble parishes, while freehold and crown land
dominated in Kävlinge and Hög. The parishes each had 200–500 inhabitants in the
latter half of the eighteenth century. The agricultural sector in Sweden, and Scania,
became increasingly commercialised in the beginning of the nineteenth century.
New crops and techniques were introduced. Enclosure reforms and other reforms in
the agricultural sector influenced the population growth, in particular in Sireköpinge,
which experienced rapid population growth. In Kävlinge, the establishment of
several factories and railroad transportation led to rapid expansion from the 1870s
onwards (see Bengtsson 2001 for more details).
1We used the function ‘cox.zph’ in the ‘survival’ package in R.
2For a more detailed description of the test, see Therneau and Grambsch (2000: chapter
6, 127–152).
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The social structure of the agricultural sector is often difficult to analyse since
differences of wealth between the various categories of farmers and occupations are
unclear and subject to change with the passage of time. Land was the most important
source of wealth in the societies we analyse. Data from land registers on types of
tenure is limited and therefore must be combined with information from poll tax
records concerning farm size in order to arrive at a better understanding of each
household’s access to land. The category peasant includes freeholders, tenants on
crown land, and tenants on noble land as well as a few tenants on church land. We
only include peasants with farms larger than 1/16 mantal in this category since it has
been argued that peasants with smaller farms were not self-supporting. Mantal was
not a measure of the actual size of the farm but a tax-assessment unit based on
potential productivity. The few persons belonging to the nobility are also included in
this group. The second group includes farmers with land smaller than 1/16 mantal,
crofters, and the landless workers, the latter being in majority (see Bengtsson and
Lindström 2000 for more details). Thus, we are only differentiating between two
social groups: those with land enough to feed a family and those who need to work
for someone else to be able to support a family.
The nineteenth century was a period of considerable social change in the coun-
tryside. It has been described as a period of proletarianization and pauperization (see
Lundh 1983 for an overview). The numbers of landless increased (Carlsson 1968).
The downward mobility was significant since many children of farmers were unable
to obtain a farm themselves. This was true both for Sweden in general and for the
area we study (Lundh 1998). Downward mobility was also common among the
elderly, since many either sold their farms or gave them to their children. However,
they could still be rather well off since the new owner of their farm often had to look
after them in accordance with special contracts (undantagskontrakt). Not only did
social stratification increase at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the economic
condition of the landless worsened. They were, for example, more vulnerable to
short-term economic stress than they were both before and after this period
(Bengtsson and Dribe 2005).
The nineteenth century was also a period of rapidly expanding population in
Scania as well as in Sweden in general (see Bengtsson 2001). Fertility rates were
rather stable and mortality fell, first among infants and children, later among adults
and the elderly. During the period we study, the crude death rate for ages
55–80 years was declining in the four parishes, as in the rest of Sweden. Life
expectancy of Swedish women was the highest in the world (about 45 years around
1830) and remaining life expectancy at age 55 was about 16 years. The figures for
men were several years lower. The corresponding figures for our four parishes are
slightly higher than for Sweden.
Mortality in ages 55–80 years varied markedly from 1 year to the next and
showed a downward trend, as was the case nationally in Sweden (Jones 1956;
Fridlizius 1989). The models that we apply include a number of variables: sex,
whether a person has in-migrated to the parish or not, the parish of residence, birth
year, current food prices, season of birth and four other variables as indicators of
conditions in early life (see Bengtsson and Lindström 2000, 2003 for details). The
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infant mortality rate in the year of birth, a time-varying community variable, is used
as a fixed early-life covariate. It measures the disease load during first year of life.
Here the variation from 1 year to the next is also large but diminished somewhat over
time. The trend is upward for most of the eighteenth century and downward from the
1780s onwards. Thus, old-age mortality is preceded by a decline in infant mortality
by about 70 years. In order to separate effects of the trend from the effects of
occurring cycles in infant mortality, we have constructed two variables: a trend
variable, constructed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter and a variable designed to pick-
up cycles, measured as deviations from the trend. We have then categorized the
variable “infant mortality rate cycle” into five groups, the upper one at 0.12.3
The aggregated indicator of the food prices is included in the regressions as a
time-varying communal covariate (Bengtsson 1989, 1993). We use the deviation
from the log trend in rye prices as an indicator. This means that the aggregated
economic information is used as a time-varying covariate common to all individuals
in the risk set at each point in calendar time.4 Both price at birth and price at the time
of conception are included in the models. Thus, we estimate the effects of food
availability both during pregnancy and during first year of life. We use local prices of
rye, the most common crop, referring to the conditions in the fall, and we estimate
the effects of food prices during the subsequent year (see Bengtsson 2001 for more
details). Finally, we include mortality in ages 20–50 years as an indicator of the
disease environment during pregnancy.
24.4 Data for Sart
Our Belgian data come from the municipality of Sart, located in the Ardennes region,
close to the German border. Although the commune is geographically quite large
compared to other Belgian communes, it has always been sparsely populated
(42 inhabitants per square kilometer in 1846). The territory of Sart includes part of
the area known as the “Hautes Fagnes,” a high plateau of peat bogs and forest where
agriculture has always been marginal. The population of Sart resided in a half dozen
hamlets on the northern slopes of the Fagnes. Each one remains an island surrounded
by forests. The area was very poor in the nineteenth century (Alter et al. 2004b).
The rural population of the Ardennes was mostly composed of smallholders on
middle-sized farms. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, much of the land in
Sart was held in common, and recognized members of the community had a variety
of rights on common lands and forests (Vliebergh and Ulens 1912). An 1847 law
encouraged the sale of common land and the formation of larger holdings, but the
few large estates that resulted were abandoned shortly thereafter (Vliebergh and
3For further discussion of the functional form, see Bengtsson et al. (2002).
4We use the free software R (Hornik 2002), and the R package eha, which can handle time- varying
community covariates in a simple way (Broström 2002).
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Ulens 1912: 62). Agricultural techniques were primitive at the beginning of the
century, and farmers depended heavily on forests for both wood and feeding
livestock. The population of Sart grew from about 1800 persons at the beginning
of the nineteenth century to about 2500 in 1850, and there are signs of increasing
population pressure (Alter et al. 2004a). After 1850, the area was strongly affected
by the rapid industrialization of the region. Sart is less than 20 km from Verviers and
40 km from Liège, two important centers of the Industrial Revolution. Out-migration
to industrial centers increased rapidly after 1850 (Oris and Alter 2001). The combi-
nation of slow population decline and the introduction of new agricultural tech-
niques raised incomes, which are reflected in rapidly rising property values.
Sart was chosen as a research site because we have exceptionally complete
demographic records covering most of the nineteenth century. In 1811, the popula-
tion of Sart was recorded in a register showing the names of all persons arranged in
households. This register was updated to reflect changes due to births, marriages,
deaths, and migration, and a new register was opened in 1843. After the national
census of 1846, population registers were implemented in all of Belgium (Alter
1988). Since the population register records dates of in- and out-migration, we are
able to reconstruct the population at risk at every point in time.
Previous studies have already revealed the patterns of mortality in Sart during the
nineteenth century (Alter et al. 2004a; Alter and Oris 2000). The crude death rate
remained approximately constant until 1870, when a sustained decline began. The
influence of several major epidemics is readily apparent, including a typhus epi-
demic in 1816–17 following the Napoleonic Wars. Life expectancy remained stable
around 42 years before 1850 and increased slowly in the second half of the century.
Improvements in mortality began among children aged 1 to 10 in the period
1867–1880, and spread to adolescent and adult ages after 1880 (Alter et al.
2004a). Infant mortality, however, was largely unaffected until the last decade of
the century. The infant mortality rates show no trend during the period examined.
Mortality after age 55 did improve after 1850 as in Scania.
We use annual prices of oats as an indicator of economic stress in Sart5. Oats were
by no means the preferred grain, because it could not be made into bread.6 As the
least expensive grain, however, oats were the last resort of the poor. Previous studies
have shown that an increase in the price of rye was often associated with lower
mortality in Sart (Oris et al. 2005). Prices were determined on international markets,
and farmers benefited from high prices as long as they had substitutes for high-priced
5We have done analyses with both oats and rye, and the response was more sensitive to oats in this
case. Both grains were grown in Sart, but prices were determined on international markets. In some
cases we find that the grains have opposite signs when they are both included in the regression
equation. The reason, we believe, is that farmers in Sart had the choice of selling their rye in urban
markets when the price rose. Even if this meant that they ate more oats (the cheaper grain), it would
increase their welfare. When the price of oats went up, the poor in Sart were severely affected,
because (as we say in the paper) oats was their last resort.
6Prices for 1798 to 1830 were derived from Deprez (1948). Prices after 1831 come from
Gadisseur (1990).
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grains. An increase in the price of oats had a large impact on the poor, however,
because they had nowhere else to turn. Prices of oats tended to be more stable than
other grains, but there were large fluctuations in prices between 1800 and 1820.
There were constant demands for men and supplies when Eastern Belgium was part
of the Napoleonic Empire. A severe economic crisis accompanied by a typhus
epidemic followed Napoleon’s defeat.
24.5 Results
Table 24.2 shows the abridged results for a basic model with four early-life factors
included as well as a number of control variables. The full results for Sart are shown
in Appendix Table 24.5, and for Scania in Bengtsson and Lindström (2000). Our
focus is whether the effect of the disease load in year at birth has a strong impact on
mortality in later life both in Scania and in Sart. This, however, is not the case.
Instead, we find that the impact of food prices in year of birth is important in Sart; a
10% decline in food prices reduces mortality in older ages by 14%. This is the
average effect for the entire population and since we can safely assume that lower
strata were most negatively affected by high food prices the effect must have been
even larger among the poor (Bengtsson 2004; Alter et al. 2004a).
Sources: For Scania: Bengtsson and Lindström (2003: table 2). For Sart: Appen-
dix Table 24.6.
Table 24.3 shows the estimation results of a similar model in which the disease
load in the first year of life is included as a single early-life variable but where it has
been divided into a trend and a cycle component. We still find no support for the
hypothesis that the disease load in first year of life has an impact on old age mortality
in Sart, as it was in Scania7. This is, in fact, hardly surprising since the infant
mortality rate shows almost no trend in Sart.
Turning to Table 24.4, showing possible nonlinear effects of the disease load in
birth year on old age mortality, we find that children born in years of very high infant
mortality in Sart also face higher mortality later in life. The result is precisely the
same as for Scania, despite the fact that the study for Scania covers a much longer
period, one in which infants often were exposed to a highly virulent disease –
smallpox. Thus, normal variation in the disease environment at birth from 1 year
to the next has no impact on old-age mortality in Sart, only the extreme years have an
effect in later life.
7There were no smallpox epidemics in Sart because there was a strong vaccination campaign in the
early 19th century. There were isolated cases of smallpox later in the century, including a small
epidemic in 1871, because physicians did not realise that the immunity conveyed by vaccination is
not permanent.
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Table 24.2 Estimation of effects of infant mortality rate at birth, crude death rate at ages 20–
50 years 9 months prior to birth, and cycles in the logarithm of rye prices both 9 months prior to
birth and at birth
Covariate
Scania Sart
Rel.risk p-value Rel.risk p-value
Infant mortality rate at birth 2.93 0.00 1.00 0.33
Crude death rate in ages 20–50 at conception 0.67 0.91 0.99 0.62
Food-prices up 10% at conception 0.65 0.60 0.86 0.43
At birth 0.19 0.86 1.39 0.09
No. of deaths 1398 573
Sources: For Scania: Bengtsson and Lindström (2003: table 1). For Sart: Appendix Table 24.5
Note: The model controls for socioeconomic status, sex, birth year, birth season, birthplace, parish
of residence, and logarithm of current rye prices in four Scanian parishes, 1766–1894, and in Sart,
1854–1899
Table 24.3 Estimation of effects of cycles and trend in infant mortality rate (IMR) at birth
Covariate
Scania Sart
Rel.risk p-value Rel.risk p-value
IMR at birth trend 4.85 0.01 1.01 0.36
Cycle 2.35 0.01 1.00 0.97
No. of deaths 1398 573
Note: The model controls for sex, birth year, birth season, birthplace, parish of residence, socio-
economic status, crude death rate at ages 20–50 years 9 months prior to birth, and cycles in the
logarithm of rye prices 9 months prior to birth, at birth, and currently in four Scanian parishes,
1766–1894, and in Sart, 1854–1899
Table 24.4 Estimation of nonlinear effects of cycles in infant mortality rate at birth
Covariate
Scania Sart
Rel.risk p-value Rel.risk p-value
IMR at birth
Very low 1.03 0.90 – –
Low 1.01 0.93 1.14 0.26
Normal 1.00 – 1.00 –
High 0.91 0.28 0.89 0.28
Very high 1.51 0.02 1.58 0.02
No. of deaths 1398 573
Note: The model controls for sex, birth year, birth season, birthplace, parish of residence, socio-
economic status, crude death rate at ages 20–50 years 9 months prior to birth, and cycles in the
logarithm of rye prices 9 months prior to birth, at birth and currently in four Scanian parishes, 1766–
1894, and in Sart, 1854–1899
Sources: For Scania: Bengtsson and Lindström (2003: table 3). For Sart: Appendix Table 24.7
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24.6 Discussion
In a large body of studies, the conclusion is that conditions very early in life, in the
fetal stage and in the first year of life, have an impact on health and mortality in later
life. Robert Fogel (1994) has proposed several plausible causal mechanisms that
connect malnutrition in utero and during early life to chronic diseases in later life.
Fogel’s propositions have been supported by the work of Barker (1994, 1995) who
has suggested that the preconditions for coronary heart disease, hypertension, stroke,
diabetes, and chronic thyroiditis are initiated in utero but do not become clinically
manifest until much later in life. To the extent that the damage caused by malnutri-
tion in early life shows up later in life, we label it “permanent” damage. Recent
reviews of the evidence are given by Finch and Crimmins (2004) and Lindström and
Davey Smith in this volume.
For Scania, we have previously shown that the disease load in the birth year
affected mortality in ages 55–80 years, while we have found no support for either the
in utero or the diseases environment during pregnancy hypotheses (Bengtsson and
Lindström 2000, 2003; Bengtsson et al. 2002). The question we raise in this paper is
whether this is a “Swedish” phenomenon or if it can be found elsewhere. On the one
hand, we find support for the hypothesis of disease load in year at birth also for
nineteenth century Sart, a rural parish in eastern Belgium. On the other hand, not
only the disease load but also the food availability in year at birth affected old age
mortality in Sart. Neither in Sart nor in Scania have we found any in utero effects.
As regards the impact of the disease load during infancy, in Sart we find a
threshold effect but no basic effect (linear) and no trend effect. When we analyze
the period 1829–1894 in Scania, we find threshold effects almost identical to those in
Sart (Bengtsson and Broström 2003). Over the longer period from 1766 to 1894 the
results for Scania are driven both by the trend in infant mortality, which also appears
in analyses of aggregated data (Jones 1956; Fridlizius 1989; Finch and Crimmins
2004), and by extreme values. In the eighteenth century, most years with very high
infant mortality were years with high smallpox mortality (Bengtsson and Lindström
2003: Table 24.4) but smallpox was much less important in nineteenth-century Sart
– and the sub-period 1829–1894 for Scania. Thus, other epidemic diseases like
whooping cough, for Scania, and typhus and cholera, for Sart, had effects in old age
mortality similar to those of smallpox.
Another interesting finding is that food prices in the year of birth also affected
later life mortality in Sart. Could it be that when highly virulent diseases (smallpox)
disappear, socioeconomic conditions gain in importance, at least relatively speaking
but perhaps also in absolute terms? If this is the case, then it fits well with the
observation that socioeconomic factors were gradually becoming more and more
important for mortality levels during the course of the nineteenth century.
Finally, we turn to a brief discussion of the use of early-life indicators to improve
mortality forecasting. Several studies have shown that the disease load early in life
can cause permanent damage that shows up in increased mortality risks later in life.
This was the case for Sweden, using aggregate level data, as well as for a rural
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population in the very south of Sweden, using micro level data. This was also the
case for Sart in eastern Belgium, also using individual level data, as shown in this
study. Several other recent studies show similar results for other parts of Europe, as
well as for Canada (for an overview, see Beise et al. 2006; Schuster and Sunder
2005). Taken together, these findings suggest that the disease load early in life can be
used to predict mortality later in life. Finch and Crimmins (2004), however, find that
whereas mortality in the first year of life is of most importance for mortality risks at
older ages in some countries, mortality in childhood is more important in other
countries. This constitutes a problem since it implies different mechanisms. If the
mechanism in play had been the same and remained stable across populations, its
value as a predictor of future mortality would certainly be much higher.
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Appendix
Table 24.5 Sart, 1855–1899. Estimation of effects of infant mortality rate at birth, crude death rate
at ages 20–50 years 9 months prior to birth, and cycles in the logarithm of out prices both 9 months
prior to birth and at birth, controlling for socioeconomic status, sex, birth year, birth season, birth
place. The number of deaths is 573
Subjects 658
Deaths 573




Female 0.91 0.28 0.47
Year of birth 1.04 0.00 1821.42
Birth season:
Jan–Mar 1.00 27.21
Apr–Jun 1.09 0.49 25.11
Jul–Sep 0.94 0.61 21.64
Oct–Dec 1.20 0.10 26.03
Wealth after age 55
None 1.00 36.63
Low 1.19 0.07 43.47
High 0.70 0.00 19.91
(continued)
24 Early-Life Conditions and Old-Age Mortality in a Comparative. . . 345
Table 24.5 (continued)
Born in Sart 1.13 0.24 0.70
IMR year of birth 1.00 0.33 169.86
Adult Death Rate year before birth (difference from trend) 0.99 0.62 0.12
Oats year of birth
(difference from trend in logs)
1.39 0.09 0.00
Oats year before birth (difference from trend in logs) 0.86 0.43 0.00
Table 24.6 Sart, 1855–1899. Estimation of effects of cycles and trend in infant mortality rate at








Female 0.90 0.24 0.47
Year of birth Birth season: Jan–Mar 1.04 0.00 1821.42
1.00 27.21
Apr–Jun 1.07 0.58 25.11
Jul–Sep 0.93 0.58 21.64
Wealth after age 55 Oct–Dec 1.21 0.09 26.03
None 1.00 36.63
Low 1.22 0.04 43.47
High 0.70 0.00 19.91
Born in Sart 1.14 0.23 0.70
IMR Trend year of birth 1.01 0.36 161.80
IMR Cycle year of birth 1.00 0.97 8.07
Table 24.7 Sart, 1855–1899. Estimation of threshold effects of infant mortality rate at birth








Female 0.90 0.21 0.47
Year of birth Birth season: 1.04 0.00 1821.42
Jan–Mar 1.00 27.21
(continued)
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